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To Dick
Kennedy

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Monday, December 2, 1974
10:30 a.m. (45 minutes)
The Cabinet Room

From: Henry A. Kissinger *HK*

I. PURPOSE

To provide an opportunity for you and Secretary Kissinger to brief the NSC members and Dr. Ekle, Director of ACDA, on your recent trips.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS ARRANGEMENTS

A. Background: It would be highly desirable for the NSC members and Dr. Ekle to hear directly from you on your discussions with the Japanese, Korean and Soviet leaders, particularly on the strategic arms limitations agreement reached with General Secretary Brezhnev. Secretary Kissinger could also brief on his trip to Peking.

B. Participants:

- Secretary Kissinger
- Secretary Schlesinger
- Director of Central Intelligence Colby
- Chairman, JCS, General Brown
- ACDA Director Ikle
- Deputy Secretary of State Ingersoll
- Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements
- Assistant to the President Rumsfeld
- General Scowcroft

C. Press Arrangements: The fact of the meeting will be announced but not the subject.

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III. TALKING POINTS

GENERAL

-- I think my trip was a significant success on all counts and I would like all agencies to reflect that in all dealings on the subject -- with the press, on the Hill, or elsewhere.

-- Let's make certain we all stay thoroughly upbeat.

JAPAN

-- Whatever differences we may have had in the past with Japan have been removed.

-- What happened to Tanaka is not important. What is important is the symbolic getting together with the Emperor. In Japan, ceremony is indistinguishable from substance, and the visit shows that our relationship has broken through any impediments of the past and has been placed on a substantially new and solid footing.

-- Our success in Japan, while perhaps somewhat difficult to articulate in precise terms, was very substantial.

-- In the vital area of security, the Japanese told us that they believed security must now be seen in a wider sense -- not just in military terms but in terms of such other requirements as energy and food.

-- In energy, the Japanese are somewhat exposed because of their heavy reliance on Middle Eastern oil. Moreover, they are reluctant to commit themselves to our proposals until they see that we are really determined to make them work. Subject to these reservations, however, they appeared ready to look seriously at all our proposals for solving international energy problems and to play a role more nearly in line with their first-rank global economic position.

-- I spoke to the Japanese about increasing their aid to Vietnam, and they agreed to look into this.

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-- They clearly count on us as an important and stable supplier of food, especially soybeans, and enriched uranium, and we shall have to make certain that we fulfill our obligations.

-- We also want to make sure that they have confidence in our ability to sustain a consistent policy.

KOREA

-- I think it was very important for me to have gone to Korea. If I had not gone, the North Koreans might have underestimated our determination to support our friends as well as our commitment to stability in the area.

-- The Korean economic progress is astonishing. Seoul looks like a modern American city, with skyscrapers, cars and an obviously thriving economy. My welcome was amazing -- there must have been two million people lining the streets between the airport and the hotel.

-- I was very impressed by our troops in Korea. Their moral and their training are very high and I am glad I visited them so that they know we have not forgotten them.

-- President Park believes he is directly menaced by North Korean aggression and cited the recently discovered tunnel as evidence. He is going to want all the military aid that we can give him and regards the sustained level of our forces as vital, at least for the near term. He wants us to complete our program of assistance to the Modernization Plan for South Korean forces as soon as possible. I reaffirmed our support for the Plan.

-- I told President Park that we will keep our forces in Korea at present levels and that he can count on our continued military and economic assistance subject to Congressional funding limitations.

-- I also pointed out that we maintain our commitments in an era of detente and that we will not take actions that affect their interests without consulting them.



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VLADIVOSTOK SUMMIT

-- My summit talks with General Secretary Brezhnev I think clearly mark a significant change in the international environment.

-- There is absolutely no question about the success of our efforts in Vladivostok and I want everyone to hit this issue hard and demonstrate full Administration unanimity and enthusiasm about the SALT agreement.

-- There is some negative momentum building up and it is up to us to get across to the American people the deep significance of what we were able to achieve. We have put a cap on the arms race and will be creating a situation of stability which will greatly facilitate the negotiation of future arms control agreements.

-- Let me first outline the major provisions of the SALT agreement and some of the other discussions with Brezhnev in Vladivostok. Then Henry will give us some of the negotiating details and background and outline the work we have ahead of us in the next six months if we are to nail down the agreement with the Soviets in time for Brezhnev's visit.

-- The details of the agreement are as follows: Each side will be permitted 2400 strategic delivery vehicles and 1320 missiles equipped with MIRVs. The 2400 limit applies to all strategic delivery vehicles including ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers. It also includes other strategic delivery vehicles that might be deployed in the future such as land-mobile ICBMs or ICBMs dropped from airplanes. In this regard, I specifically agreed that air-launched ballistic missiles with a range greater than 600 kilometers would count in the 2400 total.

-- Besides SALT, we had brief discussions on the Middle East, Cyprus, the European Security Conference, and the Trade Bill legislation.

-- No new ground was broken in our review of the Cyprus and Middle Eastern situations; but it allowed me to underscore the need for restraint and responsible conduct by all parties, including the Soviets.



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-- On the European Security Conference, the Soviets are anxious to bring it to a summit-level conclusion. I pointed out that the major issues are those requiring resolution by the USSR and the Europeans, that we would continue to assist in the negotiating process, and that we had no objection to a summit when the results warranted it. I underlined that the Soviets could not expect us to pressure our allies, but that we would assist, with the possibility of concluding the conference in the spring of 1975.

-- On trade, the Soviets, of course, are distressed by the continuing lack of MFN and the linkage of trade with emigration. I reviewed the steps I am taking with the Congress on the Trade Bill.

-- Henry will now describe the recent negotiating history and go into more detail on the implications of the Vladivostok agreement.

At the end of the meeting:

-- Henry, thank you for your presentation. Your points concerning the criticisms we have been receiving are particularly well taken.


-- It is imperative that everyone in the Administration give enthusiastic support to the agreement and follow a consistent approach in public statement. I would like everyone to get out and support the agreement. Please coordinate with the NSC on the timing of your briefings, so we don't all do things on the same day. I think Henry plans a backgrounder tomorrow, don't you?

-- We want to be positive about the agreement, which represents a major achievement. The main points the critics have been making -- aggregate levels too high and no reductions, MIRV levels too high, no throw weight limits, and negotiations carried out in haste -- can be dealt with in a logical and persuasive way.

-- I have told the Congressional leadership that this agreement resets a cap on force levels, which will bring additional stability to the strategic arms competition.

-- The agreement establishes a basis of equality from which it will be easier to make subsequent reductions.

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-- On the relatively high level of the MIRV limits, we have to make it clear that these limits were simply the best we could negotiate. For over a year we attempted to negotiate much stricter limits, but the Soviets simply would not go along.

-- The present agreement leaves open all our options for responding to the Soviet MIRV program. If we decide it is necessary, we can increase our throw weight to the Soviet level, deploy land or air mobile ICBMs, or move part of our force to sea. We have not constrained our ability to do any of this.

-- We should emphasize the impetus this agreement will give to further negotiations. We have removed the terribly contentious issues of FBS and third-country forces. This means we can continue the talks on a strictly bilateral basis, focusing on U. S. and Soviet forces only. This will make it much easier to achieve further limits in the future.

-- Finally, the simple fact that we were able to reach agreement significantly reduces the fears both sides will have about an unrestrained arms race. Letting such fears run unchecked would have quickly led to a complete breakdown of our relationship.



Talking Points

NSC Meeting, December 2, 1974

-- You are all well aware of the internal deliberations we went through in September and October in analyzing various options for a 1985 agreement. Therefore, I'll concentrate on our exchanges with the Soviets over the last six or seven weeks.

-- Prior to my visit to the Soviet Union in October, the President decided on a proposal which was an amalgamation of several of the approaches which we had under discussion at that time. This proposal was submitted to the Soviet Union about a week prior to my visit in October.

... The proposal called for a equal aggregates at 2200 by 1985 with 1320 MIRVed missiles on each side.

... It also included a heavy missile MIRV ban, range limitations on air-to-surface missiles, and deployment rate limitations for new systems.

-- This proposal led to a Soviet counterproposal which was discussed in detail during my October visit.

... The Soviet counterproposal called for a 2400 Soviet versus 2200 US aggregate for the period of the agreement, with the US apparently entitled to 2400 launchers after 1985. However, British SLBMs were to be counted against the US total.


... Brezhnev accepted the proposed MIRV total of 1320 on each side, but insisted on no MLBM sublimits.

... In addition, a limit of 10 new Trident or Typhoon submarines would be imposed. Typhoon is the name Brezhnev gave to their future SSBN, apparently the follow-on to the D-class.

... They also proposed that ASMs on new bombers be limited to 2000-3000 km with the missiles counted in the aggregate. We clarified through Dobrynin that they did not intend that SRAMs deployed on the B-1 would be counted.

-- Clearly there were unacceptable provisions in the Soviet proposal; however, we felt that the Soviets were being forthcoming and that the prospects for agreement were favorable.

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-- At Vladivostok, the President accepted the Soviet proposal for a 2400 aggregate with MIRV total of 1320 on each side. However, in contrast to the Soviet proposal, our reply called for the 2400 aggregate to come into effect for the US at the end of 1983, with a US MIRV advantage of 1320 to 1120 balancing a Soviet advantage of 2400 to 2200 in the aggregate prior to that time.

-- We also proposed a sublimit of 180 on new heavy missiles (SS-18s) without specifying whether these missiles would be MIRVed. In return, we agreed to limit new heavy bombers to 250 and SLBMs on new types of submarines to 288 -- numbers more than adequate to permit completion of our B-1 and Trident programs.

-- At this point, Brezhnev indicated that he would prefer a simple agreement of 2400 aggregates and 1320 MIRV missiles, dropping the other provisions, with the exception of limitations on air-to-surface missiles.

-- We were hesitant to drop our attempts to get limits on Soviet heavy missiles, but after some deliberation, decided that we could go along with Brezhnev's proposal if he dropped his demand that air-to-surface missiles be limited.

-- The rest of the negotiations centered on air-to-surface missiles. In the end, we compromised by agreeing to count all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 600 kilometers within our 2400. Since we always expected to count intercontinental range ballistic air mobiles, the only concession this represented was to count "Skybolt-type" missiles.


-- Of lesser importance, but still of significance, we also agreed to carry over the Interim Agreement provisions banning the construction of new silos and the conversion of light ICBM launchers to heavy ICBM launchers.

Verification and Other Outstanding Issues

-- Even though we are well on our way to concluding a 1985 agreement, there are still some technical details which will remain to be worked out. In particular, there will have to be some collateral constraints to insure adequate verification of the MIRV limitations.

-- The Verification Panel Working Group has already commenced analyzing the collateral constraints question. We will be discussing this question in the Verification Panel prior to the resumption of the Geneva negotiations in January.

--(See Tab B for further talking points on outstanding issues should you wish to go into more detail.)



Criticisms

-- We have already heard considerable criticism. In particular, critics have made the following points:

- The aggregate total is too high and provides for only trivial Soviet reductions and a U.S. build up.

- The MIRV levels are astonishingly high and force a massive build up.

- There are no limits on throw weight, and, since the Soviet missiles are two to three times the size of U.S. missiles, this will give the Soviets a major advantage.

- The high MIRV levels, lack of throw weight restraints, and lack of serious reductions simply mean that the quantitative arms race will be channeled into a qualitative arms race.


- The entire agreement was negotiated in great haste, during a mere 36 hours in Vladivostok. We should not have given up on more serious restraints so easily.

-- It is not surprising that we have heard these arguments, especially considering that many of them come from people with a built-in bias. Each point can be easily rebutted; furthermore, it is important that the many positive aspects of the agreement be emphasized.

-- There is no need to have to oversell the agreement. Some of the points made by the critics would be valid except in the reality of the options available to us. The critics simply overlook the positive aspects and ignore the negotiating environment in which we are operating. In particular:

- While the total force levels are higher than we would have desired, they are considerably below the potential of both sides. Furthermore, they do require some Soviet reductions -- a major precedent setting step. (See Tab C for force projections.)

- The MIRV levels are also high. However, the U.S. could not have accepted significantly lower numerical MIRV limits without jeopardizing the Trident program, which is a key to maintaining a survivable deterrent force. Thus, we could have gotten lower Soviet limits only in an asymmetrical deal on aggregates. It would be inconceivable to expect the Soviets to agree to MIRV levels lower than those of the U.S. without some compensation in the aggregate numbers.



• Setting limits on throw weight was virtually impossible given the asymmetrical force structures of the two sides. Furthermore, the agreement does not prohibit our matching the Soviet throw weight if we feel we need to.

• The criticism that this agreement was negotiated too hastily is simply absurd. It is the product of all the negotiations which have taken place in Moscow, Washington, Geneva, and Vladivostok since the 1972 Summit. Furthermore, the basic equal aggregates approach is one which has played a central role in our deliberations for years now.

-- Perhaps more important than the specific criticisms, is the shortsightedness of the critics.

-- Most of them are, in effect, insisting that we should postpone any agreement with the Soviets until we can achieve a perfect agreement solving all problems. It is inconceivable that we could ever obtain such an agreement.


-- The critics compare the agreement with their own perception of the ideal agreement. The proper comparison is with no agreement at all, since that is the alternative we faced. Compared to no agreement, we have made a major step:

• We have kept the Soviet program considerably below every intelligence projection. Our intelligence projections showed a Soviet program of 3300 launchers, including 3100 MIRVed missiles, as a maximum possibility. Even the most likely program included 2600 launchers and 1950 MIRVed missiles.

• By putting the cap on total force levels, we add a major level of stability to the arms race. Each side can plan its forces against a much more accurate estimate of the other side's forces, rather than having to plan against the highest possible threat.


• The simple fact that we were able to reach agreement on the basis of equality should reduce fears on both sides.

• Finally, the Soviets had something of a point in their arguments concerning our forward bases and our allies forces. Certainly one could argue that British SLBMs, supplied by the United States, should be counted. Furthermore, we ourselves have admitted that our forward submarine bases increase the effectiveness of present forces stationed at these bases by at least 50 percent. Nevertheless, this agreement removes these terribly contentious issues from our future negotiations.



for a 10-year period. This alone is a major breakthrough, and was insisted upon by many of the very critics we are now facing.

-- In sum, Mr. President, I believe that if we explain and support the agreement, letting the logic of it support our reputation of our critics, we will have little trouble convincing both the Congress and the American people that it represents a major step forward in our pursuit of a safer world.



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MINUTES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Date: Monday, December 2, 1974

Time: 10:40 a.m. to 11:35 a.m.

Place: Cabinet Room, The White House

Subject: SALT

Principals

The President
 Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
 Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger
 Director of Arms Control and Disarmament
 Agency Fred Ikle
 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
 General George S. Brown
 Director of Central Intelligence
 William E. Colby


Other Attendees

State: Deputy Secretary Robert Ingersoll
 Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, U. S.
 Representative, SALT

Defense: Deputy Secretary William Clements

White House: Mr. Donald Rumsfeld, Counselor to the President
 Mr. Robert Hartman, Counselor to the President
 Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft

NSC: Mr. Jan M. Lodal



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MR 98-39, #11 ; NSC 68-2/11/98

By Lt NARA, Date 5/24/99

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President Ford: George, did you get caught up?

General Brown: I'm not sure. It was cold up there!

President Ford: It was real cold on our side. But I enjoyed the game. I guess Notre Dame didn't enjoy theirs.

Secretary Kissinger: Did you see that game on television?

President Ford: No.

Secretary Kissinger: In the first half Notre Dame looked great. I thought the Rose Bowl was ruined. Southern California looked pathetic.

President Ford: By New Year's I think they'll be okay.

Secretary Schlesinger: Will you be routing for the Big Ten, Mr. President?

President Ford: I will have to give my sympathies to the Big Ten. Woody Hayes has his faults, but I like his attitude.

I think the trips to Japan, South Korea, Vladivostok, and China produced excellent results. The initial reaction when I got back was all positive, particularly on the agreement in Vladivostok. I was glad that Jim indicated last Monday when I saw him his full agreement with the results at Vladivostok.

The initial press reaction was also good, but I had been disappointed in the last day or two. I was particularly disappointed with the Wall Street Journal editorial this morning. It is headlined, "Whose Triumph?" There have been many instances of uninformed and inaccurate statements. At the press conference tonight, I intend to take a very positive point of view. I think we obtained an excellent agreement, far better than what I personally thought we would achieve. I was also pleased with the way we developed a consensus here, and hope we can make some headway with Congress. Henry, do you talk to them tomorrow about trade?

Secretary Kissinger: Tomorrow I talk to them about trade, but I may answer some questions about this. I intend to background a group of leading columnists tomorrow, and brief the Foreign Relations Committee on Wednesday.

President Ford: I hope everyone in this room will speak out affirmatively on this, unless you have questions about it. If so, you should raise them here. I think it is a good agreement, and we can defend it



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before the Congress, the press, and the public. I understand that the Senate and House Armed Services Committees may call you, Jim, and perhaps George and Henry.

Secretary Schlesinger: Jackson's Subcommittee will.

President Ford: I don't know, but if you're not called, I think you might take the initiative and tell them that you are available. You and Henry both should talk to them.

In my judgment, it's a good agreement, better than I thought we would get, and we should not let the nitpickers undercut something that's in the best interest of the country. Unless I hear to the contrary from you, I will expect all of you to support it.

Now let me give you my impressions of the trip. First, before I left many people wondered why I was going. I would like to say that everything that could have been done here during that time was done in advance -- on the economy, the budget, and the state of the Union.

What did we accomplish? First, in Japan, it was vitally important that an American President go to Japan. To have backed out would have been disastrous. Our aim was to broaden our relations to cover problems such as energy and food. Some have alleged that the Tanaka resignation undercuts our efforts. We met with him, but we also met with many other officials. Whether we were meeting with Tanaka, Fukuda, Miki, or anyone else, we were in effect meeting with a consensus government. We discussed our broad relations, defense, and other issues. I spoke on the need for Japan to increase its aid to South Vietnam. I think it was \$64 million last year, and I suggested going to \$120 million. They said they would take it under advisement. I let them know how strongly we feel about this. If they do increase, it will help our own efforts.

There was some criticism of the visit to South Korea. But to not go would have been misunderstood by North Korea and questioned by our allies. George, I went to the Second Division; it was really inspirational. General Emerson is something! He has made it into a first-class fighting organization with the right attitude and morale. I hope our other 14 or 15 Divisions have the same attitude.

General Brown: We are delighted when you can find time to visit the units like that.

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President Ford: They are great kids with a good leader. You can definitely be proud of them.

Deputy Secretary Clements: Emerson is a good guy.

President Ford: I was forthright in talking to Park and indicated that we don't agree with some of his oppressive domestic tactics. But on the other hand, it doesn't hurt to have a strong leader in that part of the country, with all the problems there.

In Vladivostok, General Secretary Brezhnev and I established a good working relationship. He knows I was firm, and I understand his firmness. We were both acting in the best interest of our countries.

The main accomplishment was that we went from non-equivalence to equivalence. We agreed on a limit of 2400 on the aggregates and 1320 on the number of MIRV missiles. There's no compensation for FBS or the nuclear capability of the French and the British. I think we came away with a good agreement. George, I think you understand the 600 km range limitation -- anything more would be counted, anything less not counted.

We put a cap on the arms race. Sure, we would have liked to have gotten 1700 or 2000, but these were negotiations. I was looking at the estimates of the intelligence community and when I saw that the minimum, median, and maximum were all higher than the limit we negotiated, I see that where we ended up was very good. If the public is given this information, I think they will agree. There are people on either side, both the left and the right, who don't understand the facts.

Mr. Colby: Mr. President, that is equally true on MIRVs (shows chart).

President Ford: Right -- I looked at the figures. How much of this can we safely let out?

Mr. Colby: Many of these projections are judgmental and might be open to attack.

Secretary Schlesinger: You can make two observations. First, it is universally recognized that the Soviet program could go beyond 2400 SDVs, and second, the numbers here are lower than the numbers in the Interim Agreement.

Ambassador Johnson: We also got a start on controlling MIRVs.



Secretary Kissinger: You can make an absolutely flat statement that these numbers are below what the Soviets could have done in the absence of the agreement and below the numbers permitted in the Interim Agreement. They wanted a thousand MIRVs and a five-year agreement and we knew that was their minimum program.

Ambassador Johnson: Will you give out the numbers tonight?

Secretary Kissinger: I'm going to see Dobrynin at 2:30, and I am sure we will be able to give out the numbers, although there are a few other minor problems being worked out.

Ambassador Johnson: That will be helpful if you can give out the numbers.

President Ford: I agree. We have to go on the attack. I have no qualms about the agreement; I think it was good. At the end of the first night, Henry, I didn't think we would come out this well.

Secretary Kissinger: When we talked the next morning, we thought we would have to show more flexibility. I had got in touch with Jim, and we wanted to protect the SRAM on the B-1 -- nothing else. As it turned out, we did a hell of a lot better than that. There are many things we accomplished -- equal aggregates; no FBS compensation; no compensation for the Chinese or what they have called geographic disparities. These are all out for a ten-year period. And anyone who talks about strategic superiority -- our FBS might not be worth much in a second strike, but in a first strike, they could do a lot of damage to the Soviet Union --

Secretary Schlesinger: I hope you will not use that argument publicly!

Secretary Kissinger: The Soviets are concerned about FBS. Grechko once showed me a map showing the capabilities.

We would not trade our forces in the 1980's for theirs, and we have great flexibility. If we want more throw weight, we can deploy a bigger missile. We can put missiles on aircraft. We have 200 extra launchers we can play with. We could go heavier on Trident if we wanted to.

Secretary Schlesinger: We shall.

Secretary Kissinger: We know they plan 200 or more mobiles, and these will now have to come out of their ceiling. We got far beyond what we thought we could.



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A number of people have argued that this was a quickie deal. That is nonsense. We had several NSC meetings here. Then the President in October ordered a combination of the Chiefs position and some MIRV limits. In Moscow we started with two gory days of battle. Finally, on Saturday, I took Brezhnev aside and told him that if we had no agreement, we were going to increase our force levels. I also told him that it was important to agree in 1975 because 1976 was an election year. I told him the President could go either way. He called a politburo meeting and came back and proposed equal aggregates in 1985, but unequal in the Interim. The U.S. would be limited to 2200. There would also be a 2000 kilometer limit on ASM range and a limit of ten on the number of Tridents and "Typhoons".

At one point he proposed a limit on their 160 bomber -- I said we would trade the B-3 for that! (laughter)

But this was the state we were in after my trip to Moscow. After our deliberations here, the President then ordered that we propose to accept the unequal aggregates through 1973, but with a MIRVed differential to offset it plus a sublimit on heavy missiles with MIRVs.

We met for six hours the first evening. Brezhnev even cancelled a state dinner he had planned. He started out insisting that we count the British and the French submarines and accept a 3000 kilometer limit on ASMs. He had two generals sitting behind him and every time he moved, they came up with a piece of paper.

Secretary Schlesinger: We could arrange that for you also, Mr. President! (laughter)

Secretary Kissinger: You should have seen how he solved that problem-- He insisted that we continue in a restricted meeting!

Ambassador Johnson: Do you know who they were?

Secretary Kissinger: One was the Deputy Chief of their general staff -- Hyland knows both of them.

In the end, we proposed a limit of 200 on MLBMs MIRVs. Their people said they were not planning any more, but their generals, and generals must be the same the world over, would not give up rights to have more. I think they were stupid. They will have to count all their 18s as MIRVs or keep the 9 in the force.



With what we came up with, what difference does it make whether the ceiling was 2400 or 2200. There's no difference. When people say we have negotiated to leave a machine gun in everyone's hands, that is nonsense. An overkill capability exists at any level.

Secretary Schlesinger: We should stay away from that argument publicly. We are trying to get our defense budget passed, and if we tell them we have overkill, it won't help.

President Ford: Now that we have set a cap, we have to fight to keep our forces up to the agreed level.

Secretary Kissinger: If the Congress does not agree to keep our forces up, they are buying perceived inferiority. All the arguments we made before on the defense program can be made now.

I would also like to say that I think this could have been done only at the Summit. Semenov could never have agreed to equal aggregates with no compensation.

Ambassador Johnson: I said right here in this room that it would be very difficult to get equal aggregates in 1985 -- I made that point at every opportunity.

President Ford: I remember that.

Secretary Kissinger: I think our allies will see this as an unbelievable achievement. We have gotten rid of the FBS problem for 10 years. They didn't even ask for noncircumvention.

Ambassador Johnson: Is that still open?

Secretary Kissinger: I think we would have to do it if they asked.

Ambassador Johnson: If it's properly framed, it's probably in our interest so that they can't build up their non-central system.

President Ford: What does this mean?

Secretary Kissinger: This is a question of agreeing not to circumvent the limits by building up systems not covered.

I think we were able to get the agreement for several reasons. Brezhnev was dealing with a new President, and wanted to do so in a constructive way. Detente has been under attack, and he knew he would be dealing



with the President who could be around for six years and was not a lame duck. He wanted to strengthen detente. And I think he was somewhat afraid of an arms race with the U.S. He knew you were making final plans for your defense budget. Finally, Brezhnev wanted, with the new President, to get off in the right direction. But this agreement could not have been made at any lower level.

Without the agreement, the total would have been even higher again and we would have been less capable of getting an agreement later. On MIRVs, the only way we could have gotten a lower level was to have a big program of our own. Once the Russians would see what Congress was doing, we would never get agreement. If we hadn't done this, we would have been in the worst possible position -- no programs and no agreement -- if we had stuck at 2100.

President Ford: The next Congress will give us even more trouble. I think one thing that might have helped was that in my opening statement I told Brezhnev that I had to decide on our defense budget very soon.

Secretary Kissinger: One of the dangers is that if we try to drive the defense budget down now, there are a thousand ways to hang up the agreement between now and the next Summit. If the Soviets really believe that we haven't a chance of meeting our levels, they could hang it up. This is why we have to have at least Jim's budget. I'm opposed to cutting it in the executive branch.

If this agreement becomes like the trade issue, I think we will see a massive reversal of the Soviet position on detente. This agreement will not be easy for Brezhnev. For him, every weapon comes out of somebody's pocket. The levels permit us to go up.

President Ford: We have even more flexibility than we would have under the 2200 limit in 1983.

Secretary Kissinger: In China, nothing helped as much as having made the agreement in Vladivostok. In our first meeting, the Chinese said "we hear that our relations are not so good. That's not true on our side; is it true on your side?" On the other hand, the fact that you are going to go to China will help tremendously with the Soviets. We have this triangular game going again as a result of Vladivostok. The more we talk Soviet strategic superiority, the more it hurts us with China. It's imperative that they not believe we are inferior militarily to the Soviets. We can make a good case here for this agreement.

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President Ford: Brezhnev started out charging that we had violated the agreement, talking about covers over our silos. He had his generals there --

Secretary Kissinger: He kept saying that Kissinger tells us the concrete gets soft without the covers! (laughter)

President Ford: We agreed that neither party can build new missile silos.

Secretary Kissinger: The Soviets had no objection to counting land mobiles.

Secretary Schlesinger: Mr. President, you can win on this -- you've got the high ground. This is an equal agreement. Some will say that until 1980, it will reduce the incentive for reductions. But you can say that we want reductions, are prepared for them, and hope to induce the Soviets to reduce, but we will not reduce unilaterally as long as I am President of the United States.

As you said, we did better than we expected, but don't say that publicly! In the next round, Brezhnev will not ask how soft your position is. You held on equal numbers and no FBS. We should come up with the right position and stick with it.

In the area of violations, you do have some vulnerability. People will say that even if the agreement is good, how do we know the Soviets will hold to it if they violate their existing agreements? This has to be thought out with considerable care. With respect to SALT I, you can simply say that there are ambiguities and that we are going to discuss them with the Soviets.

President Ford: And we have a good system of verification.

Secretary Kissinger: You can say that if we are convinced of a violation, we will take action. There are always ambiguities and we will get clarification. If we don't get clarification, we will take action.

I agree with Jim -- we should be positive about this. But I think it is equally important that we do not say that this proves what we can get if we were tough. We should say that both sides looked at the situation and concluded that this was right. It would not hurt to praise Soviet statesmanship somewhat. If we say that this proves what a tough



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President can achieve, this will simply force the Soviets to be tougher in the future. We should say that we stuck with a reasonable position and the Soviets responded in a statesman like manner.

Deputy Secretary Clements: I would like to endorse what Jim said about reductions. I talked to Brent about this -- we should emphasize that further talks will start not later than 1980 as agreed. The public wants some reduction of the threshold. We should emphasize that we had to first cap off the race, then discuss reductions.

President Ford: I raised this with the Congressional leadership; we can and will emphasize this point.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree. The point was that with the forces going up, we didn't have an agreed base from which to begin reductions. We should calmly speak about reductions, but not be too anxious on reductions. First, we have to support our defense budget. And second, we don't want the Soviets to get the idea that we are so anxious for changes in the agreement until we get this one signed and sealed.

Secretary Schlesinger: We can say that we are prepared for reductions and that this provides the basis for reductions.

Secretary Kissinger: Exactly.

President Ford: Jim, I want to talk to you about your budget levels. I understand you want about \$95 billion and OMB wants about \$93 billion. I want to talk to you, George, and Henry about both the substance of your request and this question of perceptions related to the agreement. Do you want \$95 billion?

Secretary Schlesinger: \$94.6 billion in outlays. But the real problem is in TOA. We have to make good significant underfunding in our procurement because of inflation. To be frank, we can manage outlay somewhat. The outlays this year are less serious. We can make \$94.6 billion in outlays without reducing our programs.

President Ford: For procurement?

Secretary Schlesinger: Total, including procurement. The FY 75 budget was first projected out to \$93 billion, but then we have projected the inflation since then. I think Roy has agreed to \$94 billion, but I would like for him to speak for himself.



President Ford: We should get together and discuss this on both substance and perception grounds.

Secretary Schlesinger: There is one other question, on throw weight. On this you can say that throw weight is just one variable. We are prepared to agree on limits, but it requires unilateral (sic) agreement. But the agreement you have made does not permit them to outclass us. There is no limit on throw weight. From an arms control standpoint, it would be more advantageous for both sides to agree to limits on throw weight.

President Ford: We have the flexibility to increase our throw weight; we have the flexibility to deploy a new larger land-based missile or deploy missiles on aircraft. We can do this if our military decide they want to go up from our present throw weight to a substantially larger throw weight.

It was interesting that when this topic came up, Brezhnev drew silos. He and Henry got into an argument about whether we are expanding our throw weight. Henry pointed out that they were digging their silos deeper.

Secretary Kissinger: His argument was that to deploy their new missiles they were making their silos narrower. I said yes, but that they were digging them deeper. Brezhnev said "you were more farsighted -- you left room in your silos to deploy larger missiles, and I know you are doing it. Kissinger keeps trying to tell us that the covers are there because of the sun and the rain, but he knows it's because you're deploying larger missiles." He said we were increasing our silos by 15% and deploying a new missile up to 200 tons in weight. He said he knows we can increase 15%, but pointed out that even the existing holes can take bigger missiles. He said "I don't object," and said repeatedly that they were deploying no new silos.

Secretary Schlesinger: If he were smart they would object and accept restraints on themselves in return for restraints on us.

Secretary Kissinger: If he were smart, but he was taking his military's position into account.

Secretary Schlesinger: Most of what was in the Wall Street editorial was nonsense. Mr. President, you can say categorically that you have not put the U.S. in a position of inferiority.



Secretary Kissinger: This agreement will not put us in a position of inferiority. If we are inferior, it will be by our own decision, but I wouldn't say that publicly.

President Ford: Should we think of a rebuttle to this editorial?

Secretary Schlesinger: We should get the other side out -- these criticisms are all being fed by the Jackson staff.

Counselor Rumsfeld: Perhaps you could use this exchange of aide memoires. Since the President has now come out with the details, they could get off the hook, now that they have the numbers.

President Ford: The editorial says they have 500 medium bombers in Cuba. George is that right?

Secretary Schlesinger: Maybe they're talking about Backfire.

General Brown: They have 135 Bears, 35 Bisons, and 35 Backfires.

Secretary Kissinger: They are talking about bombers going to Cuba and back?

Secretary Clements: They're talking about the Badgers.

Secretary Schlesinger: Those are offsets to our FBS.

President Ford: Logistically, they have no armaments in Cuba and they aren't prepared to operate there.

Secretary Kissinger: If our Air Force saw these bombers heading to Cuba after launch --

President Ford: If they launch 500 aircraft, we're not going to sit around and let them have a free ride.

I have another meeting in five or ten minutes so unless there are any questions, perhaps we should wrap up -- Fred?

Dr. Ikle: On verification, I think it is important if we can be very forthcoming on the covers. Otherwise, we will lose our argumentation on that.

President Ford: I'm not sure I understand you --



Dr. Ikle: The Soviets have argued that we cover our missiles, and if we don't agree to do something about it, they will argue that they can cover theirs. We don't want this.

Secretary Kissinger: We scheduled a Verification Panel meeting to look at both these compliance issues and the whole verification question, prior to another NSC. We should be prepared for an NSC within a month.

Secretary Schlesinger: Mr. President, the attack will probably come from the left, not the right. The Jackson staff has gone haywire on this, and I think Scoop will suffer for it. Jackson has always argued for equal aggregates, and you got that.

Secretary Kissinger: The problem will come from the left. But we can say we will put a ceiling on. There were two alternatives -- to let the Soviets increase, only to counter their build-up, and continue to build on both sides, or the agreement.

Dr. Ikle: How soon will the negotiations on further reductions be resumed?

President Ford: We have to get this one signed and sealed first, but we are flexible. Sometime between 1975 and 1980 we can move for additional reductions.

Dr. Ikle: Now that we have this framework, we can add additional restraints.

Secretary Kissinger: But our major object is to get this agreement signed. We should not get too cute about further reductions and restraints until we get this one signed.

President Ford: We will have 4 1/2 years subsequent to getting this one completed for the other matters.

Secretary Schlesinger: I'm not sure some of this attack isn't beneficial. If the whole attack were from the left, you might have even more of a problem.

President Ford: We need to be unified and forthright. We should make a maximum effort in the coming days.



TOM

6091X

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 12, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: Jeanne W. Davis *JWD*

SUBJECT: Minutes of NSC Meeting,
December 2

Attached are Jan Lodal's minutes of the December 22, NSC meeting for your approval and the President's file.

I have kept a copy for the official NSC records.

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