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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
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WITHDRAWAL ID 09217

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
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RECEIVER'S NAME President Ford
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/XGDS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Wednesday, February 11, 1976
2:30 p.m.
The Cabinet Room

From: Brent Scowcroft

DECLASSIFIED • E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.8
WITH PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 SEC. 1.5 (a)
State Dec 9/25/98, OSD Dec 4/27/04
MR 98-40 #50: NSC Dec 2/19/99
CIA Dec 5/10/05

BY dal NARA DATE 7/20/06

I. PURPOSE

To review the options that might constitute a reply to the last Soviet offer made by Brezhnev in Moscow.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS PLAN

A. Background: The following are the common elements in our position as they stand now, following Secretary Kissinger's discussion with Brezhnev:

1. Air Launched Cruise Missiles Above 600 km in Range:

The Soviets agree that:

- ALCMs can only be deployed on heavy bombers that are included in the aggregate of 2400 and, therefore, banned on other aircraft;
- are completely banned over 2500 km in range; and
- that each heavy bomber equipped with air launched cruise missiles of a range between 600 and 2500 km will count as the same as a MIRVed missile, and therefore counted in the 1320 ceiling agreed at Vladivostok.

Additionally, the Soviets proposed, and we rejected, that the [redacted] [redacted] would count as three MIRVed vehicles.

2. Submarine Launched Cruise Missiles:

- Our positions coincide on banning any cruise missile over 600 km in range from deployment on submarines.

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3. Cruise Missiles Over 600 km on Surface Ships:

- The Soviets propose that cruise missiles with a range over 600 km be banned from deployment on surface ships.
- We made two proposals: (1) that each surface ship equipped with any cruise missiles over 600 km in range count as a MIRVed vehicle; and (2) that the US be permitted to deploy 25 surface ships, in a separate limit that also includes 275 Backfire bombers.

4. Land Based Cruise Missiles

At Helsinki we had agreed that cruise missiles of intercontinental range would be banned:

- In our last proposal, however, we proposed that the range be reduced to 2500 km (to coincide with other range limits), and all land based cruise missiles above that range would be banned from deployment.
- This led the Soviets to claim that all along they had meant that all land based cruise missiles with a range over 600 km would be banned; and they confirmed this in a formal proposal.

5. Backfire:

The Soviets, of course, have opposed including Backfire in SALT:

- In this last round Brezhnev presented official performance data to support his claim that it was a heavy bomber; he claimed that the maximum operational range of the Backfire with a minimal payload, flying both subsonically and supersonically, was 2200 km in radius -- as opposed to our current estimate of about [REDACTED] km in radius.
- He also proposed that as part of the SALT record he would include a formal pledge not to give the Backfire an intercontinental capability.

We made two proposals concerning Backfire in Moscow:

- (1) that all Backfire produced after the effective date of the agreement (October, 1977) would be counted in the 2400 aggregate; and

(2) that Backfire would be subject to a separate limit (of no more than 275) for five years through 1982.

Both proposals were rejected by Brezhnev.

6. Reductions:

As part of the modified Option III proposal presented to Brezhnev, in which there would be a 275 upper ceiling for five years on Backfire, we also proposed a reduction from 2400 to 2300 by 1980.

-- Brezhnev countered that he would agree to reductions to 2300 or "even larger," if we accepted his position on cruise missiles (i. e., ban them over 600 km on surface ships and on land).

Options for a Counterproposal

The Verification Panel has gone through several sets of Options to define the basic approaches, which you might adopt as the framework for a reply to Brezhnev. The three approaches are:

- I. To set numerical limits on Backfire;
- II. To exclude Backfire, in return for reductions of heavy ICBMs;
- III. To defer both Backfire and sea and land based cruise missiles for an interim period.

Option I:

The rationale for this option is that Backfire must be counted either in the 2400 aggregate or in a separate limit.

Option I. A. -- is essentially the old modified IV, which was our opening position in Moscow.

Option I. B.

This is a rough approximation of old Option III:


-- Backfire would be in a separate category, and limited to 250; the US would be free to build up to 250 surface ships and/or submarines with SLCMs over 600 km.

- Other cruise missiles, land based, would be limited to 2500 km.
- A reduction to 2150 by 1980.

Option II: Backfire Excluded from Reductions

The basic idea is to allow the Backfire to go free outside of SALT, but to propose a significant Soviet concession in the form of reductions of heavy ICBMs.

- In other respects the proposal would be the same as Option I. A, that is ALCMs and surface ship SLCMs between 600-2500 km, as MIRVs, submarine launched cruise missiles over 600 km banned, and land based permitted up to 2500 km.
- The Soviets would agree to reduce to 2150 by 1980, and in the process would reduce 100-200 of their older heavy missiles, the SS-9.



Option III: A Modified Deferral

The basic idea of this option is to defer the remaining issues on cruise missiles and Backfire for a defined period, say through 1980, but to exchange commitments about constraining each side during the interim.

- The US, for its part, would pledge that land and sea based cruise missiles would be tested only up to 2500 in range, and our development program would not be accelerated, which would mean these cruise missiles would not be deployed in this period.
- The Soviets would pledge not to accelerate Backfire deployments beyond an agreed schedule.
- The Vladivostok agreement would be signed, including counting ALCMs as MIRVed vehicles, in order to clinch the other unsettled points -- MIRV verification.

The No SALT Environment

You asked for a contingency budget that might be considered if SALT failed. The paper being prepared by the Defense Department is

still not quite finished with interagency clearance, but the main outlines are emerging:

In the near term we would have three general courses of action, depending in part on the Soviet posture:

1. Maintain our present budget for FY 77 on the grounds that it already includes a 20 percent growth in strategic force spending for modernization, under the option that the Soviets will show some restraint even without an agreement.
2. Gradually increase strategic spending starting with an amendment in the budget request of about \$800 million, to provide a basis for force expansion aiming at equivalence over a period of 5 years; continuation of such a program over 5 years would require up to \$7.6 billion for Defense and \$400 million for ERDA; (Alternative 1 in paper at Tab B).
3. Accelerate strategic force modernization starting with a supplemental to the FY 76/77 budget of about \$320 million and a \$2.1 billion increase in the FY 1977 budget; continuation of such a program would over the next five years if necessary require \$19.6 billion for Defense and \$3.3 (Alternate 2 in the draft study at Tab B) billion for ERDA.

In the gradual build up, the bulk of the spending would be for a full [redacted] production, including the [redacted] acceleration of the new [redacted] ICBM operational capability to 1983, instead of 1985, and acceleration of the ALCM and SLCM program to earlier operational capabilities.

Under the rapid build up, the same programs would be adopted, plus increased [redacted] acceleration of B-1, acceleration of [redacted] missile operational capability to 1983.

If the US chose under either build up to add improvement of conventional forces, it is estimated that a program might cost an additional \$10.3 billion over five years.

(Note: None of the options include major spending for air defense.)

B. Participants: List at Tab C.

III. TALKING POINTS

In your opening remarks you may wish to make the following points:

1. It is in our interest to reply to Brezhnev before the Party Congress on February 24 -- at least to give him the general direction of our thinking.
2. Brezhnev has made some concessions, especially in his willingness to consider a reduction.
3. We have tentative agreement on some other points, if we wish to consolidate common elements, but we still have the problem of Backfire and the land- and sea-based cruise missiles.
4. The first issue is whether we still want to insist on numerical limits on Backfire.
5. Call on CIA (Carl Duckett) to give an evaluation of the Soviet performance data on Backfire that they presented in Moscow.
6. After the CIA briefing, call on Secretary Kissinger to review the main options.
7. At the end of the meeting, you might refer to the advantages of a SALT agreement compared to the non-SALT case, and especially point out that most of the programs proposed under an accelerated build-up would not necessarily be denied under the Vladivostok accord, but that the problems -- Backfire for example -- will still remain without an agreement.

Attachments:

- Tab A - Charts of SALT Options
- Tab B - No-SALT Contingency Budget
- Tab C - List of Participants

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 09218

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Memorandum
CREATOR'S NAME William Hyland
RECEIVER'S NAME Henry Kissinger
TITLE Talking Points for NSC
CREATION DATE 02/11/1976
VOLUME 5 pages
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DATE WITHDRAWN 02/26/1998
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 10, 1976

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS

MEMORANDUM FOR: HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: WILLIAM HYLAND

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR NSC

-- Mr. President, the Verification Panel has examined the alternative approaches which we might adopt as the basis for a reply to the Soviets.

-- Before we discuss these approaches, I would first like to review the deliberations which took place in Moscow.

- Carl, could you put up the chart showing the status in Moscow.

-- Consistent with your instructions, we started with Modified Option IV under which all Backfire produced after October of 1977 would be counted in the aggregate.

- As expected, the Soviets flatly rejected this because of the stringent limit on Backfire.

-- Consistent with your instructions, we then moved toward a tougher version of Option III.

- [As shown on the chart]: We proposed a separate limit of 275 Backfire by 1982 along with a limit of 25 surface ship SLCM platforms and reductions to 2300 by 1980.

-- After a long Politburo meeting, the Soviet response was (a) to accept our proposed throw weight definition for heavy ICBMs, (b) accept ACLMs as MIRVs, (c) accept a ban on submarine launched cruise missiles over 600 km, and to offer further assurances that Backfire would not be given an intercontinental capability. Moreover, Brezhnev made a conditional offer to consider reductions to 2300 and possibly lower if we would accept a 600 km limit on surface ship SLCMs and land-based cruise missiles.

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 With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
 E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (d)



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MR 98-40, #51; Szakelka 9/25/98;
 Enigma NSC 2/19/99
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-- That was the present situation and I think it is important to note that our last position was to ban submarine SLCMs above 600 km and to count heavy bombers with long-range ALCMs in the 1320 MIRV limit in the contest of a 5-year limit of 275 Backfire.

-- Let's now take a look at the options.

-- Mr. President, as you can see from the charts, we have come up with three basic concepts which might be considered in formulating a reply to the Soviets; as you might expect, these concepts differ principally in their treatment of Backfire.

-- In considering these approaches we have to keep in mind that there is a negotiating record, and the Soviets will judge our counter-proposal in light of our previous offers.

- First, we could continue to seek numerical limits on Backfire -- in effect stand on our opening position in Moscow.

- Alternatively, we could decide to exclude Backfire from numerical limits on this basis, and seek compensation in some other area such as the composition of reductions.

- And finally, we could still defer a solution on Backfire and most cruise missile limits in SALT II while continuing the negotiation on these systems for an interim period of say 4-5 years, but make the deferral more attractive.

Option I

-- The first of the approaches shown under the first concept would be to return to the initial position we took in Moscow which was the modified version of Option IV.

- Under this approach, all Backfire produced after October 1977 (or alternatively all those above a low level such as 100) would be counted in the 2400 aggregate.

-- There are serious political implications if we take this approach.

-- We would back away from the last position we took in Moscow which would have permitted 275 Backfires through 1982.



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-- The second approach under this concept, Option IB on the chart, would permit 250 Backfire through 1985 and, in addition, back away from our proposal of 600 km limit on submarine SLCMs by permitting up to 250 surface ships and submarines with SLCMs up to 2500 km.

-- This, too, is a toughening of our last position in Moscow of 275 Backfire and 25 surface ship SLCM platforms through 1982.

-- There are serious doubts that either of these Options will produce any movement in the talks.

-- Brezhnev could only conclude that we were stonewalling and we have to take into account now the Soviets would assess this kind of reply.

Concept II: Exclude Backfire from Strict SALT Limitations

-- The basis of the second concept is that we would decide once and for all to stop seeking numerical limitations on Backfire in SALT.

-- However, we would continue to seek Backfire assurances and strict collateral constraints on upgrading, tankers, etc.

-- The idea of this option is that we should try to obtain a significant concession from the Soviets in return for excluding Backfire from numerical limits.

-- An interesting possibility would be to ask the Soviets to freeze SS-18 deployment and reduce part of their older heavy missile force, i.e., the SS-9s, in a reduction to 2150.


-- At this stage of the talks, it will be a new idea. The Soviet reaction is not likely to be enthusiastic.

• But since they are permitted heavy missiles and we are not, we have some basis for arguing for a preferential reduction of heavy missiles.

-- The question is what would be a reasonable figure:

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- It is probably not realistic to expect them to reduce all of them in this agreement.

- Even a reduction of 100 would set a valuable precedent for further heavy missile reductions in SALT THREE. This would be over 1 million pounds of throw weight and 1200 RVs.

- As shown in the chart, we would propose such a trade off while basically sticking to the cruise missile position we had in Moscow.

Concept III: Defer a Permanent Solution on Backfire and Cruise Missiles

- The third approach is a modification of the pure deferral option which Gromyko rejected. In this new version we codify in a SALT TWO agreement those limits agreed at Vladivostok and subsequently.

- For example, we would probably have to agree to count heavy bombers with long-range ALCMs in the 1320 MIRV limit in order to insure Soviet agreement to the MIRV counting rule, and the missile throw weight limits.

The new features are:

- During the deferral period, the Soviets would agree not to upgrade the Backfire and not to increase the deployment rate.

- In return, we would agree not to test SLCMs or land-based cruise missiles above 2500 km and not to deploy these cruise missiles above 600 km which we don't plan to do anyway before 1980.

- Therefore the deferral period would have to be through 1980, so the Soviets can see it is long enough to have some impact on our programs.

- Nevertheless, if you choose this option, we could start by proposing the end of 1979 and fall back to 1980.

- Our previous deferral proposals would have deferred all cruise missile limits, whereas in this case we are offering to include ALCMs on heavy bombers in the 1320 MIRV limit and ban ALCMs above 600 km on aircraft other than heavy bombers.

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-- We would also want to get a Soviet commitment to reductions, although we could probably accept making the reductions contingent on resolution of the cruise missile and Backfire issues.

-- We might agree on a reduction to 2150 by 1980, but contingent on a satisfactory outcome to the Backfire/cruise missile negotiations.

* * * *



-- Mr. President, those are the three concepts which could serve as a basis for our reply to the Soviets.

-- In my view, if we put forth either of the two approaches under the first concept, it would signal a sharpening of our position. If we want to stonewall then, this is the option.

-- If we want to maintain some momentum and force the Soviets to give serious consideration to their position, then Option II is a possibility.

-- The deferral approach as presently modified would also force a serious Soviet reply, but it is still more of a fallback.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ - XGDS

MINUTES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

DATE: Wednesday, February 11, 1976
TIME: 2:30 p. m. to 4:15 p. m.
PLACE: Cabinet Room, The White House
SUBJECT: SALT

Principals

The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Dr. Fred Ikle
Director of Central Intelligence George Bush
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft

Other Attendees

White House: Mr. Richard Cheney, Assistant to the President
Mr. William G. Hyland, Deputy Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs
State: Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Defense: Deputy Secretary William Clements
CIA: Mr. Carl Duckett (who departed after presenting
the intelligence briefing at the opening of the
meeting)
NSC Staff: Colonel Richard T. Boverie

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Classified by Brent Scowcroft

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MR 98-39, #52; NSC let 2/10/99

let NADA, Date 5/25/99

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President: I think it is important that we give some reply to Brezhnev before their Party Congress. If we have no specific counter proposal, I think we ought to give him a total negative or the general direction in which we will proceed.

Henry has made some headway in his last several meetings with Brezhnev. There are still some areas of difference. There have been one or more Verification Panel meetings which have explored the options and looked over the options paper.

I want to reiterate that I think it is in the best interest of this country to achieve a SALT II agreement. I intend to push to the extent possible to get a good one. But if a deadlock occurs, we will have to make a 180 degree change in our course. By 180 degrees I mean we can stand still; or go to Option 2, which would be the least of my efforts; or go to Option 3, which would be my preference.

The options I am referring to now are Don's options for a SALT contingency budget.

Rumsfeld: You must have got a copy of the SALT Contingency Plan out of channels. It is still being worked on at the working level and is not yet agreed on. Here is the latest copy of the working group's paper which is being circulated to the principals.

President: Option 1 says we would stand still. I would not do that. Option 2 says we would have a moderate program. This is the least I would do. Option 3 is the one I think would be necessary.

I will wait for the final version of the paper.

I want to reassert that a SALT agreement is in the best interests of this country! It is possible to do this. I reassert this with emphasis!

George [Bush], do you have something for us?

Director Bush: We have analyzed the Backfire bomber. The Soviet data do not alter the CIA's present estimate that it has the capability of inter-continental operations.

Mr. Duckett: [Note: Copies of the charts used by Mr. Duckett are at Tab A.] At the top of the chart you will see three sets of flight conditions per Soviet claims. The question is do they match our estimates for the Backfire? For the first case, they volunteered that most of the flight is subsonic, and that some is supersonic. It was said the operational radius is 2200 kilometers.



However, they did not say how much of the flight was supersonic, or how much payload was carried in this profile.

President: How does its payload compare with the B-52?

General Brown: The B-52 payload is around 50,000 lbs.

Mr. Duckett: The Backfire carries 20,000 pounds in bombs. Its payload is 25,000 pounds when it carries external weapons.

The US estimate for the Backfire ranges from 1,000 kilometers to 3,500 kilometers at the extremes, depending on the length of supersonic dash.

We could reduce the uncertainties in our estimate if we had more data. If we want more data, we could ask the Soviets for it. However, we do not think this will solve the problem about Backfire's ability to strike US targets.

The operational range includes a 10 percent fuel reserve.

The Soviets also say that the maximum technical range is 5,000 kilometers. Our estimates are that the maximum range is between 2,100 kilometers and 7,300 kilometers.

Therefore, we cannot tell what the Soviet figures represent.

The third case is ridiculous -- it represents a profile no one would fly.

We asked the Soviets how far it could fly at 15,000 meters altitude, but this is the wrong altitude for the Backfire. It was the wrong question to ask. We believe it has no capability of sustained flight at 15,000 meters.

Kissinger: The major problem was that I raised the question while General Kozlov was with Brezhnev. They had made no serious study of the question. The problem was that Kozlov didn't want to deviate from what Brezhnev said. Therefore, it was not a carefully considered statement. It was not a thoughtful reply. I agree with Secretary Kissinger that the

Mr. Duckett: On the other board you see our study of Backfire flight profiles. It shows that our estimate of the Backfire radius is greater than 5000 kilometers. Also it shows that we have seen the aircraft actually fly to a radius of 2775 kilometers. I agree with Secretary

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Kissinger that the Soviet estimate was off the top of their head.

With some additional data, we could generate some high confidence estimate. We would like to know from the Soviets the maximum gross take-off weight, maximum fuel load, internal bomb payload, and cruise lift-to-drag ratio. But this does not change our judgment that the Backfire has an intercontinental capability.

President: Your estimate is that the maximum radius is 5,125 kilometers?

Mr. Duckett: Yes, with an 8,125 pound payload.

President: With no supersonic dash?

Mr. Duckett: No supersonic dash.

President: Therefore your figures would indicate the Backfire has a range of 5,400 to 5,500 nautical miles.

Clements: You have actually tracked the Backfire?

Mr. Duckett: Their radar has, and we have some telemetry. We have some late data which may make the numbers slightly smaller, 100 kilometers, but this doesn't solve the problem.

General Brown: Do you have an assessment of the new photos? Do you have greater confidence in your estimate for the engine?

Mr. Duckett: Yes. We now believe they are using the older engine. Also, Bill Hyland saw the nomenclature in Moscow. Therefore they are not using the best engine at this time.


President: If they fly that profile, is it militarily desirable?

General Brown: The typical flight profile is the one in the center, where as the aircraft climbs it burns off fuel.

President: Would they fly 5100 kilometers in that pattern one way, without a dash, to attack a military objective?

General Brown: Yes, against the US, since we have minimum air defenses.

Kissinger: What would they hit?



General Brown: Airfields, industrial areas of a city, and targets such as that.

Director Bush: We have a chart on possible bases. Carl (Duckett) can explain it.

Mr. Duckett: They have two airfields being equipped with Backfire. With a 5000 nautical mile capability, they could cover all of the US on a one way mission.

Director Bush: Cuba would not be a suitable recovery location for the aircraft.

Mr. Duckett: I believe it would be more likely that they would go back to northern Canada, or even ditch at sea near ships.

If the Soviets go to Arctic basing, then even 4,000 nautical miles covers most of the US. They have some poor facilities there, some good. One thing we would want is an assurance that the Soviets would not use Arctic basing.

President: Are those bases not usable in normal course for use against China?

General Brown: There would be no reason for them to use those bases.

Mr. Duckett: I doubt they plan to refurbish these two bases.

General Scowcroft: For your payload calculations, did you load the Backfire the same way you loaded it for the megatonnage chart?

Mr. Duckett: Yes. The maximum loading was 20,000 pounds, which depends upon the amount of space in the aircraft. The 8100 pounds is a conventional load.

President: Henry?

Kissinger: We have had a number of Verification Panel meetings in the spirit of harmony. (Laughter)

We have gone through a number of options on some conceptual basis. The first option is that we would count Backfire. The second option would exclude Backfire from strict limits. The third would defer a permanent solution of the Backfire and cruise missile issues for various periods of time.

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In assessing these options, we have to consider several things. We have to know what its intrinsic merit is. We have to consider the negotiating history -- if we introduce an option which has already been rejected, this has significance. We also have to consider the consequences of where we would be without an agreement.

In Option 1 we would count the Backfire. Option I A is the old modified Option 4. That is, we would go back to the Soviets with exactly the same proposal as we started in Moscow.

I have a note which says the Chiefs even want to add reductions to Option 1 A.

General Brown: I know nothing about that.

Kissinger: I have a note here which says that's what the Chiefs want. Where did this come from?

Mr. Hyland: General Rowney called the NSC staff.

General Brown: What we have said is that we agree with the principle of reductions.

Kissinger: Option I A is the old Option IV. Option 1 B is in effect the old Option III. You have to assess whether, in terms of negotiating history, this is right. If you assess that they will make an agreement under any conditions, that is one matter. But we will have gone from IV to III and then back to IV.

I agree with Option 4 on its merits, but this would certainly cause us negotiating problems.

Now Option 1 B. My recollection is that what happened in Moscow, Mr. President, is that I did not use all of the authority you gave me. Our position was the Soviets would have 275 Backfire and we would have 25 surface-ship SLCM platforms by 1982. This would give us the high breakout potential without cruise missiles.

SLCM's on submarines would be banned above 600 km.

Option 1 B is a toughening of our last position in Moscow. It reduces the Backfire limit, removes the submarine SLCM limit, and reduces the aggregate to 2150. From a negotiating standpoint, this is Option III, minus certain features. Our counterproposal would be worse than what they have already rejected. This doesn't mean they would not cave.



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Therefore, Option IA and IB put limits on the Backfire. In IA, Backfire is counted in the 2400 aggregate. IB is a toughened version of the old Option III, which the Soviets have already rejected.

There is a second category of options which excludes Backfire from strict SALT limitations. It includes assurances against Backfire upgrading and includes additional collateral constraints. This would reduce the aggregate to 2150 by 1980. We would count heavy bombers and surface ship platforms under the aggregate and the MIRV sub-ceiling. It would ban submarine SLCMs above 600 km.

In return, the aggregate would be reduced from 2400 to 2150. The Soviets would have to dismantle a significant percentage of their heavy throw weight missiles. In the working group, 200 heavy missiles were discussed, but this is an empty possibility; the Soviets would never do this. Some figure might be possible.

In terms of negotiability, I doubt that the Soviets would accept this, but they would have to study it seriously. It would not be interpreted as an attempt to drive them to the wall.

President Ford: Does this mean they would reduce their SS-9's?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, and the overall totals.

If we say we count land-base cruise missiles above 600 km, we can have them, although something else would have to come out. And this is an American decision. [to Vice President Rockefeller]: This takes care of Edward (presumably Edward Teller).

The end result is that we could have land-based cruise missiles up to 2500 km, but counted in one form or another. A 2150 aggregate brings pressure on the total number.

George's concern is that Option IIA would have some upper ceiling on the Backfire -- so that they could not have, for example, 1000. I don't think we can get the Soviets to write this into an agreement. But maybe there could be a letter from Brezhnev to you, Mr. President, saying that they plan on having X number of bombers. They can then have some force -- not specified in the treaty -- and we can have our assurances.

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There was another option within Option II, but it has been dropped. It was a State Department option and was highly negotiable. But we should not have it if it is not supported by the military and supported only by the State Department.

The third major option is deferral. I have tried this three times and it has always been rejected. But it was never linked with a cruise missile settlement.

We could defer SLCM and land-base cruise missile deployment. How we would do this depends on your decision.

We could ask the Soviets not to increase the rate of Backfire production. We would not deploy cruise missiles--except on bombers--beyond 600 km through an agreed date. From the standpoint of the Soviets, the later the date the better. For the US, the sooner the better.

We would be free to test cruise missiles through a certain range. The Soviets could continue Backfire production.

There is basic agreement on what this option does. It would codify what has been done. For an interim period, it defers the Backfire and some cruise missile limits.

President Ford: Would it ban cruise missiles over 600 km on heavy bombers?

Secretary Kissinger: No. It would permit cruise missiles with ranges from 600 to 2500 km on heavy bombers, but these bombers would count in the 1320 sub-ceiling.

This is the basic deferral option.


To sum up--considering the impact on the Soviets:

I believe that Option I would result in a prolonged deadlock at a minimum. A last minute yield is possible, but I don't believe this will happen.

Option II would get us into the negotiation. Option III is a good fallback position. But we could also do Option III immediately--it is your choice, Mr. President.

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President Ford: How much different is Option II from that which was done in Moscow?

Secretary Kissinger: It is significantly different. We never described to them where they should take their reductions. If we specify their heavy throw weight missiles, it is an unprecedented new step. Also, the Soviets would have to back off from the 600 km cruise missile limitation.

But Backfire would be free for the Soviets, except for an unclassified letter from Brezhnev on assurances, which we would ask them for since there would be restrictions on cruise missile ranges.

My judgment is that they would turn down Option II, but that they must study it carefully, and then would come back with something.

Vice President Rockefeller: I am concerned about cruise missiles at longer distances. The Soviets are developing three different SLBMs. Why should we interrupt cruise missile applications for land or submarines. This is such a new thing; we really do not know what its potential is, and we should keep our options open in cruise missiles.

Brent Scowcroft: In Option II, 2500 kilometers is the upper limit.

Vice President Rockefeller: This is why I am concerned. The Soviets have three new missiles on submarines and five new missiles on land. The only thing going for us is our cruise missile with excellent guidance accuracy.

Secretary Kissinger: We have the Trident and the MX.

Bill Hyland: And the B-1.

Brent Scowcroft: And two new Trident missiles.

General Brown: Both sides have sea-based ballistic missiles. There is no reason to replace them with cruise missiles. They can't defend against the ballistic missile, but they can defend against the cruise missile.

The cruise missile can be used to protect the sea lines of communication and perhaps have an ASW role. However there is no reason for them simply to lie off the beach for attacks against the Soviets. We are not warhead limited.



Vice President Rockefeller: You say that we would have no objection to limiting them for submarines. But that means they would get something for nothing. Five to ten years from now our present plans could be obsolete and we may want to do this -- but there would be a 600 km limit on cruise missiles.

The Soviets have leapfrogged us in naval force structure. We must be in a position to leapfrog them with cruise missiles.

General Brown: The only way they could guard against the ballistic missile is if the ABM Treaty fell apart.

Dr. Ikle: Theatre uses are more important for cruise missiles.

Vice President Rockefeller: If you are not going to use them, they shouldn't worry.

President Ford: This is like our argument with them on the Backfire.

Secretary Kissinger: If we counted every cruise missile, we would have over a thousand missiles. Then we would bust the 2150 total strategic level, considering naval and regional uses.


If we count ships with 600 to 2500 km missiles as MIRVs, we could use them against the Soviet Union, but the in-theatre forces would be free. Fifty ships still doesn't hurt the MIRV total very much.

There have been lots of press arguments about this, but the fact as we know it from the SIOP is that we don't need all those MIRV warheads except if the ABM Treaty is abrogated. We would be better off in many cases with single warhead missiles.

If we count these on a one for one basis, we would very rapidly be in bad trouble with the 2150 or the 2400 level.

Secretary Clements: Mr. Vice President, during the ten-year period while we are developing our technology, we can move forward in the state of the art. For periods greater than ten years, we don't know where we will be going. Within the timeframe, with a 2500 km range, and with the platforms, we can develop the needed technology.

Vice President Rockefeller: But we would be limited at long ranges.



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Secretary Clements: Not at the end of the treaty time.

Secretary Kissinger: This would be no problem with the deferral option since we are talking about roughly 1982.

President Ford: And we would have a clearer picture of the situation at that time.

Secretary Kissinger: If we want to go to deferral, we are better off getting at it by one more substantive proposal, then using deferral as a fallback. I do not believe the Soviets would accept Option II, but they would give it a serious response. The Soviets would not go along with Option I in my view.

Vice President Rockefeller: We should get a clearer idea about the use of non-nuclear missiles for any range.

Secretary Kissinger: There are two problems.

The reason many want to surface the nuclear/non nuclear problem is that they are convinced they will be given away in the last period of the negotiations. If we have a disciplined government, you would establish the range principle now. You would then table the conventional definition in Geneva and handle it on the technical level. If the Soviets balk, we could always say that SALT never has handled conventional weapons.

If we permit an enormous disparity between what is permitted in conventional and nuclear missiles, it will be a tremendous domestic problem. If we say that it applies only to nuclear armed missiles, the verification problem would be totally unmanageable.

Vice President Rockefeller: This would be only for ten years. It could be covered in a new agreement.

Secretary Kissinger: The way to handle it -- I would prefer a four or five-year interim agreement on deferral, with less strict standards. If we have an eight to ten-year agreement, then we must think carefully about the definitional problem because the Soviets can have them then.

President Ford: Henry, what you are saying is that rather than surface the distinction at the outset, let's settle the range matter first, and then we can move at the technical level on the other.?



Secretary Kissinger: Yes. We could simply act stupid. We could say that SALT never addressed conventional weapons at any time. We could do this in Geneva, rather than spring it on Brezhnev and make him answer to the Politburo. If we do it my way, he then would have a commitment to something he has agreed to.

Secretary Clements: Was this raised at the Vladivostok?

Secretary Kissinger: No, and neither were cruise missiles.

Dr. Ikle: Option III helps with verification issues versus Option II. Cruise missiles of 600 km are hard to verify. Option III gives us the time to understand the verification problem.

President Ford: Is a five-year period better than a two-year period to defend?

Dr. Ikle: We could use four years, that is 1980, since that is the approximate time for IOC of the cruise missile.

Secretary Kissinger: The problem Brezhnev has is that he must say he got something of his proposal. That's why 600 km is significant.

Secretary Rumsfeld: I would like to walk through some of these things.

First, I think we should clear up the outstanding issues of both sides in the SCC. We will be criticized if we don't try to do this before having a new agreement.

Second, there are a number of smaller questions around that can get big later on. The reason the armed/nuclear armed definition is important is not that we might be "raped" by Henry as Henry stated, but because it makes a difference. As long as we can understand what we want to do here about the nuclear definition, that is fine. I won't argue the tactics, but the substance is important.

President Ford (to Secretary Kissinger): In your approach we would freeze the range, then solve the technical differences on the definition at Geneva.

Secretary Rumsfeld: The reason I raised it is because it makes a difference.

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My third point has to do with the range of cruise missiles. Range is complicated. If one changes the warhead and increases the range, we have a problem.

Fourth, you have to consider non-circumvention and non-transfer. These are important.

Our goal should be long-term arms limitation -- not confrontation. Therefore I believe it is important to have simplicity, symmetry, and higher verification, not less.

The problem with Option II on Backfire, if not counted in the aggregate, is that we would have no definition of a heavy bomber. It would be like the heavy missile problem. We would have problems in SALT III. You should take the long view -- don't do something in SALT II that makes SALT III difficult.

I also want to point out that if we reduce the aggregate further and Backfire goes free, Backfire's importance grows.

Vice President Rockefeller: What are your specific points? What are your specific proposals?

Secretary Rumsfeld: I have been here one hour and ten minutes and have not spoken a word. I am coming to my specific points.

In weighing the three options, we have to consider the balance for SALT and detente.

First, we could do something which would leave the U.S. weak. Second, we could accept an agreement which we could not easily verify and we could expect reaction. Third, we could be stiff and unyielding. Fourth, we could be doing something now, for example, letting the Backfire go free, which would cause us problems in going for SALT III.

On Option IA, we are including 150 variants which were not offered earlier. This gives us a way to get back into negotiation.

For Option IB, we would be rolling back from a smaller number of SLCM platforms to a larger number, so that we would have symmetry. This would be an advantage of the option.

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Option II is appealing if we can get them to reduce 200 heavy missiles.

Secretary Kissinger: We can't get them to reduce 200 heavy missiles.

Secretary Rumsfeld: I have been patient so far. But it is a marginal option even if they reduce by 200 heavy missiles because of SALT III -- that is, there would be no heavy bomber definition. And we could expect them to reduce a smaller number than 200 missiles.

Therefore, deferral is in my view the best option. It is the most honest. We would say that there are gray area systems which we cannot solve now, and that it shouldn't surprise us that we can't get them in.

Deferral would permit us to codify Vladivostok. Space and sea-bed weapons would be banned. Mobile missiles would not be banned but would be counted. Intercontinental cruise missiles would be banned at 5500 kilometers.

It may also be possible to get the MIRV verification rule by throwing in the ALCM limit at 2500 kilometers and counting the platforms in the 1320 sub-ceiling.

Secretary Kissinger: The only way deferral can work is by using number the Soviets have already seen. There is a chance deferral would work as a fallback position -- if there were a 600 km limit, and no deployment.



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There is a chance of deferral working as a fallback position -- if there is a 600 kilometer limit, no deployment for 3-4-5-X years. And we could continue R&D. There is a chance of its working.

There is no chance of permitting 5500 kilometer land-based missiles, but we will have none by 1981 anyway.

Secretary Rumsfeld: What about the cruise missile limit?

Secretary Kissinger: ALCMs would be permitted at 2500 kilometers; all others would be 600 kilometers until 1980 or 81.

President Ford: And what about research and development?

Secretary Kissinger: R&D and testing could continue.

Mr. Hyland: The working group had proposed that in the interim period, there would be restraint on testing of SLCMs and land-based cruise missiles beyond, for example 2500 kilometers, and on development. This would possibly include not deploying SLCMs and land-based cruise missiles above 600 kilometers.

Secretary Kissinger: The concern is the deployment limit. But this is phoney, since there will be no deployment anyway.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Therefore there is a question on timing. Under this option, would it be a 10 year treaty?

Secretary Kissinger: No. It would be 8 years, since it would start in 1977, on Vladivostok, MIRV counting, ALCMs on bombers, and throw-weight. All others -- cruise missiles and Backfire -- would be for an interim period through around 1980 or 1981.

We would not deploy SLCMs and land-based cruise missiles above 600 kilometers. With the Soviets we would have assurance that the Backfire production rate would not be greater than the present rate. This interim period would expire at the precise moment of our maximum break-out capability for cruise missiles.

For the Soviets, 2 years is not realistic. My view is that it is better to go to 1980 or 81.



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Secretary Rumsfeld: I believe we should use a target date shorter rather than longer so that we can get along on resolving the issues. For example we could use October 1977, when SALT I expires.

President Ford: But SALT II is a follow-on from SALT I. And if we have deferral, it could go for two to four years.

Secretary Kissinger: I've raised deferral with the Soviets three times and they have rejected it every time.

President Ford: But this is a version they have not seen.

Secretary Kissinger: This will be a comedown for them, but it won't present a political crisis if we propose it.

Director Bush: Is there any way to get additional data on the Backfire?

Secretary Kissinger: We can't go to the Soviets for data, to formulate our position. We could say we will let Backfire go free if they give us data to confirm its role. Therefore we could have Option II.

Dr. Ikle: In Option III, if we don't accelerate, they don't accelerate.

Secretary Rumsfeld: The ALCM is part of the central systems, and we would be dealing with central systems. We could set aside the grey areas right?


Secretary Kissinger: For Option III, a one to two year interim period won't work.

President Ford: It is better for us to have a three to four year period for cruise missile testing. We won't know much more in one to two years.

Secretary Clements: We are starting to fly them now.

President Ford: And we will know more in three to four years. And we will be better off at four years for break-out.

Dr. Ikle: We want to avoid legitimizing Backfire deployment while making cruise missiles illegitimate.



President Ford: If we agree on a Backfire production rate and we proceed with research and development on cruise missiles then in three years if there are no negotiations we are in a better position to go ahead with cruise missiles than they are with the Backfire.

Secretary Kissinger: That is why the damn thing may not work. They will buy a 600 kilometer limit on cruise missiles but they would not go for an eight year period without the limit. Too little is known.

Dr. Ikle: Does this mean we should settle the limits?

Secretary Kissinger: Only on deployments for X number of years. But we have to accept the 600 kilometer limit. We would be able to deploy up to the 600 kilometer limit. Brezhnev can tell the Politburo it got something.

The advantage for us would be our break-out position. There would be no verification problem.

Vice President Rockefeller: Would test ranges be unlimited?

Secretary Kissinger: Test ranges would be unlimited or at 2500 kilometers.

President Ford: Would Option II or III be okay from a military standpoint?

General Brown: No. The Chiefs view is that we should give up as little cruise missile capability as we can. It is one point of our leverage on the Soviets. We propose that the Backfire be counted, but recognize that this may not be possible. We could slide to deferral. But deferral should be stated positively like Don (Rumsfeld) stated it, not negatively as is shown on the chart.

Deferral would be a good position for us in this country. It formalizes Vladivostok, which we applauded. Vladivostok was simple, gave us symmetry, and provided equivalent balance for the U.S. But after a year and a half it is still not codified.

President Ford: I would be concerned if there were no agreement and no codification of Vladivostok. There is a 50/50 chance there will be no deal.

General Brown: Before you left for Vladivostok, you were told you couldn't get certain things. But you came home with what you were told you couldn't get.



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Secretary Kissinger: That is not true.

General Brown: I remember it explicitly.

President Ford: From the military view if you freeze the SS-18 and reduce the SS-9s, is this a significant gain?

General Brown: Yes. But if the Backfire runs free they can make up the difference easily with the Backfire. If they reduce their heavy missiles by 200, this would be significant. But in my judgment, they won't buy it.

Secretary Kissinger: Before Vladivostok, we said equal aggregates and equal MIRVs, or unequal aggregates and unequal MIRVs.

President Ford: (To Secretary Kissinger) How do you recommend proceeding with one or the other option or should one option be followed by the other.

Secretary Kissinger: We should treat the options separately, or have one as a fallback. If we go with Option II we can probably get a letter from Brezhnev saying they would have no more than 450 Backfires. And they would go down by 250 systems from Vladivostok.


Or we can go with Option III. This might work but it would be better if we first went with Option II and then go to Option III if the other fails. But we could do Option III first and then Option II.

There are a lot of advantages in Option III. It is simpler. But if we go from III to II, it would be difficult. We may not be able to get II if III fails. But we might be able to get III if II fails.

President Ford: Could we give them the option of one or the other?

Secretary Kissinger: No. We did that once in the ABM negotiations; we gave them three options, but they picked the wrong one and we rejected it. (Laughter)

Secretary Rumsfeld: We could have a statement that if they go beyond certain limits they will have circumvented the treaty. They could give us a Backfire production rate, or some limit, and we could say that we would make some overt act if they exceeded these limits, such as deploying cruise missiles in Europe. However, this causes a problem because we might want to deploy missiles like that anyway and not depend upon what they do on the Backfire.



I like the deferral option. It is honest and in the interest of long-term arms limitation. I believe it is negotiable. We don't mix the threat on grey area systems. However we may need to discuss this with our allies since they have an interest in the Backfire and cruise missiles.

President Ford: We don't want to bring in problems of allies.

Secretary Rumsfeld: They will bring in the problems.

Dr. Ikle: The simplicity of Option III is a significant advantage over Option II. And it gives us time to resolve the verification problem.

President Ford: I would like to see the refined material on the assumptions of what we would do if there were a deadlock. (Note: This presumably refers to the SALT contingency plan.)

General Scowcroft: It is being reviewed now by the principals. This is still a working group paper.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Here is a later draft. It is going to the principals. It shows that we would need from one to twenty billion dollars over a five-year period. It uses a building block approach and has a variety of levels of activity. In the event of a Soviet breakout, it calls for another \$10 billion in non-strategic forces. Therefore, the plan ranges from one to thirty billion dollars.

President Ford: My own visceral reaction is that if there is no SALT, their plans are not such that they would have to do more. For us, I will not stand still.

General Scowcroft: The air defense system is not in the earlier package.

General Brown: It is part of this package.

Secretary Kissinger: Nothing prohibits us from building an air defense. If we are so worried by Backfire, we should do this regardless. It is independent of an agreement.

General Brown: I agree.

Secretary Clements: We will take care of it.

General Brown: The air defense today would not be the same as in earlier years.

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President Ford: I was going to say I want no more BOMARC.

General Brown: We would have AWACS plus interceptors currently in the program. In times of tension we would bring in the interceptors. It would be far more effective than the old system.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Before we close, Mr. President -- you asked George if there are military objections to Option 2.

The real objections are not military, but objections from an arms control standpoint. We have to try to deal with the effect on SALT III, and this makes the definition of bombers important.

The throw weight buffs, such as Nitze, would applaud it if we reduced their heavy missiles.

General Brown: If we get enough of their heavy missiles.

Secretary Kissinger: Option II was the DOD option.

Secretary Rumsfeld: I am not ashamed of it. We have attempted to get as many different options as we can which are realistic. But that doesn't mean I can't analyze them. Even if we got all 200 missiles, there would be no throw weight definition for heavy bombers. The problem gets worse downstream.

Secretary Kissinger: The dividing line would be that any upgrading of Backfire equals a heavy bomber.

I have no preference between Option II versus III.

General Scowcroft: But Option II permits us to bring the 2400 level down.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Option III does that also.

Secretary Kissinger: But you won't get it in Option III. Deferral will keep us still at the 2400 figure.

General Brown: Some would argue that if Backfire runs free, we have broken Vladivostok.

President Ford: Thanks.

Secretary Kissinger: If we choose Option 3, we don't want to define the systems as grey area systems, since that would then bring in FBS. We should put it as unsettled issues, for later negotiation, before we put Europe.



President Ford: If nothing out of this NSC meeting shows up in the newspaper, it will be an all time record for my time in office. It will be of major significance if nothing is leaked out. If it does, I'll throw up my hands and say that's it. The first god-damned newspaper story on this, I will say it ends the prospects for a SALT agreement.



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2/24

Eddy:

This is one of five charts that are supposed
to be at Tab A to the NSC Minutes of Feb. 11.

If the other four charts ever turn up, I
will send them to you.


Sheila

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A

2/17/75

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL


To: BILL HYLAND

From: DICK BOVERIE

Shella
I can
you
add
to
minutes

BILL: ATTACHED IS
THE LAST OF THE CHARTS
FOR THE NSC MEETING
MINUTES. YOU SHOULD
NOW HAVE 5 CHARTS
TO BE ATTACHED AS TAB A
OF THE MINUTES.

Dick



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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Chart

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CREATION DATE 02/1976
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COLLECTION TITLE National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
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FOLDER TITLE NSC Meeting, 2/11/76

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SUBJECT: ~~Minutes of NSC mtg of Feb 11 1976 re SALT & USSR - LA~~ **Minutes of NSC mtg of Feb 11 1976 re SALT & USSR - LA**

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EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS
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