

The original documents are located in Box 1, folder: “NSC Meeting, 3/5/1975” of the National Security Adviser’s NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

Copyright Notice

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 09170

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Agenda
CREATOR'S NAME Henry Kissinger
RECEIVER'S NAME President Ford
TITLE Meeting of the NSC, 3/5/75
CREATION DATE 03/05/1975
VOLUME 8 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 031200010
COLLECTION TITLE National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER 1
FOLDER TITLE NSC Meeting, 3/5/75
DATE WITHDRAWN 02/25/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST LET

opened with portions exempted
5/10/01
3/10/09
6/2/14

(B)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET/CODEWORD~~

MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Wednesday, March 5, 1975

The Cabinet Room

From: Henry A. Kissinger *HK*

I. PURPOSE

To review issues relating to Soviet compliance with the SALT I agreement and verification of a SALT II agreement.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, AND PRESS ARRANGEMENTS

A. Background: The US recently raised four issues relating to Soviet compliance with the SALT agreements at a special session of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) in Geneva. There has been speculation in the press about some of the compliance issues including charges that the Soviets are "violating" provisions of the SALT agreement. In addition, Senator Jackson has been holding hearings in which compliance issues have been discussed. Director Colby testified last month, and Senator Jackson pressed him hard on several compliance issues. Jackson was obviously seeking evidence to substantiate a claim that the Soviets are in violation of the SALT agreement. He will later use this to argue against the Vladivostok agreement. Secretary Schlesinger is scheduled to testify this week, and he can probably expect rough treatment from Jackson.

Although we strongly believe that the Soviets are not in violation of any of the SALT agreements, several of the issues could be politically explosive. At this meeting, we will review each of the issues and update you on where we stand following the end of the special SCC session last month



~~TOP SECRET/CODEWORD~~ - XGDS

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
E.O. 13526
Authority NLF 07-81, Appex #1
NARA pmh Date 6/22/2014

Compliance Issues: The US raised four compliance issues at the January special session of the SCC. The Issues related to:

1. The volume of the SS-19.
2. Possible testing of a surface-to-air missile (SAM) radar for use on part of an ABM system.
3. Silo-type launch control facilities.
4. Concealment measures.

The negotiating record and relevant details on each of these issues are as follows:

1. Volume of the SS-19: Throughout SALT I, a major US goal was to limit Soviet deployment of "heavy" ICBMs. The US succeeded in freezing the number of modern "heavy" ICBMs like the SS-9 at 308. We also obtained Soviet agreement not to convert launchers for light ICBMs like the SS-11 into launchers for "heavy" ICBMs.

However, the two sides never reached agreement on a definition of a "heavy" ICBM. The two sides did agree that the dimensions of ICBM launchers would not be increased by more than 10-15%, but we never agreed on a criterion for defining a "heavy" missile itself. Consequently, the US issued a unilateral statement on May 26, 1972 which said that we "would consider any ICBM having a volume significantly greater than that of the largest light ICBM now operational on either side to be a heavy ICBM." However, the US never clarified to the Soviets what we meant by "significantly," and in any event, the Soviets flatly rejected our unilateral statement.

The current CIA estimate is that the volume of the SS-19 is more than 3.3(b)(1) that of the SS-11. However, since we never defined what we meant by "significantly" in our unilateral statement and since the Soviets rejected our statement immediately, we have little legal basis for claiming a violation based upon the volume of the SS-19.



Nevertheless, the US pressed the Soviets on this issue in the SCC to reemphasize the importance we attach to controlling "heavy" ICBMs and to lay the groundwork for a more precise distinction between "light" and "heavy" ICBMs in the next agreement. The Soviet response during the session has been that the agreed 10-15% limits on increases in the dimensions of light ICBM launchers is an adequate criterion for ensuring that light ICBMs are not converted to heavy ICBMs.

2. SA-5 Testing in an ABM Mode: In SALT I, one of our major concerns was to insure that air defenses were not given an ABM capability. One of the ABM Treaty provisions which protects against this possibility is the ban on testing non-ABM components, such as air defense radars and interceptors, "in an ABM mode." To insure that there was no misunderstanding on the meaning of the term testing in an ABM mode, we included a unilateral statement which precisely defined the type of testing which would be prohibited.

Among the activities we cited was the testing of a radar against an incoming strategic ballistic missile. However, we exempted range safety and range instrumentation radars from this criteria since they are necessary components at a test range.

The problem which has developed is that since April of 1974, the Soviets have been routinely operating what is apparently an air defense SA-5 radar during ballistic missile tests at the Sary Shagan ABM test range.

3.3(b)(1)

We raised this issue at the end of the recent SCC session, but the Soviets have not as yet had a chance to respond.

3. III-X Command and Control Silos: At the time of the signing of the SALT agreements in 1972, the Soviets had a number of new large silos under construction which we assumed would all be for the deployment of new missiles. However, as construction



of these silos proceeded, it became apparent that some, which we designated the III-X silos, were probably going to be used as launch control centers. Nevertheless, we could not preclude the possibility that these silos could also be used as missile launchers.

We exchanged a number of notes with the Soviets on these silos pointing out our concerns about the possible employment of these silos as missile launchers. Their response was that the silos in question are intended for launch control facilities, and that we could confirm this from satellite photography.

The communication lines to these silos and other characteristics do tend to indicate that they will be used for the command and control of missile launchers; however, we still cannot preclude their use as missile launchers since they have quick opening doors and since the old launch control centers have not been destroyed.

When we raised this issue in the SCC, we indicated that we would be satisfied if, in the future, they destroyed the old launch control centers and redesigned the door so it would not be opened quickly. The Soviet response in the SCC has been entirely consistent with their earlier replies on this issue -- that our national technical means can confirm that the III-X silos are not intended to launch missiles.

4. Concealment and Deception: As you know, our principal means of verification is satellite photography. In recognition of this, the SALT I agreements explicitly banned the use of deliberate concealment measures which impede verification. However, to avoid requiring changes in normal maintenance and construction procedures which had been in effect before the SALT agreements, the agreement also stipulated that the provisions banning deliberate concealment would not require changes in existing construction and overhaul practices. For example, we have for years overhauled submarines in covered facilities, a practice we are not required to change.

The concern which has arisen is an apparently expanding pattern of Soviet concealment and deception activities over the last year. These activities include:

-- Use of canvas and netting over equipment, launch pads, and revetments at the Plesetsk and Kapustin Yar test sites.



-- The erection of shed-like coverings over rail spurs at a missile production facility, clearly intended to deny photographic coverage.

-- Concealment of submarine hull sections at a facility where missile-carrying submarines are constructed.

-- Construction of dummy submarines.

-- Coverings over a missile storage area at an ABM test range.

At the recent SCC meeting, we asked the Soviets to cease their concealment activities at the Plesetsk and Kapustin Yar missile test ranges, the Sary Shagan ABM range, and the Sevordvensk naval shipyards, and expressed our concern about the expanding concealment and deception activities. The Soviet response so far has been mixed. In at least one instance, they claim to be unable to find the activity we objected to. With respect to the concealment activity at test ranges, they claim that such activities are outside the scope of the Interim Agreement and, thus, not a valid topic for discussion. Finally, recent intelligence indicates that they may have already cut back their concealment activities.

At the SCC session the Soviets, as expected, again raised an analogous concealment issue -- the issue of US shelters over ICBM and ABM launchers at Warren and Grand Forks. We had previously exchanged several notes on this subject. We responded, as we had in the earlier notes, that the use of shelters over Minuteman silos is strictly for environmental control as part of our silo hardening program, and is not intended to provide concealment. However, we indicated that we would be prepared to modify our use of these shelters in the context of arrangements to eliminate other compliance ambiguities.

General Approach to Verification: It is evident from the nature of the compliance issues described above that there is no evidence of any violations, or even potential violations, of the basic provisions of the existing agreements. The ambiguities which have arisen relate principally to the issues of treaty language and the acknowledged inability to write language that will unambiguously deal with all activities which could take place during the period



of the agreement. At the same time, the recent SCC session is a testimony to the good faith of both parties in recognizing that ambiguities will arise and that they can be discussed in a constructive manner.

We must provide the Congress this type of balanced perspective on the issue of verification of compliance with SALT agreements. In particular, we must dispel any idea that the existing agreements are crumbling under Soviet violations. Rather, we must convey that the basic objectives of these agreements -- keeping both sides to a minimum level of ABM capability and freezing offensive weapon deployment -- have been met.

Of equal importance, with respect to the SALT agreement currently being negotiated, we must convey an understanding of the extent to which a detailed set of MIRV counting rules are required or advisable. Although we should have clear and unambiguous provisions covering MIRV verification, we cannot hope to achieve any extensive set of rules to cover all possible contingencies. Nor would such a detailed set of rules be advisable, since too much detail would only induce each side to work around the rules.

Our basic objective should be to reach an understanding with the Soviets on the types of MIRV verification problems which could arise and to insure that there continues to exist a viable mechanism, such as the SCC, which can handle the ambiguities that will undoubtedly arise.

After your opening remarks, I suggest that you ask me to review the compliance issues we raised with the Soviets. Bill Colby and Carl Duckett are prepared to discuss the latest intelligence on each issue as we go through them. Finally, we should discuss our basic approach to verification and the way to handle attacks such as Jackson's.

- B. Participants: (List at Tab A)
- C. Press Arrangements: The meeting but not the subject will be announced. There will be a White House photographer.



III. TALKING POINTS

A. At the Opening of the Meeting

1. The purpose of this meeting is to review those issues related to verification with the SALT I agreement and to discuss the general problem of verification as it relates to the agreement currently being negotiated.
2. I want to insure that we are doing everything possible to insure the successful completion of the current negotiations.
3. I know Jackson is holding hearings on compliance. It is essential that we do not give him any kind of lever to use in undermining the Vladivostok accords.
4. In addition, I want to emphasize that raising issues which had been resolved at Vladivostok will only reopen long-standing disagreements. By tabling provisions which go beyond the Vladivostok accord, even to counter a similar Soviet move, would quickly deprive Vladivostok of any significance. If we are to include a new agreement this summer, we must continue to be guided by the Vladivostok Aide Memoire.
5. Henry, could you give us a rundown on the compliance issues.

B. At the Close of the Meeting

1. It is clear from this discussion that we have a job on our hands to provide the proper perspective on compliance, both to the Congress and to the public.
2. It is apparent that we have no evidence of any Soviet violations of the SALT agreement. However, Jackson seems determined to press us hard on every ambiguity. As I said at the outset, we must not allow Jackson to claim violations of SALT I and use that as a vehicle to destroy the chances for an agreement this summer. There are ambiguities, because it is impossible to write an agreement which can cover in advance every detail which may arise. That is precisely the reason the SCC was set up and that is the way we are dealing with the current ambiguities.



3. We must insure that verification issues, which are problematical, do not serve as a vehicle to undercut our whole approach to SALT II. I want each one of you to be very conscious of this problem and form your discussions with the Congress in such a way as to permit no chance for success of any such maneuver.



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~TOP SECRET/CODEWORD~~
Attachment

March 17, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: Jeanne W. Davis *JWD*

SUBJECT: Minutes of NSC Meeting on
SALT Compliance, March 5, 1975

Attached is a copy of Jan Lodal's minutes of the March 5 NSC meeting on SALT compliance.

Attachment

~~TOP SECRET/CODEWORD~~
Attachment

lt 5/25/99

ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 09171

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Minute
CREATOR'S NAME Jan Lodal?
RECEIVER'S NAME Brent Scowcroft
TITLE Minutes of NSC Meeting, 3/5/75
CREATION DATE 03/05/1975
VOLUME 23 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 031200010
COLLECTION TITLE National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER 1
FOLDER TITLE NSC Meeting, 3/5/75
DATE WITHDRAWN 02/25/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST LET

*excised Nsc with 2/10/99
wt 5/99*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~TOP SECRET/ CODEWORD~~MINUTES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

DATE: Wednesday, March 5, 1975

TIME: 7:34 a.m. to 8:30 a.m.

PLACE: Cabinet Room, The White House

SUBJECT: SALT Compliance

Principals

The President
 The Vice President
 Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
 Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger
 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen George S. Brown
 Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Dr. Fred Ikle
 Director of Central Intelligence William Colby

Other Attendees

State: Deputy Secretary Robert Ingersoll

Defense: Deputy Secretary William Clements

CIA: Mr. Carl Duckett

White House: Mr. Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to
the President

NSC: Brent Scowcroft
Jan M. Lodai



DECLASSIFIED • E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.4
 With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
 E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (b) (1)
 3.4

MR 98-39, #19; NSC Ltr 2/10/99

By lt NARA, Date 5/24/99

~~TOP SECRET/ CODEWORD~~ - XGDS

ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

President Ford: Good Morning. There are four or five issues on compliance with the SALT I Agreements, questions we have raised with the Soviets -- Henry, do you want to sum up where the problem is -- maybe Carl and Bill could add to it also --

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, Mr. President -- I would like to begin by bringing you up-to-date on the status of the Geneva Talks, and then we can turn to compliance. The Soviets tabled a draft treaty at the first SALT meeting in Geneva. On a number of issues, they differed with our views.

On MIRV Verification, they have said that our existing national technical means of verification are adequate. We have put forth several counting rules for distinguishing MIRV launchers -- the ones we went through at the last NSC meeting. We have now put these in a protocol to our own draft treaty, but we have left it open for them to tell us what characteristics of their systems our national technical means can use to distinguish MIRVs. If they can tell us, we will bring the proposal here to you.

There is the expected disagreement over cruise versus ballistic missiles. We have not yet had an opportunity to explore our compromise of banning cruise missiles on everything except bombers.

The Soviets' draft also contained two provisions that went beyond the Vladivostok Agreement. One of these is a limit of 240 on new types of SLBMs, including our Trident. At your instruction, I pointed out to Gromyko that we would not negotiate on items inconsistent with Vladivostok. They have not yet dropped it, but he said they would consider this point carefully.

We will table a draft treaty very shortly, if we have not already done so.

Mr. Graybeal: We plan to table it today.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we will table a draft treaty today? In summary, the differences that exist are manageable if the Soviets really want an agreement, or they can be used to stall if they don't want an agreement. Unless they can satisfy us that our national technical means can distinguish their MIRVs, we will not



accept their approach. Of course, their position has one advantage, in that it indicates they will not press us on the distinctions between Minuteman II and Minuteman III.

In short, it is too early to tell how it will come out.

On compliance, Senator Jackson has been holding hearings on the issues of compliance. Bill testified last week, and I think Jim is scheduled sometime this week.

Secretary Schlesinger: George and I plan to go up sometime tomorrow.

Secretary Kissinger: At least if Jackson pulls out JCS documents, George will know what he is talking about! (Laughter)

Secretary Schlesinger: That is not certain!

Secretary Kissinger: The last time I went up there, Jackson pulled out some JCS documents which I had never seen, and wouldn't show them to me, but he wanted me to confirm them. (Laughter)

Jackson is clearly trying to build a case against the Vladivostok Agreement by pointing to loopholes and ambiguities in the first agreement, so these can be used as an issue on Vladivostok.

There are four issues which we should discuss --

- The volume of the SS-19.
- Possible testing of an SA-5 air defense radar in an ABM mode.
- The III-X command and control silos.
- Concealment and deception at missile test and production facilities.

Secretary Schlesinger: Isn't this a political loser for Jackson? Isn't he just losing ground by attacking Vladivostok?

President Ford: I think he is.

Secretary Kissinger: I would have thought so.



President Ford: He has quieted down some from his first blast, but with these hearings, perhaps he is trying to build a new case so that he can be ready when the agreement is finished.

Secretary Schlesinger: He has been very inconsistent. He is trying to run with both the hounds and the hares.

President Ford: Other politicians have tried that also -- ask Rumsfeld about it -- he is a master! (Laughter)

Secretary Kissinger: On the substance, I agree with Jim -- he is inconsistent. He said the SALT I numbers were too low, and the SALT II numbers too high. Perhaps that's why he is now focusing on verification problems, so he can call the whole thing no good.

Secretary Schlesinger: Our position has to be clear on this -- there are verification problems, but we can handle them. We are not in some Utopia --

Secretary Kissinger: Our ultimate position should be consistent with the position you outlined. But first, I think we should go through the specific issues.

The first issue is the SS-19. Throughout SALT I, a major goal of the US was to limit Soviet deployment of heavy ICBMs. The interim agreement froze the number of launchers for heavy ICBMs at 308. However, the two sides never reached agreement on what constituted a heavy ICBM.

There was some interesting side-play on this. At one point during the negotiations in Moscow, Brezhnev agreed to no increase in silo dimensions. The next day, Smirnov pulled back on this.

.....
..... Therefore, we agreed on the 15% limit on the increases.

But we never fully defined even that, whether it was in all directions, or just in one.

Consequently, the US issued a unilateral statement which said that the US would consider any ICBM having a volume significantly greater than that of the light ICBM operational to be heavy ICBM. But we never explained exactly what we meant by "significantly". The Soviets flatly rejected the unilateral statement.



Later, at one point Laird answered in writing a question from Jackson by saying that the Soviets would be permitted to increase the volume of their light missiles only up to about 30%, but again, this is not part of the formal record, except as a unilateral statement on our part.

Whatever the state of play is now with respect to the 19, one of our objectives in SALT II is to draw a limit on the size of the missile at the 18, so there won't be questions like this in the future.

Bill, you might wish to explain what we know about the 18.

Mr. Colby: (Referring to chart.) The point is that it is significantly larger than the 11. The permitted increase in the size of the silos is fixed at less than 15%, but we didn't define missile size. Throw weight was not mentioned either, so this is only a question of volume. The SS-11, their older missile, is We think the SS-19 is

President Ford: And they are putting it in a bigger silo?

Mr. Colby: The silo is the same.

Mr. Duckett: In some cases they have increased the depth by 15%, but it has a smaller diameter, so the volume is less.

President Ford: It's the volume, not the dimensions --

Mr. Colby: The volume has increased..... Of course, there has been a big increase in throw weight.

Secretary Kissinger: Brezhnev indignantly denied they were increasing the size of their silos in several meetings. He denied all methods of increasing the size, except the one they have used, namely digging down deeper.

Mr. Duckett: One point of interest is that Jackson predicted that the Soviets would do exactly what they are doing -- increase their missile size--ase their missile size.

Mr. Colby: We do have Laird's statement that if they increase by 30%, it would be a violation --

Secretary Kissinger: The point is there has been some increase in the missile, although they have not increased the silo-- there has



just been better utilization of the existing space. We can do the same thing with the MX.

President Ford: That's right -- we can do it in the same way --

Secretary Kissinger: We can do it even better. We have more unused space in our silos that they do in theirs.

President Ford: We argue that 15% is not applicable?

Secretary Kissinger: The 15% has standing only with respect to the silo. If we increased our silos by 15%, we could increase our throw weight tremendously. Even without increasing the silo, the MX will be in the same class as the SS-19.

The Soviets never accepted our definition of "significantly" -- except with respect to the size of the silo. Any statements made on volume have been unilateral, and rejected by the Soviets. Laird made statements to Jackson, but they have no standing with the Soviet Union. In my view, what they are doing is legal. We have the capacity of putting in missiles the size of the 19 in our silos also and we would be within the letter of the agreement. ~~They could not do this.~~ We can do this.

Secretary Schlesinger: There is irony here -- we would be in violation of our unilateral statement since we accepted it, but the Soviets would not, since they did not accept it.

President Ford: (To Secretary Schlesinger) Some of these arguments, I agree with you, are not very viable politically!

Mr. Clements: Mr. President, when you start talking about the "cube", which is what you are talking about when you talk about volume, you should realize that the whole trend of technology is toward miniaturization -- putting more and more into small volume. So volume is not a good measure of capability in the long run.

Mr. Ikle: That's why we are trying to get the definition in terms of throw weight.

Secretary Kissinger: That they will never accept.



Secretary Schlesinger: What position do we want to take on this? We cannot say that we can do something that they can't. The position we have to take is that the Soviets are not in violation of the treaty. We must state that they are in violation of the unilateral statement, but not the treaty. All this points to is the ineffectiveness of unilateral statements. They make you feel good, but not much else.

Mr. Duckett: Jackson makes this point very strongly. He says that unilateral statements are completely worthless. I'm sure he will make this point strongly when Jim goes up.

Secretary Kissinger: The next issue concerns the SA-5. The problem is that we do not want them to turn their air defense systems into anti-ballistic missile systems. One of the ABM treaty provisions which protects against this is a ban on testing non-ABM components, such as air defense radars and SAMs, in an ABM mode.

We described our understand of those activities which constitute testing in an ABM mode in a unilateral statement. Unlike our statement on the 19, the Soviets did not reject this. Among the activities we describe as testing in an ABM mode was the testing of a radar against an incoming missile with the trajectory of a strategic ballistic missile. However, we exempted range safety and range instrumentation radars since these are necessary components at a test range.

With this background, the problem is that the Soviets have been operating what is apparently an SA-5 air defense radar during some ballistic missile tests at one of their test ranges. We now believe they have been testing this as a range instrumentation radar. In this case, we're in the unique situation that this might be a violation of the treaty, although it does not violate our unilateral statement. Bill, perhaps you can go through the details --

Mr. Colby:

Secretary Kissinger: This would be a matter of the greatest concern.

Mr. Colby: The agreement says that neither side will test non-ABM radars in an ABM mode.



.....
.....

President Ford:

Mr. Colby:

.....
.....
..... Nevertheless, this is the closest thing to a technical violation we have. But our own unilateral statement says if they are using it only for range instrumentation, it would not be a violation.

Secretary Schlesinger: It is more ambiguous than that. The average radar operator is told to look at every target of opportunity, so he probably turns it on any time he sees something.

President Ford: Even if he knows it as one of their own?

Mr. Colby: It's more regular than that.

Mr. Duckett:

Mr. Colby:

Secretary Schlesinger: This is a true ambiguity.

Secretary Kissinger: Particularly since we ourselves pointed out the ambiguity.

Mr. Clements: We could easily have done something like this ourselves.

President Ford: We have the equipment on hand?

Mr. Colby:

Secretary Kissinger: The next ambiguity concerns the III-X command and control silos. At the time of signing of the SALT agreements in 1972, the



Soviets had a number of new large silos under construction which we assumed would all be for the deployment of new missiles. However, as construction proceeded, it became apparent that some were probably going to be used as launch control centers. Nevertheless, we could not preclude the possibility that these silos could also be used as missile launchers. We had many signs that they intend them to be launch control facilities.

Mr. Duckett:

Secretary Kissinger: We have exchanged several notes with them on this. The number of these related to the size of their total force is small. We have not said it is a violation, but asked them for clarification.

President Ford: Are all of them in proximity to the old facilities?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Mr. Colby: Yes, except the ones built before the agreement. These did not have old ones nearby. They knew when we counted 11 of these in the agreement. We believe they may have made changes after this by moving them much closer to the old one, perhaps attempting to accommodate us.

If one said they could tear the guts out and put a missile in, a process which would take them 6 months, and you project the numbers to assume they put one with each silo group, you could come up with about 150--a number which would not be trivial.


President Ford: If the process takes 6 months, wouldn't we be successful in detecting them doing so?

Mr. Duckett:

Mr. Colby:

Mr. Duckett: Jackson wants demonstrable proof that they haven't put a missile in, something we can't get.

General Brown: If this is an effort on the part of the Soviet Union to disguise cheating, they are spending a whole lot of money to do it. They have put in tunnels, underground buildings, and extensive electronic equipment, all of which is very costly.



Secretary Schlesinger: I think this will clarify itself as they complete construction. Theoretically, it could be a worry, but I do not believe it will turn out to be a problem.

Mr. Colby: That's possible.

Secretary Schlesinger: We could pursue this with them, but not get hung up on it.

Secretary Kissinger: But not in a harrassing manner. They have to have launch control facilities, so if this is not it, it will be something else. We have proposed to them that they destroy the old one or put on a new door. So far the Soviets have not been too responsive.

Mr. Duckett: I should point out that we have always believed these are launch control facilities.

Mr. Colby: Jackson doesn't contest that. But he wants to know how we can prove at some point in the future they will not be used as launchers. We can't prove this.

Secretary Kissinger: The next issue concerns concealment and deception. This can be illustrated by the photos.

Mr. Colby:

Mr. Duckett:

Mr. Colby: (.....)

President Ford: Is the cover itself a violation?

Mr. Colby: No, it is an ambiguity - they did not agree not to develop mobile missiles.

Secretary Kissinger: There are two ambiguities here, Mr. President. First, they did not agree to put their test range under controls. Second, mobile missiles were not part of the SALT I agreements, although they are part of SALT II.

President Ford: This is a testing facility?



Mr. Colby: Yes, it is a test center.
.....
.....

Mr. Duckett: In addition, nets like this were in place before SALT I was signed, so they could also argue that they are not changing their practices.

Mr. Colby: (referring to photograph) Here is another example. They have put a net over this revetment. It has since been taken away.

President Ford: What did it show when they removed it?

Mr. Duckett: Just a revetment. Whatever was under it was movable.

Mr. Colby: At the same test site, there is a problem,
.....
.....

Secretary Kissinger: There is no question that if they deploy it under netting, it would be a violation of the agreement.

Mr. Duckett:
.....
.....



Secretary Kissinger: There are two problems. First, how to count the 20. Second, what happens if they deploy them under nets.

Mr. Graybeal: There is no evidence they have deployed anything under nets to date. -- this has all been at test ranges.

Secretary Kissinger: If they deploy the 20, we will have an argument on counting it.

Director Colby: (Referring to photograph) This is not an example of concealment, but rather deception. This is a dummy rubber submarine. Here we caught one with a bend in it -- it's designed to go around curves -- (laughter)

President Ford: They have some great naval architects!

Director Colby: It is hard to figure out what these are for. It's probably a pure deception target for bombers.

President Ford: Would it deceive our Air Force?

General Brown: Is there anything on it that gives a radar return?

Mr. Duckett: We think it may be a test activity.

Director Colby: Earlier, they built some wooden submarines. We later saw them broken up on the shore.

Secretary Kissinger: I don't know what this violates --

Director Colby: No, it just reflects their penchant for secrecy. The Soviet military once complained that our military were letting our civilians in on too many military secrets.

(Referring to next picture)
.....
.....
.....
.....

Mr. Duckett:

President Ford:



Mr. Duckett: Yes. It is not very effective concealment.

Secretary Schlesinger: I'm not sure. They are playing a shell game, and we don't know what they're up to.

Secretary Kissinger: We build our submarines in sheds, also.

Director Colby: (Referring to picture) Here is the construction shed down here.

.....
.....
.....

President Ford:

Director Colby: Yes.

Mr. Duckett: This is where the dummy may come in. We think they may put the real submarine inside and the dummy outside.

President Ford: (To Schlesinger) It seems to me that when you and George testify, you'll have no problems. You can say that these are ambiguities, and that they can be handled.

Secretary Schlesinger: That's true with respect to our testimony. This last issue, concealment and deception, is a violation of the spirit of the agreement. We will say we are discussing all of these with them, and we will have to keep exploring them.


Secretary Kissinger: We would count the dummies (laughter). Seriously, then that's their problem.


The other problem is that if there is systematic concealment, and if we have difficulty verifying, we will have to watch them.

We can do exactly what Jim said -- these are all ambiguities that are the natural results of operating a large complicated strategic force.

President Ford: The one thing this requires us to do is to maximize our capability to observe and detect their activities.

Director Colby: That leads me to one problem.
.....
.....
.....





General Brown: But innocent passage is permitted. We fought hard for innocent passage.

Vice President Rockefeller: You call that innocent?

General Brown: They would.

President Ford: Will this be a problem with Jackson?

Secretary Schlesinger: He could stir up something on it -

President Ford: These are not open hearings, are they?

Schlesinger: No, but --

President Ford: There could be leaks.

Mr. Colby: It might help to know their order of interest. First, the SA-5. One of Jackson's staffers has apparently said that we testified that they were violating the agreement on this, but that's not true. Second, the SS-19. On the 19, they showed us Laird's testimony.

President Ford: Is there anything else, Henry?

Secretary Kissinger: The Soviets have made some complaints about our activities. Some are frivolous, like complaints about our old Atlas and Titan launchers. Others are not. They complained about our covers on our Minuteman silos. I am uneasy about the covers. If we saw them doing it, all hell would break loose. You heard Brezhnev complain about them at Vladivostok. While we said they're for environmental purposes, they're a problem.


The third complaint concerned the confidentiality of the SCC.

Dr. Ikle: Isn't it our understanding that we will remove the covers?

Secretary Kissinger: If I know General Brown, he will have finished his program by then -- (laughter) (laughter)

General Brown: I can't speed it up that much -- it will go on until 1982!

Secretary Kissinger: It's good to offer to remove them.



Dr. Ikle: We could do without them.

General Brown: I brought a picture of them for you.

President Ford: The netting?

General Brown: No, it's a building in which the contractors work. (Referring to picture). This gives you an idea of what it's like. We can modify this to remove the roofs during daylight and good weather. This would give a 12 hour open period each day. The expense would be nominal -- 3/4's of a million dollars.

President Ford: We use these only during construction?

General Brown: Yes. We have used them forever. They do get bigger as we go along --

Mr. Clements: Henry, didn't you also offer on-site inspection to them?

Secretary Kissinger: No. We talked about it here, but we never decided to offer it to them.

Mr. Clements: We should do it.

Secretary Kissinger: I think we should save on-site inspection for something more important.

Dr. Ikle: Such as the Minuteman II/Minuteman III problem.

Secretary Kissinger: We don't want to throw it away.

President Ford: Well, thank you --

Secretary Schlesinger: There are two final points. I think we have learned that in the future, we have to pin down precisely what we mean with them. We need a greater degree of precision. Second, on the SS-19, which has a throw weight of 7,000 lbs versus 1,800 for the 11. I think we need a decision to define heavy, medium, and light missiles in the current negotiations.

President Ford: Do we have that now?

Dr. Ikle: Yes --

President Ford: Well, thank you gentlemen.



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 09313

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Chart
CREATOR'S NAME CIA
RECEIVER'S NAME NSC
TITLE Graphics used during 3/5/75 NSC Meeting
DESCRIPTION Analysis of Soviet capability
CREATION DATE 03/1975?
VOLUME 5 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 031200010
COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL MEETINGS FILE
BOX NUMBER 1
FOLDER TITLE NSC Meeting, 3/5/75
DATE WITHDRAWN 06/21/1999
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST LET