

The original documents are located in Box 7, folder “Intelligence - Release of Documents to the Church Committee (2)” of the Richard B. Cheney Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Memo	re []CHAOS (2 pp.)	Undated	A
2. Cable	CIA Headquarters to CIA Addressees Abroad (5 pp.)	3/5/74	A
3. Memo	re Audio Surveillance (1 p.)	Undated	A
4. Memo	re Project [cryptonym] (1 p.)	Undated	A
5. Memo	copy of item 1 (2 pp.)	Undated	A
6. Memo	re Projects [cryptonym, cryptonym, cryptonym] (1 p.)	Undated	A
7. Memo	re Project [cryptonym] and Project [cryptonym] (1 p.)	Undated	A
8. Memo	re Project [cryptonym] re retiring director of BNDD (1 p.)	Undated	A
9. Memo	re Project [cryptonym] re developing private sources among CIA employees (1 p.)	Undated	A
10. Memo	re Project [cryptonym] re surveillance of foreign individuals temporarily in the U.S. (1 p.)	Undated	A
11. Memo	re Projects [cryptonym, cryptonym, cryptonym] re surveillance against employees (1 p.)	Undated	A

FILE LOCATION

Cheney Files
 General Subject File
 Intelligence - Buchen Memo re Releases of Documents (2)

Box 7

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WHM, 5/30/85

Memorandum to the Record:

Sanitized versions of many of the documents closed in this folder are available for research in a CIA press release version of the Colby report located in the folder "Intelligence - Colby Report" in box 13 of the staff files of Vernon Leen and Charles Leppert.

William McFitt
Ford Library
5/30/85

1 JUN 7


Program Manpower Resource Requirements
Special Operations Group, Counter Intelligence Staff

The program of the Special Operations Group originated in instructions of the Deputy Director for Plans on 15 August 1967, based on instructions to him by the Director, Central Intelligence Agency. These instructions were to establish a program for collection and dissemination of information on foreign involvement in domestic extremism and dissidence; and to maintain an adequate supporting data base, including full control of pertinent related information received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The program started with one officer and one IA, building strength gradually as personnel could be obtained.

The first formal strength authorization was provided in mid-1969 when a total of 36 positions was authorized with the understanding that, if this should prove insufficient, additional personnel would be authorized. (The Chief of the Special Operations Group estimated that a force of about 60 would be required as a minimum to fully implement the required program.)

To facilitate a rapid qualitative buildup of the program, a memorandum was sent in September 1969 by the DCI to each of the Agency Directorates requesting full support to the program; i.e., especially by the Office of Security and Office of Communications in the Support Directorate; by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service and the Domestic Contact Service in the Intelligence Directorate; by the Office of Computer Services in the Scientific and Technical Directorate; and by all pertinent elements in the Plans Directorate. As part of the buildup of the Special Operations Group, several key personnel assignments were made in mid and late 1969; i.e., three branch chiefs and a deputy chief.

By mid-1970 the authorized strength of 36 had been achieved and was inadequate for the workload, despite the use of a very large amount of overtime.



~~SECRET~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

As a result, the question of overall strength was reviewed and a decision made in late Spring of 1971 that an additional 18 positions would be authorized for the Special Operations Group for fiscal year 1972. Due to the lack of an effective directed assignment system, the Group has been unable to date to build up to its authorized strength (and still is short of the space needed to accommodate that strength).

As of 2 June 1972, the Group has an on-board strength of 42, with two additional officers scheduled to report by early July. Four Group officers, however, are scheduled for transfer out by mid-July. The Group thus needs not only to complete its buildup to authorized strength by filling existing vacancies, but also to obtain replacements for officers still in the Group whose tours with the Group either are already over or are close to their end. The early satisfaction of these personnel requirements is essential to bring a halt to the physical drain on the health of the Group's officers trying to keep up with the enormous continuing volume of work. The Group has been staffed to date primarily by junior officers who are bright and hard-working but who require relatively close supervision because of lack of prior experience. The management span of the senior officers is thus larger than desirable; additional middle grade, experienced officers are required. Replacement of officers at or near the end of their tour of duty is also required to maintain a concept of rotation-tour-staffing which has proven the only effective means of attracting qualified, experienced personnel or bright, ambitious, young personnel.

In fulfillment of a requirement set forth when a 54 strength Group was authorized, a formal Table of Organization has been recently approved. The Group is organized around two worldwide operational branches, each of which is concerned with the collection and dissemination of information on foreign involvement in certain specific aspects of the domestic U.S. scene. These branches are supported by a special operational unit and by sections concerned with the control of correspondence and the maintenance of a retrievable data base. In addition, the Office of Computer Services provides five full man years and two partial man years of programming and system design

support for the computer systems under development for and utilized by the Group. Without such computer support, it would be impossible to run this program with the relatively small number of people authorized and with the short time deadlines required to provide effective requirements and guidance for field operations, and to respond effectively to special studies and estimates requirements levied upon the Agency.

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21 APR 1972 E

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Plans
Deputy Director for Support
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Heads of Independent Offices

(For Distribution to Office/Division Chief
Level Only)

SUBJECT : CIA Activities in the United States

1. From time to time some of our employees express concern over various allegations or rumors of CIA activities in the United States. The attached memorandum is designed to clarify this subject so that supervisors can authoritatively reply to any employees indicating such concern. It is a statement of the facts of the situation. If incidents or activities are reported which appear to conflict with this statement, they should be reported to appropriate senior authority for resolution (or correction if unauthorized activities might have occurred).

2. Because of the possible sensitivity of this description of the Agency's methodology, this memorandum is not being given the usual broad circulation of the "FYI -- Allegations and Answers" series. Office and Division Chiefs are urged, however, to use it to inform Branch Chiefs so that its points can be readily available to supervisors to react to expressions of employee concern.

/s/ W. E. Colby

W. E. Colby
Executive Director-Comptroller

Attachment

WEC:sfc
Distribution:
O - DDI

1 - Each Other Addressee:

DDP	D/DCI/IC	A/DCI (Thurmer)
DDS	D/PPB	SAVA
DDS&T	ONE	USIB Secretary
OGC	OLC	IG SECRET

DECLASSIFIED	
CIA press release, 8 July 1975	
By	NARS, Date 5/29/85



ALLEGATION:

In a variety of ways it has been alleged that CIA is working within the United States, with particular attention to extremist groups.

FACTS:

1. Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, subparagraph D3, states, "The Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions."

In his speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors on 14 April 1971, the Director stated:

"I can assure you that except for the normal responsibilities for protecting the physical security of our own personnel, our facilities, and our classified information, we do not have any such powers and functions; we have never sought any; we do not exercise any. In short, we do not target on American citizens."

In the Director's "State of the Agency" speech to employees on 17 September 1971, he said:

"I gave a talk to the American Society of Newspaper Editors last winter, as you know, and I did it for only one purpose. That was to try and put in the record a few of these denials that we've all wanted to see put in the public record for some time. And you can rely on those denials. They're true, and you can use that as any text that you may need to demonstrate that we're not in the drug traffic, and that we're not trying to do espionage on American citizens in the United States, and we're not tapping telephone lines, and that we're not doing a lot of other things which we're accused of doing. One of the things that tends to perpetuate some of these silly ideas are jokes that are made about them, particularly about domestic espionage. Although the jokes have no basis in fact they nevertheless give us a name which we don't deserve. I don't say that that makes all that much difference, but it does make some difference, and this tends to spill over, so I would like to suggest that if you have it in your hearts to do so that you speak up when the occasion arises and try and set the facts straight."



2. From time to time some employees have been concerned that Agency activities might conflict with these statements. They can be assured that Agency activities do not. For clarification, some activities which may have been subject to misunderstanding are listed as follows:

a. Domestic Contacts. The Domestic Contact Service establishes discreet but overt relationships with American private citizens, commercial, academic and other organizations and resident aliens for the purposes of collecting on a voluntary basis foreign intelligence information or soliciting their cooperation in assisting the Agency to perform its mission overseas. Records of the individuals and organizations cooperating with the Agency are maintained as a necessary practical element of this process.

b. Security Investigations. Security investigations are conducted on prospective employees, contractors, and consultants, and on security problems which arise. These investigations involve a wide range of investigative procedures, including neighborhood inquiries, checks with other Government agencies, review of credit reports, and interviews with former employers and business associates. This is essential to assure that our personnel possess a high degree of personal integrity, sense of responsibility, and competence and to protect classified information and sensitive intelligence sources and methods. The resulting files are held separately by the Office of Security and are not merged with other Agency files.

c. Foreign Resources. On some occasions, foreign citizens of interest to CIA are contacted and recruited in America for work abroad. The purpose of this activity is entirely restricted to the Agency's foreign operations.

d. Recruitment. CIA recruiters maintain a wide variety of contacts within the United States, assisting individuals interested in employment with CIA to learn more about it and to join its employee force.

e. Contracting. In the course of CIA business and operations, a number of contracts for procurement, research, or analysis are made with a variety of U.S. companies and individuals. This in no way constitutes operations in the U.S. but rather secures the assistance of these groups in carrying out the CIA mission against foreign targets.

~~SECRET~~



f. Operations. The 1967 Katzenbach Committee report was approved by the Director in March 1967 and is binding on any of our relations with American organizations today. It specifically prohibits covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any U. S. educational or private voluntary organization. Any relationship or operation the Agency has with an American organization must be and is within these guidelines.

g. Details or Loans. On rare occasions, details of technically qualified CIA personnel, technical advice, or loans of CIA equipment have been made available to other U. S. agencies at their request to assist them to carry out their responsibilities. An example is the skymarshel program, in which some CIA personnel were temporarily detailed to the FAA in order to assist in a rapid initiation of that program. Such personnel and equipment are under the operational control of the receiving agency. Assistance of this nature in no way constitutes an assumption of responsibility or authority by CIA for the program.

h. Counterintelligence and Drugs. To carry out its responsibilities for counterintelligence, CIA is interested in the activities of foreign nations or intelligence services aimed at the U. S. To the extent that these activities lie outside the U. S., including activities aimed at the U. S. utilizing U. S. citizens or others, they fall within CIA's responsibilities. Responsibility for coverage of the activities within the U. S. lies with the FBI, as an internal security function. CIA's responsibility and authority are limited to the foreign intelligence aspect of the problem, and any action of a law enforcement or internal security nature lies with the FBI or local police forces. (CIA's assistance to the U. S. Government program against narcotics and drugs is handled in the same fashion.)

i. Operational Support. To support CIA operations, arrangements are made with various U. S. business or other entities to provide cover or other support for CIA personnel or activities abroad. This can include proprietaries formed or controlled by CIA. While these may exist within the U. S., their purpose is to conduct or support operations abroad.

j. Defectors. As provided by law, CIA occasionally resettles in the U. S. defectors and other foreign individuals of operational interest. This resettlement may involve a new identity, relocation, employment, etc. Although this activity takes place in this country, its purpose is the support of operations abroad.





F





ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20305

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

9 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL CIA EMPLOYEES

1. Recent press reports outline in detail certain alleged CIA activities with respect to Mr. Howard Hunt and other parties. The presently known facts behind these stories are those stated in the attached draft of a statement I will be making to the Senate Committee on Appropriations on 9 May. As can be seen, the Agency provided limited assistance in response to a request by senior officials. The Agency has cooperated with and made available to the appropriate law enforcement bodies information about these activities and will continue to do so.

2. All CIA employees should understand my attitude on this type of issue. I shall do everything in my power to confine CIA activities to those which fall within a strict interpretation of its legislative charter. I take this position because I am determined that the law shall be respected and because this is the best way to foster the legitimate and necessary contributions we in CIA can make to the national security of the United States.

3. I am taking several actions to implement this objective:


- I have ordered all the senior operating officials of this Agency to report to me immediately on any activities now going on, or that have gone on in the past, which might be construed to be outside the legislative charter of this Agency.
- I hereby direct every person presently employed by CIA to report to me on any such activities of which he has knowledge. I invite all ex-employees to do the same. Anyone who has such information should call my secretary (extension 6363) and say that he wishes to talk to me about "activities outside CIA's charter."

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY



4. To ensure that Agency activities are proper in the future,
I hereby promulgate the following standing order for all CIA employees:

Any CIA employee who believes that he has received
instructions which in any way appear inconsistent
with the CIA legislative charter shall inform the
Director of Central Intelligence immediately.



James R. Schlesinger
Director

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY





29 AUG 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Management and Services
Deputy Director for Operations

INFO : Inspector General


SUBJECT : Questionable Activities

1. As an aspect of the allegations of improper CIA activity in connection with the Watergate and associated matters, the Inspector General was directed to assemble all information available in the Agency on any such activities. Certain specific matters were provided to him, and the Director by memorandum of 9 May 1973 directed all employees to report any activities, current or past, "which might be construed to be outside the legislative charter of this Agency." This information was assembled and consolidated by the Inspector General in a memorandum of 21 May 1973 and certain individual memoranda thereafter supplementing it. This material was used in a detailed, page-by-page review of all such information with Senator Symington and Congressman Nedzi, as Chairman of the Senate and the House Armed Services Intelligence Subcommittees, respectively. In addition, I undertook very specific commitments in my confirmation hearings to ensure that the Agency will remain within its legislative charter. I am arranging for the published transcripts of those hearings to be circulated throughout the Agency for compliance, and at that time will reaffirm the specific direction made by Dr. Schlesinger in his memorandum of 9 May 1973. This will also be incorporated into appropriate regulations.

2. With respect to the specific questionable activities which were reported as a result of the search made throughout the Agency, however, I believe it essential to take specific action in order that these not seem to be condoned or overlooked. I have therefore developed specific instructions on each reported activity. These are included in the attachments to this memorandum, and have the force of specific direction to you to pass on to appropriate subordinates the instructions outlined. Separate packages of such instructions are being developed for each Directorate in order to respect the sensitivity of some of the activities discussed, including those which are deemed quite appropriate within CIA's charter.

DECLASSIFIED
CIA press release, 8 July 1975
By DAD Date 5/29/85

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~
~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~



Similarly, each activity is placed on a separate page so that the Deputy Director concerned may most easily forward it to the office or offices directly concerned without distributing it more broadly.

3. In the event that these instructions raise substantial difficulties of implementation or compliance, I would appreciate your raising such cases with me directly, with whatever recommendations you may have for modification to carry out the spirit of the action undertaken here but to avoid undue disruption of legitimate activities. In the absence of such notice, I will expect full compliance with the instructions outlined herein.

4. Each addressee Deputy Director is instructed to recommend to the DDM&S modification or addition to Agency regulations of appropriate language to reflect the direction included in this memorandum and attachments addressed to him. DDM&S will be responsible for consolidating such recommendations and making an overall report to the Director through the IG, coordinating with General Counsel.

SIGNED

W. E. Colby

Attachments



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This form marks the file location of item number 1 as listed
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H



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This form marks the file location of item number 2 as listed
on the pink form (GSA form 7122, Withdrawal Sheet) at the front of the folder.

STAEDTLER
MARS PLASTIC



NOTE: A selected group of attachments to this memorandum is attached. The selection includes all those which might be related to the allegations in the New York Times article of December 22nd.



29 AUG 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Management and Services
Deputy Director for Operations

INFO : Inspector General

SUBJECT : Questionable Activities


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2. With respect to the specific questionable activities which were reported as a result of the search made throughout the Agency, however, I believe it essential to take specific action in order that these not seem to be condoned or overlooked. I have therefore developed specific instructions on each reported activity. These are included in the attachments to this memorandum, and have the force of specific direction to you to pass on to appropriate subordinates the instructions outlined. Separate packages of such instructions are being developed for each Directorate in order to respect the sensitivity of some of the activities discussed, including those which are deemed quite appropriate within CIA's charter.

DECLASSIFIED

CIA Press release, 8 July 1975
By DAD, NARS, Date 5/29/85

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~



Similarly, each activity is placed on a separate page so that the Deputy Director concerned may most easily forward it to the office or offices directly concerned without distributing it more broadly.

3. In the event that these instructions raise substantial difficulties of implementation or compliance, I would appreciate your raising such cases with me directly, with whatever recommendations you may have for modification to carry out the spirit of the action undertaken here but to avoid undue disruption of legitimate activities. In the absence of such notice, I will expect full compliance with the instructions outlined herein.

4. Each addressee Deputy Director is instructed to recommend to the DDM&S modification or addition to Agency regulations of appropriate language to reflect the direction included in this memorandum and attachments addressed to him. DDM&S will be responsible for consolidating such recommendations and making an overall report to the Director through the IG, coordinating with General Counsel.

SIGNED

W. E. Colby

Attachments

- 2 -

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~



MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Care in Relation to Significant Domestic Events

All Deputy Directors will exhibit particular sensitivity to the possible coincidence of CIA training, testing, or support activities and significant domestic, political or other events to which they could be wrongly related by the unwitting observer. This refers particularly to political conventions, the activities of dissident groups, etc., in which cases CIA activities should be deactivated, moved away, or suspended temporarily.

DECLASSIFIED

CIA press release, 8 July 1975

By AAO NARS, Date 5/29/85

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~



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This form marks the file location of item number 3-5 as listed
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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Restrictions on Files of American Citizens

The Office of Security or the Chief, CI Operations will not maintain files of American citizens other than those developed as an incidental aspect of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence matters or as employee, applicant, contact, etc. The arrest records formerly received from the Washington, D.C., and certain other areas have been destroyed and will not be reconstituted.

DECLASSIFIED
CI A press release, 8 July 1975
By *DAD* NARS, Date *5/29/85*




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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Testing of Equipment in U.S.

Testing of intelligence and espionage-peculiar equipment may be undertaken in the United States, but care will be taken that no recordings are made of U.S. citizens or otherwise conducted on unwitting subjects in the United States. If it is essential to test equipment on an American communications system or other establishment, this may be done provided that no recordings of the material are retained or examined by any element other than the original test engineers.



~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~
~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~



MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Testing of Equipment in U.S.

Testing of intelligence and espionage-peculiar equipment may be undertaken in the United States, but care will be taken that no recordings are made of U.S. citizens or otherwise conducted on unwitting subjects in the United States. If it is essential to test equipment on an American communications system or other establishment, this may be done provided that no recordings of the material are retained or examined by any element other than the original test engineers.

DECLASSIFIED	
<i>CIA press release, 8 July 1975</i>	
By <u>DAD</u>	NARS, Date <u>5/29/85</u>

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~




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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Influencing Human Behavior

Any experiment or use of drugs or other techniques for influencing human behavior will be undertaken only with the Director's specific approval and in no case on unwitting American citizens.



~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~



MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Postal Service

The assistance provided the Office of the Chief Postal Inspector by OTS seems appropriate, provided it is essentially defensive in orientation and would not assist penetration of the mail.

DECLASSIFIED	
<i>CIA press release, 8 July 1975</i>	
By	<i>DDM</i> NARS, Date <i>5/29/85</i>

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~



MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: OEL Speech-Processing Assistance

Speech-processing assistance by OEL should be limited to assistance in the technique developed for speech processing and should not involve the processing of the tapes themselves by CIA or with CIA participation.

DECLASSIFIED
CIA press release, 8 July 1975
By JAD NARS, Date 5/29/85



~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Restrictions on Operational Lists on Americans

The accumulation of operational leads to Americans with access to significant foreign targets must be conducted in a fashion which clearly avoids the charge that black lists of any sort are being accumulated by CIA. If such listings cannot be made by CIA in a non-misunderstandable manner, arrangements should be made for the service to be performed by the FBI or other service which can legitimately do this function. This particularly refers to matters such as mail watches, overseas telephone call watch lists, doctors who studied abroad, etc.

DECLASSIFIED	
<i>CIA press release, 8 July 1975</i>	
By <i>DAD</i>	NARS, Date <i>5/29/85</i>

SECRET-EYES ONLY



MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: U.S. Citizens Involved in Narcotics Abroad

NARCOG is directed to review its passage of information with respect to U.S. citizens involved in narcotics trafficking abroad. To the extent these reports reflect intelligence incidentally acquired on U.S. citizens in the course of operations against foreign intelligence targets in the narcotics field, these reports may be continued, but no operations are authorized to be launched aimed at individual U.S. citizens as a target in themselves. Assistance can be provided for DEA operations abroad in the narcotics field, even in provision of intelligence-related equipment, so long as it is clear that the operation belongs to the DEA and is not a joint activity by CIA and DEA against U.S. citizens.

DECLASSIFIED
CIA press release, 8 July 1975
 By DAD HARS, Date 5/29/85



MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Foreign Connections with Organized Crime in the U.S.

The SEC request for assistance with respect to information on any foreign connection with organized crime in the U.S. should focus on foreign targets and not on U.S. citizens. To the extent that information on the latter appears to be acquired incidentally to the foreign coverage, it may be passed to the appropriate agency.

DECLASSIFIED
CIA per release, 8 July 1975
By *DAD* HANS, Date *5/29/85*

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~



MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: DCS Assessment of U.S. Citizens

DCS assessment of the suitability and willingness of U.S. citizens to cooperate with CIA in its foreign intelligence mission is an appropriate action.

DECLASSIFIED	
<i>CIA per release, 8 July 1975</i>	
By	<i>DAD</i> <i>5/29/85</i>

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~
~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~



~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~


MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: DCS Interest in Foreign Students and Foreign
National Physicians

DCS collection of information on foreign students studying in the U.S. and on foreign national physicians trained abroad but practicing in the U.S. may continue. DCS may also continue to accept information on possible foreign involvement in U.S. dissident groups and narcotic trade, when sources refuse to deal directly with the FBI or DEA.

DECLASSIFIED
CIA next release, 8 July 1975
By DAD [unclear] 5/29/85

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~



MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The Intelligence Evaluation Committee

The Intelligence Evaluation Committee has been disbanded. In the future, CIA participation in interagency domestic intelligence discussions will be restricted to the provision of foreign intelligence which might bear upon the matters being considered. CIA will not participate in recommendations or actions with respect to domestic affairs.

DECLASSIFIED
CIA per release, 8 July 1975
By DAD [unclear], Date 5/29/85




MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Reporting on Dissident Groups

Reference to U.S. dissident groups can appear only in the most incidental form in CIA publications, and no study in depth will be developed of such groups, such as occurred in OCI publications in 1967 and 1968. However, it is appropriate to focus on significant foreign intelligence such as black radicalism, even when such subjects have substantial impact on domestic situations.

DECLASSIFIED	
<i>CIA mem release, 8 July 1975</i>	
By <i>DAD</i>	NARS, Date <i>5/29/85</i>

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~



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