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MEMORANDUM

February 4, 1975

TO : THE PRESIDENT

FROM: R. L. "Dick" Herman

SUBJECT: 1976 REPUBLICAN CONVENTION

All committee and subcommittee appointments and functions are of vital importance, but four items, I believe, should be of primary concern to the White House.

(1) Date of the Convention (Call Committee)

If we have federal financing of presidential elections, the funds will be extremely limited, approximately \$22 million. Even without federal funds, financing will be on a tremendously reduced scale due to the fear of violating election laws and the impact of an impaired economy; therefore, it is imperative that the convention be an integral part of the campaign and held as late in 1976 as possible, consistent with candidate certification laws of the respective states. Unfortunately, it is impossible to hold the convention after Labor Day in 1976 and meet the candidate-nominee certification requirements in all states. The 1972 Republican Convention commenced on August 21.

(2) Location of the Convention (Site Committee)

It is important that a Site Committee be appointed immediately for the purpose of determining the interest of various cities throughout the country and the capabilities of each, including convention hall, housing, transportation, security, and financing.

The Vice Chairman of the Arrangements Committee should be a member of the Site Committee and is the only member of the Arrangements Committee who need be appointed to the Site Committee. In 1972, the Vice Chairman of the Arrangements Committee was not a member of the Site Committee so, consequently, the convention operating committee had no input in the selection of the site. Convention knowledge and experience should be represented on the Site Committee.

Important emphasis should be placed on program projection, including support of crowd enthusiasm with a minimum possibility of external disturbance.

Bids and invitations for site visits should be received prior to March 15, 1975, with site determination made no later than July, 1975.



(3) Convention Program (Sub-Committee on Program Planning)

President Nixon was at a 61% popularity rating immediately following the 1972 convention. This was the first time that the popularity of a presidential nominee had not dipped in the polls following a convention. This points out the need for excellent programming and image projection, because at no other time during the campaign will the presidential nominee and the party be so vividly portrayed and subject to such intensive appraisal. Capitalizing on this opportunity must be the most important objective of the convention.

(4) Personnel Appointments

a. Temporary and Permanent Chairmen of the Convention.

(1972 - Governor Ronald Reagan, Temporary Chairman
Congressman Gerald R. Ford, Permanent Chairman)

b. Resolutions (Platform) Chairman.

(1972 - Congressman John J. Rhodes)

c. Parliamentarian.

(1972 - Congressman H. Allen Smith)

d. Chief Sergeant-at-Arms.

(1972 - Ody J. Fish)

e. Arrangements Committee.

Vice Chairman -- Since the RNC Chairman is also the Chairman of this committee, its Vice Chairman, in effect, becomes the operating head of the Arrangements Committee.

(1972 - R. L. "Dick" Herman)

Sub-Committee Program Chairman -- This individual is responsible for the programming, projection, participants, and timing of the convention program. It is imperative that this chairman be able to work with the White House.

(1972 - Robert M. Flanigan)

f. Committee on Rules Chairman.

(1972 - William C. Cramer)

g. Committee on Contests Chairman.

(1972 - Edwin G. Middleton)



Having served as a member of the RNC and as Vice Chairman of the 1972 Republican National Convention, I recognize the fact that it is the prerogative of the National Chairman and the responsibility of the Republican National Committee to determine and decide the items discussed in this memo. It is with this realization that I respectfully submit the foregoing discussion and suggestions.



1972 Convention Officials

Gerald R. Ford, Permanent Chairman
Ronald Reagan, Temporary Chairman
John J. Rhodes, Chairman, Committee on Resolutions
Mrs. Anne Armstrong, Secretary
H. Allen Smith, Parliamentarian
Ody J. Fish, Chief Sergeant-at-Arms
Jim Anderson, Chief Page
Robert P. Knowles, Convention Coordinator
Miss Josephine Good, Convention Director
Joe Bartlett, Chief Reading Clerk

Committee Assignments: '72 Convention

Committee on Arrangements

Chairman - Senator Bob Dole
Vice Chairman - R. L. (Dick) Herman
Secretary - Mrs. Mildred K. Perkins
Treasurer - Mrs. J. Willard Marriott
General Counsel - Fred C. Scribner, Jr.
Special Asst. to the Chairman in
Charge of Convention Planning -
McDill Boyd
Adviser to the Committee on Arrangements -
Ray C. Bliss

Subcommittee on Badges and Tickets - Harry Rosenzweig
Subcommittee on Housing - Howard H. (Bo) Callaway
Subcommittee on News Media Operations - McDill Boyd
Subcommittee on Program Planning - Robert M. Flanigan
Subcommittee on Transportation - Kendall D. Garff

Committee on Rules

William C. Cramer, Chairman

Committee on Contests

Edwin G. Middleton, Chairman

Committee on Call

Miss Martha C. Moore, Chairman

Committee on Site

Senator Bob Dole, Chairman



PENNSYLVANIA

1. GENERAL

At this point in time, while there are pockets of strong conservative adherence in Pennsylvania and others who respond to the personality of Ronald Reagan, the official leadership of the Party is unanimous for the President and that is the overwhelming sentiment in Party ranks as well. Pennsylvania's Republican State Committee has passed a resolution unanimously favoring the nomination of the Ford-Rockefeller team.

Starting now, an effort to bring any dissidents into camp could be successful and should be undertaken.


2. OBTAINING DELEGATES

According to the best authorities, Pennsylvania is entitled to 103 delegates at the National Convention in 1976, that is, if the present allocation is sustained by the court in the Ripon Society case.

Three delegates and three alternates are to be elected in each Congressional District, making a total of 75 delegates. The Primary Election will be held on Tuesday, April 27, 1976.

Petitions can be circulated beginning January 27, 1976 and must be filed on February 17, 1976.

An additional nine delegates will be awarded, one each, to the top nine Congressional Districts ranked by their "Republicanism" according to the state party rules and will also be elected in the Primary Election.



Nineteen delegates are selected by the Republican State Committee "in special meeting" as delegates at large.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS

- A. That a campaign committee be selected in consultation with the statewide Republican Party officials as soon as possible. Suggestion: This meeting be held in office of Senator Scott in Washington - Senator Schweiker, Tom McCabe, Elsie Hillman, Dick Frame, June Honaman, George Bloom, Bill Meehan. Offhand possible suggestions for statewide campaign organizer are Drew Lewis, Cliff Jones.
- B. Several names have been suggested for the committee, especially men and women in their thirties and forties (who are essential for an enduring organization.) See attached partial list.
- C. George I. Bloom should be involved in this campaign on a day-to-day basis as a chief advisor to the campaign organizer. This will help all over the state, but particularly among conservative groups.
- D. The President should use the opportunity of state functions at the White House to invite prominent Pennsylvanians and their wives. Immediate names suggested are: The Honorable and Mrs. George I. Bloom, Mr. and Mrs. John T. Dorrance, Jr., Mr. and Mrs. Richard M. Scaife, Mr. and Mrs. F. Eugene Dixon, Jr., Mr. and Mrs. W. Keen Butcher, Mr. and Mrs. W. James MacIntosh.



1. Fred Ashton
2. Bob Bartlett
3. Harry Biddle
4. Martin Hamberger
5. Mike Kitsock
6. Bill Klinger
7. Bob Kurtz
8. Orville Lerch
9. Dave New Hall
10. Herb Pfuhl
11. Jay Sasall
12. Richard Scott
13. Andy Sordoni
14. Tom Webster
15. Roy Zimmerman
16. Marilyn Lewis
17. Marge Broderick
18. Nancy Price
19. Pat Crawford
20. Jack Wilkins
21. Woody Turner
22. Bob Jubilirer
23. Jim Reichley
24. Alma Jacobs
25. Mary Jane Clemmer
26. Betsy Umstattd
27. Barbara Franklin
28. Dr. Ethel Allen
29. Barbara Eisenhower
30. Bobby Pettinato



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UNIVERSAL CITY, CALIFORNIA 91608

PHONE 985-4321

EXECUTIVE OFFICES

April 14, 1975

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500


Dear Don:

One very important name that was left off the list I gave the President in Palm Springs is Mrs. Ann Miller (the wife of Richard Miller, Pacific Gas & Electric in San Francisco). Ann Miller is for President Ford and expects to help him just as she did Richard Nixon's '72 campaign.

I talked to Dee Keaton and he feels Jack Westland should be included in any central plans in our group here.

Best regards,

Taft B. Schreiber



FINCH IN '76

Committed and Go Public Supporters

- A Earl C. Adams
 Victor C. Andrews
 Howard Allen
 Raymond Arbuthnot
 Clifford Anderson
 Lou Aragon
 Stanton Avery
 George Argyos
- B Robert S. Barnes
 Ross Barrett
 Edgar Bergen
 Robert Beaver
 Arnold Beckman
 Daniel Bryant, Jr.
 Steven Broidy
 Dean Butler
 Sybil Brand
 John F. Bishop
 Watt Brown
 Herb Block
 Fred Briskin
 Warren Biggs
 Worth Brown
 Daniel Bryant, Sr.
- C Asa Call
 B. Gerald Cantor
 Ray Caldiero
 Edward Carter
 Athalie Clarke
 Henry Clock
 Roy Crocker
 Ted Cummings
 Robert Fenton Craig
 Aylett B. Cotton
 Ralph Cutright



FINCH IN '76

Committed and Go Public Supporters

D Al Derre
✓ Ben Deane
Christian deGuigne III
Franklin Donnell
William Doheny
✓ Jack Drown
Charles Ducommun
Jim Dunn
Mrs. Nina Dodsworth
Gabriel Q. Duque Jr.
Andrew Davis
Vroman Dorman

E Howard Edgerton
Bryant Essick
Ralph Erickson
Ed Ettinger
Clint Eastwood

F Leonard Firestone
Mrs. MacIntyre Farries
Ernest Friedman
Lewis Fletcher

G George Gearn
Russell Green, Jr.
Henry Griswold
Robert Guggenheim
John Gurash
Freeman Gosden
Robert Garrick
Guilford Glazer
Max Gluck



FINCH IN '76


Committed and Go Public Supporters

H Peter Haas
Walter A. Haas, Sr.
— Walter A. Haas, Jr.
James Hall
Charles Hall
Al Hartwick
Al Hart
Al Harutunian
Rod Hills
— Jack Horton
Preston Hotchkis
Mrs. Jean Haley
John Hennessey
Michael B. Harwin
Spencer Honig
Durward Howes, Sr.
Durward Howes, Jr.
Victor Hansen
Gavin Herbert
AA Patt Hitt
James Hodgson
— Philip Hawley
Stanton Hale

I James Irwin

J Eli Jacobs
Frank Jorgenson
Fletcher Jones
— SARLE JORGENSEN (Reason close friend)

K Sanford Kaplan
← Darius Keaton
— Herbert G. Klein
Harry J. Keaton
James Knapp
King Karpen
Joe Kaplan



FINCH IN '76

Committed and Go Public Supporters

L Raymond Lee
Ernest Loebbecke
Art Linkletter
Harlen Loud
Lewis Lehrman
H. Sidney Loughlin

M David J. Mahoney
Fred Martin
Cliff Miller
Arch Monson
Norm Morrison
Joe Mitchell
Bob McLain
Frank McGee
Bill McGarvey
Robert Maize
Herman T. Mickler
Jerome Mayo
Gordon McLain
Paul Miller

N Robert Nesen
Bruce Nestande
Harvey Nienow
Patrick Nagel

O Marne Obernauer



FINCH IN '76

Committed and Go Public Supporters

P David Packard
Hubert Perry
Tom Pike
W. F. Powers
Ross Perot
Norris Poulson
Claire Peck Jr.

R Matthew (Sandy) Rae
James Reynolds
Robert Reynolds
Daniel Ridder
Joseph Rensch
Henry S. Rose
Ed Rubin
Leroy Rose
Eugene Rosenthal

S Martin Samuelson
William T. Sesnon, Jr.
Taft Schreiber
Walter R. Schmid
George Shultz
Forrest Shumway
Robert Silverstein
Earl Smittcamp
Charles Soderstrom
Al Spiegel
Adela Rogers St. Johns
Russell Smith
Ann Sonne
Ann Spencer
Walter C. Smith
Nate Shoffiel
Tom Smith

GRACE SALVATORI

Henry



FINCH IN '76

Committed and Go Public Supporters

T Waller Taylor
Laurence R. Tollenaere
Frank Turnbull
Anthony Telich

V Jack Venneman

W Ray Watt
William Weinberg
Charles Wick
David E. Wood
Helen Wysong
Jonathan Winters
Hal Wallis
Mrs. Gene Washburn

Z Richard D. Zanuck



4/19/75

To: The President
From: J.R. Stiles *JRS*

Subject: Timing of active candidacy.

Until this date I have not thought that active candidacy was yet necessary.

Discussions with a number of experienced convention "pros", however, have convinced me that we should make the decision sooner rather than later.

I had informal discussions with R. Hartman, G. Anderson, Bill Scranton, Charlie McWhorter, John Byrnes, Lou Frey, Mel Laird, Robert Finch, Pat Hillings, Ed Terril and others. They all express a concern that delaying further may create convention problems.

Compelling reasons:

- 1) In many areas the party is fragmenting over ideology.
- 2) This fragmentation is egged on by ultra conservatives who are exploiting talk that "Ford is not a serious candidate but plans to step aside for Rocky." These are scare tactics to drum up recruits for Reagan and they are working.
- 3) The Reagan enthusiasts are solidifying their forces and gaining hard to reverse commitments on the county level.
- 4) The Florida Primary comes within a week of New Hampshire (10th in the rollcall.) Florida has many ultra conservatives plus aggrieved Cubans who see "detente" with Castro as their abandonment by the administration.
- 5) The largest single delegation, California, is 5th in the rollcall. Obviously Reagan will be pushed to run as a "favorite son." Whatever happens in this situation, Ford must establish grass roots support from the key California county chairmen.

It appears to be the combined judgement of those consulted that we need more specific political activities now. The disadvantages of becoming an official candidate may be outweighed by the urgency of the situation.



Suggested Plan of Action

- 1) Selection and announcement of a Ford-for-President finance chairman. Employment of a political fund-raising expert.
- 2) Begin active solicitation including direct mail as the Democrat candidates are doing. It was announced yesterday that George Wallace has already qualified for primary matching funds. (\$100,000 raised in 20 states in gifts not more than \$250 each.)
- 3) Locate and designate approximately 7 qualified volunteer field men. They should travel the states contacting political leaders gathering grass roots information. (I have the names of some who have offered their services.)
- 4) Establish a campaign "kitchen cabinet" made up of those interested and available to meet at least once a week to recommend policy. A number of those named above are ready and willing to serve in this capacity without compensation, reward, or official recognition

NOTE: My suggestion is not to designate a campaign manager at this time. The title of "coordinator" might be suitable for a nuts-and-bolts man to supervise the work of the field men and report to the White House and "kitchen cabinet."

Obviously active campaign personnel would not be on the White House payroll.

- 5) Open a modest Ford-for-President office in Washington, D.C.

It is my recommendation that we delay designating "state chairmen" for the time being. Field reports will yield insight into personalities in the various states. Many campaigns have been side-tracked by the wrong choice of state chairmen

- 6) Arrange for an attorney who knows the new campaign law; also a qualified accountant to keep the strict records of contributions and expenditures required.



Nominating Politics

- 1) From the information developed in the next two months (against the forecasted calendar of events), the "kitchen cabinet" together with other consultants such as state chairmen and national committee persons can set up an action plan of priorities.

At the moment top priority should go to --

FIRST --Florida
SECOND--New Hampshire
THIRD --California

No-one can foresee events what may alter priorities but immediate political action in these states is essential.

- 2) A financial budget with strict controls must be established for PRIMARY CAMPAIGNS. Because of the 10 Million limitation (an unprecedented restriction) money must be allocated most precisely and unfortunately there is no-one who can claim to be an expert in this area.

Priorities in spending will be as important as priorities in campaigning, scheduling, and appearances.

What should be spent on literature?

What should be spent on travel?

What should be spent on phones and long distance?

What should be spent on postage and direct mail?

What should be spent on TV and radio, and newspapers?

Because the Vice President's campaign activities and expenses must come out of the same 10 million as the President's, how can he be used most effectively?

NOTE: Of the 10 million not more than \$200,000 or 2 x 8¢ multiplied by the voting age population of the state may be spent in any one primary. Thus California, the single most important state will be tough to deal with on such limited funds.

- 3) The campaign of '76 must put the heaviest reliance on VOLUNTEER MANPOWER. We must organize nationally in the next 20 months as we did in '48 in the Fifth District. The development of a plan to achieve this end must go apace.

This will truly have to be a SHOE LEATHER campaign. We should preempt this slogan, "Ford will conduct an all-out shoe leather campaign in '76."



Nominating Politics (cont.)

The name of the game in nominating politics is GOP DELEGATES.

The magic number is one more than half.

It is possible to be nominated when as few as thirty states have been called in the roll.

This should be our objective.



W

Questions are being raised about the initiation of planning for the 1976 campaign. The memo examines some of the considerations which will shape that planning activity and suggests next steps.

Background

There has been some discussion about the role of the RNC in the campaign. This discussion, however, misses the basic point that at least until the Convention is over, the President cannot use the RNC, since it must remain neutral so long as another candidate might emerge. Therefore, some sort of a separate Presidential campaign organization must be established prior to the Convention. The pertinent questions are:

- What should such an organization do?
- When should it be established?
- Who should head it?
- How (if at all) should it relate to the WH and the RNC prior to the Convention?
- How should it relate after the Convention?

Discussion

What Should the Organization Do?

There are four separate types of activities which the organization can perform:

- ..detailed strategic planning
- ..fund raising
- ..local state and national organization building
- ..implementation of campaign strategies in primaries and general election

Strategic planning, at least in the early stages, could be done elsewhere; for example, in the White House. Within a short time, however, this activity would become extensive, involving the collection of substantial amounts of data, development of detailed flow charts, memoranda, papers and discussions with others. It would not be appropriate to have these activities carried out by an individual or individuals on the public payroll. The other functions, of course, could only be properly performed by a non-governmental body. As I write this, the wire is carrying an article on Jack Stiles which makes the point.



When Should It Be Established?

The organization could be established in two ways:

- ..as an immediate follow on to a firm Presidential committment to run again
- ..as an independent group which does so without formal committment of the President to run

The former approach is by far the cleaner one, since it fully recognizes the campaign reform act. Its disadvantages are that it starts the countdown on primary campaign expenditures very early in the game, and that it delays comprehensive planning until the organization is established. The latter approach has been used in the past even without the constraints of campaign spending laws. It would allow "set up" expenses to be excluded from the limitations. On the other hand, this approach may well be viewed as deviating from the spirit of the law.


Who Should Head it?

Again, there are some choices here. A person could be named as a fill in until the President was willing to name his top man. Or the top man could be named at the start. The former approach allows deferral of a tough decision, but it would also entrail very close WH involvement and oversight. The blurring of the President's governmental and political roles might well recall previous campaign styles. If the top man could be selected early on, it would avoid this problem since responsibility and authority could be combined in one man. The key would be that this individual chosen have:

- ..the confidence of the President
- ..the stature to deal with national, state and local officials
- ..the managerial ability to develop and run what will become a large organization

How Should It Relate to the WH and RNC Prior to the Convention?

The organization must for legal and political reasons have a great deal of autonomy. The RNC, as mentioned above, will have to be neutral before the Convention. The friction points will probably occur in the competition for funds at all levels. One of the bitterest complaints against CREEP was that it acted as a vacuum cleaner for political funds, and that by the time the RNC started fund raising, there was little to be had. The



right head of the organization could set mutually acceptable ground rules with RNC. There will have to be some coordination with the WH in several areas such as scheduling the President's time. Close links at several levels, however, should be avoided if a real distinction between the President's governmental and political roles is to be maintained. A single WH contact point would be the best way to do this.

How Should It Related After the Convention?

It is unrealistic to imagine that an organization such as the one contemplated could (or should) disappear after the convention. It is also unlikely that the organization could be successfully folded into the RNC. Decisions on the specific form of the relationship fortunately can be deferred until the organization is set up, the top man chosen, and the date of the Convention draws closer.



Room - DN

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 25, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

JERRY JONES

FROM:

FRED SLIGHT *[Signature]*

[Handwritten initials]

The Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 provides for a number of considerations which have a significant bearing on the conduct of fundraising efforts for 1976. Three major considerations are as follows:

1. No more than \$1,000 may be legally contributed by an individual to the President's campaign from January 1, 1975 until the the conclusion of the Republican National Convention. An additional \$1,000 may be given by the aforementioned donor upon the adjournment of the Convention.
2. No more than \$10 million may be spent by the President's campaign committee for his primary campaign (including all campaign-related Convention expenses) and no more than \$20 million may be spent on the general election.
3. Up to 20% of the candidate's actual expenditure may be excluded from the limitation provision in order to defray fundraising costs. In short, the President's campaign committee (political and finance components) may spend a maximum of \$30 million for the entire campaign with an additional \$6 million which may be expended to support the solicitation program.

Two conclusions are inevitable:

1. The days of the "fat cat" contributor are over.
2. A super effective and cost-effective, broad-based fundraising unit, the likes of which have yet to be seen, is mandated if \$10 million is to be raised from a \$2 million investment (or \$20 million from \$4 million for the general election).

With regard to the last point, the highly touted CRP sustaining program which sought out the under \$100 contribution cost approximately



ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

50 cents per each dollar raised. Most professional political fundraisers will readily confirm that a cost of 33 cents per dollar raised is reasonable to expect when seeking out the under \$1,000 donor, especially so when the solicitation program must be started from the ground up. Simply stated, it is very unlikely that the maximum expenditure might be made for either the pre or post Convention periods, since fundraising costs can be expected to exceed the \$2 and \$4 million maximum exclusion levels. In fact, the cost "overruns" under the 33% estimate would run \$1.3 million and \$2.6 million respectively. These roughly projected costs would, therefore, have to be deducted from the general campaign budget, thereby denying to the political component funds which are already in tight supply for its grass-roots, media and related activities.

Only two alternatives appear plausible confronted with these facts:

1. Begin immediate preparation for the creation of a fundraising apparatus and solicitation program which will be successful in reducing its operational costs to an historic low.
2. Be fully prepared to accept public financing for a portion or possibly for all phases of the campaign and gear the fundraising program toward fulfilling the qualification requirements for receiving public funds.

The Democrat sponsors of the '74 reform law appear to have successfully denied the President the option of conducting his campaign from private donations. Clearly, this action was taken to prohibit the Republican nominee from outspending his opponent (as in 1972) as well as closing the door on any potential political issue which might be made of the Democrat's acceptance of "public funds."

Considerations regarding the formation of a Presidential finance committee and projected parameters on program design will be submitted in a subsequent memorandum.



Summary

A. THE FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT.

Financing is basic to every aspect of a campaign. The Act creates a new and radically different financial framework to which every aspect of the campaign must be accommodated. Thus an understanding of the Act is essential not only to the financing of a campaign but to its organization, and especially to the timing of its organization.

The following summary of the Act's provisions is greatly over-simplified. It embraces highlights that point up the practical problems that the Act creates.

1. Limits on Giving.

a. Individual giving is limited to \$1000 for each stage of a candidate's campaign.

b. There is an over-all limitation of \$25,000 in total contributions by any one person in any calendar year to all candidates and committees. The \$25,000 can all be given to a national committee, a state committee or a highly technical "multi-candidate committee", or split between such committees and individual candidates (up to \$1000 each for the latter).

A "multi-candidate committee" must have been registered for 6 months, have received contributions from more than 50 people and have made contributions to 5 or more Federal candidates. Such a committee can give up to \$5000 to each stage of a candidate's campaign.

c. A Presidential or Vice Presidential candidate and his family can contribute up to \$50,000 of his own and his family's money to his campaign.

2. Limits on Expenditures.

a. Election Campaign.

(1) A Presidential candidate (and his running mate) are limited to \$20 million.

(2) At the option of a candidate, his campaign will be wholly funded by the Federal government.

(3) In addition, a national committee can spend up to 2¢ times the voting age population of the U.S. on a Presidential election.

b. Primary Campaign.

(1) A Presidential candidate may spend up to \$10 million.

(2) He may spend another million to defray his fund-raising costs.

(3) Providing a candidate fulfills a "threshold requirement", the government will match up to \$250 of every contribution he receives.



- (4) To fulfill "threshold requirement" a candidate must (i) declare his candidacy and (ii) raise \$5000 in contributions of \$250 or less in each of 20 states.

B. ANALYSIS.

Under the Act the President would have to depend for the financing of a primary campaign on

1. Contributions from himself and the Vice President and their immediate families up to a total of \$50,000 for each family.
2. Direct solicitation of individual gifts not exceeding \$1000, or \$2000 for a husband and wife combination.

Even at these figures a well-organized solicitation in every state can raise substantial sums country-wide. The \$1000 dinners of the Nixon campaign raised a lot of money. Lang Washburn, who ran those dinners with great success, should be available to run them again. He was unscathed by Watergate.

3. Direct mail solicitation.
4. The government's matching gifts, up to a potential total of \$5½ million (½ of \$10 million plus the \$1 million allowance for the cost of fund-raising).
5. The "multi-candidate committee" does not appear to be a practical concept for us. At the cost of a disproportionate amount of delay, time, expense, and trouble, each such committee could give only \$5000 for the primary campaign.
6. It must be recognized that far less money will be available than needed for the primary campaign and than has been raised in the past. However, any other potential contenders will be laboring under the same restrictions.

C. TIMING.

There are urgent reasons why the above categories of fund-raising should be launched immediately. We are now less than a year away from the first primary. Immense and time-consuming efforts must be set afoot in the following areas, among others:

1. Campaign organization. Concept. Organizational chart. Recruitment of leadership and staff.
2. Issue research and formulation directed to projecting a positive leadership image for the President. Polling would be desirable in arriving at such a formulation.
3. The immense job of legal and political research and analysis on each of the primary states (presently 32 in number); which of them should be entered; how each of these should be organized; the development of such issues as are distinctive to each. Here again polling would be desirable on all aspects.



4. Similar attention to the delegate selection process in the non-primary states.
5. The development of the finance effort itself. Before any of the above efforts can proceed, money must be raised to get them off the ground. This in itself will be a slow process. Principal reliance will have to be on direct mail and the government's matching funds. Reputedly it has taken years and over a million dollars of investment to develop Wallace's present direct mailing lists of over 2 million addressees. His emotional following made that easier than it would be for others.

Thus it is apparent that it is very late in the day. It is clear, or so it seems to us, that if we are to have any hope of success in contested primaries the money raising must start immediately.

Questions:

Where will the seed money to start the effort to raise the money to start the campaign, come from?

And how long will all this take?

If we start now, can we do it in time?

Sadly, the day is gone when several million dollars could be readily and quickly raised on the telephone for a sitting President. We are speaking of a finance effort that will take large amounts of seed money, if we can find it, and many months of time to implement fully. Only after start-up money is raised can the real work of the campaign begin.

Thus, in all reason, we should start the finance effort now.

But there is a catch.

D. CANDIDACY.

Under the Act, the moment contributions are received or expenditures made by a person "with a view to bringing about his nomination for election, to (such) office", he is a candidate under the law.

It possibly could be argued that we were raising money initially for the purpose of canvassing the issue of whether to run or not. But in all the circumstances here, especially, the President's firmly announced intention to run, and the use to which we know the money is really going to be put, the argument is just not credible. We could not in honesty advance it.

Thus it seems clear that the raising or spending of money would automatically make the President a candidate under the law.

Being a candidate, he would:



1. Come under the rigid, expensive and burdensome reporting requirements of the Act.
2. Be subjected to the limitations, restrictions and penalties of the Act.
3. Be put under the equal time provisions in respect to media projection and suffer some limitation on free time accorded a non-candidate by the media.
4. Be subject to the suspicion of political interest in all his actions and pronouncements.
5. Possibly lose continued funding by the National Committee of the President's and Vice President's travels for the party. We believe, however, that there would be a solid basis for arguing that this could and should be continued, even after candidacy. We are talking about the President and the Vice President. The President is the head of the party. The purpose of the trips is to strengthen the party and to raise money for its National Committee as well as the state committees.
6. Require him immediately to set up an extensive and detailed accounting system to meet the onerous record-keeping and reporting requirements of the Act.

In these respects, delay in candidacy is desirable.

The question is, can we delay. For the reasons stated under "C", we do not think that we can, notwithstanding the weight of the above considerations.

E. A PARAMOUNT CONSIDERATION - RECOMMENDATION.

There is a paramount consideration, above all others, why we believe candidacy should be announced firmly and soon.

That consideration is the important and perhaps decisive effect it will have in discouraging others from competing for the nomination. All these horrendous problems of financing a primary campaign under this Act, as well as many other problems, would, of course, be avoided if the nomination of the President were uncontested.

A firm announcement at this time, plus the follow-up steps outlined below, would present the reality of a sitting Republican President running seriously and vigorously for re-nomination. It would have to have a powerful negative impact on the potential competition.

We therefore recommend an early, positive declaration of candidacy.

F. GETTING GOING.

In preparation for this, the following steps would have to be contemplated immediately.

1. The selection and public announcement of an outstanding national figure as Chairman of the President's campaign for the nomination.

Among other qualifications the Chairman should be one who has a close and cordial rapport with the National Committee.



2. The selection and public announcement of nationally recognized powerhouses as Finance Chairman, Co-Chairman and Vice Chairmen.

The Finance Chairman, his Co-Chairman, Vice Chairmen and staff would have to go into operation immediately in the solicitation of \$1000 contributions to provide start-up money.

Simultaneously they would have to move immediately to fulfill "the threshold requirement" for the government's matching funds.

In a third area, direct mail solicitation, there is not time to set up an effective program from scratch. However the National Committee has perhaps the most effective direct mail program in the country. The possibility of piggy-backing on that should be immediately canvassed and effectuated. The same service would undoubtedly have to be made available for the same purpose to other bona fide candidates. That is all right. It will serve the President better than the others.

The Finance Chairman, Co-Chairman and Vice Chairmen should be old hands. There is no time for on-the-job training.

Suggestions for consideration --

For Chairman and Co-Chairman:

Jerry Milbank (New York) and
Lil Phipps (New York and Florida).

For Vice Chairmen:

Pat Wilson (Tennessee)
Max Fisher (Michigan)
Dave Packard (California).

3. An immediate start on the organizational concept and staff structure and recruitment.
4. An immediate start by the President on the formulation of a substantive program projecting a positive leadership image that he can carry into the campaign.
5. An immediate start on the massive job of analyzing the primary options, making choices of primaries to enter and determining strategy and organization for each; also on the delegate selection process in the non-primary states.

In the interest of saving time and conserving money, we wonder if here again, much of the data could not be obtained from the National Committee. The Committee is well-financed. It is a service organization to Republicans. It has field men in each section of the country. It has a large research operation which presumably is keeping itself current on the law and political profile of each of the states.

At least it would seem worthwhile to examine and appraise



the Committee's operation in this respect and to canvass the possibility of getting immediate access to its data and staff help.

The Committee also does polling. Perhaps we could take advantage of this, both in respect to issue formulation and judgments relating to the primary states, thus saving substantial amounts of time and money.

Again these services, if made available to us, would have to be made available to all bona fide candidates for the nomination.

6. The immediate resumption by the President and Vice President of active help to the state parties in fund-raising and inspirational leadership. The state parties are broke, demoralized and disturbingly indifferent to the national administration.

This can be changed. The situation is to a very large extent the result of neglect. Since succession to their present offices both the President and the Vice President have been totally and properly preoccupied with the problems of the country. But during this period, the party has been passing through some of its darkest hours. It was badly defeated in November. There is Watergate. There is a recession. There is international disarray. There are all the political finance scandals, prosecutions, convictions, and all the new and confusing laws, rules and regulations that have turned off so many givers and reduced fund-raising to a trickle.

This is serious. A strong, vibrant, enthusiastic party marshalled behind the President is essential to nomination. It is also important to effective government.

Thus, a revitalized party is a high priority.

The Vice President has a special problem. It is the traditional role of the Vice President to tend the party. Because of this Vice President's preoccupation with pressing problems, he has not been doing it. When, in a time of great party need and distress, he declines invitations to help with fund-raising, there are resentments.

Thus we urge, both as a high priority in the strategy of the campaign and substantively as well, that the Vice President, and the President himself to the very fullest extent possible, come to the aid of the party.

This should not wait until the Fall. Here again a prompt and intensive series of party appearances by the President and the Vice President throughout the country now and the enthusiastic receptions that will be accorded them now, will be powerful dissuaders to potential competition. If, as is quite possible, such appearances are successful in discouraging competition, they will have saved no end of time, effort, trouble, expense - and party disunity - later.



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I. INTRODUCTION

There is no magic to the organization of a national presidential campaign. The key is O R G A N I Z A T I O N - the sooner the better and the better the better.

This memorandum will be divided into three parts: The selection of the general Chairman, the nominating process, and the general election campaign.

II. THE GENERAL CAMPAIGN CHAIRMAN

The selection of the person to be the general campaign Chairman until the election of the President is accomplished is the first and the most important single decision that has to be made. I would strongly urge that nothing of a definitive nature be done until this has been accomplished.

The basic reason is simple. Politicians need and react to authority and decision making. In the absence of a Chairman with acknowledged authority, the effort will flounder, potential allies will hold back, and enlisted aides will become frustrated and squabble among themselves.

The Chairman should be involved in the selection of all key personnel from the beginning. He should have all or most of the following characteristics:

1. Absolute loyalty to the President, even to the exclusion, if necessary, of his own best interests;
2. Complete access to the President;
3. The ability to make a decision. Indecisiveness to politicians is disastrous;

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4. General knowledge of the political, business and media worlds;
5. A good organizer;
6. Available on a fulltime basis;
7. A "good guy" with few, if any, deep-seated adversaries.

Believe it or not, such a person exists and should not be hard to find. Items 1, 2 and 3 are absolutely imperative.

His priorities should be the selection of:

1. The Delegate Chairman and his top deputies;
2. A Finance Chairman;
3. A top polling expert.

The rest of the campaign structure will fall into place as you go along. However, the Delegate Chairman will need money from the beginning. A polling expert will be needed almost from the beginning because of the necessity to analyse the primary states. This will be discussed later.

I don't think it advisable for the President to formally announce any key people until he formally declares his candidacy. Nevertheless, all key people should be approved by him and they should have a brief "off the record" meeting with him (with the General Chairman) at the time of their selection.

Until the President announces his candidacy all persons will function as volunteers of an "Elect Jerry Ford Committee". The headquarters of the Committee should be in Washington, D.C., and should function openly. Its formation should be announced by the general Chairman after the delegate

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Chairman and the finance Chairman has been selected so that their identities can be publicly announced at the same time.

If the foregoing is accomplished by June 1, 1975, you should be in good shape.

The selection of the general Chairman first is imperative.

III. THE NOMINATING PROCESS

A. INTRODUCTION

The nomination of a Republican candidate for President today is, ofcourse, an enterprise far different than the election of a Republican candidate. This fundamental fact can never be forgotten and must be understood from the beginning by all those engaged in the nominating process. Many of them will be required to submerge themselves in the general electorate as soon as the nomination is assured. Upon the nomination of the President then, ofcourse, the nominating organization is formally dissolved and only selected members of it are brought into the general election campaign organization.

The sole purpose of the nomination organization is to secure the nomination of the President in a manner best calculated to insure his election.

B. THE NOMINATING ORGANIZATION

1. The Chairman.

Next only to the selection of the general Chairman, this person is critical. He should have the following characteristics:

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- a. Absolute loyalty to the President;
- b. Access to the President when necessary;
- c. The ability to make a decision;
- d. Knowledge of the Republican party and its processes;
- e. A good organizer;
- f. Capable of serving under the general Chairman;
- g. Available on a full time basis;
- h. A good politician with no deep-rooted enemies in the party.

Again, items a., b., and c., are vital. In addition, this person should not have the compulsion to advance himself politically.

2. The Organization

a. The Co-Chairmen

The Chairman should have three deputies, being: a woman, a good southern politician and a good north-east politician.

The selection of the woman is obvious.

The selection of the other two are not quite so obvious.

If an effort is made by the so-called "Conservatives" to nominate a candidate, their principal support will come from the South. Our southerner has to be able to develop the most delegates possible but in such a manner that the President will receive maximum support in the general election.

Only a competent knowledgeable southerner can accomplish this!

The selection of the north-eastern co-Chairman should maximize the political power base, the stature and prestige of the Vice President.

Depending on how matters shape up, this person could be critical.

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b. The Regional Chairmen

A division of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico into regions is the only practical way to organize a national nominating organization. To the extent possible, these persons should be selected first by the Chairman, his co-Chairmen, and with the advice and help of the general Chairman.

They, together with the co-Chairmen, should likewise have an "off the record" meeting with the President upon their selection.

If it is possible to select the Regional Chairmen first, then they in turn can participate in the selection of the State Chairmen. This is important inasmuch as the Regional Chairmen will have the primary contact with them on a continuing basis.

The primary characteristics of a Regional Chairman should be:

- a. Loyalty to the President;
- b. A knowledgeable and good politician;
- c. A good organizer;
- d. Available as and when needed.

c. The State Chairmen

1. The Primary States.

One of the first things to be done by the General Chairman and the Delegate Chairman is the analysis of all states which select delegates by a primary election. As it is determined which primaries will be entered (either directly by the President or by a surrogate) a Chairman has to be selected who is best equipped to manage an election campaign. That kind of person is somewhat different, by way of qualifications and characteristics, than the other state Chairmen. In addition, their selection can be much

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more vital for obvious reasons.

This subject matter could take fifty pages and inconsistent with the purpose of this memorandum. Suffice it to say, however, that the approach to the primary states problem should be the constant preoccupation of the general and delegate Chairmen from the outset. And that is why, as soon as possible, expert polling should be available.

In regard to polling, absolute security should be maintained. Only those with "a need to know" should have access to your polls. This is easier said than done.

2. The Non-Primary States

Each state is different when it comes to the selection of delegates. Therefore, it is vital to get as soon as possible, the "right person" to be the President's Chairman. He should have the following characteristics:

- a. Loyalty to the President;
- b. A knowledgeable politician in the Republican party in his state;
- c. A good guy with no deep seated enemies in any faction of the party of his state;
- d. Available as and when needed.

The time-table for their selection should pretty well coincide with the date when their delegates are selected. Oklahoma, for instance, usually has the first convention and the State of Washington the last. In any event, the Regional and State Chairmen begin as soon as possible in their analysis of each state and a determination of what is required and at what time.

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One caveat. If at all possible under the circumstances, it is better to wait for the right person than hastily pick a person who might have to be replaced later.

Consistent with the foregoing caveat, if all Regional and State Chairmen can be picked and in place by the time the President makes his formal announcement to seek the Republican nomination, a psychological advantage of great proportions is achieved. The presence of your entire national organization at the time and place of such an announcement signifies to other Republican aspirants on the one hand and to Democrat aspirants on the other that the President means business and is well organized. So much for that.

d. Communications

The worst thing that can happen to a politician is not to have someone to talk to. The next worst thing is not to know what is going on. Communication is the answer to both.

One of the first things the General and Delegate Chairmen should do is select an Editor of a newspaper to be published by the Campaign Committee. Initially, it would be circulated among your organization and the functionaries of the entire Republican party -- that is, National Committee, State Chairmen, County Chairmen, past delegates, women's organizations, young Republican organizations, elected Republican officials, etc.

Its uses are obvious. First, it tells everybody what is going on on behalf of the President. Second, it permits identification and recognition of your organization as it develops. Third, and most important, it tells the Republican Party about the President.

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The importance of the publication cannot be over emphasized.

Throughout the development of your national organization, as many regional and national meetings of your entire organization should be held as is practically possible. These meetings serve several essential functions.

1. The entire organization becomes acquainted with itself - an indispensable ingredient at convention time;
2. Complaints, bitches and gripes can be aired;
3. Morale, enthusiasm, and dedication is kept high.

These meetings are absolutely vital!

e. Delegate Books

The Delegate Chairman should keep one copy of a Delegate book for each state. This book should contain information, on forms supplied by the state Chairman under the supervision of the Regional Chairman, pertaining to your delegate position in that state.

Only the President, the General Chairman and the Delegate Chairman should know the whole picture.

This is a problem to be encountered many months from now, but it is one with respect to which both the concept and the discipline must be understood at the very beginning.

f. The Convention

Your national delegate organization should be your organization at the Convention. This is a subject matter in need of much

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elaboration. Suffice it to say, however, that thought should be given as early as possible to the designation of the person who will be in charge of logistics at the Convention. He must be loyal to and compatible with the President and the General and Delegate Chairmen.

IV. THE GENERAL ELECTION

As soon as it is determined that the President will be nominated, planning for the general election should be given absolute top priority. The nominating organization is kept alive only through the Convention.

It seems to me that, with in incumbent President, the General Chairman should become the Chairman of the Republican National Committee on the day following the nomination. This is necessary for two reasons. First, it permits the President and his organization to function through the Republican Party apparatus. Second, it eliminates the problem posed by CREEP in 1972.

Many regular state Chairmen will have been a part of your nominating organization. All regular State Chairmen and all of your nominating organization should work together in the general election. This is more easily accomplished through the Republican National Committee than otherwise.

This does not preclude the organization of a multitude of citizen, ethnic and other groups to participate in the general election. The important thing, however, is that the General Chairman - the President's man - function as such from beginning to end. Nothing can be worse in a political organization during an election than to have change and lack of identified decision-making at the top. I repeat, nothing could be worse.

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V. CONCLUSION

The foregoing is a brief and hastily put together outline of a political organization for the nomination and election of the President in 1976. Obviously, it can be expanded one hundred fold.

Its simple message, however, is two-fold: First, carefully select two men - the General Chairman and the Delegate Chairman. Second, ORGANIZE and COMMUNICATE.

