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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE - XGDS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING  
ON SALT ISSUES

Saturday, August 9, 1975  
9:45 a.m. (one hour)  
The Cabinet Room

From: Henry A. Kissinger *HK*

I. PURPOSE

To review the results of your meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev in Helsinki and to agree on a work program for the SALT Verification Panel pending the receipt of a considered Soviet reply to our latest SALT proposals.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, AND PRESS ARRANGEMENTS

A. Background: I have prepared a detailed memorandum at Tab A which summarizes where we stand on the full range of outstanding issues. While the memo tells where we are, there remains the question of how we move to conclusion of an agreement for signature at the fall summit.

There also remains the problem of bringing the Geneva negotiations more in line with the positions taken by the two sides in the private channel. As you know, it was agreed at Helsinki to move to the Geneva forum a number of issues on which the two sides are in agreement.

In particular, it was agreed to ban:

-- Cruise missiles of greater than 600 km range carried on aircraft other than heavy bombers.

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-- Intercontinental cruise missiles (ICCMs).

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
Use with 2/19/99

MR 98-40, # 33; State letter 9/25/98.

By *lit* NARA, Date 10/21/98, 7/11/99

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-- Ballistic missiles above 600 km range on surface ships.

-- Ballistic missiles on the seabeds and inland waters.

A fifth issue which was discussed at Helsinki, systems for placing nuclear weapons in orbit, has already been taken up in Geneva on the basis of the most recent NSDM.

To wrap up these issues I have enclosed at Tab B a draft NSDM for your approval which instructs Alex Johnson to agree to these positions.

The purpose of the meeting today is two-fold: to outline your discussions with Brezhnev at Helsinki and to generate some new approaches to the remaining problems of Backfire and cruise missiles.

Following your opening remarks, I suggest you have me go over the results of the Helsinki meeting.

B. Participants: (List at Tab C)

C. Press Arrangements: The meeting but not the subject will be announced. There will be a White House photographer.

### III. TALKING POINTS

#### At the Opening of the Meeting


1. The purpose of this meeting is to give you a readout on the results of my meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev. We also need to take a serious look at how we might reformulate our approach to the remaining serious problems -- the Backfire bomber and cruise missiles.

#### At the Conclusion of the Meeting

2. It is apparent that we need some new thought on a solution to the problem of Backfire and cruise missiles. I would like Defense and the Verification Panel to examine what modification we might be able to make in our positions on these issues.



3. In the meantime, we can forward to Geneva appropriate instructions on those issues on which there was agreement in Helsinki.



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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction  
TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Memorandum  
CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . Henry Kissinger  
RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . President Ford  
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MR 98-40, #34, DOD Ltr 11/6/02

By dal NARA Date 6/19/03

~~TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE~~ - XGDS

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER  
SUBJECT: Current Status of SALT Issues

In light of your meetings with General Secretary Brezhnev on SALT, I have outlined below where the two sides stand on the range of issues which continue to divide the sides; the outline includes a brief description of where the U.S. agencies can be expected to come out on the issues. I have also enclosed a draft NSDM (Tab B) for your approval which instructs the Delegation to take up those issues which are either resolved or sufficiently close to resolution to warrant shifting to Geneva.

MIRV Verification. Although the Soviets made a major move on this issue by agreeing to count missiles tested with both MIRVs and single RVs as MIRVed when deployed, they have linked this concession to U.S. acceptance of their position on cruise missiles. In addition, a problem still remains with respect to counting MIRVs on SLBMs. If MIRVs are deployed only on part of a submarine class, we may not be able to verify that the remaining missiles on that class are not also MIRVed. Consequently, our position has been that all SLBMs in a submarine class should count when the first submarine in the class is equipped with a MIRVed missile.

Since the problem of counting SLBM MIRVs involves technical issues which are probably best dealt with at the Delegation level, we proposed in Helsinki to move the MIRV verification issue to the formal negotiations in Geneva. The Soviets refused to accept this approach, stating that they could not move any verification issue to Geneva until the cruise missile issue is resolved.

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..... However, all agencies are concerned about the impact in Congress if the agreement is weak on MIRV verification. With the Soviet agreement to count missiles tested with both MIRVs and single RVs as MIRVed when deployed, much of this concern has been alleviated. However, the agencies still expect to achieve some variant of a rule which counts SLBMs by submarine class. This issue could be a problem with the Soviets unless they can accept a counting rule tied to the overhaul schedule for submarines but which still counts all submarines in a class as MIRVed after an agreed period.


Since the SLBM MIRV issue has not been taken up in your channel and involves highly technical issues, we should probably attempt to resolve this issue through the Delegation. Even though the Soviets refused in Helsinki to refer verification issues to the Delegations, the issue is of sufficient importance to try to make some headway in the formal negotiations. Consequently, I recommend that we put forth in Geneva a modification to our submarine class rule which ties the SLBM MIRV count to an overhaul or conversion schedule. The draft NSDM indicates your approval of this approach.

Cruise Missiles. There has been no change in the Soviet position on cruise missiles since it was originally put forth at Geneva in early February. The Soviets are continuing to insist that cruise missiles of greater than 600 km range should be counted on heavy bombers and banned on all other aircraft and on all sea-based platforms. Their proposal on land-based cruise missiles is to ban all above intercontinental range, i. e., 5500 km.

Although the formal U. S. position in Geneva is still that cruise missiles were not discussed at Vladivostok and are outside the scope of this agreement, the U.S. has made major concessions on cruise missiles in your private channel:

-- We have agreed to ban air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) with range greater than 600 km on aircraft other than heavy bombers.

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
-- You indicated to Brezhnev that we could accept a limit of 1500 km, and possibly as low as 1200 km, on sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). The remaining difference in the position of the two sides on this issue (the Soviet position is a 600 km limit) is not significant since the major Soviet concern, elimination of the U.S. strategic SLCM option, is satisfied by almost any SLCM range below 3000 km. ....

..... There is a good chance the Soviets would agree to a SLCM limit of around 1000 km.

-- We have agreed to ban land-based cruise missiles of inter-continental range. Defense views this limitation as acceptable; they feel it is advantageous to the U.S. since it gives us the option of deploying long-range land-based cruise missiles in Europe.

This leaves only the ALCM limit as a major source of contention on cruise missiles. We have insisted on a range limit of 2500-3000 km for ALCMs on heavy bombers. As you know, the issue with respect to ALCMs is the need to retain long-range ALCMs as a hedge against future threats to bomber penetration, and in particular as a hedge against the uncertainties regarding eventual B-1 deployment.

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
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On the other side of the argument is the question of how long-range ALCMs would affect Soviet bomber capability. With a 2500-3000 km ALCM, the Backfire and Bison can cover most of the more populated regions of the U.S. and recover in the Soviet Union. On the other hand on one-way missions complete coverage of the U.S. is possible, with or without long-range cruise missiles. If Backfire is not classed as a heavy bomber, a restriction on equipping aircraft other than heavy bombers with ASMs of range in excess of 600 km will prevent extension of Backfire capability through the deployment of long-range ASMs.

In sum, we should continue to insist on a 2500-3000 km limit on ALCMs launched from heavy bombers and a 1200-1500 km limit on SLCMs. There is wide bureaucratic support for this position, with Defense being particularly adamant against accepting a lower range limit. Although our position on cruise missiles results in different range limits for cruise missiles launched from different platforms, we believe that the attendant verification problems are tractable.



The enclosed draft NSDM instructs Alex Johnson to put forth those cruise missile issues which were resolved by you and General Secretary Brezhnev in Helsinki. However, to avoid a potentially awkward negotiating position in Geneva of having Alex maintain that cruise missiles on heavy bombers and sea-based platforms are unlimited while intercontinental cruise missiles and cruise missiles on non-bomber aircraft are banned, we should probably make some movement on cruise missiles on all platforms. At the same time, we should probably avoid making a major movement on cruise missiles in the formal negotiations without insisting upon appropriate Soviet concessions in other areas. Consequently, I recommend that we have Alex tie the U.S. movement on cruise missiles on heavy bombers and sea-based platforms to Soviet movement on the Backfire and heavy ICBM definition issues. I have included such an approach in the enclosed NSDM.

Mobile ICBMs. Although we withheld discussing this issue directly in Helsinki, Gromyko indicated at my meeting in July that the Soviets were prepared to ban the deployment of land-mobile ICBMs for the duration of the new agreement. Coupled with their present formal position in Geneva which effectively bans air-mobile ICBMs, the Soviet proposal amounts to a combined ban on both air- and land-mobile ICBM systems (although a limited air-mobile system might still be permitted.) We withheld discussing this issue directly in Geneva to permit time for analysis of the Soviet proposal. In the formal talks in Geneva we have continued to take the position that mobile ICBMs should be permitted and counted.

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I believe we should wrap up the mobile ICBM issue once and for all and agree to the Soviet proposal to ban the deployment of mobile ICBMs. As you pointed out in the NSC, the mobile ICBM issue really boils down to how best to obtain money from Congress for R&D programs for mobile systems. We would probably be in a worse position regarding R&D funds if we rejected the Soviet proposal and the Soviet proposal were leaked





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We have always realized that, if the Soviets could convince us that Backfire is not to be used as an intercontinental bomber, we would be satisfied. The problem is that we have not studied in detail what kind of assurances we need from the Soviets or what our ability is to verify whether Soviet actions are in conformance with their assurances.

We may still be able to nail down specific indicators or constraints which would improve our confidence that Backfire was not being used for intercontinental roles but which still permit the Soviets to exempt Backfire from the 2400. However, even though there are some indications that the Soviets may consider a tanker prohibition for Backfire operations (Gromyko did not explicitly rule out such an approach when we met in Geneva), it is unlikely that we could ever get the Soviets to go beyond a commitment on tankers and a declaration not to use Backfire for intercontinental missions. In any event, it is clear that we cannot accept the Soviet position that Backfire should be excluded from the 2400 aggregate without collateral constraints or assurances regarding Backfire employment.

For the time being, in Geneva, we should probably not go beyond our formal position that Backfire should be counted in the aggregate, other than to indicate that some other solution may be possible. I have recommended earlier that we tie our movement on ALCMs and SLCMs to Soviet acceptance of our formal Backfire and heavy missile position. Even though the Soviets are unlikely to agree to count all Backfire in the aggregate, we may gain some negotiating leverage which could break loose some Soviet movement on Backfire in your channels.

Heavy ICBM Definition. The Soviets made an important concession in agreeing to include a heavy ICBM definition in the new agreement. However, their proposal to define a heavy ICBM on the basis of missile gross weight (or launching weight as they describe it) appears to permit too much potential growth in capability. For example, with a heavy ICBM definition pegged to the SS-19 gross weight, an advanced technology missile might have a throw weight of 9,000-12,000 lbs as compared to the 7,000 lb throw weight of the current SS-19. If the throw weight could go as high as 12,000 lbs, it would clearly be unacceptable to have a definition based only on gross weight.



The Verification Panel is making an effort to narrow the current uncertainty in throw weight growth potential for a definition based on missile gross weight. Because of this uncertainty, the note passed to the Soviets just before the Helsinki Summit proposed that heavy ICBMs be defined on the basis of both the gross weight and throw weight of the SS-19. Until the Soviets respond, there appears to be no reason to modify this position. In the interim, the Verification Panel is examining other possible combinations of gross weight, throw weight, and volume for the heavy ICBM definition.

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
..... Thus, the draft NSDM instructs the Delegation to propose defining a heavy ICBM on the basis of both the gross weight and the throw weight of the SS-19. As I mentioned earlier, I also recommend that this issue be tied to U.S. movement on ALCMs and SLCMs.

Silo Dimensions. The two sides are not far apart on an approach for resolving this issue. The problem is the ambiguity of whether the 10-15 percent Interim Agreement limit on increases in silo dimensions permits increases of 10-15 percent in one or both dimensions (depth and diameter) of a silo. At our July meeting in Geneva, Gromyko proposed that in the new agreement a 32 percent limit on volume increases should be substituted for the 10-15 percent limit on increases in dimensions. However, since we want to retain an independent 15 percent limit on depth increases, the note passed to the Soviets before the Helsinki Summit proposed a compromise wherein a 15 percent limit on increases in dimensions would be supplemented by a 32 percent volume limit.

There is no agency disagreement on this approach, and I recommend that we instruct Alex to propose such a compromise in the formal negotiations.

Effective Date of the 2400 Aggregate. While we have taken the position in the formal talks that the 2400 aggregate limitation should be effective upon entry-into-force of the new agreement, the Soviets have favored a delay after entry-into-force to permit reduction to the 2400 level. Gromyko indicated in Geneva that the period during which they will reduce to the 2400 level would not exceed 12 months.

The two sides are not far apart on this issue. We indicated in Helsinki that we could accept a reasonable interval to achieve the 2400 aggregate limitation, and we have already instructed Alex to put forth such an approach at the formal negotiations.



Follow-On Negotiations. One final issue concerns follow-on negotiations. The U.S. position has been that follow-on talks should begin no later than one year after entry-into-force of the new agreement while the Soviets had proposed that further negotiations should begin no later than 1980-81. However, Gromyko indicated in July that the Soviets would be willing to have follow-on negotiations begin "in the same year that the Vladivostok agreement enters into force." This essentially meets the U.S. position.

Non-Transfer. Although it did not come up in Helsinki or in my meeting with Gromyko in Geneva, we can anticipate that the Soviets will insist on inclusion of a non-transfer provision in the final agreement. Their current proposal on this issue would ban the transfer of strategic offensive arms, components, technical descriptions, and blueprints to third countries. They have also proposed an additional commitment not to assist in the development of strategic offensive arms by other states.

We have made no proposals on non-transfer and have told the Soviets that we can not consider any non-transfer provision until the final shape of an agreement is clear and we know which systems will be limited. As a result, there has been no significant exchange on the non-transfer issue in Geneva.


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While we probably will have to accept some non-transfer provision in the final agreement, it should be as general and non-restrictive as possible. For the time being, we should probably continue to defer consideration of this issue until the final shape of the agreement becomes clear.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize me to sign the NSDM at Tab B.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_ DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_



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Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 09196

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction  
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RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Henry Kissinger  
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*excised NSC letter 2/10/99  
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ - XGDS

MINUTES  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

DATE: Saturday, August 9, 1975  
TIME: 9:45 a. m. - 11:20 a. m.  
PLACE: Cabinet Room, The White House  
SUBJECT: Middle East, SALT

Principals

The President  
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger  
Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger  
Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Fred Ikle  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George Brown  
Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby

Other Attendees

State: Under Secretary Joseph Sisco  
Defense: Deputy Secretary William Clements  
CIA: Mr. Carl Duckett  
White House: Lt Gen Brent Scowcroft  
NSC: Roger Molander *RM*



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MR 98-39, #35, NSC letter 2/10/99

By lt NARA, Date 5/25/99

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President Ford: While this meeting was called for the discussion of SALT, Henry and I think that because of the situation in the negotiations in the Middle East, maybe Henry at the outset for a limited time could point out where we are and then there is one matter I would like your advice on -- a very crucial matter.

Secretary Kissinger: The main point is that these negotiations have been going on for several months now revolving around two issues, the Giddi and the Mitla passes and the Abu Rodeis oil fields. The Egyptian position is that the Israelis must get out of the passes and stop working the oil fields. The Israelis have gone through contortions too long on these issues to sense what really is possible. At one point they were willing to give up one half of each of the passes. They even drew a line through the Giddi pass to indicate where they would fall back to.

The negotiations are now at a point where it is possible to get an agreement. The Israeli problem is that they will have to agree to get out of the passes, although they will be permitted to keep the high ground in between the passes.

We have pretty well negotiated three fourths of the corridor to Abu Rodeis but there is still a little territory which has not been resolved. We have come up with a possible solution but this has not as yet been put into the negotiations.

There is also a dispute over the Israeli definition of the end of the passes which differs from the Egyptian definition. The Israeli position is that the pass ends at the end of the mountains.


President Ford: Plus the burial plot at Parker's Memorial. The Israelis insist on retaining that.

Secretary Kissinger: No one had ever heard of this burial ground including the Egyptians.

President Ford: We found it on an old map but the Israelis moved it.

Secretary Kissinger: Where the Israelis claim it is, is not where it is on the only map we've found with it on.

The disputed issue is where the passes end. The disputes on the other lines are fully agreed to. The Israelis have agreed that the UN zone can go to the Egyptians. But the Egyptians feel that for symbolic reasons they must get at least a few kilometers inside the current Israeli lines.



The Israeli line is that they can't show their people that they have given up any ground, even if it is only a few kilometers. The Israelis claim that it is a matter of principle.

President Ford: I have got to see this few kilometers they won't give up.

Director Colby: It's very valuable -- two kilometers of dry sand. (laughter)

Secretary Kissinger: That's right, it's nothing but dry sand. Sadat says he wants seven kilometers, but he will probably settle for two. The Israeli hangup is that they want monitoring sites near both passes. They are willing to accept Egyptian stations so long as they are managed by Americans. The Israeli outposts would be manned by Israelis. The Egyptians are opposed to the Israeli request for six American-manned positions in the pass areas for tactical warning. They object to having Americans man these positions; they say they have just kicked the Russians out and if they permit Americans to man these positions, the Russians will insist on returning. The Egyptians say they will not accept any new posts in the passes but they may be willing to let Americans take over existing posts.

Secretary Schlesinger: There's really nothing that six posts could do that two or three couldn't do.

Secretary Kissinger: That's now where the negotiations stand; it revolves around whether the Egyptians will permit Americans to manage their posts in the passes.

President Ford: Bill.

Director Colby: Compliance with the agreement will be a problem at those sites which are capable of providing intelligence information. If we provide intelligence from these sites to the other side, it will be the same as letting them poke into the other side's position. One solution is that we would agree to only provide warning, etc. There may not be an easy solution to this problem.

Secretary Schlesinger: Why is that? In 1967 the Israelis had outposts behind the lines in Jordan. It's not a point of the Israelis never having had such a capability.

Secretary Kissinger: I believe the Israelis may accept American operation of these sites.



Director Colby: The capability of these bases permits them to gather information well into the other side's territories. For example, they can observe aircraft well into Egypt. They are very sophisticated. Beyond the question of manning there is the question of the capabilities of these bases.

Secretary Kissinger: I think these problems can be solved. The big issue is Egyptian acceptance of American stations for tactical warning and how many. There is also the issue of selling this to Congress. We said we wouldn't make any moves in the Middle East without consulting with the Congress.

President Ford: The Egyptian station would also be managed by Americans.

Secretary Kissinger: If the solution is that these stations are run by the Israelis with an American flag and American management it may be acceptable.

President Ford: Civilian management.

Secretary Kissinger: The Egyptians may claim that the military are there somewhere in some unexplained manner.

President Ford: That's their problem.

Director Colby: It will be less of a problem if we limit the Americans activity to simply managing the stations.

Secretary Kissinger: These are really two separate problems. Our problem is to man the posts and make sure both sides carry on only what is permitted.

President Ford: It is really symbolic. The total number of Americans would only be 80 to 100.

Secretary Kissinger: It depends on how many stations we put there. These two stations here (points to map) are only symbolic.

Director Colby: We will have little problem if we provide equal information to the Egyptians.

Deputy Secretary Clements: We will use civilians?



President Ford: Yes, in the zone where the UN now has the responsibility.

Secretary Kissinger: Next is the tactical warning stations which the Israelis want. They want three in each pass. The check points would be about 10 km apart. Sadat keeps referring to having Americans protect the lines. These are really second-line positions. They don't look like warning stations. There is also the problem of the Russian reaction to Americans manning these stations. If war starts, the stations couldn't possibly survive. The Israeli demand for three stations in each pass is outrageous on substance. There is no other part of the front with as many as six stations in so small an area.

President Ford: If we did agree to man these stations, we would have American hostages in an area which is one of the most volatile in the world.

Secretary Kissinger: We might obtain agreement to put one station in the middle of the Giddi Pass which looks both ways. It might be more acceptable. If the Israelis want to put in sensors, they could do it at their end of the passes.

General Brown: Why not man the sensors from some perimeter post? This would avoid the President's point of hostages.

Secretary Kissinger: We have not been able to generate interest in any approach of that type. The Israelis insist that they want six stations. They won't get it. The Israelis won't accept an agreement without some American personnel manning these stations. Maybe if there were only two posts it would be acceptable.

President Ford: Wherever Americans would be in the area, they would be hostages. But we must forge ahead.

General Brown: We could monitor the sensors from any location.

President Ford: I must say the force would be symbolic. We did not try and find a technical solution to this problem.

Secretary Kissinger: Golda Meir is concerned about American opinion if there are Americans in the area. She thinks there will be a nasty debate in America. The Israeli cabinet is also concerned about this problem.

Director Colby: If a war started, the posts wouldn't last for 10 minutes.



President Ford: It's really a symbolic force. I agree with what you are saying. In talking to Rabin, Sadat, and Dinitz, they all understand that it's just a token force. I am more willing than Henry to put Americans into these posts. Unless we are willing to take such a step, it is unlikely that there will be an agreement. If, in the final crunch, if that's what is needed, to put some Americans in a non-military context, then I think we should do it. I've checked this out with a number of individuals in Congress. Their reaction is that the Congress will go along.

Secretary Kissinger: We've gotten down to the issue of two positions and Um Hashiva, and these 150 Americans.

President Ford: .....  
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Deputy Secretary Clements: Would we need that many people?

Secretary Kissinger: There would have to be three shifts per day with 15 men on each shift.

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Deputy Secretary Clements: How big is the UN force?

Secretary Kissinger: About 8,000 now.

Director Colby: But none are US.

Deputy Secretary Clements: Under a peace settlement, the UN force would probably be drawn down.


Director Colby: But then again it might get larger.

Secretary Kissinger: This zone (points to map), a hundred miles long, would not be under Egyptian control. It would be a UN zone. It's one of the wrinkles the Egyptians have drawn up.

General Brown: What would be the US responsibility? Who would the Americans report to?

President Ford: Our own government.

Secretary Kissinger: The US representatives would be unarmed.



President Ford: We would handle violations just like they are handled currently.

Secretary Kissinger: The Egyptians will not agree to having the Israelis run the stations. They won't accept having an Israeli flag over the stations. The Egyptians prefer the UN flag. The Israelis will not accept the UN flag since then it could be raised in the Security Council or the General Assembly and the posts removed.

Director Colby: There will be awfully sensitive material which people will have access to at these stations.

Secretary Kissinger: .....  
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President Ford: Well, let's go on to SALT.

Deputy Secretary Clements: One question. With respect to the oil deal, will the Israelis look to Iran for oil?

Secretary Kissinger: They'll look to us -- not to Iran.

President Ford: It will not come out of our own production.

Director Colby: Up to now, has Iran demonstrated any willingness to provide oil?

Deputy Secretary Clements: This is a sticky point.

Secretary Kissinger: We have assured the Israelis of our help in storing and buying oil.

Deputy Secretary Clements: The Shah is shaky on this. He is not as strong politically as he has been. This gives the Israelis pause.



Secretary Kissinger: .....

Director Colby: The Israelis have increased their storage capability already.

Secretary Schlesinger: Do American tankers go into Israel if there is a war?

Secretary Kissinger: If there is a war, they will draw on their storage facilities.

General Brown: What about having tankers with other flags pick up oil and deliver it to the Israelis?

Secretary Kissinger: It is true, the Israelis are not asking that the oil be delivered by American flag ships.

Director Colby: How long would the war last anyway?

Secretary Kissinger: Three weeks at the outside.

Mr. Sisco: If there is a war, the Israelis could take over the oil fields anyway.

Secretary Schlesinger: They wouldn't find any oil producing facilities when they got there.

President Ford: This is a crucial issue.

(End of discussion on the Middle East).




President Ford: The main reason for this meeting is to bring you all up to date on where we are on SALT. We had two meetings with Brezhnev in Helsinki. We made some progress but not a lot. Let me tell you what we have agreed to and then we can talk about those issues which we are still hung up on.

We have agreed to ban cruise missiles of range greater than 600 kilometers on aircraft other than heavy bombers. We have also agreed to ban inter-continental cruise missiles and ballistic missiles of greater than 600 kilometers range on surface ships. We have also agreed to a ban on ballistic missiles on the seabeds and inland waterways. We also discussed a fifth issue related to weapons in orbit, but I understand that this has already been taken up in Geneva. We thus come down to the problem of cruise missiles -- air-launch cruise missiles and sea-launched cruise missiles -- and the question of the Backfire. Henry, will you run through the details of where we stand on these issues?

Secretary Kissinger: Without endorsing what the Soviets say, let me tell you what Dobrynin told me in the meeting I had with him yesterday. He indicated that they were having real problems with our position. They figure that the ALCMs would give us 11,000 free warheads which are not counted under the aggregate. I assume that they are calculating something like 32 missiles on each B-1 with 240 B-1s and 12 on each B-52 with 400 B-52s. This comes to about 11,000. He indicated they don't know what to do with this sort of situation. He claimed it is absolutely impossible to agree to a situation where there are 8,000 warheads limited in the aggregate and 11,000 warheads that run free.

The second point Dobrynin brought up is that they want to have a SALT agreement in preparation for the next party Congress. They want to be able to go to that Congress and ask for real reductions in military expenditures. But with our cruise missile position, they say they'll have to ask for additional expenditures in two areas. They say they will have to spend additional money on increasing air defenses and then also deploy cruise missiles themselves, neither one of which they had intended to do. This presents a problem on cruise missiles which is unavoidable since we want to deploy them.

With respect to Backfire -- this issue became rather heated at Helsinki -- Brezhnev claimed that the Backfire has only half the capability of the Bison and the President challenged him on this. This really became acrimonious between the President and Brezhnev.





President Ford: I just quoted your figure, Bill.

Secretary Kissinger: They consider our position on Backfire to be cynical. They just think we are just bargaining. They say we should know that the Backfire is being deployed for use against Europe and China and not against the United States. They claim that they gave up on FBS, which was the same type of issue. They claim that if you count refueling, you have to count all F-111's and F-4's too because with refueling they also can reach the Soviet Union. They say our position on the Backfire gives them a problem which is simply unmanageable.

In my conversation with Dobrynin I asked him if the Soviets really wanted an agreement. Dobrynin said yes, that it had been in their program for this year.

The question now is what to propose on these issues. These are the arguments the Soviets give. I repeat I am not endorsing these arguments, but these are the ones which Dobrynin put forth. Dobrynin got a summary cable from Moscow on the Helsinki discussions which listed the unresolved issues. He didn't mention the throw weight issue so I asked him if the summary cable had listed that. He said that it listed mobiles, cruise missiles, and Backfire. I asked him what about throw weight? Dobrynin said it wasn't listed. It's clearly not at the same level as these other problems. Also we didn't get nearly as big a reaction with respect to throw weight as we did on Backfire in Helsinki.

President Ford: Right.

Secretary Kissinger: Brezhnev didn't explode over throw weight like he did over Backfire.

President Ford: In discussing cruise missiles, we got into a discussion about who was going to move their industrial complexes. We told them they should move theirs closer to their borders to make the situation comparable. We were kidding them about this.

Secretary Schlesinger: Kidding? That was the next proposal we were going to make. (Laughter)

Secretary Kissinger: I thought you were becoming more conciliatory. I said we would move all our cities inland.



President Ford: If we continue with our position of a 3,000 kilometer limit on ALCMs and a 1500 kilometer limit on SLCMs and if, in addition, we make no movement on how we want to handle Backfire, then I don't think there's going to be an agreement.

I previously had a conversation with Jim to try and resolve what our course of action would be if it looked like there weren't going to be an agreement. I asked what military appropriations Jim might come up with for a FY 76 supplement plus a five year program. The figures are astounding. George, I guess you've seen these, but I would just like to run through them for you, Bill, and others.


In FY 76 -- this is in 1976 constant dollars -- the figure would be 206 million dollars. Then for the transitional quarter would be another 114 million. In 1977 two billion, five hundred; in 1978, 2 billion and seven; in 1979, 4 billion and five; in 1989, 5 billion and eight; and 1981, 8 billion and six. That's not a very good picture to have to go to the Hill with.

Secretary Kissinger: This is without additional money for ABM.

Secretary Schlesinger: We will be spending a lot of money on ABM R&D, however, but no money for ABM deployment.

Secretary Kissinger: There's another column here that has the price increases that would take place with a reasonable rate of inflation. For example, if we take the last entry under 1981 and crank in an inflation figure, it would be 11.5 billion. In 1988 the 5.8 billion figure goes to 7.4 billion with inflation dollars. This gives you some idea of the magnitude of what we would be up against if there were no agreement.

I believe the choice is some modification to our current position or this alternative which I have just described. Now I think it is important from an internal point of view to get an agreement, an agreement that would not sacrifice national security. I'm not talking about an agreement that's just a one-way street, but I believe a two-way street agreement can be achieved which will be in the national interest and in the world interest. I must say my assessment is that if we don't get an agreement, we will be in trouble on the Hill since we simply won't get the money we need. Getting additional appropriations for defense won't be any less difficult, with or without an agreement, and the figures we have just gone through are really unbelievable and unacceptable. When it comes to submitting this budget



it won't be believed or accepted. We'll end up further behind. We need an agreement to protect our national interest and the world interest as well. What we have to do is find where we can make some modification in the cruise missile and Backfire areas.

Secretary Kissinger: One other fact, anyone who has dealt with Brezhnev recently must conclude that his life expectancy is limited. It's not a question of his political survival but after 45 minutes in our meetings he simply ran out of steam. The Romanians whose dislike for the Russians is pathological -- if Ceausescu keeps up the way he's going he might trigger some action on the part of the Soviets. They feel only Brezhnev can put over a SALT agreement with the Soviet military. Grechko is too encrusted and couldn't do it. If the Soviets have a new leader, especially if it is Kirilenko, he will have to play all the party factions. Thus it may be that we will have to work aggressively toward an agreement because of the time problem. Brezhnev was like Pompidou was in Iceland when he met with Nixon. Brezhnev could only bat the ball back with extreme mental slowness, things had to be explained to him two or three times.

Director Colby: That's our assessment as well. He only has a short time. After he dies or steps down he will probably be succeeded by a person of collective acceptability who won't be aggressive in pursuing a SALT agreement. The track record of the Soviet Union is that there is a transition period of three to five years before a new leader can be aggressive in international affairs. The question of who will be the successor, whether it will be someone like Kirilenko or a military man like Grechko.

Secretary Kissinger: Everyone in Europe thinks it will be Kirilenko, but it might work out that it's someone like Malenkov, who will only last for a year.

President Ford: Let me ask a question. If there is no agreement and Brezhnev is out and there is an interim period, their momentum figures they will keep going in all areas -- aircraft, submarines, and ballistic missiles. Everyone will probably try and line up the military on their side. Once the momentum gets going it will become even more difficult for whoever succeeds Brezhnev to stop it, just like with us.

Director Colby: We have been working out of a triad but now on cruise missiles we're really talking about a quartet. We have the balance in strategic forces that we need. If we have reductions it will mean reductions for us not for them. The SALT limits which were agreed assure a Soviet buildup. We would have problems with reductions.



Within the next five years the only real danger is that fighting will break out in a conventional war not a strategic war. We see no technical developments that are likely to give them a strategic first strike against us. If we continue the stalemate in strategic systems, it is likely that their naval buildup and their buildup in conventional forces in Europe will continue. This will form the basis for competition between us, along with third world military aid. If we have to put money into strategic systems, we'll have to also put money into conventional forces.

President Ford: We can't gamble on our national security. If a deal can be worked which eliminates the Backfire and cruise missile problems, then we should work toward it.

Secretary Kissinger: One thing Dobrynin said to me was why did we introduce these new elements, cruise missiles and Backfire, into the negotiations. I said we need cruise missiles for penetration of their defenses. He said it was their own estimate that within three years our bomber force would have an overwhelming problem getting into the Soviet Union. He said if we deploy cruise missiles, they will have to increase their air defenses.

President Ford: George?

General Brown: I don't share Bill's optimism with respect to the ten year period. Ten years is too long a time. I am worried that the situation might change dramatically through the application of lasers.

President Ford: If they run free.

Secretary Kissinger: They do anyway.

Director Colby: In the ten year period, the Soviets still could not develop a first strike capability, but they could substantially improve their offensive capability.

President Ford: Let me ask a question; assume we get an agreement, laser development is free anyhow, is it not?

Deputy Secretary Clements: Yes.

President Ford: Are we proceeding with lasers of our own.

Deputy Secretary Clements: Yes, We have additional money in the current budget. Right now we are spending all we reasonably can.



Secretary Schlesinger: The Soviets have had a more aggressive program in the past.

General Brown: The Soviets would have a motivation to work faster on lasers without an agreement.

President Ford: Right, George.

Dr. Ikle: Without an agreement we will be diverted to work on numbers for political reasons.

Secretary Schlesinger: Mr. President, with respect to what's agreed, what is meant by the term "other than heavy bombers" -- cruise missiles on transports?

President Ford: Yes -- on transports.

Secretary Kissinger: Cruise missiles of greater than 600 kilometer range would be banned on transports.

Secretary Schlesinger: Tactical cruise missiles carried by tactical aircraft are not limited?

President Ford: Right.

Secretary Schlesinger: So we're talking about strategic nuclear-armed missiles.


As for the points of issue -- as for Backfire. We may be unable to suck out of anybody on the Soviet side what they think about this.

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However, we could be wrong about Backfire capability since we still have no measure of fuel capacity. It's very complicated, but we always come up with the same 3000 mile figure plus or minus five to ten percent off.

We have set up a development advisory group on Backfire. It may be that our estimates are too high; however, the report is not completed. Nevertheless, the Soviets claim that the Backfire range is one half that of the Bison is very unlikely.

Secretary Kissinger: They said in capability.



General Brown: We agree that it is probably designed for peripheral missions.

Secretary Schlesinger: If Backfire can only attack by overflying the US on a one-way mission, it is less important substantively versus politically terms. Critics on the Hill will argue that if the aggregate is 2400 and the Backfire is free, they will be able to do more than us.

If the Soviets can give us assurances on the Backfire, the political problem will be alleviated. The question is what will they provide.

President Ford: I believe we should not be adamant on this issue; nevertheless, we should take a firm position. We can challenge them as to what proof they have.

Director Colby: The intelligence community differs on this issue -- not the numbers but on Backfire employment.

President Ford: Jim is right. If the range is 3000 miles, political opponents will say the aircraft has a one-way capability to strike the United States.

Secretary Kissinger: So does the F-111 against the Soviet Union.

Director Colby: But the Backfire is not a first strike weapon. Compared to ballistic missiles, slow flying aircraft are not useful for first strike.


Dr. Ikle: We seem to have made some progress on throw weight.

Secretary Kissinger: All they did on throw weight was to not reject our proposal. I'm not sure what their position is. Throw weight was not included in the reporting cables sent to Dobrynin as one of the unsolved issues. There's no explanation for this. Brezhnev was not very fast on his feet on this issue. He asked me what we meant by our position. I told him we wanted a definition based on launching weight and throw weight. He asked for what missile. I said for the SS-19, and he didn't reject this.

Dr. Ikle: With progress on the throw weight issue, we will be able to halt the expansion of Soviet first-strike capability.

President Ford: Jim, what are your observations on the cruise missile problem.

Secretary Schlesinger: There is more give on SLCMs; they have a role in sub-SIOP missions. SLCMs are one way to do other missions. ALCMs



are a more difficult subject. From the point of view of numbers of weapons which the Soviets raised, we could also substantially increase the number of bombs as well as the number of missiles. Because of decisions made while McNamara was Secretary of Defense we have the current number of bombs on the B-52s. The B-1 carries..... We could increase the number of bombs to.....

General Brown: We currently have a clip on which there are..... weapons. We have the capability to deploy.....

Secretary Schlesinger: We can probably estimate a numerical limit of five to six thousand ALCMs by 1985. This is far less than the potential number of bombs. For reasons relating to maintaining our desire to continue to be able to penetrate, we are developing ALCMs. The Soviets don't need ALCMs to penetrate our air defenses. Our interests should be in controlling warheads, not missiles. We need a better fix on the parameters of discussion before we reach a solution.

Secretary Kissinger: Like what?

Secretary Schlesinger: For example, the Soviet argument that we are expanding the number of warheads is a characteristic of bombs not just missiles. We are not limited..... A constraint on the number of ALCMs could be sufficient to satisfy their concerns on this issue.

President Ford: Let me ask you this. Put us in their shoes -- if we limit the number of cruise missiles on the B-52 and the B-1, how will they know if we have not modified these aircraft to carry more missiles without verification.

Secretary Schlesinger: Verification is an important issue.

President Ford: It goes both ways.

Secretary Kissinger: If we say 5000 to 6000 cruise missiles as a limit it will get a horrible reaction from the Soviets. Better to limit the number of planes with cruise missiles. Maybe we could bring this into relation with the Backfire. We could still end up with a reasonable cruise missile force.



Secretary Schlesinger: The B-52 is not worth making into a penetrating bomber in the time frame of interest. Comparing the B-52 vs the B-1, the B-52 will be dependent on ALCMs for penetration.

Secretary Kissinger: If we put a 6,000 limit on cruise missiles, it will put a real burden on verification. If only x planes carried cruise missiles, it would be much better.

Director Colby: This will be hard to monitor.

Secretary Schlesinger: The Soviets will argue that we will put 24 on each bomber.

Secretary Schlesinger: They can get all the information they need from Aviation Week. Dobrynin will claim that we will carry them in the body as well as under the wings.

Secretary Schlesinger: Maybe we can arrange to have Aviation Week visit the Backfire factory.

Deputy Secretary Clements: We will only carry them internally on the B-1. They will be carried in pods on the B-52.

Director Colby: For once verification is on our side. We should send them a subscription to Aviation Week. (Laughter)

Dr. Ikle: The shoe will be on their foot.

Secretary Kissinger: How many can we carry inside?

General Brown: .....  
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Dr. Ikle: We have concerns about the way they do some things, and they have concerns about the way we do things. Perhaps this will make them more forthcoming in the future at the SCC.

President Ford: If we limit the number of aircraft, perhaps they will make some concessions on Backfire.

Secretary Kissinger: If we could get SLCMs down to their position and ALCMs down from 3000 kilometers and then limit the number of cruise missiles carrying aircraft, we could get a hearing. There would be a wierd aspect in that these limits would mean next to nothing in terms of verification. Both sides would be free to test cruise missiles up to 5000 kilometer range. Perhaps we could go to 2000 kilometers on ALCMs.





The only difference between 2000 and 3000 is with respect to fuel. We could test to the 2000 kilometer limit from aircraft and use land-based missiles to test to longer ranges. Even the SLCM limit is not that significant. You could juggle fuel and payload there too. Even if cruise missiles above 600 kilometers are banned on ships and above 2000 kilometers on aircraft, if I understand this technology, you can still do what you want. It is easy to go from 2000 to 3000 kilometers.

President Ford: Just put in a lighter warhead and add more fuel.

Secretary Kissinger: Unless I misunderstand the problem, we could come down in distance on the cruise missiles. Perhaps a package where we go way down on SLCMs, a little on air-launched cruise missiles, and then limit the number of aircraft equipped with cruise missiles. This will give them something to study. They are stuck on what to do on this issue.

President Ford: I agree.

Secretary Kissinger: You saw Gromyko jumping up and down to talk to Brezhnev when we were discussing this question.

President Ford: George, you had something you wanted to say.

General Brown: Yes. We could trade fuel for weight, download fuel to decrease range.

President Ford: And we wouldn't have to test to longer ranges to have the capability.

Deputy Secretary Clements: We are constantly developing more exotic fuels which will drastically increase range.

Dr. Ikle: We have to be careful or maybe we will get into a trap and end up fighting among ourselves whether we or they have violated these limits. We need to nail down a definition of cruise missile range.

Secretary Kissinger: We haven't agreed to take cruise missiles to Geneva.

Dr. Ikle: Except for intercontinental cruise missiles. Definitions will be a difficult problem.

President Ford: I think we understand where we are and the dilemma we face on this issue. It is far better for us to look at a package which contains



legitimate proposals in the cruise missile and Backfire areas. If we're not careful we could end up with nothing. I don't want to compromise our national security, none of us do. We need to come up with some modification to our current position.

Secretary Schlesinger: The Russians need to be more forthcoming on Backfire information. SLCMs are not of direct concern as a strategic system. We might want 50 or 60 SLCMs for peripheral missions, a small number.

Secretary Kissinger: 50 to 60? There's no objection if they're under 600 kilometers.

Secretary Schlesinger: We are interested in the possibility of sub-SIOP missions, such as in Iran. It's part of deterrence in areas where we have no base structure. It's a secure way to deliver nuclear weapons. The real problem is massive deployment of cruise missiles, so a cruise missile solution is probably workable. On ALCMs we don't know yet what kind of numerical limits we could accept. But we can't back off to the point where bombers can't penetrate.

General Brown: We are looking at some form of limit such as those suggested by Henry, but we have not found a way to work this out yet. We need to work Backfire in if we modify our position. In any case the Soviets probably will raise the FB-111 issue.

President Ford: Well what is the time frame we ought to establish for something for us to come up with bearing in mind Brezhnev's health problem.

Secretary Kissinger: We should try and have something in about ten days.

Secretary Schlesinger: We should have something ready when the President returns.

Secretary Kissinger: That's on the 25th.

President Ford: Why not say by the 25th we'll have something. Henry will be here to see how things are evolving.

Secretary Kissinger: Maybe we can talk before then.

Secretary Schlesinger: Maybe by the end of next week we'll have something.



President Ford: When you come to see me, Henry, you can bring me up to date on where we are.

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the first issue, if the only way the Israelis will accept an agreement is to have Americans stationed in the Sinai, how do you think this will be viewed by the American people.

(End of discussion of SALT)

President Ford: As I indicated, I am more willing than Henry to commit Americans to man these stations. Jim, what's your reaction.

Secretary Schlesinger: If this is the only way to obtain an agreement, then we should and must be willing to use American personnel. As I understand it, this is the only way to impart the required momentum to obtaining the agreement. As I understand it there will be two kinds of stations, both the Egyptian and Israeli stations would be manned by Americans. Each station would look one way into Egypt and into Israeli territory. In addition, there would be three stations in the passes which would look both ways. We must be careful not to provide a de facto guarantee of American intervention should war start.

President Ford: I agree.

Secretary Schlesinger: The Israeli stations would be manned by Americans.

Secretary Kissinger: Exactly.

General Brown: I have the same concern. We discussed the question earlier of who the Americans would report to. We want to avoid the problem of this being an adjunct to the UN force.

President Ford: That's also the Israeli fear. The Israelis want them separate from the UN force. If they are UN manned, there is the problem of keeping them there.

Secretary Kissinger: Clearly there would be a problem if we brought the UN in.

President Ford: Bill, what do you think?



Deputy Secretary Clements: It's a real dilemma. We have a sense of responsibility here, part of our own accountability. We can't walk away from the situation -- it's not the national interest to do that. Congressmen I have discussed this with think Congress will accept this and that the American public will accept this. This degree of involvement is a practical real world requirement, but it's not without accompanying issues. For example, the Russian problem.

General Brown: I agree. Implications of war in the Middle East are far more important than simply having American personnel there.

President Ford: You've put your finger on it. Our involvement could be much more massive. With no settlement there could be a situation in which the Soviets intervene or whatever, and it could be far more serious than the problems of getting some reasonable number of Americans manning these posts.

Director Colby: This is more than a defensive move -- it's an opportunity for positive movement to get in there and establish peace. We are really friends of both countries.

Under Secretary Sisco: We should play this as an extension of our own responsibility in seeing to it that there is a settlement in this area.

President Ford: I agree.

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Secretary Kissinger: There's also the question of the legal setup. On the warning stations this has not yet been agreed. If it is set up as an agreement between Israel, Egypt and the United States with no removal without the agreement of Egypt and Israel, then I see no unilateral problem. However, if in three years from now one party says it wants out, we'll be in a hell of a fix. Or if Egypt decides to cut off the water, since it is on Egyptian territory, or if the Egyptians simply say get out, we'll have a hell of a decision to make.

President Ford: We should try and tie this down as strongly as possible in legal terms. If they tell us and the UN to get out, they will trigger a war just as in 1967.



Dr. Ikle: I think it will be ideal if this is couched as a peace-keeping mission. It will have wide appeal in this country.

President Ford: Just a first step in a real peace-keeping effort.

Thank you all for your comments.

