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APPROVED

OCT 13 1975

*Signed
10/13*

ACTION

**THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**

Last Day: October 22

October 10, 1975

*Ceremony (OVAL OFFICE)
"Remarks" by the President*

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

JIM CANNON *[Signature]*

SUBJECT:

**H.J. Res. 683 - United States
Participation in a Sinai Early-warning
System**

*To Archie
10/14/75*


Attached for your consideration is H.J. Res. 683, sponsored by Representatives Morgan and Broomfield, which authorizes the President to implement the United States proposal for an early-warning system in Sinai involving the assignment of up to 200 United States civilian personnel to Sinai to carry out certain noncombat functions.

A discussion of the resolution is provided in OMB's enrolled bill report at Tab A.

OMB, NSC, Max Friedersdorf, Counsel's Office (Chapman) and I recommend approval of the resolution.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign H.J. Res. 683 at Tab B.







EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

OCT 10 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Enrolled Resolution H.J. Res. 683 - United States participation in a Sinai early-warning system
Sponsor - Rep. Morgan (D) Pa. and Rep. Broomfield (R) Mich.

Purpose

Authorizes the President to implement the United States proposal for an early-warning system in Sinai involving the assignment of up to 200 United States civilian personnel to Sinai to carry out certain noncombat functions in connection with the proposal.

Agency Recommendations

Office of Management and Budget

Approval

Department of State

Approval (Informally)

National Security Council

Approval (Informally)

Department of Defense

Defers to State (Informally)

Discussion

On September 4, 1975, Egypt and Israel signed a basic agreement in which both parties pledged, among other things, to resolve the conflict between them and in the Middle East not by military force but by peaceful means. An integral factor in the conclusion of the agreement was the United States proposal to participate in an early-warning system in Sinai. The agreement will not take effect until Congress approves the United States role in connection with surveillance and observation functions under the early-warning system.

H.J.Res. 683 provides the requisite congressional approval contemplated by the agreement for the President to implement the "United States Proposal for the Early-Warning System in Sinai." The authority is subject to the conditions that any United States civilian personnel assigned



to Sinai under the proposal shall be removed immediately (1) in the event of an outbreak of hostilities between Egypt and Israel or (2) if Congress by concurrent resolution determines that the safety of such personnel is jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no longer necessary. An amendment added on the House floor further states:

"Nothing contained in this resolution shall be construed as granting any authority to the President with respect to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances which authority he would not have had in the absence of this joint resolution."

This language, which is identical to a provision in the War Powers Act (P.L. 93-148), is apparently intended to assure that H.J.Res. 683 does not grant any additional war powers authority to the President beyond that which he has now under existing law.

Although the House International Relations Committee's report on H.J.Res. 683 indicates that State Department witnesses testified before the Committee that the executive branch did not object to the first two provisos noted above, Justice has typically opposed the inclusion of similar concurrent resolution provisions in law on the grounds they circumvent the President's constitutional role in the legislative process. We would point out, however, that current laws, including the War Powers Act, contain such provisions.

The enrolled joint resolution stipulates that United States civilian personnel assigned to Sinai must be volunteers. In its report, the House International Relations Committee stated that, "...it is the expectation of this committee that none of the Americans serving in such a capacity in the Sinai will be an employee of any foreign intelligence gathering agency of the U.S. Government." The Committee report further notes that executive branch witnesses testified that they did not intend to employ as civilian technicians anyone presently employed by the Central Intelligence Agency or any other foreign intelligence gathering agencies.




H.J.Res. 683 also requires the President to submit written reports to Congress at least once every six months for as long as United States civilian personnel continue to participate in the early-warning system. The reports are to cover the status, scope, and anticipated duration of the participation of such personnel and the feasibility of ending or reducing their participation as soon as possible by substituting foreign nationals or by making technological changes.

The final section of H.J.Res. 683 states that the authority in the joint resolution to implement United States participation in the early-warning system does not signify congressional approval of any other agreement, understanding, or commitment made by the executive branch. In further elaboration of this disclaimer, the report of the House International Relations Committee states:

"It is intended to make clear that the authority contained in this joint resolution to implement the 'United States Proposal for the Early-Warning System in Sinai' does not, and shall not in any way be construed to, constitute congressional approval, acceptance, or endorsement (1) of any other oral or written commitment, understanding, assurance, promise, or agreement, whether expressed or implied, or any other expression, oral or written, by any official of the United States which Israel, Egypt, or any other nation or organization might construe or interpret as a basis on which it could rely or act; or (2) of any characterization of any such commitment, understanding, assurance, promise, or agreement, or other expression, as constituting a 'codification' of existing, congressionally approved, U.S. policy."

In this connection, prior to the issuance of the Committee's report, you said in your letter of September 30, 1975, to several Members of Congress:

"The issue before the Congress now is whether the Congress will approve acceptance by the United States of the role that has been proposed for it. There are other issues which



the Congress must eventually consider in connection with our continuing relations, policies, and programs in the Middle East-- particularly our programs of military and economic assistance there. The Congress will want to consider those carefully at the appropriate time, but they are not integral to the implementation of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel. Voting in favor of the U.S. role in the Early-Warning System will not commit anyone to take a position one way or another on these issues."

James M. Fry

Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference

Enclosures



THE WHITE HOUSE

ACTION MEMORANDUM

WASHINGTON

LOG NO.: 639

Date: October 10, 1975

Time: 500pm

FOR ACTION: NSC/S *ok*
Max Friedersdorf *ok*
Ken Lazarus *ok*

cc (for information): Jack Marsh *ok*
Robert Hartmann
Jim Cavanaugh
Warren Hendriks

FROM THE STAFF SECRETARY

DUE: Date: October 10

Time: 600pm

SUBJECT:

H.J. Res. 683 - U.S. participation in a Sinai early-warning system

ACTION REQUESTED:

- | | |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> For Necessary Action | <input type="checkbox"/> For Your Recommendations |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Agenda and Brief | <input type="checkbox"/> Draft Reply |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> For Your Comments | <input type="checkbox"/> Draft Remarks |

REMARKS:

Please return to Judy Johnston, Ground Floor West Wing

The Staff Secretary's office has asked that this bill be ready for the President when he returns tonight.



PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.

If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in submitting the required material, please telephone the Staff Secretary immediately.

Jim Cavanaugh
For the President

Date: October 10,

Time: 500pm

FOR ACTION: NSC/S
Max Friedersdorf *MB*
Ken Lazaruscc (for information): Jack Marsh
Robert Hartmann
Jim Cavanaugh
Warren Hendriks

FROM THE STAFF SECRETARY

DUE: Date: October 10

Time: 600pm

SUBJECT:

H.J. Res. 683 - U.S. participation in a Sinai early-warning system

ACTION REQUESTED: For Necessary Action For Your Recommendations Prepare Agenda and Brief Draft Reply For Your Comments Draft Remarks**REMARKS:**

Please return to Judy Johnston, Ground Floor West Wing

The Staff Secretary's office has asked that this bill be ready for the President when he returns tonight.

**PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.**

If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in submitting the required material, please telephone the Staff Secretary immediately.

Jim Cavanaugh

U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST EARLY
WARNING SYSTEM

COMMUNICATION

FROM

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

URGING ACTION ON THE PROPOSED UNITED STATES ROLE IN THE
EARLY WARNING SYSTEM PROVIDED FOR IN THE AGREEMENTS
SIGNED BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL ON
SEPTEMBER 4 IN GENEVA

SEPTEMBER 30, 1975.—Referred to the Committee on International Relations
and ordered to be printed

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, September 29, 1975.


The Honorable the SPEAKER OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: I am writing to emphasize the importance of
a Congressional decision in the coming week on U.S. participation
in the Early Warning System which is an integral part of the Agree-
ment signed between the Governments of Egypt and Israel on Septem-
ber 4 in Geneva.

Over the past two years, our Government has played an essential
role in helping defuse the tensions in the Middle East. We have chosen
this course because we recognized, as has every American Administra-
tion over the past 30 years, that the issues involved in that troubled
area are central to the American national interest.

The September 4 agreement, like the two preceding disengagement
agreements, was negotiated with the assistance of the United States.
The parties themselves have described it as a significant step towards
peace in the Middle East. It will reduce the risks of war, create new
opportunities for negotiating peace, and help provide a stable environ-
ment in which global economic dislocations can be avoided. This Agree-
ment is in the overall national interest of the United States.

There would have been no Agreement without provision for Ameri-
can participation in the Early Warning System. That System is de-
signed to reduce the danger of surprise attack, and the parties to the



Agreement were able to agree to entrust the System only to the United States. The special American role was the only one in which both sides had adequate confidence.

I want to be certain that the leaders of the Congress fully understand the consequences of further delay in acting on this important matter.

The first step in the implementation of the basic Agreement under the timetable negotiated and agreed to by Egypt and Israel in Geneva on September 22 is scheduled to be taken October 5. This process will not begin, however, until the Congress has acted on the proposed United States role in the Early Warning System. Delay in Congressional action will, therefore, delay implementation of the basic Agreement. It will risk causing the lengthy and difficult negotiations on the entire five-month implementing timetable to be reopened. It will prevent a lessening of the risks of war. If for any reason the agreement should fail, the responsibility would be heavy indeed.

The issue before the Congress now is whether the Congress will approve acceptance by the United States of the role that has been proposed for it. There are other issues which the Congress must eventually consider in connection with our continuing relations, policies, and programs in the Middle East—particularly our programs of military and economic assistance there. The Congress will want to consider those carefully at the appropriate time, but they are not integral to the implementation of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel. Voting in favor of the U.S. role in the Early Warning System will not commit anyone to take a position one way or another on these issues.

In summary, I met with the leadership three weeks ago to describe what was involved in the new Agreement between Egypt and Israel and to request urgent approval of U.S. participation in its implementation. This question has been under intensive discussion in the Congress for nearly three weeks. All relevant papers and all U.S. commitments related to the Agreement have been submitted to the appropriate committees of the Congress. If action is not completed in the coming week, the United States will be in the position of holding up implementation of an Agreement which two key Middle Eastern countries have signed as a significant step towards peace. The Middle East is an area where American policy has long had broad bipartisan support. The issue presently before the Congress offers an opportunity to reaffirm that tradition and to demonstrate how the Executive and Legislative branches can work together on a foreign policy matter of high importance to the national interest and for the benefit of world peace. I, therefore, urge strongly that action be completed as early as possible and no later than Friday, October 3.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

6835

October 10, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: JIM CAVANAUGH

FROM: Jeanne W. Davis *JWD*

SUBJECT: H. J. Res. 683

To confirm my telephone conversation today, the NSC staff concurs in H. J. Res. 683 - U. S. participation in a Sinai early-warning system.



To: J. Cavanaugh
10/10/75
4



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

OCT 10 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Enrolled Resolution H.J. Res. 683 - United States participation in a Sinai early-warning system
Sponsor - Rep. Morgan (D) Pa. and Rep. Broomfield (R) Mich.

Purpose

Authorizes the President to implement the United States proposal for an early-warning system in Sinai involving the assignment of up to 200 United States civilian personnel to Sinai to carry out certain noncombat functions in connection with the proposal.

Agency Recommendations

Office of Management and Budget	Approval
Department of State	Approval (Informally)
National Security Council	Approval (Informally)
Department of Defense	Defers to State (Informally)

Discussion

On September 4, 1975, Egypt and Israel signed a basic agreement in which both parties pledged, among other things, to resolve the conflict between them and in the Middle East not by military force but by peaceful means. An integral factor in the conclusion of the agreement was the United States proposal to participate in an early-warning system in Sinai. The agreement will not take effect until Congress approves the United States role in connection with surveillance and observation functions under the early-warning system.

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(Signed) James M. Frey

Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference

Enclosures



TO IMPLEMENT THE UNITED STATES PROPOSAL FOR THE EARLY-WARNING SYSTEM IN SINAI

REPORT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
TOGETHER WITH
SUPPLEMENTAL AND ADDITIONAL VIEWS
ON
House Joint Resolution 683



OCTOBER 6, 1975.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE



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(II)

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(III)

TO IMPLEMENT THE UNITED STATES PROPOSAL FOR
THE EARLY-WARNING SYSTEM IN SINAI

OCTOBER 6, 1975.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. MORGAN, from the Committee on International Relations,
submitted the following

REPORT

together with

SUPPLEMENTAL AND ADDITIONAL VIEWS

[To accompany H.J. Res. 683]

The Committee on International Relations, to whom was referred the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 683) to implement the United States proposal for the early-warning system in Sinai, having considered the same, report favorably thereon without amendment and recommend that the joint resolution do pass.

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE OF THE RESOLUTION

The principal purpose of this resolution is to give congressional authorization to the President to implement the United States proposal for an early-warning system in the Sinai Peninsula.

That proposal provides that up to 200 civilian technicians of U.S. citizenship may be assigned to early-warning facilities in the Mitla and Giddi Passes region of the Sinai, to help insure compliance with an agreement between the Government of Egypt and the Government of Israel.

COMMITTEE ACTION

On September 1, 1975, the President transmitted to the governments of Egypt and Israel identical proposals for U.S. participation in an early-warning system. As a result of that proposal, those govern-

ments signed an agreement with each other on September 4, 1975. The text of the U.S. proposal subsequently was submitted to the Congress for approval.

On September 8, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger appeared before the House International Relations Committee in both open and executive sessions to discuss the agreement. On September 11, 18, and 23, testimony was heard from Hon. Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. On October 1, the committee took testimony from Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Harold H. Saunders and technical experts from the Department of Defense. On September 25, the committee held public hearings, receiving testimony from representatives of the Liberty Lobby and the American Friends Service Committee.

On October 2, the committee met to mark up a draft resolution of approval proposed by Chairman Thomas E. Morgan and the ranking minority member, Hon. William S. Broomfield. Four amendments were adopted and the chairman was instructed by the committee to introduce the draft as a house joint resolution. That was accomplished on October 2. The following day the committee met and by a vote of 31 to 0, ordered the resolution, House Joint Resolution 683, favorably reported to the House of Representatives.

COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS

The House International Relations Committee has spent almost 1 month giving its consideration to the question of whether or not to approve the sending of up to 200 American civilian technicians to the Sinai Peninsula in order to implement an Egyptian-Israeli peace settlement.

The time was well spent. A variety of complex issues were involved in the approval which required thorough attention and discussion in the Congress. Further, there was a need to avoid the kind of haste which in times past sometimes accompanied congressional action involving national commitments: for example, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.

At an appropriate point, deliberation must give way to action. This the committee did on October 3 when it voted by 31 to 0 to approve the sending of the technicians.

It did so, on the basis of the following factors:

As the chronology included in this report makes clear, the United States has been intimately involved in seeking a Middle East solution for a very long time, and most particularly since the October 1973 war.

This involvement follows from the vital United States interest in peace in the Middle East, interest reflected by basic U.S. support for the independence and sovereignty of Israel. It is reinforced by concern over future disruptions in petroleum supplies which a new outbreak of hostilities in the region could provoke.

The October 1973 war proved expensive to the United States: \$2.2 billion for resupply to Israel, an estimated \$15-\$20 billion cost in the impact of the oil embargo, and billions more in indirect costs to the Nation's economy from the recession which was caused at least in part by higher petroleum charges.

Both parties—Egypt and Israel—are willing to place their trust in the United States to monitor the peace agreement in a fair and impartial way, a role not sought by our Nation but one thrust upon it by circumstances.

The role of the technicians will be far different from that played by our U.S. combat advisory role in Vietnam: our 200 advisers in Sinai will have purely technical, not military, tasks to perform.

Recognizing the serious issues involved, and having no feasible alternative, the only responsible course for the Congress is to approve the implementation of the agreement, as requested by the executive branch, but with adequate safeguards.

There is a clear relationship between this resolution and the overall Egyptian-Israeli agreement. If we disapprove this resolution, the Egyptian-Israeli agreement will likely be voided and such an impasse immeasurably increases the possibility of the resumption of hostilities in the Middle East. This connection, which is both implicit and explicit, makes it more important that Congress act immediately.

Failure to act this week jeopardizes the Egyptian-Israeli agreement, the implementation of which is geared to the calendar. The agreement's implementation is meant to start this week and the Congress should not counter the timetable and wishes of the parties by delaying action.

We believe adequate safeguards are provided for in House Joint Resolution 683. Specifically, the resolution contains the following requirements:

The American technicians must be removed immediately if fighting breaks out, or if Congress through a veto-proof concurrent resolution directs their removal.

The technicians must be civilians who have voluntarily asked to be given this mission, not Federal employees assigned to the task.

The President must report semi-annually to the Congress on the status of the technician force, including on the possibility of replacing the American presence with an alternative.

The resolution of approval does not extend to any other agreements or commitments which may have been made in the larger context of a Middle East peace settlement. The approval contained in House Joint Resolution 683 relates only to the matter immediately at hand: the sending of the technicians to Sinai.

In other words, the Congress will have the following future opportunities with regard to the Sinai agreement if this resolution is passed:

To remove the technicians regardless of the view in the executive branch.

To review the status of the technicians closely every 6 months for the duration of their mission; and

To give its approval or disapproval to other agreements which may be in the Middle East Settlement, for which the administration will have to request authority or funds in the future.

As a result of these many considerations, the committee urges the overwhelming approval of the House of Representatives for this joint resolution.

ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS

The October 1973 war in the Middle East made it clear to all Americans that conflict in that part of the world entails considerable risks and costs to the United States.

There are risks of U.S. military involvement, including direct confrontation with the Soviet Union and its attendant dangers of nuclear war.

There are costs which affect the lives of all Americans. The oil embargo of 1973-74 not only meant personal inconvenience to millions of Americans at the gasoline pumps, but it helped trigger the most severe recession the United States has experienced in 30 years.

Because the safety and welfare of all Americans are directly involved in what happens in the Middle East, it is a vital interest of the United States to ease tensions in that region.

For that reason the United States, since October 1973, has made a major effort to obtain peaceful solutions to the longstanding disputes of the Middle East, particularly those related to hostilities between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

A chronology of events related to these American initiatives follows:

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

1974

- January 9*—Egypt and Israel suspended the Geneva Conference on Troop Disengagement Along the Suez Front to await new mediation by U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, who arrived in Egypt 2 days later.
- January 11-17*—Secretary Kissinger shuttled back and forth between Egypt and Israel, conferring with Egyptian and Israeli officials regarding disengagement.
- January 18*—Egypt and Israel signed an agreement to disengage their troops along the Suez Canal.
- January 25*—Israeli forces began the Suez withdrawal.
- January 28*—The pullback lifted the siege of the city of Suez and ended the isolation of the Egyptian III Corps on the east bank.
- January 30*—Prime Minister Meir said that Israel had no interest in retaining territories occupied in October 1973; that disengagement talks could not begin until Syria provided a list of POW's and allowed Red Cross visits; and that no negotiations with Arab Terrorist organizations would occur in Geneva.
- February 28*—The United States and Egypt renewed full diplomatic relations after a 7-year break.
- March 4*—Disengagement of Egyptian and Israeli troops along the Suez front was completed.
- March 18*—The United States joined in the international operation to clear obstructions in the Suez Canal, closed since the 1967 war.
- April 18*—President Sadat said Egypt will not longer rely solely on the Soviet Union for arms.
- May 29*—Syria and Israel reached agreement, scheduled to be signed in Geneva May 31, on a cease-fire and disengagement of forces on the Golan Heights.

- May 31*—The accords, achieved by Secretary Kissinger in his latest round of "shuttle diplomacy," were signed in Geneva. Israel and Syria accepted a separation of forces, a U.N.-policed buffer zone between them and a gradual thinning out of forces.
- June 4*—Secretary of State Henry Kissinger briefed the Committee on Foreign Affairs on his peacemaking efforts between Syria and Israel.
- June 14*—Presidents Nixon and Sadat issued a joint statement outlining plans for U.S. assistance to Egypt in nuclear technology, establishment of a Joint Cooperation Commission, and the setting up of working groups to prepare concrete development programs.
- June 17*—President Nixon, in Jerusalem, promised to negotiate an agreement with Israel to provide nuclear aid for peaceful purposes.
- June 23*—Israel evacuated the last portion of Golan Heights territory occupied in the October 1973 war.
- September 10*—Israeli Prime Minister Rabin met in Washington with President Ford (sworn in Aug. 9), who said the United States would remain "committed to Israel's survival and security."
- September 13*—In a press conference ending a 4-day visit to Washington, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin said that pledges of nonbelligerency from Arab countries would have to accompany any further Israeli withdrawals from occupied territories. (In the United States to seek expanded U.S. military aid to Israel in the amount of \$1.5 billion a year, Rabin told Jewish leaders that he was encouraged by his reception from President Ford and other U.S. officials.)
- September 30*—State Department spokesman Robert Anderson said that Secretary Kissinger would spend 5 days beginning October 9 in visits to Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Israel.
- October 23*—The U.N. extended its peacekeeping force in the Sinai for 6 months.
- November 6*—Israel's Information Minister Aharon Yariv told newsmen that his country had received assurances from the United States of "an important additional amount of arms," which would "get to Israel as soon as possible."
- November 6*—Secretary Kissinger received expressions of support from President Sadat and King Faisal for continuing his step-by-step personal diplomacy.
- December 3*—Israel's Foreign Minister Allon told Parliament that an unpublished section of the Egypt-Israel disengagement agreement signed in January called for Israel access to the Suez Canal once it is reopened.
- December 5*—Israel's Prime Minister Rabin told a Tel Aviv high school audience that, while Israel was willing to make territorial compromises, "under no circumstances" would there be a return to the pre-1967 war boundaries.

1975

- January 15-17*—Israeli Foreign Minister Allon concluded 3 days of talks with American leaders in Washington and announced that Secretary of State Kissinger had agreed "in principle" to go to Israel as soon as he could.

- January 20*—It was reported that Israel had asked the United States for more than \$2 billion in economic and military assistance for the next fiscal year.
- January 22*—Egyptian President Sadat criticized the Soviet Union for its “unfriendly attitude” toward Egypt and said he continued to have full confidence in the U.S.-sponsored step-by-step approach to a Middle East settlement.
- January 23*—Defense Secretary Schlesinger said that he was confident the United States could provide the resources to sustain Israeli forces if there is another Middle East war, and affirmed the “military feasibility” of intervention in Middle East oil areas to prevent national strangulation.
- January 23*—The administration informed Congress that it will sell Israel about 200 Lance missiles, a short-range missile capable of carrying nuclear warheads.
- February 17*—Secretary Kissinger and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko concluded talks in Geneva without any apparent resolution of differences between Soviet demands for an immediate resumption of the Geneva conference and Kissinger’s “step-by-step” approach to a disengagement in the Sinai.
- February 18*—Egypt confirmed it is getting Soviet arms, including Mig-23 fighters, from the Soviet Union for the first time since the 1973 war, but Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy said the weapons do not replace losses of that war and that Egypt will not return to the Geneva Conference until they are replaced.
- February 19*—Secretary Kissinger, concluding his 10-day Middle East trip, reported “some progress” toward a framework for negotiating an Egyptian-Israeli accord on the Sinai.
- March 8*—In a new round of shuttle diplomacy, Kissinger sought further disengagement in the Sinai.
- March 22*—Kissinger suspended his efforts to draw Israel and Egypt into new accords, calling the breakdown “a sad day for America.” Obstacles included the fate of Israeli-held Abu Rudeis oil fields, Mitla and Giddi passes and an Egyptian pledge and nonbelligerency.
- March 23*—Secretary Kissinger returned to Washington from the Middle East following the failure of his “shuttle diplomacy” to produce an Arab-Israeli accord. (This appeared to end Kissinger’s “step-by-step” approach toward a Middle East settlement, leaving a return to the Geneva peace talks likely.)
- March 24*—President Ford ordered a total reexamination of U.S. policy toward the Middle East following the collapse of Secretary Kissinger’s efforts to attain a new agreement.
- March 25*—King Faisal of Saudi Arabia was assassinated in Riyadh by a nephew reportedly suffering mental illness. In an orderly transition, his brother, Crown Prince Khalid assumed the throne.
- March 27*—In an interview, President Ford said that Middle East peace would have been better served had Israel been more flexible in the recent negotiations with Egypt.
- March 29*—Egyptian President Sadat announced that he would reopen the Suez Canal to international shipping on June 5, 1975, and that he would renew the mandate of the U.N. force in Sinai for 3 more months when its terms expired April 24, 1975.

- March 30*—Egyptian officials announced that Israeli bound cargo aboard ships of third nations, as well as Israeli ships, would be banned from using the Suez Canal when it is opened to international traffic.
- March 31*—Secretary Schlesinger said that the United States would be “reluctant” to enter into any new arms commitments to Israel while the reassessment of American policy in the Middle East was going on.
- April 1*—Egypt formally asked the United States and the Soviet Union to reconvene the Geneva peace conference on the Middle East.
- April 6*—Israel Defense Minister Peres said that Israel would make “significant concessions” toward peace if Egypt opened the Suez Canal as promised on June 5, 1975, although he did not spell out what those concessions would be.
- April 8*—It was reported that Israel and Egypt had informed the United States of their interest in a new American mediation effort, but that Secretary Kissinger was wary of becoming involved again until he was convinced that an agreement was certain.
- April 10*—In his foreign policy speech to Congress, President Ford said the United States was going ahead with reconvening the Geneva Conference, but added that he and Secretary Kissinger “will move ahead on whatever course looks most promising, either towards an overall settlement or interim agreements, should the parties desire them.”
- April 12*—Egyptian President Anwar Sadat said in an interview that U.S. mediation in the Middle East was no longer enough and that the United States must state clearly that it wants Israel to withdraw to its borders of 1967.
- May 5*—U.S. officials confirmed that the United States had agreed to supply Jordan with an air-defense system, including Hawk ground-to-air missiles.
- May 20*—In Vienna, Secretary Kissinger and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, after 2 days of talks, agreed to postpone resumption of the Geneva Conference on the Middle East until fall.
- June 2*—President Ford and Egyptian President Sadat ended a 2-day meeting in Salzburg, Austria, with agreement on the urgent need to break the diplomatic stalemate in the Arab-Israeli conflict, but with uncertainty as to what course to take. (Ford said the United States was prepared to provide Egypt with current assistance for long-range economic development, and that he would “work with our Congress to give reality to this continuing pledge.”)
- June 4*—Israel completed a unilateral withdrawal, announced on June 2, of some of its forces from areas it occupied close to the Suez Canal.
- June 5*—Egypt officially reopened the Suez Canal to international shipping.
- June 12*—Israeli Prime Minister Rabin concluded 2 days of talks in Washington with President Ford and administrative officials, saying that he believed there was “a basis for negotiation” of a new agreement with Egypt, but many questions remained as to Egypt’s readiness to meet some of Israel’s demands.

- June 18*—Egyptian officials said Egypt had agreed in principle to resume negotiations on an interim settlement. (The Israeli Cabinet gave its approval for renewed diplomatic efforts on June 17.)
- June 24*—Israel proposed a new disengagement agreement with Egypt that would last 3-to-4 years and would include a land corridor to the Abu Rudeis oilfields and withdrawal of Israeli troops from the western reaches of the Mitla and Giddi passes.
- June 30*—Denying reports from Israel of a U.S. ultimatum, President Ford said the United States would have no choice but to suggest a reconvening of the Geneva Conference unless there was "a meeting of the minds" on an interim Egyptian-Israeli agreement.
- July 8*—Egypt, Israel, and Secretary Kissinger denied world rumors that new Sinai accords were imminent.
- July 12*—It was disclosed that, following a meeting between Secretary Kissinger and Israeli Prime Minister Rabin in Bonn, remaining differences to be resolved for a new interim agreement included: (1) the precise location of a new cease-fire line; (2) Egyptian access to the Abu Rudeis oilfield; and (3) corollary U.S. assurances of economic, political, and military support for Israel. (Outstanding issues concerned Israeli electronic surveillance stations monitoring approaches west of the Mitla and Giddi passes, protection of defense facilities at Bir Gilgafa, and access to Sharm al Shaikh.)
- July 15*—Egypt avowed it would not renew the U.N. forces mandate in the Sinai unless progress toward peace is made, and accused Israel of exploiting the state of "no war, no peace" to perpetuate its Sinai occupation.
- July 24*—U.N. Security Council approved a 3-month extension of the emergency force in Sinai after Egypt dropped opposition to renewal of the mission.
- July 25*—Rabin termed Egypt's new disengagement proposals "substantially not acceptable," but better than the one in March when Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy collapsed.
- August 17*—Israeli cabinet endorsed Rabin stand on new Sinai negotiations, paving the way for new direct negotiations by Kissinger. Cairo also approved of new Kissinger mediation.
- August 21*—Secretary Kissinger arrived in Israel to begin a new round of "shuttle diplomacy" aimed at reaching a new Israeli-Egyptian interim agreement.
- August 24*—Israeli official said agreement reached on setting up early warning installations, to be manned partly by American technicians, in the Sinai, thus clearing away one last major obstacle to new accords.
- September 1*—In separate ceremonies in Jerusalem and Alexandria, Israeli and Egyptian leaders initialed new Sinai pact. Israel yielded to Egyptian demands that it withdraw from Sinai mountain passes and return Abu Rudeis oilfields, and Egypt made several political concessions. Kissinger initialed provisions for stationing of U.S. technicians in the Sinai. Ford asked that Congress approve the new U.S. Middle East role.
- September 4*—New Sinai pact was formally signed by Israeli and Egyptian representatives during brief ceremony in Geneva.

PROVISIONS OF THE BASIC AGREEMENTS

Those portions of the Middle East settlement which are involved in and affected by House Joint Resolution 683 are encompassed in three documents:

- The Agreement between Egypt and Israel;
- The Annex to the Egypt-Israel Agreement; and
- The United States Proposal for an Early-Warning System in Sinai.

The texts of these agreements have been made public by mutual agreement of the parties and have been provided by the executive branch to the Congress.¹ Only the U.S. proposal directly involves a national commitment of the United States and it is specifically that document which would be approved by the passage of this resolution. The text of the proposal follows; the texts of the Egypt-Israel agreements may be found in the appendix.

PROPOSAL

In connection with the Early Warning System referred to in Article IV of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel concluded on this date and as an integral part of that Agreement, (hereafter referred to as the Basic Agreement), the United States proposes the following:

1. The Early Warning System to be established in accordance with Article IV in the area shown on the map attached to the Basic Agreement will be entrusted to the United States. It shall have the following elements:

a. There shall be two surveillance stations to provide strategic early warning, one operated by Egyptian and one operated by Israeli personnel. Their locations are shown on the map attached to the Basic Agreement. Each station shall be manned by not more than 250 technical and administrative personnel. They shall perform the functions of visual and electronic surveillance only within their stations.

b. In support of these stations, to provide tactical early warning and to verify access to them, three watch stations shall be established by the United States in the Mitla and Giddi Passes as will be shown on the map attached to the Basic Agreement. These stations shall be operated by United States civilian personnel. In support of these stations, there shall be established three unmanned electronic sensor fields at both ends of each Pass and in the general vicinity of each station and the roads leading to and from those stations.

2. The United States civilian personnel shall perform the following duties in connection with the operation and maintenance of these stations:

a. At the two surveillance stations described in paragraph 1a. above, United States civilian personnel will verify the na-

¹ In addition to these public agreements, several other agreements and assurances were made to Egypt and Israel by the United States which were provided to the Congress in classified form by the executive branch. They have not been submitted to Congress for approval at this time.

ture of the operations of the stations and all movement into and out of each station and will immediately report any detected divergency from its authorized role of visual and electronic surveillance to the Parties to the Basic Agreement and to the United Nations Emergency Force.

b. At each watch station described in paragraph 1b. above, the United States civilian personnel will immediately report to the Parties to the Basic Agreement and to the United Nations Emergency Force any movement of armed forces, other than the United Nations Emergency Force, into either Pass and any observed preparations for such movement.

c. The total number of United States civilian personnel assigned to functions under this Proposal shall not exceed 200. Only civilian personnel shall be assigned to functions under this Proposal.

3. No arms shall be maintained at the stations and other facilities covered by this Proposal, except for small arms required for their protection.

4. The United States personnel serving the Early Warning System shall be allowed to move freely within the area of the System.

5. The United States and its personnel shall be entitled to have such support facilities as are reasonably necessary to perform their functions.

6. The United States personnel shall be immune from local criminal, civil, tax and customs jurisdiction and may be accorded any other specific privileges and immunities provided for in the United Nations Emergency Force Agreement of February 13, 1957.

7. The United States affirms that it will continue to perform the functions described above for the duration of the Basic Agreement.


8. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Proposal, the United States may withdraw its personnel only if it concludes that their safety is jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no longer necessary. In the latter case the Parties to the Basic Agreement will be informed in advance in order to give them the opportunity to make alternative arrangements. If both Parties to the Basic Agreement request the United States to conclude its role under this Proposal, the United States will consider such requests conclusive.

9. Technical problems including the location of the watch stations will be worked out through consultation with the United States.

HENRY A. KISSINGER,
Secretary of State.

EFFECTS OF THE BASIC AGREEMENTS

As explained to the committee by the Secretary of State in his appearance September 8, the provisions and effects of these agreements can best be seen by reference to a map of the Sinai area. (See map on facing page.)



DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT

At the beginning of the negotiations the Egyptian line was along Line E of the map, about 10 kilometers from the Suez Canal. The Israeli line was about 20 kilometers from the Suez Canal, and there were small zones of limited armaments behind it. In the agreement that has been negotiated, the Egyptian line will move forward to the former Israeli line. The Israelis will withdraw on the central front a distance of 30 to 50 kilometers. In the area along the Gulf of Suez, for a distance of about 150 kilometers, Egyptian sovereignty will be re-

stored, but the area is to be without military forces, installations, or fortifications. It is under Egyptian civilian administration, with a United Nation presence to check on the military provisions of the agreement.

The agreement relinquishes to the Egyptians the strategic Giddi and Mitla Passes, and the oil fields at Abu Rudeis and environs.

ZONE OF LIMITED ARMAMENTS

On the central front where the major Israeli withdrawal has been agreed to, the military dispositions are designed to make a surprise attack difficult. Behind each line there is a zone of limited armaments indicated by the dotted Line K and by the dotted Line F along the Suez Canal.

In the zone of limited armaments the total number of forces and weapons is 8,000 troops, 72 artillery pieces, 75 tanks. Further, no weapon can be stationed in that area which can reach the front line of the other party.

Behind the zone of limited armaments each side has also agreed not to station weapons that can reach the front line of the other. In other words, neither side will station long-range artillery or rockets in such a position where it could fire on the front lines of the other.

EGYPTIAN COMMITMENTS

In return for the partial Israeli withdrawal, Egypt undertook a number of commitments to Israel, including:

- A pledge not to employ a military blockade against Israel;
- Permission for Israeli civilian ships to be given the right of peaceful passage through the Suez Canal; and
- An agreement to settle the problems of the Middle East by peaceful means.

WARNING STATIONS

The need for the American presence arose, according to Secretary Kissinger's testimony, because Israel maintains a strategic warning station at the western approaches to the Giddi-Mitla Passes area (E-1 map). Israel insisted that it has to maintain at least the capability of this warning, and offered Egypt an opportunity to establish a similar warning station. Egypt finally agreed to locate one at J-1 on the map.

Both sides proposed to the United States that it assume the trusteeship over the stations. The U.S. refused to man these stations because they would have required the presence of large numbers of Americans.

The United States, however, did agree to supervise the fact that the stations would not be used for fortification and would not contain military equipment. The parties agreed.

Israel further proposed that in addition to the two strategic warning stations the United States place tactical warning stations in this area. Israel insisted that it would not make the agreement unless the United States agreed to man these warning stations. American participation was required, the Secretary testified, because Israel was not confident enough about some of the members in the United Nations

force and because both parties had confidence only in the United States for manning these stations.

As a result, the agreement calls for American civilian technicians to operate three early-warning facilities of a tactical nature in the United Nations-controlled buffer zone.

BUFFER ZONES

The agreement calls for the establishment of buffer zones which will be controlled by the United Nations Emergency Force.

Buffer Zone 1 (see map), in which the American warning stations will be located, is from 30 to 50 kilometers deep. Buffer Zones 2A and 2B will be established along the Gulf of Suez.

The buffer zones will contain about 5,000 troops of the United Nations Forces, predominantly Finnish, Swedish and Canadian. Each of those contingents would be larger than the American group in that area.

THE AMERICAN PRESENCE

The American presence would be confined to two roads through the Mitla Pass and the Giddi Pass. The total number of Americans assigned to the mission cannot, by the terms of the agreement, exceed 200. Since they will operate in three shifts, the total number of Americans in the buffer zone at any one time would not exceed 75 and could be less. Americans not on duty will reside outside this area.

The Americans in the civilian technician force will have no military function.

They will be in the Sinai; in a peacekeeping role exactly the same as that of the United Nations Force and of the 39 Americans who for some time have been serving in an observer status with the United Nations in Sinai.

The technicians will report to both parties and to the United Nations about what they find.

Under the agreement the United States has the right to withdraw its civilian technicians at any time that it is believed their safety is jeopardized.

COSTS OF TECHNICIANS TO THE UNITED STATES

At the request of the committee, the Department of State has provided preliminary cost estimates for sending and maintaining up to 200 U.S. technicians in the Sinai.

According to testimony from Under Secretary Sisco on September 23, the estimates are:

	<i>Millions</i>
Startup costs:	
Early warning equipment, sensors, radars.....	\$2.0
Communications equipment	2.5
Construction, prefabricated buildings.....	2.0
Transportation	2.0
Food, medicine and other supplies.....	0.75
Vehicles, generators and other support equipment.....	0.75
Total	10.0
Annual operating costs:	
Personnel, equipment, etc.....	10.0

Costs, therefore, are estimated at \$20 million for the first year of operation, fiscal 1976, and \$10 million annually thereafter.

This resolution does not authorize appropriations for U.S. participation in the Sinai early-warning system. The committee has been informed that the executive branch intends to use funds made available under section 903 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (Middle East special requirements fund), to pay the costs of the U.S. technicians and equipment for the Sinai. Under this provision of law, the executive branch will be required to submit to Congress a report of its plans for the obligation of funds and the Congress can disapprove those plans by adopting a concurrent resolution within 30 days after the executive branch report is received. The committee believes this is an appropriate use of the special requirement fund. The reporting and review procedures described above will insure that Congress will be kept informed and will be able to maintain oversight of the implementation of the U.S. proposals approved by this resolution.

COST ESTIMATE

As noted earlier, the executive branch on a preliminary basis estimates the cost of recruiting and installing the technicians will be \$10 million with an additional \$10 million cost for annual operations, equipment, and personnel. Thus the cost for fiscal 1976 would be an estimated \$20 million, with a projected annual expense of \$10 million for succeeding years.

It should be noted that the joint resolution does not contain any authorization of appropriations. Funding for the technicians will be requested by the executive branch at a later time.

STATEMENTS REQUIRED BY RULE XI(1) (3) OF HOUSE RULES

A. Oversight Findings and Recommendations

No oversight findings are possible since the activity involved in the resolution is still in prospect. The committee did, however, insert in the resolution a reporting requirement which will help insure adequate review in the future.

B. Budget Authority

This resolution creates no new budget authority or tax expenditures.

C. Congressional Budget Office Estimate and Comparison

No estimate and comparison prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section 403 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 has been received by the committee.

D. Committee on Government Operations Summary

No oversight findings and recommendations have been received which relate to this measure from the Committee on Government Operations under clause 2(b) (2) of Rule X.

INFLATIONARY IMPACT STATEMENT

No funds are authorized to be appropriated by this resolution. It does, however, give congressional approval to an activity which will require dollar outlays. The estimate is for \$20 million during the current fiscal year and \$10 million thereafter.

Because the amount involved is a very small fraction of Federal outlays, and because a significant part of it is likely to be spent for the support of, and by, the American technicians, its inflationary impact should be miniscule.

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

PREAMBLE

The joint resolution contains four prefatory ("whereas") clauses which are designed to put the resolution in an appropriate context:

Clause 1 notes that the agreement signed on September 4 between Egypt and Israel, when it enters into force, may constitute a significant step toward peace in the Middle East.

Clause 2 states that the U.S. proposal calls for the United States to assign up to 200 American civilian personnel to carry out specified noncombat functions under agreed-on conditions and terms.

Clause 3 points out that the proposal would permit the United States to withdraw such personnel if it concludes that their safety is jeopardized or that their role is no longer necessary.

Clause 4 asserts that the implementation of the U.S. proposal for an early-warning system in Sinai may enhance the prospect of compliance with the terms of the Egyptian-Israeli agreements and thereby promote the cause of peace.

RESOLVED CLAUSES

The substantive or "resolved" clauses of the resolution are encompassed in five sections:

Section 1—Implementation

This provision authorizes the President to implement the "United States Proposal for the Early-Warning System in Sinai," subject to the proviso that U.S. personnel assigned to Sinai under the proposal will be removed immediately under two specific contingencies: (1) if there is an outbreak of hostilities between Egypt and Israel; or (2) if the Congress by concurrent resolution determines that the safety of such personnel is jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no longer necessary.

Department of State witnesses, in testimony before the committee, asserted that the executive branch has no objection to the inclusion of such provisos.

Section 2—Concurrent Resolution "Privilege"

This provision states that the concurrent resolution provided for in section 1 should be privileged in the same manner and to the same extent as a concurrent resolution described in section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148) is privileged under section 7 of that law. Following are the two sections:

SEC. 5. (c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), at any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.

* * * * *

SEC. 7. (a) Any concurrent resolution introduced pursuant to section 5(c) shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may be, and one such concurrent resolution shall be reported out by such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar days, unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays.

(b) Any concurrent resolution so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question (in the case of the

Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents and the opponents) and shall be voted on within three calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

(c) Such a concurrent resolution passed by one House shall be referred to the committee of the other House named in subsection (a) and shall be reported out by such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar days and shall thereupon become the pending business of such House and shall be voted upon within three calendar days, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of Congress with respect to a concurrent resolution passed by both Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee of conference shall make and file a report with respect to such concurrent resolution within six calendar days after the legislation is referred to the committee of conference. Notwithstanding any rule in either House concerning the printing of conference reports in the Record or concerning any delay in the consideration of such reports, such report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than six calendar days after the conference report is filed. In the event the conferees are unable to agree within 48 hours, they shall report back to their respective Houses in disagreement.

Section 3—Volunteers

This provision emphasizes that U.S. civilian personnel participating in the early-warning system in Sinai should include only individuals who have volunteered for such an assignment.

During the hearings on the Sinai early-warning system, executive branch witnesses testified that they did not intend to employ as civilian technicians anyone presently employed by the Central Intelligence Agency or any other foreign intelligence gathering agencies. To the extent that this personnel policy would be fully in keeping with the civilian character of this undertaking and the peacekeeping purposes which the technicians are supposed to serve, it is the expectation of this committee that none of the Americans serving in such a capacity in the Sinai will be an employee of any foreign intelligence gathering agency of the U.S. Government.

Section 4—Reporting Requirement

This section contains a reporting requirement obligating the President to submit a written report to Congress whenever American civilian technicians, pursuant to this congressional authorization, participate in any early-warning system. The section stipulates the circumstances requiring such a report, prescribes its form, specifies the nature of its contents, and states the timing of its submission. The reporting requirement has two key purposes: first, to cause the President to review the participation of American civilian technicians; and second, to provide the Congress with information on which it can render judgment and exercise its prerogative of ordering the removal of such civilian technicians by concurrent resolution.

The circumstances which would require a report are enumerated in the resolution as follows: "Whenever American civilian technicians, pursuant to this authorization, participate in an early-warning system". This language applies to the participation of American civilian technicians in the Sinai as long as they remain in that role.

The latter half of the section deals with the timing, form, and scope of the report submitted by the President.

(1) *Timing.*—The language specifies that reports from the President shall be submitted to the Congress "periodically, but no less frequently than once every 6 months." That time frame was determined by the committee as adequate enough for events to be gathered and appropriately analyzed yet not constitute an undue administrative burden.

(2) *Form.*—The report by the President is required to be in writing. Moreover, to the maximum extent possible, it is to be unclassified. If classified information must be included the President is free to do so. In keeping with established procedures of the Congress, the reports would be submitted to the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate. In addition, appropriate committees should promptly hold hearings on the reports and report their findings and recommendations to the Congress.

3. *Contents.*—Three stipulations are made on the contents of the report. They are:

(a) *Status.*—The intent of the committee here is that the report include reference to the general welfare of the civilian technicians, particularly with reference to their safety and security as threatened by any hostile attacks or impairment of their function and purpose.

(b) *Scope.*—In this connection, the committee's intent is that the report include specific reference to the nature of their activity, any changes in that activity, and the freedom with which they are able to conduct that activity effectively.

(c) *Anticipated duration.*—By this language the intent of the committee is that the report make precise and specific reference to the estimated length of time the presence of such civilian technicians will be necessary. In this context the view of the committee is that every possible effort be exerted by all parties concerned to minimize that period of presence. To that end the committee's intent is that the report concentrate on two possible avenues of reducing the presence of the civilian technicians:

(1) We recognize that prevailing political circumstances militate against an international monitoring arrangement. We appreciate that both parties place great faith in the credibility of the United States. Nonetheless, we would hope that over time an improved political climate would permit some broadening of the existing arrangement so as to include nationals of other countries.

(2) The committee recognizes the parties' interest in an American physical presence in the Sinai. We are concerned, however, that that presence be as limited and secure as possible. We are interested in knowing, then, to what extent new or alternative technological options might permit a reduction of our personnel or their relocation to a somewhat less vulnerable spot.

Section 5—Interpretation of Resolution

This provision makes clear that the authority contained in this joint resolution does not signify approval of the Congress for any other agreement, understanding, or commitment which may have been made by the executive branch, particularly any such which relate to a settlement in the Middle East.

It is intended to make clear that the authority contained in this joint resolution to implement the "United States Proposal for the Early-Warning System in Sinai" does not, and shall not in any way be construed to, constitute congressional approval, acceptance, or endorsement (1) of any other oral or written commitment, understanding, assurance, promise, or agreement, whether expressed or implied, or any other expression, oral or written, by any official of the United States which Israel, Egypt, or any other nation or organization might construe or interpret as a basis on which it could rely or act; or (2) of any characterization of any such commitment, understanding, assurance, promise, or agreement, or other expression, as constituting a "codification" of existing, congressionally approved, U.S. policy.

APPENDIX

TEXTS OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL, AND THE ANNEX TO THE EGYPT-ISRAEL AGREEMENT

AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel have agreed that :

Article I

The conflict between them and in the Middle East shall not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means.

The Agreement concluded by the Parties January 18, 1974, within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference, constituted a first step towards a just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973.

They are determined to reach a final and just peace settlement by means of negotiations called for by Security Council Resolution 338, this Agreement being a significant step towards that end.

Article II

The Parties hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force or military blockade against each other.

Article III

The Parties shall continue scrupulously to observe the ceasefire on land, sea and air and to refrain from all military or para-military actions against each other.

The Parties also confirm that the obligations contained in the Annex and, when concluded, the Protocol shall be an integral part of this Agreement.

Article IV

A. The military forces of the Parties shall be deployed in accordance with the following principles :

(1) All Israeli forces shall be deployed east of the lines designated as Lines J and M on the attached map.

(2) All Egyptian forces shall be deployed west of the line designated as Line E on the attached map.

(3) The area between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines E and F and the area between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines J and K shall be limited in armament and forces.

(4) The limitations on armaments and forces in the areas described by paragraph (3) above shall be agreed as described in the attached Annex.

(5) The zone between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines E and J, will be a buffer zone. In this zone the United Nations

Emergency Force will continue to perform its functions as under the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of January 18, 1974.

(6) In the area south from Line E and west from Line M, as defined in the attached map, there will be no military forces, as specified in the attached Annex.

B. The details concerning the new lines, the redeployment of the forces and its timing, the limitation on armaments and forces, aerial reconnaissance, the operation of the early warning and surveillance installations and the use of the roads, the United Nations functions and other arrangements will all be in accordance with the provisions of the Annex and map which are an integral part of this Agreement and of the Protocol which is to result from negotiations pursuant to the Annex and which, when concluded, shall become an integral part of this Agreement.

Article V

The United Nations Emergency Force is essential and shall continue its functions and its mandate shall be extended annually.

Article VI

The Parties hereby establish a Joint Commission for the duration of this Agreement. It will function under the aegis of the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East in order to consider any problem arising from this Agreement and to assist the United Nations Emergency Force in the execution of its mandate. The Joint Commission shall function in accordance with procedures established in the Protocol.

Article VII

Non-military cargoes destined for or coming from Israel shall be permitted through the Suez Canal.

Article VIII

This Agreement is regarded by the Parties as a significant step towards a just and lasting peace. It is not a final peace agreement.

The Parties shall continue their efforts to negotiate a final peace agreement within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338.

Article IX

This agreement shall enter into force upon signature of the Protocol and remain in force until superseded by a new agreement.

ANNEX TO THE AGREEMENT

Within 5 days after the signature of the Egypt-Israel Agreement, representatives of the two Parties shall meet in the Military Working Group of the Middle East Peace Conference at Geneva to begin preparation of a detailed Protocol for the implementation of the Agreement. The Working Group will complete the Protocol within 2 weeks. In order to facilitate preparation of the Protocol and implementation of the Agreement, and to assist in maintaining the scrupulous observance of the ceasefire and other elements of the Agreement, the two Parties have agreed on the following principles, which are an integral part of the Agreement, as guidelines for the Working Group.

1. Definitions of Lines and Areas

The deployment lines, Areas of Limited Forces and Armaments, Buffer Zones, the area south from Line E and west from Line M, other designated areas, road sections for common use and other features referred to in Article IV of the Agreement shall be as indicated on the attached map (1:100,000-U.S. Edition).

2. Buffer Zones

(a) Access to the Buffer Zones will be controlled by the United Nations Emergency Force, according to procedures to be worked out by the Working Group and the United Nations Emergency Force.

(b) Aircraft of either Party will be permitted to fly freely up to the forward line of that Party. Reconnaissance aircraft of either Party may fly up to the middle line of the Buffer Zone between Lines E and J on an agreed schedule.

(c) In the Buffer Zone between Lines E and J, there will be established under Article IV of the Agreement an Early Warning System entrusted to United States civilian personnel as detailed in a separate proposal, which is a part of this Agreement.

(d) Authorized personnel shall have access to the Buffer Zone for transit to and from the Early Warning System; the manner in which this is carried out shall be worked out by the Working Group and the United Nations Emergency Force.

3. Area South of Line E and West of Line M

(a) In this area, the United Nations Emergency Force will assure that there are no military or para-military forces of any kind, military fortifications and military installations; it will establish checkpoints and have the freedom of movement necessary to perform this function.

(b) Egyptian civilians and third-country civilian oil field personnel shall have the right to enter, exit from, work, and live in the above indicated area, except for Buffer Zones 2A, 2B and the United Nations Posts. Egyptian civilian police shall be allowed in the area to perform normal civil police functions among the civilian population in such numbers and with such weapons and equipment as shall be provided for in the Protocol.

(c) Entry to and exit from the area, by land, by air or by sea, shall be only through the United Nations Emergency Force checkpoints. The United Nations Emergency Force shall also establish checkpoints along the road, the dividing line and at other points, with the precise locations and number to be included in the Protocol.

(d) Access to the airspace and the coastal area shall be limited to unarmed Egyptian civilian vessels and unarmed civilian helicopters and transport planes involved in the civilian activities of the area as agreed by the Working Group.

(e) Israel undertakes to leave intact all currently existing civilian installations and infrastructures.

(f) Procedures for use of the common sections of the coastal road along the Gulf of Suez shall be determined by the Working Group and detailed in the Protocol.

Emergency Force will continue to perform its functions as under the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of January 18, 1974.

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(b) Egyptian civilians and third-country civilian oil field personnel shall have the right to enter, exit from, work, and live in the above indicated area, except for Buffer Zones 2A, 2B and the United Nations Posts. Egyptian civilian police shall be allowed in the area to perform normal civil police functions among the civilian population in such numbers and with such weapons and equipment as shall be provided for in the Protocol.

(c) Entry to and exit from the area, by land, by air or by sea, shall be only through the United Nations Emergency Force checkpoints. The United Nations Emergency Force shall also establish checkpoints along the road, the dividing line and at other points, with the precise locations and number to be included in the Protocol.

(d) Access to the airspace and the coastal area shall be limited to unarmed Egyptian civilian vessels and unarmed civilian helicopters and transport planes involved in the civilian activities of the area as agreed by the Working Group.

(e) Israel undertakes to leave intact all currently existing civilian installations and infrastructures.

(f) Procedures for use of the common sections of the coastal road along the Gulf of Suez shall be determined by the Working Group and detailed in the Protocol.

4. Aerial Surveillance

There shall be a continuation of aerial reconnaissance missions by the United States over the areas covered by the Agreement (the area between Lines F and K), following the same procedures already in practice. The missions will ordinarily be carried out at a frequency of one mission every 7-10 days, with either Party or the United Nations Emergency Force empowered to request an earlier mission. The United States Government will make the mission results available expeditiously to Israel, Egypt and the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East.

5. Limitation of Forces and Armaments

(a) Within the Areas of Limited Forces and Armaments (the areas between Lines J and K and Lines E and F) the major limitations shall be as follows:

- (1) Eight (8) standard infantry battalions.
- (2) Seventy-five (75) tanks.
- (3) Seventy-two (72) artillery pieces, including heavy mortars (i.e., with caliber larger than 120 mm.), whose range shall not exceed twelve (12) km.
- (4) The total number of personnel shall not exceed eight thousand (8,000).
- (5) Both Parties agree not to station or locate in the area weapons which can reach the line of the other side.
- (6) Both Parties agree that in the areas between Lines J and K, and between Line A (of the Disengagement Agreement of January 18, 1974) and Line E, they will construct no new fortifications or installations for forces of a size greater than that agreed herein.

(b) The major limitations beyond the Areas of Limited Forces and Armaments will be:

- (1) Neither side will station nor locate any weapon in areas from which they can reach the other line.
- (2) The Parties will not place anti-aircraft missiles within an area of ten (10) kilometres east of Line K and west of Line F, respectively.
- (c) The United Nations Emergency Force will conduct inspections in order to ensure the maintenance of the agreed limitations within those areas.

6. Process of Implementation

The detailed implementation and timing of the redeployment of forces, turnover of oil fields, and other arrangements called for by the Agreement, Annex and Protocol shall be determined by the Working Group, which will agree on the stages of this process, including the phased movement of Egyptian troops to Line E and Israeli troops to Line J. The first phase will be the transfer of the oil fields and installations to Egypt. This process will begin within 2 weeks from the signature of the Protocol and the introduction of the necessary technicians, and it will be completed no later than 8 weeks after it begins. The details of the phasing will be worked out in the Military Working Group.

Implementation of the redeployment shall be completed within 5 months after signature of the Protocol.

SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF HON. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI

The Middle East has for too long been a source of conflict and threat to the peace of the world. While urgent social and economic problems within the area remain unresolved, vast amounts of time, money, and energy have been expended in the cause of war. This drainage of natural resources and continued confrontation has most recently led to increased oil prices which have seriously undermined the economy of the entire Western World and have been especially detrimental to the underdeveloped countries. While the situation in the Middle East is at best tenuous it could cause renewed abrasive relations between the superpowers and erode efforts at détente.

For all these reasons any effort which may lead to a lessening of tensions in this highly volatile area must be commended. Indeed, the Government of the United States has exercised its good offices to bring about such a defusing of the situation. I appreciate and approve of those efforts.

However, despite the continued dangers inherent in the area if peace does not prevail and despite the positive role played by the United States, I am reluctantly compelled to register reservations to House Joint Resolution 683, the resolution approved by the House International Relations Committee—hurriedly drawn legislation which may buy today's "peace" but produce tomorrow's peril.

My basic concern centers on the extent to which the authorization allowing participation by 200 American civilian technicians in the early-warning system in the Sinai symbolizes a deepening involvement of the American role in the Mideast. What that participation represents for the United States is a shift away from detached arbiter to that of active *participant*. With that change comes the serious prospect and danger of involvement against which this resolution does not sufficiently protect the national security of the United States.

From testimony received by the committee it would appear that the arrangement providing for 200 American civilian volunteer technicians was necessary in order to obtain agreement between Israel and Egypt. In that connection, two concerns are particularly troubling.

First, I believe strongly that the civilian technician force should have been multinational rather than exclusively American. Particularly if and when these American technicians should come under hostile attack the overwhelming temptation for the United States will be to commit military forces for their rescue. That prospect clearly carries with it the inherent danger for even deeper U.S. direct military involvement. Such a possibility must be avoided at all costs.

Second, we have been repeatedly assured by executive branch witnesses that an international technician force was impossible because both Egypt and Israel insisted upon American technicians. However, that contention is contradicted by certain recent reports that it was

the American Government which promoted the idea of American personnel. One reason given was that the equipment was too technical and of such an advanced type that a security factor had to be considered. However, testimony received by the committee clearly demonstrated that neither the security nor the complexity of the sensor equipment proposed for use in the Sinai precluded operation by other than Americans. Indeed, we were advised that it will be the same type of equipment deployed in Vietnam. The North Vietnamese are now in possession of that equipment. Therefore, the national security issue is not valid.

Another concern relative to the deepening position into which this arrangement on American civilian technicians is moving the United States was expressed in *The Washington Post* editorial of October 1, 1975. As seen by the *Post*—one of the major newspapers often privy to sensitive information—"Israel needs the agreement as its ticket to the billions in aid and the political partnership it seeks from Washington." Frankly, I am concerned. I submit the Congress and the American people should be concerned relative to what commitments were made in order to attain the Sinai agreement.

Despite these strong reservations I will vote for the resolution authorizing the participation of 200 American civilian technicians. However, I will do so with the following understandings: First, that every effort will be made to reduce U.S. participation as soon as possible through the substitution of other nationals and the full use of remote control equipment. Second, that the United States, acting in accord with established arms control policies, will avoid supplying high sophisticated arms to the area which would prove destabilizing. Indeed, the ideal would be to discontinue all military assistance to the area. Finally, in the interests of fairness and justice, it is important that in providing economic aid the United States be balanced and prudent.

Without adequate safeguards and control, the resolution approved by the committee represents the danger of being a first step in the direction of added, direct involvement. It is the proverbial camel's nose under the tent.

In an effort to establish such safeguards and controls and thereby preclude or minimize that danger, during the markup of the legislation I offered two amendments to the resolution. The first, much in the spirit of the War Powers Resolution, would have required the President to consult with Congress prior to agreeing to any similar arrangement in the future. Its purpose was to assure an opportunity for congressional input into significant commitments of this type. As it now stands, Congress is in the awkward position of having to act only on accomplished fact.

Although the amendment was rejected, I should note in its defense that it complemented the rising voice within Congress for a full and meaningful opportunity to exercise our proper partnership role in foreign policy formulation. From bitter past experience I have come to the reluctant conclusion that the executive branch is less than anxious to allow Congress that opportunity. Too often the executive branch has been too reluctant to provide the Congress information which would make possible our fuller and more effective participation in the policy formulation process. As an example I cite the Executive's failure

to file with the Congress the Executive Agreement Memorandum of Understanding of December 30, 1973 between Israel and the United States. The filing of such agreements within 60 days of their going into force is required under the Case-Zablocki Act. What is significant in connection with the December 1973 agreement is that it is cited in the current agreements. As of this moment, the December 1973 agreement still has not been filed with Congress.

Similarly, recent frustrating experiences with an executive branch proclivity toward selective, evasive, and elusive interpretations of laws passed by Congress prompted my second amendment, this one dealing with "interpretation." It would have spelled out in precise and comprehensive language Congress' exact understanding of what it was doing in authorizing the use of civilian technicians. The amendment had two simple but important objectives: First, it would have made absolutely clear that in allowing the civilian technician participation we were doing *only* that and nothing else. Thus, it would have precluded any inference that this action of Congress could be construed as approval for any other oral or written commitment, understanding or expression made by any U.S. official and on which any party could rely or act. Also, the amendment would make crystal clear that by approving the resolution we would not be codifying or otherwise approving or endorsing in any way what has so often and in so many ways been loosely and vaguely referred to as "U.S. policy."

This amendment was replaced by a shorter version offered by the gentleman from California, Mr. Lagomarsino. Although the language of my amendment appears in the body of the committee report, in elaborating upon the meaning of Mr. Lagomarsino's substitute, for the sake of emphasis I believe it is desirable to repeat it here in complete form:

SEC. 2. The authority contained in this joint resolution to implement the "United States Proposal for the Early-Warning System in Sinai" does not, and shall not in any way be construed to, constitute congressional approval, acceptance, or endorsement (1) of any other oral or written commitment, understanding, assurance, promise, or agreement, whether expressed or implied, or any other expression, oral or written, by any official of the United States which Israel, Egypt, or any other nation or organization might construe or interpret as a basis on which it could rely or act; or (2) of any characterization of any such commitment, understanding, assurance, promise, or agreement, or other expression, as constituting a "codification" of existing congressionally approved, United States policy.

At the present time, and in approving the implementation of any other agreement in the future, the Congress must resist emotional pressures and insist that a prudent and balanced policy prevails if we are to enhance peace in the area.

It is in this spirit that these supplemental views are presented.

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI
AND HON. PAUL FINDLEY

THE MISSING SAFEGUARD—A 2-YEAR LIMITATION

As reported to the House, the resolution (H.J. Res. 683) stationing technicians in the Sinai creates a U.S. obligation of substantial magnitude and risk. Our commitment is essentially open-ended, since, in practical terms, we have left it up to Israel and Egypt to decide the duration of our stay. Recent history and common sense argue against such an approach.

We believe that this extensive conveyance of authority needs to be more adequately safeguarded. Political instability and uncertainty in the Middle East are entirely too great for us to proceed under this kind of an arrangement.

Accordingly, we will support an amendment (to be offered on the House floor) which will automatically terminate the authority for the obligation after a two year period. This is the only effective way we know of causing the entire 95th Congress to reevaluate systematically the U.S. commitment in light of prevailing circumstances. If the events and trends are promising, approval will no doubt be swift and simple. The termination date is a safeguard and nothing more.

The pending resolution stands very much at odds with the spirit and rationale of the War Powers Resolution. That legislation was the distillate of an enormous national tragedy and of the sober reflections that flowed therefrom. As the principal House authors of the War Powers Resolution, we are troubled to see its prudent concepts disregarded in this instance. We believe that the logic of War Powers should guide us at this critical juncture.

It may be argued that the safeguard of a mandatory review after a 2-year period would disrupt a delicate situation and require a renegotiation of the entire agreement. We find such an argument unpersuasive. The United States proposal to the basic agreement, which has been accepted by both Egypt and Israel, already states that the United States may withdraw its personnel if it believes that "continuation of their role is no longer necessary." Our amendment simply creates a thoughtful and guaranteed process by which the Congress can evaluate the necessity of our commitment after a reasonable period of time. This amendment flows naturally from an already admitted reservation. Moreover, it will help to give shape and focus to what might otherwise be rather intermittent and desultory reviews.

Some may also suggest that we should be satisfied with the existing provision that allows the Congress to end our commitment by concurrent resolution. We recall, however, that the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was governed by an identical provision for termination. (Year after year, the Congress simply declined to act, preferring to leave hard decisions to others.) The manifest ineffectuality of such a provision will be recalled by all.

It is well for us to understand the following facts, all of which argue in their own way for the kind of limitation which we envision.

First, the current wording of the commitment suggests extraordinary permanence. The basic agreement lasts until it is superseded by another agreement. No one of course can predict when this will occur. As Under Secretary of State Sisco conceded, even the outbreak of hostilities can only interrupt—not terminate—the U.S. obligation.

Second, the obligation entails undeniable risks. American personnel will be introduced into an area where hostilities are prospective, if not imminent. They will be placed on the line, as our committee inquiry reveals, for largely political reasons rather than to perform some genuinely useful and unique warning function. They will be a continuously tempting target for terrorists. And the need to remove them in the midst of another sudden and violent Middle East war could well draw our military forces into the fighting at a most undesirable time and place.

Third, in this some connection, the resolution conveys a seemingly unprecedented grant of authority to the President to evacuate the technicians. In effect, the existing language mandates the President to take whatever steps are necessary to remove our personnel. Moreover, it mandates him to do this "immediately."

Finally, the perception of open-endedness that arises from this obligation may significantly lower the incentives for any further and more comprehensive settlement. Many states in the Middle East argue that the door has now been closed on any further negotiation. Surely, we want to do what we can to minimize that perception. After all, we are willing to approve this risky commitment, because we believe that it may be a necessary investment in a wider peace. And yet the connection between our presence and the requirement for continued progress toward a comprehensive settlement is insufficiently established by the existing resolution.

Our goal is positive in its orientation. We seek to safeguard the national interests of the United States while at the same time enhancing the prospects for peace in the Middle East. We are willing to make a commitment for peace, but we insist upon doing so in a prudent manner. The administration itself at first strongly opposed the commitment of U.S. personnel. Surely, then, they cannot quarrel with the sort of minimal safeguard we are proposing now.

The mandatory review contemplated by our amendment is a sensible check upon an uncertain situation. It enables those of us in the Congress to exercise a greater degree of control. Without this, we shall be like the ant roaring downstream on a log, believing all the while that he was steering.

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI,
PAUL FINDLEY.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

In order to put House Joint Resolution 683 in perspective, I am enclosing for the interest of my colleagues a report by the Library of Congress which gives a summary of the reported "Secret Agreements" between the United States and Israel and Egypt. This report is based on recent press accounts and not on official documents.

The Library of Congress report follows:

A SUMMARY OF THE REPORTED "SECRET AGREEMENTS" BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, ISRAEL, AND EGYPT SUBSEQUENT TO THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT OF 1975¹

(The following is based on current press accounts and not on official documents.)

At the time of the signing of the 1975 Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement of 1975 in Geneva on September 4, 1975, there was widespread press speculation to the effect that, in addition to the Accord and Annex, which were made public, and the U.S. proposal for the establishment of an early-warning system in the buffer zone, the overall agreement also included secret understandings between the United States, Israel, and Egypt which contained commitments with regard to foreign aid and other matters. On September 16 and 17, 1975, the Washington Post and the New York Times published the alleged texts of three such secret agreements. According to the New York Times, the texts were made available by columnist Jack Anderson and were authenticated by officials who have seen the originals. The first document is entitled "Memorandum of Agreement Between Israel and the United States." The second is entitled "Assurances From the United States Government to Israel," which augments the first document's aid provisions. The third is entitled "Assurances from the United States Government to Egypt." According to press reports, there may be other such secret agreements.

I. SUMMARY OF "MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL"

1. The United States will make every effort to be responsive to Israel's long-term defense, energy, and economic needs, subject to congressional approval.
2. The United States and Israel will periodically consult on Israel's long-term military supply needs; and beginning with the 1976 request, the United States will view sympathetically Israel's request for advanced weapons.

¹ By Susan M. Mowle, Analyst in International Relations, Foreign Affairs Division, Sept. 25, 1975.

3. In the event that Israel cannot meet her oil requirements through normal procedures, the United States agrees that for the next 5 years it will:

(a) Sell and help ship oil to Israel if U.S. reserves permit; or

(b) If the United States itself faces an oil embargo, it will make oil available for purchase in accord with the International Energy Agency conservation and allocation formula, as applied by the United States Government.

4. The administration will request Congress to:

(a) Take into account Israel's oil import requirements in determining the overall Israeli aid figures;

(b) In determining total aid to Israel, take into account Israel's extra expenditure to replace the oil derived from the Sinai wells which are to be returned to Egypt; and

(c) Make available funds for construction of storage facilities to enable Israel to increase her supply of oil reserves to 1 year's need within the next 4 years.

5. The United States will not expect Israel to implement the Agreement² until Egypt permits the passage of Israeli cargo through the Suez Canal to and from Israeli ports.

6. The United States agrees that the next agreement with Egypt should be a final peace agreement.

7. The United States will consult with Israel on remedial action by the United States in the case of any Egyptian violation of any of the provisions of the Agreement.

8. The United States will veto any Security Council resolution which would adversely affect the Agreement.

9. The United States will seek to prevent efforts by others to consider proposals detrimental to Israeli interests.

10. In the event of a threat to Israel's security by a world power "the United States will in the event of such threat consult promptly with the Government of Israel with respect to what support, diplomatic or otherwise, or assistance it can lend to Israel in accordance with its constitutional practices."

11. The United States and Israel will conclude the contingency plan for an emergency military supply operation, if possible within 2 months of the signing of this document.

12. It is the United States view that Egyptian commitments under the Egypt-Israeli Agreement are not conditional upon any developments between Arab States and Israel.

13. The United States shares Israel's view that negotiations with Jordan are to be directed toward an overall peace settlement.

14. The United States regards the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb and the Strait of Gibraltar as international waterways and supports Israel's passage through the straits as well as freedom of flight over the straits and the Red Sea.

² Agreement, when capitalized, refers to the Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement of 1975 signed on Sept. 4, 1975, and included the Accord and Annex.

15. The Agreement will remain binding even if the U.N. forces are withdrawn without the prior agreement of Egypt, Israel, and United States and even if no subsequent agreement has been reached.

16. The Agreement will not take effect before the United States Congress approves the U.S. role in connection with surveillance and observation functions.

II. SUMMARY OF "ASSURANCES FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO ISRAEL"

The United States will continue to supply Israel with advanced types of equipment, such as the F-16 aircraft, and the Administration agrees to undertake a joint study of sophisticated military items, including the Pershing ground-to-ground missiles with conventional warheads, with a view to giving a positive response.

III. SUMMARY OF ASSURANCES FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO EGYPT"

1. The United States intends to make a serious effort to bring about further negotiations between Syria and Israel.

2. In the event of a violation of the Agreement by Israel, the United States will consult with Egypt about possible remedial action by the United States.

3. The United States will provide technical assistance to Egypt for the Egyptian early-warning station.

[From the New York Times, Sept. 17, 1975]

U.S. DOCUMENTS ACCOMPANYING THE SINAI ACCORD

(Special to the New York Times)

WASHINGTON, Sept. 16.—*Following are the texts of three documents relating to the recent Sinai agreement between Israel and Egypt. The first is a memorandum of agreement between Israel and the United States relating to American aid to Israel and diplomatic actions in the Middle East; the second, entitled "Assurances From the United States Government to Israel," augments the first document's and provisions; the third is entitled "Assurances From the United States Government to Egypt."*

MEMORANDUM

The United States recognizes that the Egypt-Israel Agreement initialed on Sept. 1, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the agreement), entailing the withdrawal from vital areas in Sinai, constitutes an act of great significance on Israel's part in the pursuit of final peace. That agreement has full United States support.

(1) The United States Government will make every effort to be fully responsive, within the limits of its resources and Congressional authorization and appropriation, on an on-going and long-term basis, to Israel's military equipment and other defense requirements, to its energy requirements and to its economic needs. The needs specified in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 below shall be deemed eligible for inclusion within the annual total to be requested in fiscal year 1976 and later fiscal years.

(2) Israel's long-term military supply needs from the United States shall be the subject of periodic consultations between representatives of the U.S. and Israeli defense establishments, with agreement reached on specific items to be included in a separate U.S.-Israeli memorandum. To this end, a joint study by military experts will be undertaken within three weeks. In conducting this study, which will include Israel's 1976 needs, the United States will view Israel's requests sympathetically, including its request for advanced and sophisticated weapons.

(3) Israel will make its own independent arrangements for oil supply to meet its requirements through normal procedures. In the event Israel is unable to secure its needs in this way, the United States Government, upon notification of this fact by the Government of Israel, will act as follows for five years, at the end of which period either side can terminate this arrangement on one year's notice.

(a) If the oil Israel needs to meet all its normal requirements for domestic consumption is unavailable for purchase in circumstances where no quantitative restrictions exist on the ability of the United States to procure oil to meet its normal requirements, the United States Government will promptly make oil available for purchase by Israel to meet all of the aforementioned normal requirements of Israel. If Israel is unable to secure the necessary means to transport such oil to Israel, the United States Government will make every effort to help Israel secure the necessary means of transport.

(b) If the oil Israel needs to meet all of its normal requirements for domestic consumption is unavailable for purchase in circumstances where quantitative restrictions through embargo or otherwise also prevent the United States from procuring oil to meet its normal requirements, the United States Government will promptly make oil available for purchase by Israel in accordance with the International Energy Agency conservation and allocation formula as applied by the United States Government, in order to meet Israel's essential requirements. If Israel is unable to secure the necessary means to transport such oil to Israel, the United States Government will make every effort to help Israel secure the necessary mean of transport.

Israeli and U.S. experts will meet annually or more frequently at the request of either party, to review Israeli's continuing oil requirement.

(4) In order to help Israel meet its energy needs, and as part of the over-all annual figure in paragraph 1 above, the United States agrees:

(a) In determining the over-all annual figure which will be requested from Congress, the United States Government will give special attention to Israel's oil import requirements and, for a period as determined by Article 3 above, will take into account in calculating that figure Israel's additional expenditures for the import of oil to replace that which would have ordinarily come from Abu Rudeis and Ras Sudar (4.5 million tons in 1975).

(b) To ask Congress to make available funds, the amount to be determined by mutual agreement, to the Government of Israel necessary for a project for the construction and stocking of the oil reserves to be stored in Israel, bringing storage reserve capacity and reserve stocks, now standing at approximately six months, up to one year's need at the time of the completion of the project. The project will be implemented within four years. The construction, operation and financing and other relevant questions of the project will be the subject of early and detailed talks between the two Governments.

(5) The United States Government will not expect Israel to begin to implement the agreement before Egypt fulfills its undertaking under the January 1974, disengagement agreement to permit passage of all Israeli cargoes to and from Israeli ports through the Suez Canal.

(6) The United States Government agrees with Israel that the next agreement with Egypt should be a final peace agreement.

(7) In case of an Egyptian violation of any of the provisions of the agreement, the United States Government is prepared to consult with Israel as to the significance of the violation and possible remedial action by the United States Government.

(8) The United States Government will vote against any Security Council resolution which in its judgment affects or alters adversely the agreement.

(9) The United States Government will not join in and will seek to prevent efforts by others to bring about consideration of proposals which it and Israel agree are detrimental to the interests of Israel.

(10) In view of the long-standing U.S. commitment to the survival and security of Israel, the United States Government will view with particular gravity threats to Israel's security or sovereignty by a world power. In support of this objective, the United States Government will in the event of such threat consult promptly with the Government of Israel with respect to what support diplomatic or otherwise, or assistance it can lend to Israel in accordance with its constitutional practices.

(11) The United States Government and the Government of Israel will, at the earliest possible time, and if possible within two months after the signature of this document, con-

clude the contingency plan for a military supply operation to Israel in an emergency situation.

(12) It is the United States Government's position that Egyptian commitments under the Egypt-Israel agreement, its implementation, validity and duration are not conditional upon any act or developments between the other Arab states and Israel. The United States Government regards the agreement as standing on its own.

(13) The United States Government shares the Israeli position that under existing political circumstances negotiations with Jordan will be directed toward an over-all peace settlement.

(14) In accordance with the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas and free and unimpeded passage through and over straits connecting international waters, the United States Government regards the Straits of Babel Mandeb and the Strait of Gibraltar as international waterways. It will support Israel's right to free and unimpeded passage through such straits. Similarly, the United States Government recognizes Israel's right to freedom of flights over the Red Sea and such straits and will support diplomatically the exercise of that right.

(15) In the event that the United Nations Emergency Force or any other United Nations organ is withdrawn without the prior agreement of both parties to the Egypt-Israel agreement and the United States before this agreement is superseded by another agreement, it is the United States view that the agreement shall remain binding in all its parts.

(16) The United States and Israel agree that signature of the protocol of the Egypt-Israel agreement and its full entry into effect shall not take place before approval by the United States Congress of the U.S. role in connection with the surveillance and observation functions described in the agreement and its annex. The United States has informed the Government of Israel that it has obtained the Government of Egypt agreement to the above.

ADDENDUM ON ARMS

On the question of military and economic assistance to Israel, the following conveyed by the U.S. to Israel augments what the memorandum of agreement states.

The United States is resolved to continue to maintain Israel's defensive strength through the supply of advanced types of equipment, such as the F-16 aircraft. The United States Government agrees to an early meeting to undertake a joint study of high technology and sophisticated items, including the Pershing ground-to-ground missiles with conventional warheads, with the view to giving a positive response. The U.S. Administration will submit annually for approval by the U.S. Congress a request for military and economic assistance in order to help meet Israel's economic and military needs.

ASSURANCES TO EGYPT

1. The United States intends to make a serious effort to help bring about further negotiations between Syria and Israel, in the first instance, through diplomatic channels.

2. In the event of an Israeli violation of the agreement, the United States is prepared to consult with Egypt as to the significance of the violation and possible remedial action by the United States.

3. The United States will provide technical assistance to Egypt for the Egyptian early-warning station.

ADDENDUM

On September 18, 1975, the New York Times published the text of an alleged United States-Israeli Memorandum of Agreement dealing with the Geneva peace conference, bringing to a total of four the number of reported "secret agreements" between the United States, Egypt, and Israel which have been published in the press subsequent to the Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement of 1975.

SUMMARY OF "MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL WITH REGARD TO THE GENEVA PEACE CONFERENCE"

1. The United States and Israel will coordinate on the timing of the reconvening of the Geneva peace conference.

2. The United States will not recognize or negotiate with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as long as the PLO does not recognize the right of Israel to exist, and the United States will not accept U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The United States and Israel will seek to coordinate strategy and position on this issue, and with regard to the participation of any additional states at the conference.

3. The United States will seek to insure that all substantive negotiations at the conference be on a bilateral basis.

4. The United States will veto any Security Council resolution which seeks to adversely alter the terms of reference of the Geneva peace conference or any adverse changes in Resolutions 242 or 338.

5. The United States will seek to insure that the role of the co-sponsors be consistent with the terms of the December 20, 1972, Memorandum of Agreement between the United States and Israel.

6. The United States and Israel will plan action to insure that the conference be conducted in a manner directed toward the advancement of a negotiated peace between Israel and its neighbors.

[From the New York Times, Sept. 18, 1975]

U.S.-ISRAEL PACT ON GENEVA

(Special to The New York Times)

WASHINGTON, Sept. 17—Following is the text of a previously unpublished memorandum of agreement between the United States and Israel dealing with the Geneva peace conference.

1. The Geneva peace conference will be reconvened at a time coordinated between the United States and Israel.

2. The United States will continue to adhere to its present policy with respect to the Palestine Liberation Organization, whereby it will not recognize or negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization so long as the Palestine Liberation Organization does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The United States Government will consult fully and seek to concert its position and strategy at the Geneva peace conference on this issue with the Government of Israel. Similarly, the United States will consult fully and seek to concert its position and strategy with Israel with regard to the participation of any other additional states. It is understood that the participation at a subsequent phase of the conference of any possible additional state, group or organization will require the agreement of all the initial participants.

3. The United States will make every effort to insure at the conference that all the substantive negotiations will be on a bilateral basis.

4. The United States will oppose and, if necessary, vote against any initiative in the Security Council to alter adversely the terms of reference of the Geneva peace conference or to change Resolutions 242 and 338 in ways which are incompatible with their original purpose.

5. The United States will seek to insure that the role of the co-sponsors will be consistent with what was agreed in the memorandum of understanding between the United States Government and the Government of Israel of Dec. 20, 1972.

6. The United States and Israel will concert action to assure that the conference will be conducted in a manner consonant with the objectives of this document and with the declared purpose of the conference, namely the advancement of a negotiated peace between Israel and its neighbors.

LEE H. HAMILTON.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, HON. BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, AND HON. CHARLES WILSON

We support the presence of American technicians in the Sinai because we are convinced it is the cement which holds together the recent agreement between Israel and Egypt.

If Congress were to reject the resolution it would probably result in the collapse of the understandings arrived at a short while ago and that, we believe, would have potentially catastrophic consequences not only for Israel—our only reliable democratic ally in the Middle East—but for our own country as well.

We do not believe that the recent agreement represents the millennium in the Middle East. Israel has made very tangible territorial withdrawals in exchange for what are, in the final analysis, rather intangible political concessions. The real test of the agreement is whether it leads to a renewal of war or progress toward peace. But to the extent it has resulted in a reduction of tensions and a period of peace in which both sides will have an opportunity to gain confidence in the willingness of the other to implement such a settlement, we think we are presumptively better off with the accord than we would have been without it.

The alternative to a second stage interim agreement between Israel and Egypt was, after all, not a grand settlement of all the outstanding issues dividing Israel from its Arab neighbors—issues which have defied solution for over a quarter of a century now—but the very real probability of another round in the continuing conflict in the Middle East. Such a war, if it broke out, would threaten to drag both of the great superpowers into its vortex with all of the attendant possibilities for the outbreak of nuclear hostilities and the collapse of contemporary civilization. Even if such a doomsday scenario never came to pass, a fifth war in the Middle East could possibly produce another embargo on Arab oil, thereby creating the most serious problems imaginable, not only for our own economy, but for the economies of almost all the other nations of the world as well.

There are some who contend that the brief "breathing spell" generated by the agreement will result in a stiffening of the Israeli position with respect to such issues as the Golan Heights and the West Bank—thereby decreasing rather than increasing the prospects for a lasting peace in the Middle East. We think such criticisms miss the point entirely. The real obstacle to peace in the Middle East lies in the massive mistrust which has made more far-reaching agreements and direct negotiations impossible. What is needed, more than anything else, is the kind of movement toward peace—represented by the Sinai settlement—which will make it politically possible for additional agreements to be arrived at in the future. It would, in our judgment, be the height of naiveté to expect a dispute as bitter and longlasting as the

conflict between Israel and the Arabs to be settled overnight. Only if each side can learn to have some confidence in the peaceful intentions of the other will both sides be willing to make the kind of mutual concessions which are a precondition for a just and lasting peace.

There are others who contend that the presence of our technicians in the Passes will as surely draw us into an armed conflict in the Middle East as the activity of our "advisers" drew us into a massive military involvement in Vietnam. We would contend, however, that this analogy obscures rather than clarifies the fundamental distinctions between these two very different situations.

In Vietnam we were present at the request of one side. In the Middle East we will be present at the behest of both sides.

In Vietnam we had military advisers. In the Middle East we will have civilian technicians.

In Vietnam our "advisers" were there to wage war. In the Middle East our technicians will be there to preserve peace.

In Vietnam we were there to protect what were, at best only marginal American interests. In the Middle East we will be there to protect our most vital national interests.

In any case, an American presence in the Passes will be neither new nor unprecedented. The fact is that 260 Americans have already served from time to time in the U.N. peacekeeping force in the Sinai. During that period of time there was not one reported incident of terrorist activity directed at either them or any of the other nationals who compose the UNTSO force. Indeed, we dare say that the 200 technicians, surrounded as they will be by the Israeli Army in the east and the Egyptian Army in the west, with 5,000 to 6,000 U.N. troops in the middle, will be far safer than they would be if we sent them instead out onto the nighttime streets of any major metropolitan center in America. It is, in this sense, probably not an exaggeration to suggest that they will most likely face more of a danger from boredom than from terrorists.

Finally, we think it important to point out that a number of amendments adopted in committee have made it extremely unlikely that the resolution will somehow result in American participation in another Middle East war. In addition to expressing the sense of Congress that nothing in the Resolution should be construed as an endorsement of any of the understandings entered into by the United States with Israel and Egypt, the resolution was also changed to provide the Congress with the ability—through the use of a privileged resolution—to require the removal of the American technicians if it "determines that the safety of such personnel is jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no longer necessary."

In conclusion, we believe that the advantages of the resolution—and of the agreement between Israel and Egypt which it will make possible—far outweigh its disadvantages and we urge its prompt and expeditious enactment.

STEPHEN J. SOLARZ,
BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL,
CHARLES WILSON.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD

I can see no compelling reason for Congress to delay further in approving American observers in the Sinai passes. The September 1 Disengagement Agreement is an important step toward peace in the Middle East; it cannot become effective until Congress approves the stationing of American observers in the Sinai.

A contingent of American civilians manning early warning stations in the Sinai passes is in no way analogous to our early involvement in Vietnam, nor is the possibility of increased involvement similar to our Southeast Asia experience. Up to 200 Americans will be interposed between Israeli and Egyptian forces at the behest of *both* parties. Their mission will be to serve the peace rather than the military objectives of any nation. They can, and will, be removed by Congress or by the administration if hostilities are imminent or if they are otherwise endangered.

The American observers will be better insulated from possible terrorist incidents than their compatriots living in Cairo and Tel Aviv. They will be protected on both sides by military forces anxious to have them remain in place.

The question of related agreements, understandings, and commitments—oral or written, tacit or explicit, public or private—is irrelevant to this legislation. Section 5 of the joint resolution establishes beyond any reasonable doubt that, in authorizing American observers in the Sinai, Congress is not acceding to any other agreement, understanding, or commitment made by the executive branch. We are merely doing what is required of us to see that the agreement takes effect.

By providing authority to send the observers, Congress does not imply endorsement of any military or economic assistance levels for Israel or Egypt this fiscal year. These aid levels will be determined at an appropriate time, independent of the legislation before us.

Prompt approval of House Joint Resolution 683 is essential if we are to maintain the momentum toward peace in the Middle East, and I strongly urge my colleagues to endorse this legislation without further delay.

WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD.

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EARLY WARNING SYSTEM IN SINAI

OCTOBER 7 (legislative day, SEPTEMBER 11), 1975.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. SPARKMAN, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted the following

REPORT

together with

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS

[To accompany S. J. Res. 138]

The Committee on Foreign Relations, having had under consideration implementation of the United States proposal for the early-warning system in Sinai, reports an original joint resolution and recommends that it pass.


PURPOSE

The principal purpose of S. J. Res. 138 is to authorize the stationing of up to 200 United States civilian technicians in the Sinai in connection with the disengagement agreement of September 4, 1975 between Israel and Egypt.

COMMITTEE ACTION

The President sent to the Congress on September 2, 1975, a letter enclosing a text of a proposal to be signed by the President of Egypt and the Prime Minister of Israel regarding the terms under which American civilian personnel could operate an early warning system in the buffer zone between the Israeli and Egyptian forces in the Sinai. The President said: "I intend to request formally that Congress approve this document. I would appreciate your views on the form which this approval should take." The text of the United States proposal is appended to this report.

The executive branch also provided the text of an agreement between Egypt and Israel and an annex to that agreement together with a map showing the lines related to disengagement and the locations of the surveillance and watch stations. This material is also appended.



At an executive hearing of the Committee on Thursday, September 4, the Secretary of State provided certain classified materials relating to United States assurances and understandings in regard to the disengagement. The Committee held a further executive hearing on September 8 with Under Secretary of State Joseph Sisco to review the materials, and later the same day the Chairman and ranking minority member reviewed the record of negotiations in order to ascertain whether there were further assurances and undertakings involving the United States.

The Committee held additional executive sessions on September 24 and 25 and met first with Under Secretary Sisco and later with Secretary Kissinger to discuss the question of proper means of public disclosure of United States assurances and undertakings and other matters related to the Sinai disengagement.

On September 30, the Committee approved a resolution offered by Senator Javits as follows:

Resolved, That the President is requested to inform the Committee on Foreign Relations of all the assurances and undertakings by the United States on which Israel and Egypt are relying in entering into the Sinai agreement and that there are no other assurances or undertakings.

Subsequently, the Committee received the following:

CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify on behalf of the President and the Administration that the documents on the Sinai disengagement which we have provided to the Committee in connection with the United States proposal for stationing technicians in the Sinai, include all the undertakings, commitments, and assurances which the United States regards as legally binding or which will become legally binding upon signature of the two Memoranda of Agreement. It also includes all the undertakings, commitments, and assurances upon which either Israel or Egypt is legally entitled to rely.

HENRY A. KISSINGER.

OCTOBER 7, 1975.

In the meantime, the Committee held additional meetings with the Secretary of State in executive session on October 2 and 3. On the latter date, the Committee voted 12 to 2 to release documents related to United States assurances and undertakings as provided by the Department of State. Voting yea were Senators Sparkman, Church, McGee, McGovern, Humphrey, Clark, Biden, Case, Javits, Scott, Pearson, and Percy. Voting nay were Senators Pell and Griffin.

Public hearings were held on the matter October 6.

Witnesses included: Senator James Abourezk, George Ball, Paul Warnke, Charles Yost, John Volkmar, Robert Bartell, Rabbi Kranz, William Perl, Rabbi Shlomo Thaler, William A. Small, Edmond Hower, James Zogby, Richard C. Shadyac and Robert Dreyfuss. Raoul Berger of Harvard University submitted a statement for the

record. Mr. Yost suggested that the Congress should not take formal action in regard to the assurances and undertakings noting:

It would certainly be most unfortunate to disavow these commitments at this stage because to do so might vitiate the underlying Israel-Egypt agreement. On the other hand, I should not like to see these commitments made any more formal and binding than they already are, in connection with a clearly partial and interim agreement.

Despite his reservations as to the Sinai disengagement accords, Mr. Ball urged favorable action upon the Committee. He told the Committee.

I am not suggesting to you this morning that you should vote against the President's request on the narrow issue which is before you: the supplying of American technicians to man warning system in the U.N. buffer area in the Sinai. The Secretary of State has negotiated the whole complex of arrangements under dramatic circumstances, which have focused world attention on his efforts. That process has required too large an investment of American prestige and authority for the United States Congress to reject the result at this late date without damaging America's ability to play the central and essential role of leadership in international diplomacy, which our position of power and responsibility requires. Thus a rejection would prejudice, rather than advance, the cause of peace in the Middle East.

Professor Berger said that he fully concurred with Mr. Ball's judgment that the arrangements should not be rejected. However, he expressed the view that:

The lesson I would draw from the Israel agreement is that the Senate needs to take steps to reclaim its constitutional powers and rights in the domain of foreign relations, its right to full participation in the making of international agreements.

Senator Abourezk urged that the assurances and undertakings be treated as a treaty noting:

The obligations undertaken by the United States are serious enough for it to be debated as a treaty and approved as one. I think we are required to consider it as such to conform to the constitutional processes of an open decision, openly arrived at.

Mr. Warnke urged the Congress to seek Presidential agreement that assurances and undertakings made by the United States in connection with the Sinai disengagement agreement do not represent commitments but are "only good faith statements of present intention . . ."

At a hearing on October 7, Senator Thomas F. Eagleton told the Members that the Committee should report out a resolution approving technicians for the Sinai. However, he questioned the constitutional validity of the executive agreements made in connection with the Sinai disengagement.

Professor Roger Fisher of the Harvard School of Law told the Committee that the assurances and undertakings should be considered as treaties and should be treated by the Congress with that in mind.

In public testimony October 7, Secretary of State Kissinger told the Committee that the disengagement agreement is indispensable to the process of peace noting:

I can state that the prospects for peace in the Middle East have been significantly advanced, and that good chances exist for even further progress—if we have the wisdom and the national will to seize the opportunity before us.

Secretary Kissinger told the Members that the administration has certified that the classified documents provided the Committee—

include all of the assurances, undertakings, and commitments which we consider to be legally binding upon the United States. These documents also contain many provisions which are not considered legally binding; they were submitted because they were contained in documents which include binding clauses and which were initialed or signed by the United States and one of the parties.

Mr. Kissinger said that the executive branch also included excerpts from other classified documents “in the negotiating record which the Administration believes are legally binding assurances, undertakings, or commitments. We have included in this category certain provisions which, although not regarded by the Administration as binding, might be so regarded by others.”

The Secretary of State told the Members:

I am authorized on behalf of the President to state that there are *no other* assurances or undertakings, beyond those already submitted to the Congress, which are binding upon the United States. We will make no contrary claim in the future; nor can any other government.

The Secretary said further:

A vote in favor of the specific, limited U.S. role in the early warning system will not thereby commit the Congress to a position on any other issue—whether it be the question of undertakings and assurances to the parties involved; our continuing relations with various countries of the area; a given level of budget support; or our policies and programs in the Middle East. Those are separate issues which you will want to consider carefully at the appropriate time. Many will come up in the normal authorization and appropriation process; they are not an integral part of the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement.

Addressing the question of United States assurances and undertakings to Israel and Egypt, the Secretary said:

Not all provisions in these documents amount to binding undertakings. They include:

First, assurances by the U.S. of our political intentions. These are often statements typical of diplomatic exchange;

in some instances they are merely formal reaffirmations of existing American policy. Other provisions refer to contingencies which may never arise and are related—sometimes explicitly—to present circumstances subject to rapid change.

Second, undertakings or assurances by the U.S. which are conditional on existing or prior authorization and appropriation of the Congress or which fall within the constitutional authority of the President to conduct the foreign relations of the United States.

Thus to speak of Memoranda of Agreement as Executive Agreements is by no means to say that each of their individual provisions is binding upon the United States. That depends entirely upon the content of the specific provisions in question. Moreover, nothing in these particular documents constrains Congressional action in any issue involving the future legislative process.

The fact that many provisions are not by any standard international commitments does not mean, of course, that the United States is morally or politically free to act as if they did not exist. On the contrary, they are important statements of diplomatic policy and engage the good faith of the United States so long as the circumstances that gave rise to them continue. But they are not binding commitments of the United States.

The Committee met in executive session the afternoon of October 7 to consider the Sinai disengagement question and took as a working document the text of H.J. Res. 686 although that resolution was not formally before it, not having passed the House. Section 5 of that resolution, as reported by the House International Relations Committee, provided that:

The authority contained in this joint resolution to implement the United States Proposal for the Early Warning System in Sinai does not signify approval of the Congress of any other agreement, understanding, or commitment made by the executive branch.

On motion of Senator Church, the Committee amended that section to provide that the authority contained in the resolution “does not signify approval or disapproval by the Congress of any other assurance or undertaking”. Subsequently, this action was reconsidered and S.J. Res. 138, as reported, follows the House committee text. Although in normal circumstances the Committee would have preferred the language of the Church amendment, it feels that the exigencies of the present situation are such that the delays involved in a conference with the House should be avoided if at all possible. These actions were taken by voice vote.

By a vote of 2 yeas to 10 nays, the Committee rejected the following amendment by Senator Biden:

Section —. In taking action pursuant to this Resolution, the President agrees that any other assurances, pledges or undertakings, including but not limited to all the provisions of memoranda of agreements E, F, G, and H, made on behalf of the United States in connection with the agreement signed on

September 4, 1975 by the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel are only good faith statements of present intention of his, designed to promote the basic purpose of a just and stable peace in the Middle East; and

That any such other assurances, pledges or undertakings do not preclude the United States from taking such action as from time to time it may determine to be necessary or useful to advance the purpose of a just and stable peace in the Middle East.

Voting yea were Senators McGovern, Clark, and Biden. Voting nay were Senators Church, McGee, Humphrey, Case, Javits, Scott, Pearson, Percy, Griffin, and Sparkman.

Having once again reviewed documents related to the record of negotiations, Senators Sparkman and Case told Committee Members:

Apart from certain assurances and undertakings which we have been responsibly informed have been in effect since before the beginning of the negotiations leading to the Israel-Egypt Agreement of September 4, 1975, the documents shown to us disclose no assurances or undertakings by the United States which differ significantly from those which have been presented to the full Committee.

The Committee then voted 14 to 2 to report House Joint Resolution 683 as follows: Yeas: Senators Sparkman, Church, Symington, Pell, McGee, McGovern, Humphrey, Clark, Case, Javits, Scott, Pearson, Percy, and Griffin. Nays: Senators Mansfield and Biden.

Senator Biden then moved that the Committee recommend to the Senate that a secret memorandum provided the Committee by the Department of State Legal Advisor, Monroe Leigh, be declassified. The Leigh memorandum gives his judgment as to which portions of the assurances and undertakings are binding and which are not binding. Senator Biden's motion was rejected by a vote of 3 yeas and 10 nays as follows: Yeas: Senators Church, Clark, and Biden. Nays: Senators Pell, McGee, Humphrey, Case, Javits, Scott, Pearson, Percy, Griffin, and Sparkman.

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

PREAMBLE

The Joint Resolution contains four prefatory ("whereas") clauses designed to put the resolution in context:

Clause 1 notes that the agreement signed between Egypt and Israel on September 4 may constitute, when it enters into force, a significant step toward peace in the Middle East.

Clause 2 states that the U.S. proposal calls for the United States to assign up to 200 American civilian personnel to carry out specified noncombat functions under agreed-on conditions and terms.

Clause 3 points out that the proposal would permit the United States to withdraw such personnel if it concludes that their safety is jeopardized or that their role is no longer necessary.

Clause 4 asserts that the implementation of the U.S. proposal for an early-warning system in Sinai may enhance the prospect of compliance with the terms of the Egyptian-Israeli agreements and thereby promote the cause of peace.

RESOLVED CLAUSES

The substantive or "resolved" clauses of the resolution are encompassed in five sections:

Section 1—Implementation

This provision authorizes the President to implement the "United States Proposal for the Early-Warning System in Sinai," subject to the proviso that U.S. personnel assigned to Sinai under the proposal will be removed immediately under two specific contingencies: (1) if there is an outbreak of hostilities between Egypt and Israel; or (2) if the Congress by concurrent resolution determines that the safety of such personnel is jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no longer necessary.

The Secretary of State has informed the Committee that he does not object to the inclusion of these provisions.

Section 2—Concurrent Resolution "Privilege"

This provision states that the concurrent resolution provided for in section 1 should be privileged in the same manner and to the same extent as a concurrent resolution described in section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148) is privileged under section 7 of that law. Following are the two sections:

SEC. 5. (c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), at any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.

* * * * *

SEC. 7. (a) Any concurrent resolution introduced pursuant to section 5(c) shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may be, and one such concurrent resolution shall be reported out by such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar days, unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays.

(b) Any concurrent resolution so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents and the opponents) and shall be voted on within three calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

(c) Such a concurrent resolution passed by one House shall be referred to the committee of the other House named in subsection (a) and shall be reported out by such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar days and shall thereupon become the pending business of such

House and shall be voted upon within three calendar days, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of Congress with respect to a concurrent resolution passed by both Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee of conference shall make and file a report with respect to such concurrent resolution within six calendar days after the legislation is referred to the committee of conference. Notwithstanding any rule in either House concerning the printing of conference reports in the Record or concerning any delay in the consideration of such reports, such report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than six calendar days after the conference report is filed. In the event the conferees are unable to agree within 48 hours, they shall report back to their respective Houses in disagreement.

Section 3—Volunteers

This provision emphasizes that U.S. civilian personnel participating in the early-warning system in Sinai should include only individuals who have volunteered for such an assignment.

The Committee supports and endorses the intention of the executive branch that the technicians be civilian volunteers who are not presently employed by the Central Intelligence Agency. The Committee was further assured that the technicians will not operate under the control of the Central Intelligence Agency or the Department of Defense.

Section 4—Reporting Requirement

This section provides for written reports from the President to Congress, at least semi-annually, as long as American technicians participate in the early warning system. The reports are to cover the status, scope, and anticipated duration of such participation, and the feasibility of reducing their participation by substituting nationals of other countries or by making technological changes. The appropriate committees of Congress are to hold prompt hearings on each such report.

Section 5—Interpretation of Resolution

This provision makes clear that the authority contained in this joint resolution does not signify approval of the Congress for any other agreement, understanding, or commitment which may have been made by the executive branch, particularly any such which relate to a settlement in the Middle East.

The Committee notes that failure to signify approval does not connote disapproval. The Committee does not intend to pass judgment on any related assurances or undertakings made in connection with the disengagement agreement. The Committee intends solely to recommend approval of the United States proposal for the stationing of American technicians in the Sinai in connection with the operation of surveillance stations by Israel and Egypt and to operate a three-station early-warning system.

COST ESTIMATE

The executive branch estimates the cost of recruiting and installing the technicians will be \$10 million with an additional \$10 million cost

for annual operations, equipment and personnel. Thus the cost for fiscal 1976 would be an estimated \$20 million, with a projected annual expense of \$10 million for succeeding years.

It should be noted that the joint resolution does not contain any authorization of appropriations. Funding for the technicians will be requested by the executive branch at a later time.

COMMITTEE COMMENTS

Most of the Committee's consideration of this matter has been centered on two questions: (1) the extent to which approval of the 200 technicians might commit the United States to a broader network of assurances, undertakings, or agreements; and (2) the extent to which the elements of this broader network were divulged to the Committee, the Congress, and the country.

As indicated above, the Committee is satisfied that it has been informed of all the relevant assurances and undertakings which are a part of the overall Sinai agreements.

Further, the Committee has taken pains, both in the language of the resolution before the Senate and in its legislative history, to nail down the point that Congressional approval of the proposal to send 200 technicians to the Sinai Peninsula is precisely that—no more, no less—and that it does not imply approval or disapproval of anything else.

At the same time, the Committee recognizes that some of the ancillary agreements will result in requests to Congress for authorizations and appropriations. The point the Committee wishes to emphasize is that by approving the limited proposal for technicians in the Sinai the Congress does not in any way bind itself to any particular course of action with respect to future proposals.

The Committee also wishes to underline the urgency of the situation. The basic agreement between Israel and Egypt was signed in Geneva on September 4. Both sides requested American technicians, and the Israelis have made it clear from the beginning that implementation of the agreement was dependent on Congressional approval of the technicians. Although the original Administration request for Congressional action within two weeks was unrealistic, five weeks have now passed—weeks in which the Foreign Relations Committee has devoted itself to this question to the exclusion of almost all other business. It has been time well spent, and the Committee has made a record which should serve to allay many of the concerns that were originally expressed both in Congress and the general public. But in the meantime, Israel and Egypt have negotiated a timetable for implementation of the basic Agreement. The first step under that timetable was scheduled to be taken October 5. It will not be taken until Congress acts on this resolution. As the President wrote to the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee September 29:

Delay in Congressional action will, therefore, delay implementation of the basic Agreement. It will risk causing the lengthy and difficult negotiations on the entire five-month implementing timetable to be reopened. It will prevent a lessening of the risks of war. If for any reason the agreement should fail, the responsibility would be heavy indeed.

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF SENATOR CLAIBORNE PELL

I voted against publication by the Committee of the various statements of intention and understanding received from the Executive Branch because I believe that, except for those concerned with the oil supply, most of the paragraphs in them are basically statements of intention on the part of Dr. Kissinger and of the Administration. By incorporating these statements into our official hearings, we are escalating these statements of intent into a more concrete specific form and they are more likely to bind this and future Administrations than would otherwise be the case. What were intended as statements of good faith effort and intent are, perhaps, being escalated into agreements.

If the argument is advanced that Senators need the statements in order to arrive at a decision on the Floor as to how to vote, all that is needed would be to put a copy of the New York Times and Washington Post reprints on every Member's desk. And, from the viewpoint of the American people, these statements are already known because they have been reprinted in practically every paper across the length and breadth of our land.

CLAIBORNE PELL.

APPENDIX

PROPOSAL

In connection with the early warning system referred to in Article IV of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel concluded on this date and as an integral part of that Agreement, (hereafter referred to as the Basic Agreement), the United States proposes the following:

1. The early warning system to be established in accordance with Article IV in the area shown on the map attached to the Basic Agreement will be entrusted to the United States. It shall have the following elements:

A. There shall be two surveillance stations to provide strategic early warning, one operated by Egyptian and one operated by Israeli personnel. (Their locations are shown on the map attached to the Basic Agreement.) Each station shall be manned by not more than 250 technical and administrative personnel. They shall perform the functions of visual and electronic surveillance only within their stations.

B. In support of these stations, to provide tactical early warning and to verify access to them, three watch stations shall be established by the United States in the Mitla and Giddi Passes as will be shown on the map attached to the agreement. These stations shall be operated by United States civilian personnel. In support of these stations, there shall be established three unmanned electronic sensor fields at both ends of each Pass and in the general vicinity of each station and the roads leading to and from those stations.

2. The United States civilian personnel shall perform the following duties in connection with the operation and maintenance of these stations.

A. At the two surveillance stations described in paragraph 1A, above, United States personnel will verify the nature of the operations of the stations and all movement into and out of each station and will immediately report any detected divergency from its authorized role of visual and electronic surveillance to the Parties to the Basic Agreement and to the United Nations emergency force.

B. At each watch station described in paragraph 1B, above, the United States personnel will immediately report to the Parties to the Basic Agreement and to the United Nations emergency force and movement of armed forces, other than the United Nations emergency force, into either Pass and any observed preparations for such movement.

C. The total number of United States civilian personnel assigned to functions under this proposal shall not exceed 200. Only civilian personnel shall be assigned to functions under this proposal.

3. No arms shall be maintained at the stations and other facilities covered by this proposal, except for small arms required for their protection.

4. The United States personnel serving the early warning system shall be allowed to move freely within the area of the system.

5. The United States and its personnel shall be entitled to have such support facilities as are reasonably necessary to perform their functions.

6. The United States personnel shall be immune from local criminal, civil, tax and customs jurisdiction and may be accorded any other specific privileges and immunities provided for in the United Nations emergency force agreement of February 13, 1957.

7. The United States affirms that it will continue to perform the functions described above for the duration of the Basic Agreement.

8. Notwithstanding any other provision of this proposal, the United States may withdraw its personnel only if it concludes that their safety is jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no longer necessary. In the latter case the Parties to the Basic Agreement will be informed in advance in order to give them the opportunity to make alternative arrangements. If both Parties to the Basic Agreement request the United States to conclude its role under this proposal, the United States will consider such requests conclusive.

9. Technical problems including the location of the watch stations will be worked out through consultation with the United States.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel have agreed that:

ARTICLE I

The conflict between them and in the Middle East shall not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means.

The Agreement concluded by the Parties January 18, 1974, within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference, constituted a first step towards a just and durable peace according to the Provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973.

They are determined to reach a final and just peace settlement by means of negotiations called for by Security Council Resolution 338, this Agreement being a significant step towards that end.

ARTICLE II

The Parties hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force or military blockade against each other.

ARTICLE III

The Parties shall continue scrupulously to observe the ceasefire on land, sea and air and to refrain from all military or para-military actions against each other.

The Parties also confirm that the obligations contained in the Annex and, when concluded, the Protocol shall be an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE IV

A. The military forces of the Parties shall be deployed in accordance with the following Principles:

(1) All Israeli Forces shall be deployed east of the lines designated as lines JA and M on the attached map.

(2) All Egyptian Forces shall be deployed west of the line designated as Line E on the attached map.

(3) The area between the lines designated on the attached map as lines E and F and the area between the lines designated on the attached map as lines J and KA shall be limited in armament and forces.

(4) The limitations on armament and forces in the areas described by Paragraph (3) above shall be agreed as described in the attached Annex.

(5) The zone between the lines designated on the attached map as lines E and J, will be a Buffer Zone. In this zone the United Nations Emergency Force will continue to perform its functions as under the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of January 18, 1974.

(6) In the area south from Line E and west from Line M, as defined on the attached map, there will be no military forces, as specified in the attached Annex.

B. The details concerning the new lines, the redeployment of the forces and its timing, the limitation on armaments and forces, aerial reconnaissance, the operation of the early warning and surveillance installations and the use of the roads, the United Nations functions and other arrangements will all be in accordance with the provisions of the Annex and map which are an integral part of this Agreement and of the Protocol which is a result from negotiations pursuant to the Annex and which, when concluded, shall become an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE V

The United Nations Emergency Force is essential and shall continue its functions and its mandate shall be extended annually.

ARTICLE VI

The Parties hereby establish a Joint Commission for the duration of this Agreement. It will function under the Aegis of the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East in order to consider any problem arising from this Agreement and to assist the United Nations Emergency Force in the execution of its mandate. The Joint Commission shall function in accordance with procedures established in the Protocol.

ARTICLE VII

Non-military cargoes destined for or coming from Israel shall be permitted through the Suez Canal.

ARTICLE VIII

This Agreement is regarded by the Parties as a significant step toward a just and lasting peace.

It is not a final peace agreement.

The Parties shall continue their efforts to negotiate a final peace agreement within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338.

ARTICLE IX

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature of the Protocol and remain in force until superseded by a new Agreement.

For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt:

For the Government of Israel:

Witness:

ANNEX TO EGYPT-ISRAEL AGREEMENT

Within five days after the signature of the Egypt-Israeli Agreement, representatives of the two Parties shall meet in the military working group of the Middle East peace conference at Geneva to begin preparation of a detailed protocol for the implementation of the Agreement. The working group will complete the protocol within two weeks. In order to facilitate preparation of the protocol and implementation of the Agreement, and to assist in maintaining the scrupulous observance of the ceasefire and the elements of the Agreement, the two Parties have agreed on the following principles, which are an integral part of the Agreement, as guidelines for the working group.

1. DEFINITIONS OF THE LINES AND AREAS

The deployment lines, areas of limited forces and armaments, buffer zones, the area south from line E and west from line M, other designated areas, road sections for common use and other features referred to in Article IV of the Agreement shall be as indicated on the attached map.

2. BUFFER ZONES

(a) Access to the buffer zones will be controlled by the United Nations emergency force, according to procedures to be worked out by the working group and the United Nations emergency force.

(B) Aircraft of either party will be permitted to fly freely up to the forward line of that party. Reconnaissance aircraft of either party may fly up to the middle line of the buffer zone between E and J on an agreed schedule.

(C) In the buffer zone, between line E and J there will be established under Article IV of the Agreement an early warning system

entrusted to United States civilian personnel as detailed in a separate proposal, which is a part of this Agreement.

(D) Authorized personnel shall have access to the buffer zone for transit to and from the early warning system; the manner in which this is carried out shall be worked out by the working group and the United Nations emergency force.

3. AREA SOUTH OF LINE E AND WEST OF LINE M

(A) In this area, the United Nations emergency force will assure that there are no military or para-military forces of any kind, military fortifications and military installations; it will establish checkpoints and have the freedom of movement necessary to perform this function.

(B) Egyptian civilians and third country civilian oil field personnel shall have the right to enter, exit from, work, and live in the above indicated area, except for buffer zones 2A, and 2B and the United Nations posts. Egyptian civilian police shall be allowed in the area to perform normal civil police functions among the civilian population in such numbers and with such weapons and equipment as shall be provided for in the protocol.

(C) Entry to and exit from the area, by land, by air or by sea, shall be only through United Nations emergency force checkpoints. The United Nations emergency force shall also establish checkpoints along the road, the dividing line and at other points, with the precise locations and number to be included in the protocol.

(D) Access to the airspace and the coastal area shall be limited to unarmed Egyptian civilian vessels and unarmed civilian helicopters and transport planes involved in the civilian activities of the area as agreed by the working group.

(E) Israel undertakes to leave intact all currently existing civilian installations and infrastructures.

(F) Procedures for use of the common sections of the coastal road along the Gulf of Suez shall be determined by the working group and detailed in the protocol.

4. AERIAL SURVEILLANCE

There shall be a continuation of aerial reconnaissance missions by the United States over the areas covered by the agreement (the area between lines F and K), following the same procedures already in practice. The missions will ordinarily be carried out at a frequency of one mission every 7 to 10 days, with either party or the United Nations emergency force empowered to request an earlier mission. The United States Government will make the mission results available expeditiously to Israel, Egypt and the chief coordinator of the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Middle East.

5. LIMITATION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS

(A) Within the areas of limited forces and armaments (the areas between lines J and K and line E and F) the major limitations shall be as follows:

- (1) Eight (8) standard infantry battalions
- (2) Seventy-five (75) tanks
- (3) Seventy-two (72) artillery pieces, including heavy mortars (E. E. with caliber larger than 120 MM), whose range shall not exceed twelve (12) KM.
- (4) The total number of personnel shall not exceed eight thousand (8,000).
- (5) Both Parties agree not to station or locate in the area weapons which can reach the line of the other side.
- (6) Both Parties agree that in the areas between lines J and K, and between line A (Of the Disengagement Agreement of January 18, 1974) and line E, they will construct no new fortifications or installations for forces of a size greater than that agreed herein.

(B) The major limitations beyond the areas of limited forces and armament will be:

- (1) Neither side will station nor locate any weapon in areas from which they can reach the other line.
- (2) The Parties will not place anti-aircraft missiles within an area of ten (10) kilometres each of line K and west of line F, respectively.

(C) The United Nations Emergency Force will conduct inspections in order to ensure the maintenance of the agreed limitations within these areas.

6. PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTATION

The detailed implementation and timing of the redeployment of forces, turnover of oil fields, and other arrangements called for by the Agreement, Annex and Protocol shall be determined by the Working Group, which will agree on the stages of this process, including the phased movement of Egyptian troops to line E and Israeli troops to line J. The first phase will be the transfer of the oil fields and installation to Egypt. This process will begin two weeks from the signature of the Protocol with the introduction of the necessary technicians, and it will be completed no later than eight weeks after it begins. The details of the phasing will be worked out in the Military Working Group.


Implementation of the redeployment shall be completed within 5 months after signature of the Protocol.

For the Government of the Arab Egyptian Republic:

For the Government of Israel:

Witness:

(C) In the buffer zone, between line E and J there will be established under Article IV of the Agreement an early warning system



LINE E: The Egyptian line.

LINE J: The Israeli line, the lines E and J will extend 12 nautical miles into the Mediterranean Sea perpendicular to the direction of the coast and the area between the lines will be a U.N. buffer zone.

LINE K: The limit of the Israeli area of limited forces and armaments.

LINE F: The limit of the Egyptian area of limited forces and armaments.

LINE M: The line separating the Israeli-controlled area from; the area south of line E and west of line M; and the areas of buffer zones 2A and 2B.

B.Z-1: The buffer zone between lines E and J.

B.Z-2A: The buffer zones along the Gulf of Suez.

B.Z-2B: Road sections for common use.

E-1: Egyptian surveillance station.

J-1: Israeli surveillance station.

U.S.A.-W.S.: U.S.A. watch stations 1; 2; 3.

U.S.A.-E.S.F.: U.S.A. electronic sensor fields 1; 2; 3.

U.N. posts in the Hamam Faroun area.



OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
UPON SIGNING
H. J. RES. 683

THE OVAL OFFICE

2:00 P.M. EDT

I am deeply gratified today to sign this important measure which was approved last week by an overwhelming majority of both Houses of the Congress. My signature reaffirms the commitment of the United States to work toward a just and lasting peace for all nations and all peoples in the Middle East.

The Sinai Agreement, which American civilians will help support, is a significant step toward an overall settlement in the Middle East. But neither the United States nor Egypt, nor Israel see it as an end to itself.

The war in October 1973 brought home to Americans just how dangerous another Arab-Israeli conflict would be, not only for the people of the area but for the entire world. It also brought home the pressing need for a just settlement of the problems which underlie the tension and instability in that part of the world.

As a result, for two years our Government, with the government of the countries directly involved, has been engaged in vigorous diplomatic efforts to promote the prospects of peace on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 338 and 242.

With the help and the negotiating skill of Secretary of State Kissinger we have made great progress, in good part because of the trust placed in the United States by both Israel and its Arab neighbors. This confidence must be maintained if there is to be further progress and if the United States is to retain the mutually beneficial relationships it has established with Israel and the Arab states.

We must continue our diplomatic efforts with the parties in order to sustain the momentum towards peace generated by the Sinai Agreement, and the United States must accept the responsibilities which flow from our stake in peace in the Middle East and from our bilateral relationships which form the foundation for success in our diplomatic efforts.

MORE



I will soon consult Congress on what is required to sustain these bilateral relationships, just as the Administration has consulted Congress very fully over the past month on the latest diplomatic step, including the use of United States civilians to further the peace process.

We anticipate the same support and understanding by the Congress. The overall Middle East policy of the United States is founded upon the most basic reasons of national necessity as well as our desire to help bring peace to a region whose peoples have suffered too much already.

I reaffirm today that we will not accept stagnation or stalemate in the Middle East. The participation of the United States civilians in the Sinai early warning system demonstrates that determination.

I appreciate very greatly the cooperation of the Congress in this important contribution to stability and peace.

Thank you very much.

END (AT 2:03 P.M. EDT)

October 10, 1975

Dear Mr. Director:

The following bills were received at the White House on October 10th:

H.J. Res. 683 ✓

H.R. 7706

H.R. 8240

Please let the President have reports and recommendations as to the approval of these bills as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

Robert D. Linder
Chief Executive Clerk

The Honorable James T. Lynn
Director
Office of Management and Budget
Washington, D. C.



Ninety-fourth Congress of the United States of America

AT THE FIRST SESSION

*Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday, the fourteenth day of January,
one thousand nine hundred and seventy-five*

Joint Resolution

To implement the United States proposal for the early-warning system in Sinai.

Whereas an agreement signed on September 4, 1975, by the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel may, when it enters into force, constitute a significant step toward peace in the Middle East;

Whereas the President of the United States on September 1, 1975, transmitted to the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and to the Government of Israel identical proposals for United States participation in an early-warning system, the text of which has been submitted to the Congress, providing for the assignment of no more than two hundred United States civilian personnel to carry out certain specified noncombat functions and setting forth the terms and conditions thereof;

Whereas that proposal would permit the Government of the United States to withdraw such personnel if it concludes that their safety is jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no longer necessary; and

Whereas the implementation of the United States proposal for the early-warning system in Sinai may enhance the prospect of compliance in good faith with the terms of the Egyptian-Israeli agreements and thereby promote the cause of peace: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President is authorized to implement the "United States Proposal for the Early Warning System in Sinai": Provided, however, That United States civilian personnel assigned to Sinai under such proposal shall be removed immediately in the event of an outbreak of hostilities between Egypt and Israel or if the Congress by concurrent resolution determines that the safety of such personnel is jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no longer necessary. Nothing contained in this resolution shall be construed as granting any authority to the President with respect to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances which authority he would not have had in the absence of this joint resolution.

SEC. 2. Any concurrent resolution of the type described in the first section of this resolution which is introduced in either House of Congress shall be privileged in the same manner and to the same extent as a concurrent resolution of the type described in section 5(c) of Public Law 93-148 is privileged under section 7 of such law.

SEC. 3. The United States civilian personnel participating in the early warning system in Sinai shall include only individuals who have volunteered to participate in such system.

SEC. 4. Whenever United States civilian personnel, pursuant to this resolution, participate in an early warning system, the President shall, so long as the participation of such personnel continues, submit written reports to the Congress periodically, but no less frequently than once

