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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

October 17, 1974

MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Friday, October 18, 1974

3:00 p.m. - 4:30 p.m. (90 minutes)

The Cabinet Room

From: Henry A. Kissinger *HK*

I. PURPOSE

To review alternative SALT proposals for discussion with the Soviets during my trip to Moscow next week.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS ARRANGEMENTS

A. Background: Since the last NSC meeting, we have continued with the analyses of alternative proposals for a SALT agreement. These proposals form the basis for discussion at this meeting.

The proposals fall into three basic categories:

1. An effort to achieve nominal parity by the two sides, by pressing for equal numerical limits on central strategic systems. Both sides would be free to make qualitative improvements. This option could result in a massive technological arms race in unrestrained characteristics, such as MIRVs.
2. An attempt to achieve a great degree of parity between the forces of the two sides, by proposing equal numerical limits, equal throw weight of missiles and equal throw weight of MIRVed missiles. This proposal, with any numbers that would be meaningful, would require a major restructuring of Soviet strategic forces. Its negotiability is therefore close to zero.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.

MR 98-40, #5; State letter 9/25/98

By *lit* NARA, Date 10/21/98



A variation of this proposal would replace the throw weight limits with equal limits on MIRVed missiles and with limits on bombers and heavy missiles. This would retain many of the advantages of the original and would be somewhat less obnoxious to the Soviets.

3. An effort at balancing our advantages in MIRVs against the Soviet advantages in throw weight and in numbers of missiles. This proposal could permit some progress toward a useful agreement. While the approach might have the appearance of inequality, any inequalities would be without strategic significance if they were properly balanced.

After your opening remarks, I suggest you confirm with Bill Colby that there is no significant new intelligence information and then ask me to present the results of the analytical work prepared by the Verification Panel. (VP paper at Tab B.)

(The SALT negotiations in Geneva have now been underway for four weeks, but have made little progress.)

- B. Participants: (List at Tab A)
- C. Press Arrangements: The fact of the meeting, but not the subject, will be announced. There will be a White House photographer.

III. TALKING POINTS

- A. At the Opening of the Meeting
 1. The purpose of this meeting is to continue our review of alternative SALT proposals which we could give to the Soviets.
 2. Bill (Colby), can we assume there have been no developments of significance since our last meeting?
 3. Henry, would you give us a rundown on where we stand on the alternative SALT proposals which have been developed.



B. At the Close of the Meeting

1. Clearly, there are quite different concepts of how to attack the problem of achieving a reasonable strategic balance through SALT.
2. What we need to do is to try as best we can to find common ground with the Soviets for a mutually acceptable SALT agreement. We cannot be cynical, saying we want an agreement but making proposals which will not work.
3. Based on this discussion, I will decide how we should proceed. I may want to present only one proposal, all of them, or some hybrid combination.
4. Meanwhile, I expect all of you to insure that none of this ends up in the newspapers.



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WITHDRAWAL ID 09159

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Talking Paper
CREATOR'S NAME Henry Kissinger
RECEIVER'S NAME President Ford
TITLE Secretary Kissinger's Talking Points,
NSC Meeting, 10/18/74
CREATION DATE 10/18/1974
VOLUME 15 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 031200006
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Security Council Meetings File
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DATE WITHDRAWN 02/25/1998
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Serialized 6/19/03

SECRETARY KISSINGER'S
TALKING POINTS
NSC MEETING
October 18, 1974

DECLASSIFIED • E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.8
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (a)

MR 98-40 #6; DOD Ltr 11/6/02

By dee NARA Date 6/19/03

Background and Issues

-- Mr. President, as you directed at the last NSC meeting, the Verification Panel has been refining the basic options which illustrate the issues we discussed at our earlier meeting.


-- Before we go into the options, however, it might be useful for Alex Johnson to give a brief rundown of what has happened in Geneva. The Geneva talks are continuing without a recess, at the Soviet request, and Alex will be returning to Geneva early next week to continue his discussion with Semenov.

[After Johnson's remarks:]

-- As you recall, we discussed last week the five major issues we face in structuring a US proposal.

• Equal Aggregates. This is a simple and straightforward concept which puts a minimum restraint on US forces. It is likely, however, to encounter Soviet objections because of FBS, and it leaves unconstrained the Soviet throw weight advantage and the Soviet MIRV potential.

• Missile Throw Weight Limits. This strikes at a major Soviet advantage, on the other hand, at the levels we have discussed we will force major negotiations problems.



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
• MIRV Limitations. A major part of our negotiating effort has been directed toward MIRV limits. But thus far the Soviets have not been willing to concede us a significant advantage in numbers of MIRV launchers, even in the context of a three-year extension of the Interim Agreement.

• Balanced Advantages. Under this concept, we would try to strike a balance between various aspects of the two forces in which the US advantage in MIRV numbers would be offset by a Soviet advantage in launcher numbers. This approach might overcome some of our negotiating problems. However, an asymmetries approach would depart from the principle of equality and leave Soviet throw weight advantages relatively unconstrained.

• Reductions. Finally, there is general agreement on the desirability of reductions, but a major problem is that the Soviets are starting from a higher level than we are, so that equal reductions will cut deeper into their forces than into ours.

Options

-- Mr. President, with our previous discussion in mind, the Verification Panel has spent the time since our last meeting on reviewing and refining the options in a way that will illustrate the issues we must address in defining a US SALT proposal. We have boiled down our analysis to four basic illustrative options.



Option A. Equal Aggregates of Central Systems

Key Provisions

1. Aggregate levels

- Equal initial aggregate level: 2500
- Reductions to equal aggregate level by 1985: 2000

2. Equal sublimit on MLBMs: 300

3. Other features

- No MIRV limitations
- No direct limits on throw weight
- No constraints on freedom-to-mix

-- This option is based on the premise that equality in aggregate numbers of central systems is the most visible and easily perceived measure of essential equivalence. Equality in the number of central systems has been an essential element of the US approach to SALT since mid-1970.


-- The option stresses conceptual simplicity by its proposal of exact symmetry across a limited number of provisions, and its lack of MIRV and throw weight constraints and their potential verification problems.

-- The Soviets would have to reduce about 600 from their projected force of 2600

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-- The US would have to eliminate 54 Titan ICBMs and 250 older bombers (B-52s) -- system we plan to phase out anyway.

- . The Soviets would presumably MIRV all of their ICBMs, including 300 heavies. They would also MIRV a large fraction of their SLBM force.
- . In total, they could MIRV up to 1800 missiles -- the same number we project them to MIRV in the absence of an agreement.
- . In order to keep pace we would have to MIRV all our ICBM force, including 250 new ICBMs in the 7000-pound throw weight class.
- . We would probably be able to retain our lead in missile RVs under this agreement but the Soviets would have a substantial throw weight advantage.

-- As I pointed out at the last meeting, if we proposed an option like this with no MIRV constraints, the Soviets would probably be very suspicious of our intentions. They would probably suspect that we were getting ready for an all-out qualitative arms race.

-- An agreement like this would probably also generate considerable criticism domestically; it could hardly be called arms control.




-- Summarizing the advantages and disadvantages of this option:

- . Simple and symmetrical, easily perceived as providing basic equality.
- . Avoids verification problems associated with MIRV and throw weight limits, and negotiating their collateral constraints.
- . Clearly consistent with Congressional concerns for equal levels of strategic forces.

-- Disadvantages:

- . Does not constrain competition and buildup of MIRV and throw weight capability within the numerical limits.
- . Equality in aggregate number of central systems would be difficult to negotiate.
- . Would represent a failure to achieve publicly declared US and Soviet goals of SALT which have stressed the need to control qualitative competition.
- . Major departure from past negotiating record.



Option B. Equal Aggregates with Equal Throw Weight Limits

Key Provisions

- 1. Aggregate levels
 - Equal initial aggregate level: 2500
 - Reductions to equal aggregate level by 1985: 2000
- 2. Equal missile throw weight at 8 million pounds for each side, reducing to 6 million pounds by 1985
- 3. Equal MIRV missile throw weight at 4 million pounds
- 4. Equal "Heavy Delivery Systems" (heavy bombers plus MLBMs), initially 500 for each side, reducing to 250 by 1985.

-- This option also provides for equal aggregates at 2000, but in addition contains a highly restrictive MIRVed throw weight limitation of 4 million pounds, and a similarly restrictive missile throw weight limitation of 6 million pounds. A sublimit of 250 on "heavy strategic systems", that is, bombers and heavy missiles, would also be included.

As we discussed at the last meeting, this type of agreement would have little impact on our MIRV programs.

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

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- We would have better than a 2 to 1 advantage in RVs under this option.
- Missile throw weight would be equal on the two sides because of the limitations in the option. However, we would have a substantial advantage in bomber payload unless the Soviets deployed a new heavy bomber, which is highly unlikely.
- We would clearly have severe negotiating problems if we proposed such an agreement since we would be asking them to make drastic changes in the current force plans.
- The Soviets would view this option as a step backward in our negotiating position since we offered them a better MIRV force when we were discussing extending the Interim Agreement to 1980.

-- In sum, the pros and cons are:

- Equal aggregate provides easily perceived equality.
- Equal missile throw weight and MIRV throw weight limits would sharply constrain Soviet programs and reduce or eliminate Soviet MLBMs, would not seriously limit current US programs.



3. Equal "Heavy Delivery Systems" (heavy bombers plus MLBMs), initially 500 for each side, reducing to 250 by 1985.
4. No increase in number of MLBM launchers.

-- This option is based on the premise that equivalence can more readily be achieved by balancing existing asymmetries than by removing them. It is designed to balance a Soviet advantage in overall numbers of central systems with a US advantage in numbers of permitted MIRVed launchers.

-- This approach is responsive to the current force plans on the two sides since the Soviets are projected to have a larger aggregate in 1985.

-- Under this option, we could deploy a fully MIRVed SLBM force of about 736 launchers and 550 MIRVed ICBMs, some of which could be new Minuteman IV missiles of up to 7000-pound throw weight.

-- The Soviets could deploy their projected force of 600 MIRVed 17s and 19s and 400 MIRVed SLBMs. They would be permitted to retain their heavy missiles, although MIRVing of these missiles would be prohibited.

-- We would retain a large advantage in numbers of weapons to counter the Soviet advantage in missile throw weight.



-- MIRVed throw weight on the two sides would be roughly equal if we chose to deploy about 250 Minuteman IV.

-- This option is similar to that which we pursued earlier this year where the Soviets would have been permitted to retain their Interim Agreement numerical advantage until 1980 in exchange for a US advantage in MIRVed launchers.

-- The main argument against this option has been that the unequal aggregates would lead to a perception of US inferiority. However,

. I do not believe the Congress, the American people, or our Allies have such a simplistic view of the strategic balance that they ignore all considerations other than the number of missiles and bombers.

. The extra 200 missiles the Soviets would have would all be low-capability, older, and unMIRVed.

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. In the absence of an arms control agreement, there is no question but that we would choose to have relatively smaller numbers of higher capability systems, rather than sacrificing quality for quantity. Thus, to argue



against a disparity in launchers is to argue that we cannot accept in an agreement what we would inevitably do without an agreement.

- Finally, no one has proposed agreeing to an inequality in total levels without a compensating US advantage in other areas, such as a number of MIRV launchers.

-- In summary, the advantages and disadvantages of the offsetting asymmetries approach are as follows:

- Compensating asymmetries may be more negotiable than equal aggregates since it reflects difference in base line force levels for the two sides (2500 Soviet vs. 2000 US).
- Gives the US a MIRV launcher number advantage, levels off Soviet MIRV program well below projected numbers.
- Would ban MIRVs on heavy missiles and reduce their number, resulting in ceilings on missile and MIRV throw weight.

-- Disadvantages:

- Unequal aggregates might mean that some would perceive a Soviet strategic superiority;
- Does not directly constrain competition in throw weight or RVs, does not discourage (and could encourage) new programs such as M-X, D-5, and Soviet follow-on missiles.



- . MLBM MIRV ban could be difficult to negotiate.
- . Verification would require collateral constraints which might be difficult to negotiate.

Option D. Equal Deployment Rights

Key Provisions

1. Aggregate levels

- Initially present aggregate levels on each side
- Choice of one of two force levels by 1985:
 - . Aggregate of 2000 with 1300 MIRV launchers
 - . Aggregate of 2200 with 1050 MIRV launchers

2. MLBMs and heavy bombers

- Equal "Heavy Delivery Systems" (heavy bombers plus MLBMs), initially 500 for each side, reducing to 250 by 1985
- No MLBM MIRVs

3. Medium and light missiles limited to a total of 7.5 million pounds throw weight and 10,000 RVs.

-- This option is based on equal deployment rights, giving each side a choice of emphasizing total number of launchers or number of MIRV launchers.



-- It is also designed to achieve equality in heavy systems through equal sublimits and a MLBM MIRV ban, and to limit competition in medium and light missiles through throw weight and RV ceilings.

-- This option is really just a variant of the balancing asymmetries approach which incorporates the idea of equal rights in order to give a clearer perception of equality.

-- There is little question that under such an agreement we would choose the higher MIRVed launcher number, while the Soviets would choose the higher aggregate level, so that the outcome would not be any different than under the third option. However, the "equal rights" might eliminate some squabbling about "perceptions."

-- The force structures under this option would be approximately the same as those under the third option since the RV and throw weight limits proposed, 7-1/2 million pounds of throw weight and 10,000 RVs, are not very restrictive. The only significant difference would be that we could not deploy more than about 100 Minuteman IV without exceeding the RV limit.

-- Thus, the pros and cons of this option are essentially those of the previous option, with the following exceptions:

- The "equal rights" approach might help with perceptions.
- There would be a ceiling on throw weight and RVs, which could help increase confidence in strategic stability.



- . The RV limit would be hard to verify and the throw weight limit hard to negotiate.

Conclusions

-- Mr. President, before asking the group to discuss their views on those packages, I would like to recall that these options were defined primarily in order to illustrate the problems we face in devising a US SALT proposal.

-- In considering the approach you will want to take with the Soviet leaders, none of these options in its pure form is likely to satisfy the conflicting requirements put on us by our own force plans, the structure of Soviet forces and the history of these negotiations to date.

-- It is quite possible that selective approach will be the best one, incorporating elements from various options into a final package.

-- I believe an important conclusion which can be drawn from the Verification Panel's work -- and from the entire history of SALT -- is that it is very difficult to find any single measure or group of measures which will maximize all our advantages in terms of security, political and negotiating concerns. The best we can do is to select the goals that are the most important to us and attempt to achieve them in the realization that there will be a price to pay somewhere else.



-- I believe the Verification Panel and the Working Group have done an outstanding job the last few weeks in refining the analysis in a way that illustrates the issues in the clearest possible way.

-- At this point, perhaps my colleagues would like to discuss their own views of the options and the rationale underlying them.



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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INFORMATION


MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: Jeanne W. Davis *jw*
SUBJECT: Minutes of NSC Meeting,
October 18, 1974

Attached are Jan Lodal's minutes of last Friday's NSC meeting.
I have kept a copy for the formal meeting record.

Attachment

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ATTACHMENTS

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 09160

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Minute
CREATOR'S NAME Jan Lodal
RECEIVER'S NAME Brent Scowcroft
TITLE Minutes, National Security Council
Meeting, 10/18/74
CREATION DATE 10/18/1974
VOLUME 39 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 031200006
COLLECTION TITLE National Security Adviser. National
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DATE WITHDRAWN 02/25/1998
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*1st 32 pages sanitized under NSC letter 2/10/99
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REDACTED *12/2/09*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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MINUTES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

DATE: Friday, October 18, 1974
TIME: 3:40 p.m. to 5:45 p.m.
PLACE: Cabinet Room, The White House
SUBJECT: Mid East Status, SALT

Principals

The President
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger
Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Fred Ikle
Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General
David C. Jones
Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby

Other Attendees

State: Deputy Secretary Robert Ingersoll
Defense: Deputy Secretary William Clements
CIA: Mr. Carl Duckett
White House: Mr. Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the
President
Lt Gen Brent Scowcroft
NSC: Jan M. Lodal *ml*

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ - XGDS

DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
MR # 08-60, #21
NSC letter 12/2/09
By *dal* NARA, Date 1/4/10



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MIDDLE EAST

President Ford: It is nice to have you here. In the last day or so, Henry has filled me in on the results of his trip to the Mid East, but he might not have had a chance to do the same with the rest of you. I thought I might ask him to take ten minutes and give this group the benefit of what his trip brought.

Secretary Kissinger: The trip was arranged at the urgent request of Sadat who wanted to try to bring about a cooling off in the area. He made several approaches to the President; Asad finally joined in the request. We had no precise idea where we would go. But it quickly became apparent that Sadat knew what he was talking about -- the Mid East was extremely tense and uncertain. There were many factors -- the Mid East Summit next week; the unanticipated change of Presidents here, and the question of whether this change meant a change in U.S. policy; pressures from the radicals; and the oil problem.

The major purpose of the trip was to try to get a new round of negotiations started.


I might add that the Israelis also face considerable uncertainty. They have a new government with a small majority and events seem to be closing in on them.

As I said, the major purpose was to get a new round of negotiations started. The secondary purpose was the oil problem, which I raised only quietly. I didn't want to be seen as being there primarily because of the oil problem.

In the Mid East, there are three categories of problems:

- Territorial.
- The Palestinians.
- Jerusalem.

I have always told everyone that Jerusalem would have to come last, that to raise it now would tie up the talks. So it never came up.



On the territorial problems, there is Egypt, which is the easiest; the West Bank, which is the next easiest; and Syria, which is the most impossible. The West Bank is next easiest only if Jordan is the one negotiating. If the PLO negotiates, the West Bank becomes by far the most difficult problem. Of course, while we were there, the PLO issue came up in the UN.

President Ford: We were a very small minority -- something like 4 out of 110.

Secretary Kissinger: That was expected. I told everyone we would be in a very small minority because we were not killing ourselves over the issue. Faisal understood this. We paid no price with the Arabs for our PLO vote in the UN.

The easiest thing to do next is to get negotiations under-way between Egypt and Israel, if the other Arabs will tolerate it, and if others don't make demands which undermine the position of Sadat. Israel wants a political settlement. For Sadat to negotiate with Israel alone is an unbelievable political act in itself. But if he has to certify that the talks are political, the situation becomes impossible.

Sadat has to go to the Summit next week and say there is no set position yet.

Asad is determined that there not be separate negotiations. He says this three times a week in his local newspapers. He says there will not be any movement with Egypt alone if there is nothing for Syria. His position is that only all Arabs can negotiate. He believes that all Arabs should negotiate all territorial problems, that all Arabs should negotiate the Palestinian problem, and then all the Arabs should negotiate the Jerusalem problem. He and the Soviets have pushed for reconvening the Geneva Conference. The Soviets know that in separate negotiations they will be excluded. In a large conference, they can maximize their influence.

This is the minefield we have to run through. It is essential that no impression be given that any particular negotiating approach has been agreed. All of those who want separate negotiations have to go to the Summit portraying an open mind. This is especially true of those taking a moderate line -- Egypt, Faisal, and Morocco.



Syria and Jordan constitute a separate problem. Syria is trying to line up other Arab support for its position against separate negotiations.

If we can hold Faisal with Sadat, we have practically got it wrapped up. Saqqaf made a statement at the airport in which he said he used to have doubts about Kissinger's negotiating approach, but he was now convinced that this was the only route -- to take a step-by-step approach. This is even somewhat further than Sadat has gone.

I am not concerned about Sadat inviting Brezhnev to Egypt. This will let him look like he is making a slight move to the Soviets.

We face a difficult week next week with the Summit in Rabat. Once that is over, we will have to move fast. It is crucial that before then, we give no indication that we have any agreed outline or approach. Once Sadat moves out, he must not look ridiculous in the face of the other Arabs.

President Ford: Dayan seems to be going off on a tangent.

Secretary Kissinger: In Israel, the domestic politics are absolutely disgusting. A year ago, Dayan was the leading dove; he has now moved totally to the right. The Defense Minister of the present government is the second man in the Rafi faction which Dayan heads, and it is important that the seven from this group stay in power. If he is out, the government falls.

Secretary Schlesinger: They also have the religious group.

Secretary Kissinger: That's right, but assuming Egypt and Israel get negotiations started, talks on the West Bank must follow shortly. It is important that Sadat is not isolated. But the religious group opposes any West Bank talks. If it holds a balance in the Israeli cabinet, the government will be out. Therefore, the Rafi group is necessary for progress. Rafi seems more interested in the Sinai than the West Bank.

We are making good progress, but it will require a hell of a lot of work to keep it together. Last year, I thought we were playing for time. Now, we have the opportunity for serious



progress, if the Israelis can recognize the realities of the situation. Some people think the split between Egypt and Syria is a game and that they are just faking it. But the Arabs are too undisciplined to pull that off. You cannot sit with Asad one half hour and think that he could possibly be playing a game. All the Arabs see this rivalry -- even Boumediene, who is usually considered one of the most radical, was saying to me, "I know how it will end up -- they will go back to the 1967 borders with a few changes, and everyone will quit." If the Israelis were only smart enough to realize this, I think even Faisal would go along.

Deputy Secretary Clements: Isn't Faisal's backing of Sadat a must?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. Faisal, who is in some respects the most reactionary, makes it legitimate for the radicals. He can keep Syria in line.

With respect to oil, despite what the media here are saying, I think the speech you gave, Mr. President, has led to a massive reaction. I received two assurances -- that there will be no increase in prices, so that with inflation, this would mean a decrease in the real price. Second, that there would be no use of the oil weapon during negotiations, although it would be used if there were a general Arab-Israeli war.

Finally, I think that at the right moment, there is a possibility that we would get some reduction in price. Even Boumediene said some political reduction in price might be possible. We have to analyze this. I believe we can almost certainly hold the line at the present prices, and maybe get a small reduction. But the kind of reduction we are talking about, from \$9.60 to perhaps \$8.00, will slow down the producers' accumulation of funds, but it does not change our fundamental problem. Our conservation program and the approach discussed at Camp David remain important.

Above all, it is essential that the Israelis do not humiliate Egypt. The Israelis can pretend that a political negotiation is underway, but it cannot be set up so that it is called a political negotiation.

We will try again in early November to get the talks set up. I believe that once Egypt moves, the other Arabs will come along. Syria may try to impose its tough position, but not if they are all alone.



Director Colby: One last point on oil prices. One of the keys is the Shah. Any influence we can use there is critical.

President Ford: If we could get a reduction from \$9.60 to \$8.00 or \$7.00, it would be a real shot in the arm for the domestic economy.

Secretary Kissinger: I think a reduction to \$7.00 is very improbable.

Director Colby: They are talking about compensation for inflation, so if the price just stays where it is, we are ahead.

Secretary Kissinger: I am confident it will stay where it is. On whether we can bring it down, I am not sure.



SALT

President Ford: Perhaps we should move to SALT. Alex, could you give us a rundown on the negotiations in Geneva so far?

Ambassador Johnson: First, I would like to say the instructions I received are the best I have ever had since I have been in my job. They were excellent, and with them I believe I have laid a base for any direction we might go.

Compared with previous sessions, the Soviets definitely tried to give the impression of more flexibility than they have shown in the past. I am not sure how much of this is atmospheric-- the man with whom I deal is obviously under instructions -- or how much was his personal action. I don't believe the substance of what they said was as important as the fact that they were trying to show flexibility. Much of what they said was old wine in new bottles, but there were some changes in their position.

FBS constituted the rubric for all else they said. They made more speeches on FBS and stressed it more than anything else. In the past, they had hoped to convince us to withdraw all our FBS. They now seem to want only our agreement in principle to withdraw.

Secretary Kissinger: Alex hopes to make a deal giving them only principles!

Ambassador Johnson: They are not willing to settle just for principles! They said they thought they had laid the basis for settling this issue over the time period through 1985. Their basic approach was to insist on compensation for what we don't withdraw. If they don't get withdrawal, they say they are entitled to more forces as compensation.

They put considerable emphasis on carrying forward the Interim Agreement numbers, first through 1977, and then on through 1985. On aggregates, my instructions were to discuss aggregates, throw weight, MIRVs, with the final aggregate level to be reached by reductions to a common lower level. The Soviets accepted the idea that there should be a limit or limits



on overall aggregates -- whether "limit" is singular or plural is significant -- and they accepted the principle of reductions, unlike in their previous position which was that reductions should be subsequent. But, they were very hedged concerning the specifics of reductions.

On MIRVs, they proposed that an equal proportion on each side should be MIRVed. On throw weight, they demonstrated no enthusiasm as a measure of strategic capability. But, if it were considered, they insisted that we also consider bombers and our FBS, including carrier aircraft, at their maximum payload capability. Thus, their position on throw weight remained quite far out. I was not authorized, nor did I discuss, how we might take account of bombers.

Previously, they had pressed for banning the B-1 and Trident. They have now moved to a proposal to limit the deployment rates and numbers of B-1 and Trident -- controlling the pace and magnitude of the program.

President Ford: They are basically talking about the scheduling of the program --


Ambassador Johnson: The scheduling and the magnitude of the deployment. They said this would apply to their systems, but never gave an answer to what systems.

On aggregates and FBS, they insisted on compensation for our FBS and for third countries. They previously referred to NATO, but now referred to third countries, raising China. In the past, they referred to British and French submarines, but now they implied they included the Chinese submarines also.

President Ford: Were they referring to Chinese submarines, or their land-based missiles also?

Ambassador Johnson: They referred specifically to Chinese submarines, but seemed to include their ICBMs. They claimed they needed an allowance to deal with China.

In addition, they have stressed that account needs to be taken of "geographic" factors. This embraces the differences on their side of submarines getting out to sea -- having to go through narrow channels.



In summary, they showed some flexibility and made some interesting departures. But they gave no new proposals; no breakthrough.

President Ford: They offered no counter-proposals?

Ambassador Johnson: No counter-proposals, except on B-1 and Trident, where they offered some specifics. They seemed interested in talking. They seemed interested in getting an agreement, but they maintained a forward position -- a hard position.

President Ford: Do any of the rest of you have questions for Alex?

Secretary Schlesinger: Are they willing to have 50 percent of the submarines, but don't care how the other 50 percent are divided between NATO and the U.S.?

Ambassador Johnson: No.

Secretary Schlesinger: What do they mean by compensation?

Ambassador Johnson: The same thing as they meant in their 1972 Moscow statements -- greater numbers.

President Ford: Thank you, Alex.

I know the Verification Panel has been considering four options. Henry, would you like to present them to us now?

Secretary Kissinger: At the last meeting, we went through basic approaches and issues -- aggregates, throw weight, MIRVs, balancing advantages, and reductions. In the meantime, we have put these approaches into packages to illustrate the concepts. We have come up with four major options, and have put them on some charts. (Chart shown for each option as it is discussed -- see attachment.)

The first option is more or less the JCS option. It provides for equal aggregates -- initially at 2500 and reduced to 2000 by 1985. My view is that we would have to reach the final level sometime before then, by 1983. We can't wait until the agreement is about to lapse to make the final reductions. We need some time to assess where we are before the agreement lapses. I don't



know how much it should be -- one year, or six months, but some time before 1985 -- the negotiators can work out the specific time. The final level would be at 2000. We would of course be delighted to have it at an even lower level.

There would be a sublimit on modern large missiles of 300. There would be no limits on throw weight or MIRVs. These could be added, but the basic option is intended to remain simple. It is based on the premise that equality in aggregate numbers of central systems is the most visible and easily perceived measure of essential equivalence. Equality in the number of central systems has been an essential element of the U.S. approach to SALT since mid-1970.

The option stresses conceptual simplicity by its proposal of exact symmetry across a limited number of provisions, and its lack of MIRV and throw weight constraints and their potential verification problems.

The Soviets would have to reduce about 600 from their projected force of 2600, probably eliminating about 100 MIRVed ICBMs, 400 unMIRVed ICBMs, and 100 older heavy bombers. The U.S. would have to eliminate 54 Titan ICBMs, and 250 older bombers -- B-52s. I think it is fair to say that these are systems we are planning to phase out anyway. But whether or not we plan to phase them out anyway, they are probably the units we would take out.

take

The MIRVing would be up to each country. The Soviets could MIRV all their ICBMs, including their 300 heavy missiles, unless we put in a specific restraint against this.

The main advantage of this approach is simplicity. The disadvantage is that it gives us no handle on qualitative improvements.

We would face a difficulty in the negotiations, because the Soviets would have to conclude that we were on to something, rightly or wrongly. There would be a hiatus while they studied what was happening. Alex, don't you believe that if we drop MIRVs if would produce a careful study on their part?

Ambassador Johnson: Yes. For two years we have argued about MIRVs.



Secretary Kissinger: For two years, and they finally agreed, and now we would be saying we were no longer interested. This is no argument against this option, however, but it would produce a hiatus.

Director Colby: You might add a ban on SS-18 MIRVs, plus a ban on SLBM MIRVs such as they have hinted at.

Secretary Kissinger: They won't accept a ban on SLBM MIRVs under any circumstances.

Ambassador Johnson: They won't accept it.

Deputy Secretary Clements: It is not necessarily bad to make them question what we are doing.

Secretary Kissinger: It is not necessarily bad, but I was just pointing out that the consequence of this proposal would be to produce a long analysis on their part. We should ask ourselves the question: What if they conclude we are trying for some kind of break-out in MIRVs? What would be their response? I don't know, but I suspect there would be some response.

Director Colby:

President Ford:

Director Colby:

Director Ikle:

Director Colby:

Secretary Kissinger: We have always assumed that once a missile is tested to operational status with MIRVs, we would have to presume any deployment of it was MIRVed. Any deployment of the SS-17 or the SS-19, given their present state of testing, we would have to assume was MIRVed. They would have to convert the silos to deploy them, and we would count all the converted silos as MIRVed.



Director Colby: One of the provisions in the collateral constraints would be no other changes in the silos -- no hardening, for example.

Secretary Kissinger: Any silo once converted would be counted as containing a MIRVed missile.

Director Colby: They might say they were not converting them.

President Ford: You are saying that as soon as construction begins, we would have to count it as a MIRV?

Secretary Kissinger: As soon as they made the silo capable of accepting a 17 or 19, we would count it as MIRVed.

President Ford: If they allege they are not doing it for MIRVs, we could not accept that.

Director Colby: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger:

Director Colby:


Secretary Schlesinger:

Director Colby:


Director Ikle: There would be further constraints required for SLBMs.

Ambassador Johnson: We should remember that they also have an interest in verifying us. They have brought this up in the talks.

Director Colby: They would have to agree to this extensive list of collateral constraints.



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Director Ikle: This should be put in perspective. They would have to modify the silos,

Secretary Kissinger:

Ambassador Johnson: The problem is that these collateral constraints have not been scrubbed down.

Deputy Secretary Clements: Isn't the point here that there would be risks?

Director Colby: When we last made an estimate about six months ago, we said we would be able to tell the numbers to about plus or minus 100.

President Ford: Plus or minus 100 17s and 19s in 17 and 19 holes? Or in any other holes?

Secretary Schlesinger: I must share Henry's observation concerning the importance of this. Bill seems to be saying that unless we can negotiate very complicated collateral constraints, we can't detect MIRVing or count the number deployed.

Director Colby: That is correct without the constraints.


President Ford: But with them you could count with a margin of 100 or so?

Director Colby: Yes. If we said they had 1000, the real number might be 1100.

Secretary Kissinger: Bill is talking negotiability here. What is comes down to is what we can let them change in the silos. We have to scrub down these constraints. We have to consider do we want exceptions for some modification, such as 45 days as Jim mentioned. We need to do some more technical work in the Verification Panel on this.

President Ford: In any event, won't this problem be the same in any option?

Director Colby: Not in Option 1 -- there are no MIRV limits. rector Co



Director Ikle: You still need collaterals to count launchers.

Director Colby: Only for mobiles.

Secretary Kissinger: We would have to define what constituted impermissible digging up. For hardening, there would be a gray area. We need more technical work.

Secretary Schlesinger: Some of the difference in MIRVing permitted in Option C might be lost in the verification noise.

Ambassador Johnson: They have shown an interest in verifiability on both sides.

President Ford: They have mentioned collateral constraints?

Ambassador Johnson: They haven't discussed that specifically, but they have seemed sufficiently interested in problems associated with verifying MIRVs. I think they would be interested in discussing them.

President Ford: We need to find out ourselves what we want first.

Secretary Kissinger: We need a list of what we would need if we wanted MIRV limits.

Ambassador Johnson: My line has been that we would see what kind of an agreement that we wanted first, before we got into the details of verification.

Director Ikle: But the kind of agreement you want is affected by the verification problems, so this is something of a chicken and egg problem.

Secretary Kissinger: I am worried -- we have gotten into a tremendous argument about MIRVs while discussing an option with no MIRV limits! (Laughter) Mr. President, in the NSC, the behavior follows a very high standard, compared to the Verification Panel! (Laughter)

Going on to the second option, it also provides equal aggregates at 2500 initially reduced to 2000. There would be equal missile throw weight at 8 million pounds for each side,



reducing to 6 million pounds by 1985, although these figures are arbitrary, set to suit us, or they could be changed to fit the negotiating situation. The basic theory is that each side would be at an equal level, but enough lower to force the Soviets down. There would be a sublimit of 4 million pounds on MIRV throw weight.

As discussed at the last meeting, this type of agreement would have very little impact on our MIRV programs. We could deploy a fully MIRVed SLBM force of 736 missiles and 550 MIRV Minuteman for a total of nearly 1300 MIRV missiles. It would affect primarily our future MIRV force. We could not deploy additional heavy MIRVs, or go beyond what we now have programmed. In contrast, the Soviets would have to dismantle their entire MLBM force. They could deploy only about 400 MIRVed SS-17s and 19s. They could add an additional 500 light ICBMs or SLBMs, but could not get above about 900 MIRV launchers. We would have a better than two to one advantage in RVs under this option. We would also have a substantial advantage in bomber payload.

The basic issue this option poses, as Jim pointed out last time, is not just the ceiling it sets on Soviet forces, but that it brings about a redesign of their force. They would change their force to be much more like ours -- not an exact mirror image, but the same in concept -- smaller missiles, lighter warheads, more bombers and submarines. This would provide an increase in stability. It would be the most difficult to negotiate. A variant of this has already been rejected. They may turn around, but it would represent the most intrusive effects on their program.

I said that if we presented them Option A, they would need some months to study it. If we gave them Option B, they could accept it only by a massive bureaucratic rearrangement. It would take years to negotiate and require a long educational process to convince them of its advantages.

President Ford: In the meantime, they would proceed with their programs.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, they will not stop because we have put forth a proposition they previously rejected.

President Ford: The longer they proceed, the harder it becomes for them to reverse course.



Secretary Kissinger: From the point of view of stability, the end result of the option, a first strike would be most difficult. But we would change next to nothing, while the Soviets would have to redesign their force. They would either have to deploy so many less missiles that the difference in numbers would be worrisome to them, or redesign their missiles to make them smaller.

President Ford: In the meantime, we could increase the size of our own missiles with the R&D we are doing--

Secretary Kissinger: We could continue our own program with no interruption. Our own missiles are not as threatening to stability as the Soviet missiles. The Soviets would have to decrease their land-based missile force, moving to numbers which would not be a plausible threat, or develop a new smaller missile.

With this approach, we will be turned down flat. I think Alex will agree. We would have to be prepared to go the long route. There could be no fallback from this approach. We would have to develop a plausible breakout for 1977 to make them worry about what we would do if they don't stop their program. There is not a chance of doing something with this option before 1977.

Secretary Schlesinger: I think Henry has put the case very clearly. This is the toughest option for them. The U.S. force has been structured to be consistent with arms control after MIRVs. The Soviet force has not. If we were successful with this option, it would provide a degree of stability not attained with other options, particularly with Option A. The question is whether you want a relatively quick agreement, or whether you want to push for more arms control.

President Ford: If you were the Secretary of Defense in the Soviet Union, would you buy this option?

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes.

President Ford: Dave, would you?

General Jones: I think so. I would have to look at it long and hard --

President Ford: Even though you would have to change your programs which had been designed for the last ten years?



General Jones: If I were looking for a stable world, I would be inclined to accept it, but if I were going for an advantage, perhaps not.

President Ford: How could a military person or a Secretary of Defense, after promoting large throw weight for all these years, shift gears so quickly?

Secretary Schlesinger: The same way we abandoned our ABM. We should remember that it will cost them \$35 to \$40 billion just to replace the SS-9 with the SS-18. It has been in the ground ten years and will have to be replaced. They have an cost incentive not to do it.

There are two objectives that members of the Soviet Ministry of Defense may have. In the past, they have shown little interest in bilateral stability.

Ambassador Johnson: They have never accepted the theory. The Soviet military believes that bigger is better.

Secretary Kissinger: There are three factors behind that. First, the Soviets, rightly or wrongly, feel they are behind. They are driven by fear of our superiority. Second, they may not have the technical capability to do what we can do with smaller missiles.


Deputy Secretary Clements: That is right.

Secretary Kissinger: The issue is their size potential when coupled with technology such as ours.

Secretary Schlesinger: Which they will have by 1985.

Secretary Kissinger: I am not saying it won't happen. Third, there are considerations of instability, affecting the viability of our land-based systems. Fourth, the Soviets' interest in stability depends on the threat they perceive to their own force.

What Dave said can be considered as a fair statement only if the Soviets believe that failure to agree would get us into increased throw weight missiles which threaten their land-based force. If we go this route, we will have to start new missiles that threaten their land-based force. And, I am not talking



about just jazzing up Minuteman. We could do that within this option. We would have to start something which we could not build with the option. With an abstract view of stability, we will not get it. Our vulnerability does not worry them.

President Ford: They give up what we see on the chart, but we give up nothing.

Secretary Schlesinger: Well, we give up something --

President Ford: What?

Secretary Schlesinger: At 4 million pounds, our MIRV throw weight is less than we are planning with our Trident force. And we have other programs.

We should also remember that in replacing their SS-9, they have to spend quite a bit of money. We have our MX program, which we could not deploy. We have said we will match them in the absence of a reasonable agreement. This option would have the greatest arms control payoff, if it were successful. We should remember that their new missiles, which they will be deploying by 1975, by our own standards are in violation of the SALT I agreement. We said that any missile heavier than the SS-11 would be a "heavy" missile. With these new missiles, even with no 7s and 8s, they will have 12 million pounds of throw weight, which is potentially destabilizing. There will be a threat to Minuteman and to our other forces from their large RVs. We are concerned about the megatonnage also.

Ambassador Johnson: Do they have more megatonnage if you include our bombers?

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes. I believe it is on the order of two to one.

President Ford: What about the next option?

Secretary Kissinger: The next two options are more or less the same. They are both variants of the compensating asymmetries approach, which is consistent with our past negotiating history and the planned programs of the two sides. The initial U.S. aggregate would be at 2250 and the Soviets at 2500, reducing to 2000 and 2200 by 1985. We would receive compensation by MIRV limits of 1300 missiles for us versus 1050 for the Soviets. Thus,



we would have more MIRV missiles, but they would have more total launchers. There would also be a limit on heavy delivery systems -- heavy bombers and heavy missiles -- initially at 500, reducing to 250 by 1985, and no increase in the number of MLBM launchers.

This option is based on the premise that equivalence can more readily be achieved by balancing existing asymmetries than by removing them. The Soviets could claim they got some compensation for FBS, and we could claim an advantage in technology. Under this option, we would deploy essentially our presently planned program and we could introduce a new Minuteman IV missile. The Soviets would deploy their projected force of 600 MIRVed 17s and 19s and 400 MIRVed SLBMs. It would put a cap on the Soviet MIRV force. We would retain a large advantage in numbers of weapons to counter the Soviet advantage in missile throw weight. We could increase our missile throw weight by deploying the Minuteman IV.

This option is similar to that which we pursued earlier this year whereby the Soviets would have been permitted to retain their Interim Agreement numerical advantage until 1980 in exchange for a U.S. advantage in MIRVed launchers. Thus, it fits best into the negotiating history. This is no argument for it, but it provides the most continuity.

Ambassador Johnson: It is consistent with what we have been discussing with them in the past.

Secretary Kissinger: The main argument against this option has been that the unequal aggregates would lead to a perception of U.S. inferiority. What you would have to judge, Mr. President, is whether 200 older unMIRVed Soviet missiles would give them an advantage when compared to our advantage in MIRVed missiles. But this is how we would claim equivalence. A further point is that if the present agreement ends, we would likely accept an inequality in the numbers anyway, as a fact, if not as an agreement.

In summary, the main advantages of the offsetting asymmetries approach are that it may be more negotiable than equal aggregates since it reflects the differences in the base-line force levels for the two sides; it gives the U.S. a MIRV launcher number advantage; it levels off Soviet programs well below the 1985 projections; and it would ban MIRVs on heavy missiles and reduce their number, resulting in a ceiling on throw weight.



The disadvantages are that unequal aggregates might mean that some would perceive a U.S. inferiority. It does not directly constrain throw weight, the MLBM MIRV ban might be difficult to negotiate, and the verification would require the collateral constraints which we just discussed earlier.

One way to solve the perceptions problem --

President Ford: Let me ask as we go through these options -- A, B, C, and D -- what is the difference in funding for DOD?

Secretary Schlesinger: The funding would rise as you go to the right on the chart.

Secretary Kissinger: Why?

Secretary Schlesinger: A and B provide more constraints.

Secretary Kissinger: A provides no constraints on MIRVs. There would be a MIRV buildup.

Secretary Schlesinger: You are quite right. A, C, and D would be more costly. B precludes any new systems.

President Ford: B would be least costly, but least likely to be negotiable --

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes.

Director Ikle: In comparing C versus D, D would contain a limit on throw weight. You would save costs in D compared to C.

Secretary Kissinger: A would be the most costly.

Secretary Schlesinger: Under C and D, larger missiles would be permitted also.

Ambassador Johnson: If we could get B only if they saw us building a larger force, wouldn't it cost more dollars to get there?

Secretary Kissinger: B would have the paradoxical consequence that we could get it only with a larger missile and a buildup. Short of a massive buildup, I don't see how the Soviets could accept it.



We have talked about going to 2500, and the argument has been made that we could reach that level cheaply.

Secretary Schlesinger: We could keep B-52s and Polaris.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. But if the Interim Agreement lapses, the Soviets can keep their SS-11s and dig new holes for their new missiles. We could also keep older systems, but in a breakout race, they could go faster. At 2500, the price would be small. But beyond 2500, their price would not go up much, only the operating costs of the SS-11 force -- but we would have to get entirely new programs.

Secretary Schlesinger: I beg to differ with you on that, Henry.

Deputy Secretary Clements: Henry, that's not right.

Secretary Schlesinger: The difference in costs is only the cost of the silos. The rest is the same.

Secretary Kissinger: They have to pay for new silos in either case.

Secretary Schlesinger: We would have to pay for a new silo and they don't. The rest is the same.

Secretary Kissinger: My point is, though, that they have already paid for the SS-17 and 19. It is in their program.

Secretary Schlesinger: We could add silos and retain Minuteman IIs.

Secretary Kissinger: But we have no program to do this.

President Ford: We have the missiles?

Secretary Schlesinger: We will have 500 Minuteman II.

Secretary Kissinger: The point is that the Soviets have already budgeted for their new missiles. Beyond 2500, we have to get into real money. This has to be assessed in terms of what we can get from Congress.

Director Ikle: We have never considered agreements which go beyond 2500.



Secretary Kissinger: I know that -- I am talking about the breakout potential.

President Ford: Going back, from a budgetary point of view, Option A would call for a program for greater throw weight.

Deputy Secretary Clements: Our plan does not have to be driven by bigger missiles.

President Ford: But by a bigger bang perhaps.

Deputy Secretary Clements: We could increase the Minuteman III yield with no other changes. On a cost effective basis, this is the best thing we could do.

President Ford: Maybe on a cost effective basis, but how much would it cost in dollars?

Secretary Schlesinger: It would cost about \$2 billion to get 2500, or \$4 billion a year to go to 3000.

President Ford: B would be the least expensive, the most difficult to obtain, but the most expensive if we failed.

Secretary Kissinger: It would be the least expensive after we have it. On the way to getting it, we would have to increase our budget.

Secretary Schlesinger: That is what we are doing anyway.

President Ford: And C and D would cost about the same as we are now spending.

Secretary Kissinger: It would probably come down somewhat.

Director Ikle: D would come down, but C has no throw weight limit.

President Ford: Under D we would not need a bigger missile?

Secretary Schlesinger: Option D has a 7 million pound throw weight limit. If we raised our throw weight to 7 million pounds, we would have to invest in Minuteman IV. Unless the Soviets agree to restricting their program, we will have to put money in R&D and it will cost money to retain equivalence.



Secretary Kissinger: If we feel we have to match throw weight, we could go either route -- bigger missiles or increasing yield.

Deputy Secretary Clements: With no ceiling at all, it would be expensive.

President Ford: The question is, can we get Soviet agreement to one of these approaches --

Secretary Schlesinger: You can mix up the provisions of the various approaches.

Director Ikle: Mr. President, there are two gut issues here. The first is whether we simply shift the competition from one area to another. In Option A, the competition would be shifted from numbers to yield, accuracy, and so forth. The second issue is whether we will let throw weight increase, starting a new competition, getting larger missiles, and driving up force levels. Throw weight limits, even if not so low as in Option B, could cut out this competition, at least in the next generation. In SALT I we had no MIRV limits, and we are now seeing a MIRV competition. In the next agreement, we should avoid a throw weight competition. Hence, we need throw weight limits such as in Option D, even if not as low as in D.

Secretary Schlesinger: I agree.

Director Ikle: Another alternative is to go to even somewhat lower levels -- perhaps 200 lower than those in Option D (shows chart). For the Soviets, they would have 200 less medium missiles. Other reductions would be similar. Stretched over a ten-year period, this could be achieved. A larger reduction would further detente. With controls on throw weight, it would save dollars and be politically attractive.

We do not want the Soviets to increase in the 1975-1985 period, but to reduce. Increased accuracy and weapon yield will drive capabilities up. Thus, unless there is a substantial reduction in numbers, there will be a net increase overall.

Hence, I think a worthwhile goal would be 2000 on their side and 1800 on our side. If we can't get it, we can always increase the numbers later. I am not sure the Russians would be opposed over a ten-year period to lower numbers.



Under Option C, they would deploy 12 MIRVs for each single warhead missile reduced. Under Option D, they would deploy only 3 MIRVs for each single warhead missile reduced.

Secretary Kissinger: How do you get those numbers?

Director Ikle: Under C, they would reduce 84 unMIRVed missiles and deploy 1000 MIRVed missiles, for a ratio of about 12 to 1. Under D, they would reduce 284 unMIRVed missiles and deploy 950 MIRVed missiles, for a ratio of about 3 to 1. Their MIRVed missile program would be a costly expansion. Therefore, they may agree to the lower numbers.

Secretary Schlesinger: For the Soviets to replace their ICBMs alone will cost them \$35 billion. They would be giving up one hell of a cost liability. Their military people will not include the cost liability in their analyses. But their political people will see the importance.

Secretary Kissinger: There are several elements in D which could also be put in C. The essential difference is not the throw weight limit -- that could be added to either C or D. It is the concept of equal rights. This would avoid the perception of inequality. Each side would have the right to pick either a larger total or a larger number of MIRVs, as in the ABM treaty. They could pick either 2200 total and 1050 MIRVs, or 2000 total and 1300 MIRVs.

President Ford: Would each side have to designate which course it chose?


Secretary Kissinger: You would probably want it designated at the beginning.

Director Ikle: With, perhaps, a review every five years.

Secretary Kissinger: There might be a right to change, as in the ABM treaty. In that treaty, it is reviewed every five years, and each side can change once. I haven't analyzed the effect of such a provision in this case.

Mr. Duckett: Off the cuff, I would say you could allow them to switch to more MIRVs, but not the other way around.

Secretary Schlesinger: IF the Russians have the same verification standards we do, they could not accept either C or D. If they have to assume that any silo which could



accept a MIRV missile contained MIRVs, they would have to assume we have 1000 MIRVed ICBMs.

Secretary Kissinger: That is theoretically true, but they have never raised that problem with us.

Director Ikle: Mr. President, I would like to make one more point supporting lower levels. It would reduce the importance of the verification problems. If they took out 200 more SS-11s, that would mean they would have only 250 SS-11s left. It would be only these we would have to worry about, which would be no big problem.

Director Colby: That would be to our margin of error.

Director Ikle: If there were further reductions after 1985, we might end up with no verification problem.

President Ford: Could it be possible that both sides would make the same choice?

Secretary Kissinger: No. But if the Soviets did choose 2000 missiles and 1300 MIRVs, that would be a very interesting decision. It would represent a drastic cut in their program.


Ambassador Johnson: They will always choose the higher aggregates. They want a perception of a higher aggregate --

Secretary Schlesinger: Exactly the reason why we want equal aggregates.

Secretary Kissinger: I think they want the perception of the higher aggregates more for their own internal bureaucracy rather than for third countries.

President Ford: We want the perception plus our own extra capability!

Secretary Schlesinger: I was just talking to Yamanaka on this -- the Japanese Minister of Defense. He asked me why we accepted an unequal agreement in 1972. I answered him that we had a technological advantage. But this is to point out that the perception is there in third parties. The Japanese are perhaps stronger than other, but Don can tell you that there is a problem of appearance in Europe. The agreement is perceived as unequal.



Ambassador Johnson: I briefed the NAC just yesterday on our approach, and got a very good reaction.

Secretary Schlesinger: But our present position is generally tougher than these options.

Ambassador Johnson: No, I wouldn't say so. It leaves open the question of equal aggregates. I told the NAC that we had to look at aggregate numbers, throw weight, and MIRV launchers, and that equivalence is the sum of all taken together. This is essentially the approach taken in C and D. It is the sum which is of interest.

Secretary Schlesinger: If we had Option D, I would recommend to you, Mr. President, that we choose 2200 aggregates for the perception, rather than more MIRVs. So both sides would be equal even under Option D.

Secretary Kissinger: If the President accepted your advice -- (laughter)

President Ford: If you picked 2200, what would that mean to our present MIRV program?

Secretary Schlesinger: We would have to slow it down.

Secretary Kissinger: If we went to 1000 MIRV missiles, we would have to stop now. 1300 would accommodate our present program.

President Ford: Under either B or D, we could still increase our yield --

Ambassador Johnson: One thing we might consider is a reduction in RVs. The Soviets have emphasized this.

Secretary Schlesinger: If they agree to limits on throw weight, we could reduce our RVs. We have too many on Poseidon and Minuteman.

Ambassador Johnson: Too many on Minuteman?

Secretary Schlesinger: We don't need three. We could go to two. We have a one-megaton warhead under development.



Deputy Secretary Clements: That is the other side of the coin --

Secretary Kissinger: They would appreciate a few more concessions like that! (Laughter)

Secretary Schlesinger: That is precisely the point. The Soviets, by ignoring throw weight, are increasing instability.

General Jones: There is one more consideration. It is easier to go from Option B to Option C or from Option B to Option D, as the negotiations move on, than it is the other way around. The key is equal aggregates. Once we concede our willingness to accept unequal aggregates, it would be hard to go back on it. As to whether we are perceived as equal to the Soviets, it depends on how seriously you take our new programs -- air-mobile ICBM, the seven-MIRV missiles we are working on, and so forth. But we have unequal aggregates in Europe, with a qualitative advantage, and in Europe they ignore qualitative factors.

President Ford: Our allies?

General Jones: Yes. Our allies count numbers of tanks and so forth, with no consideration of quality. Whether or not they would accept equal aggregates depends on how seriously they take these other programs. But we can move off it later, if it comes up as non-negotiable.


President Ford: Your point is that to move from D to B is harder than from B to D.

General Jones: Yes. In both C and D we agree that we don't need equal aggregates.

Deputy Secretary Clements: It is harder to move to the left than to the right on the chart. You can start with A, fill in the MIRV limits and throw weight limits as you come up to the right. But you should start with equal aggregates which is simple and understandable.

Director Colby: These options are meant to represent the end of the negotiations, not the beginning.

Secretary Schlesinger: You want to be fairly tough in the beginning. If you have a few minutes, I do have a few more points --



President Ford: I do have my economic advisors who have been waiting for thirty minutes --

Secretary Schlesinger: I have one chart which lays out the basic tradeoffs you will have to make that I worked out as I was going to bed.

President Ford: How long will it take?

Secretary Schlesinger: Only about ten minutes.

President Ford: Let's do it.

Counselor Rumsfeld: You keep chart materials in your bedroom? (Laughter)

Secretary Schlesinger: (Talking to chart -- see attachment) -- You have two basic objectives in SALT -- arms balance and arms stability. If you want to emphasize arms balance, you have to go for equal aggregates. If you want to emphasize arms stability, you need control over throw weight, yields, as well as numbers. In 1972, we achieved both arms stability and arms balance: a U.S. technology offset grosser Soviet numerical advantages, and we had bombers.

On stability, the Soviets had cruder forces and poorer accuracy. The U.S. had smaller yield and throw weight and uncertain accuracy.

But by 1985, we face a different situation. The U.S. advantage in MIRVs disappears. We face the inequality of Interim Agreement numbers, and bombers are outside the agreement. On arms stability, the Soviets are increasing their throw weight and MIRVing their forces. There will be greater Soviet sophistication in accuracy.

One possible solution emphasizing arms balance is to move toward equal aggregates and adjust our forces, increasing their throw weight or changing their basing, going to land or air-mobile as necessary. The alternative is to go for arms stability in 1985. To do this, you need control over throw weight, yield, and numbers.

The relative difficulty of the two approaches is as follows. Going for arms balance is conceptually easy. It is easier to understand and quicker to negotiate than going for stability. But there is greater future risk in cost. Going for stability would be more difficult to negotiate. The Soviets don't understand stability arguments. They have always talked



strength. Bilateral stability is beyond their grasp, or they pretend that it is beyond their grasp. It would be a time consuming process to get them to agree.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree with the chart as a way of posing issues. I would only add that I see only one way to get to the last point -- to have a plausible program we would have to race them. In taking the road we would have to go to get it, we would have to enhance instabilities in the short run, in order to convince them of the importance of stability. The question is how long we could sustain the race. We could sustain it, if we could get Congress to approve it.

President Ford: If we have the will --

Secretary Kissinger: We have to have a plausible program and rapid deployments.

Secretary Schlesinger: I am not trying to advocate one approach or the other --

Secretary Kissinger: I just raise this as an issue.

Secretary Schlesinger: If you want a relatively quick agreement, Option B is unattractive. If you want an agreement in 1975, you don't put stress on arms stability; you have to stress arms balance.

President Ford: I think this is a good chart -- could I have a copy of it? But you have to put on the alternative we would face with nothing. You can't put Congress on the chart very easily --

Secretary Schlesinger: On the question of equal aggregates, it is politically and diplomatically crucial. Perhaps, it is the most critical feature. We can live with an increase in instability, but it would be difficult not to come up to their level

President Ford: Thank you very much. I would only hope we could get Congress to agree.



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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Chart
CREATOR'S NAME DOD
TITLE Charts/Tables re: SALT: Options, throw
weights, etc
CREATION DATE 10/1974?
VOLUME 7 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 031200006
COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL MEETINGS FILE
BOX NUMBER 1
FOLDER TITLE NSC Meeting, 10/18/74
DATE WITHDRAWN 06/21/1999
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