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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 18, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: DICK CHENEY

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with the
Vice President

Attached is the material you requested concerning upcoming primaries in convention states as well as a crude estimate of where we stand now on delegates. I would urge you to make the following points:

1. The situation in Michigan and Maryland looks good today.
2. Regardless of the outcome today, it's very important we move as rapidly as possible to obtain commitments from delegations such as New York and Pennsylvania.
3. Such a commitment out of the New York delegation in the next few days will give us the momentum we need to insure that we do well in convention states such as Kansas, Vermont and Alaska, all of which meet Saturday, and also helping with next Tuesday's primaries in Tennessee, Kentucky, Arkansas, Oregon, Nevada and Idaho.
4. I would appreciate anything you can do to encourage the New York delegation to go public with their commitment as soon as possible.
5. In addition to that, California, Ohio and New Jersey are going to be extremely important on June 8th, and I would like to be able to call on you and your staff for their help and assistance in these states.



If you agree, I will have Stu Spencer or Dick Cheney start working with Jack Veneman and others to make certain we do everything we can to pick up as many delegates as possible between now and June 8th.

Attachment



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 18, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: DICK CHENEY
 FROM: FOSTER CHANOCK *FC*
 SUBJECT: Primary and Delegate Update

Remaining Primaries

	<u>Number of Delegates</u>	<u>State</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Closed or Open Voting</u>
I.	43	Md.	5/18	Closed
	<u>84</u>	Mich.	5/18	Open
	127 - Total			
II.	30	Oregon	5/25	Closed
	27	Ark.	5/25	Open
	21	Idaho	5/25	Open
	37	Ky.	5/25	Closed
	18	Nev.	5/25	Closed
	<u>43</u>	Tenn.	5/25	Open
	176 - Total			
III.	20	Montana	6/1	Open
	19	R. I.	6/1	Closed
	<u>20</u>	S. D.	6/1	Closed
	59 - Total			
IV.	167	Calif.	6/8	Closed
	67	N. J.	6/8	Open
	<u>97</u>	Ohio	6/8	Closed
	<u>331 - Total</u>			

683 Total Remaining Primaries



PFC Delegate Count

	<u>Ford</u>	<u>Reagan</u>	<u>Uncommitted</u>
Legally Bound	189	313	
Publicly Committed	105	111	
Best Guess Others	<u>289</u>	<u>74</u>	<u>11</u>
Total to Date	583	498	11

Remaining State Conventions

<u>Number of Delegates</u>	<u>State</u>	<u>Date</u>
I. 18	Vt.	5/22
34	*Kansas	5/22
19	Alaska	5/22
II. 51	*Va.	6/4-5
41	*La.	6/5
III. 49	*Mo.	6/12
IV. 38	Wash.	6/18-19
36	Iowa	6/18-19
17	Delaware	6/19
V. 42	*Minn.	6/24-26
21	N.M.	6/26
VI. 18	N. D.	7/8-10
31	Colorado	7/10
VII. 35	Conn.	7/16-17
20	Utah	7/16-17



*States with asterisks have already selected some delegates at Congressional District Conventions. These figures to follow.



THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

May 8, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

THE VICE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT:

1976

1.257

I. POLITICAL STRATEGY

An organization has now been established outside the White House to develop and recommend the basic political strategy for 1976.

II. SUBSTANTIVE AND PROGRAM STRATEGY

The next step is the creation of a small, in-house group to develop and recommend policy and substantive issues from which you can shape the Ford Administration program for 1976. This group would:

- have access to and be able to authorize polling and the taking of other soundings on the issues and on strategy;
- be top-level, with a direct relationship to the President and to the formulation of domestic and foreign policy in the White House.

I have some thoughts as to the composition of this group which I'd appreciate the opportunity of discussing with you.

III. STUDY AREAS FOR DEVELOPING POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

In shaping the substantive and program strategy for 1976, two objectives stand out:

- the importance of addressing what will probably be the two major domestic issues concerning the voters:

- *jobs;

- *prices;

- the importance of expressing concern for these key constituencies:

- *small businessmen;

- *farmers;

- *youth;

- *senior citizens.

The principal issues relevant to the above objectives - for study by the Domestic Council - would seem to me to be the following:

1. Energy and Resource Policy and Finance

You have already approved the establishment of of a review group to consider policies related to

- jobs;

- energy;

- raw materials;

- transportation;

- plant conversion to produce needed equipment;

- productivity.

2. Regulations

The Domestic Council will shortly submit for your approval a proposal to assess the inhibiting impact of government regulations of all kinds on:

- the incentive system which is the essence of our free enterprise economy;

- the freedom of action and initiative of state and local governments.

3. Federal Social Programs

A proposal was submitted for your approval on April 17 for the combined study of:

- income transfer programs;
- practical approaches to consolidating existing categorical grant programs into block grants;
- alternatives for health financing and delivery;
- proposals for the allocations of functions and fiscal responsibilities between the federal, state, and local levels of government.

4. Housing

The Domestic Council will shortly submit for your approval a proposal to study prompt and effective ways of channeling private capital into the housing field.

5. Federal Drug Abuse Program

You have approved a Domestic Council study of the overall federal effort in the prevention and treatment of drug abuse.

6. Crime

The Domestic Council will shortly submit for your approval a proposal to study what additional steps can be taken at the federal level, in cooperation with local law enforcement groups, to deter crime.

This proposed study will be closely coordinated with the current efforts of the Department of Justice and its Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.

7. Science and Technology

A proposal has been submitted for your approval.

8. Bicentennial

In coordination with the efforts of John Marsh, the Domestic Council will shortly submit for your approval a proposal to study ways in which to use the Bicentennial to bring into focus the President's programs to deal with the problems of today in the perspective of two hundred years of our nation's history.

IV. A background memo highlighting the urgency of the above is attached for your personal review at TAB A.

TAB A - Background Memo

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

M E M O R A N D U M

May 8, 1975

CAMPAIGN 1976 - PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS


It is clear that organization and planning for the 1976 Presidential campaign should begin promptly. It is already late because the national conventions are barely a year hence -- the primaries only nine months away -- the 1975 Congress has already sat for four months.

I. Background for Campaign Planning and Strategy

President Ford has been in office nine months, the Vice President five of those months. Any appraisal of the Administration and its record to date, as presented by the opposition, would hold that:

- A. Hopes for a Ford government of "national unity" with close cooperation of the Congress is no longer possible. If it had ever been desirable, its chances died with: (1) the Nixon pardon; (2) the manner in which the Ford White House developed its budget and legislative program; (3) the sharp division with the Congress over Vietnam and other foreign policy matters; (4) the new Democratic caucus control of the House of Representatives.
- B. The present posture of the Administration in Foreign Affairs is difficult. Opponents say that "detente" has produced no visible benefit for the American people, as they would see it, but may be looked upon as a cover used by the Soviets to move communism forward in Southeast Asia, Latin America and Portugal, and to continue turmoil in the Middle East.

The opposition blurs the facts that it was Republicans that brought our soldiers out of Vietnam, that all our wars have been ended under Republican administrations, that no war has been started under a Republican administration, and that the Vietnam and Cambodian debacles



were generated by U. S. involvement under Democratic administrations. Although the Ford Administration inherited the whole problem, the whole thrust of the opposition is to try to make the Administration bear the brunt of criticism and the political liability that entails.

- C. Portugal will present another test for the Ford Administration. The Moderates have won the election. Because of the attacks on the CIA, we lack the capacity to influence events in Portugal. Therefore, how will the Ford Administration cope with the threat that a Communist minority in Portugal seeks to suppress the large majority?
- D. The opportunity is limited for a foreign policy "coup" such as the U.S.-Soviet Detente or the opening of U.S.-Chinese relations to give the Ford Administration a boost with the U.S. public as happened in the latter part of the Nixon Administration to bolster its chances for reelection. The Vladivostok Agreement was a major achievement but is far from being appreciated or understood in this context.
- E. In the domestic area the Ford Administration has not yet been able to establish a leadership image or to accomplish a major program breakthrough. It has unfortunately the negatives in the public mind (regardless of the merits) of:
 - 1. Vetoes overridden by the Congress by substantial numbers.
 - 2. Deficit limits firmly advocated by the President almost immediately exceeded.
 - 3. An energy program, not well understood, which has not yet been acted upon and an expectation that the President will yield for another delay on Congressional movement before increasing oil import taxes.
 - 4. The "WIN" program on inflation -- the elaborate preparation of conferences on the problem, an elaborate build-up and then a slogan -- not a program.
 - 5. A failure, in the public mind, to turn rapidly enough from the fight against inflation to the fight against unemployment and recession.



6. Despite the welcome candor and openness of the President, there is still an impression he has really not told the people "like it is." No sense of urgency has been generated in the Congress or the nation on the energy program, on the fight against the recession or on national security. Although the Administration tried, the messages have not gotten across.
 7. The policy of "no new programs" (enunciated when inflation appeared to be the single major problem) stands in the way of the President's identification with the needs and aspirations of the American people. It gives the Democrats in Congress the initiative and places the President in too much of a continuing negative-veto-posture.
- F. Despite the foregoing negatives, the Ford Administration has pluses:
1. The President's "open White House" compared to the "up-tight" secretive Nixon days.
 2. The appointment of NAR as Vice President and other appointments (Levi, Coleman, Zarb) broadening the President's Administration and getting away from the Nixon shadow.
 3. The President's courage. He has shown masculinity, and he keeps his cool.
 4. The President's ability to handle himself with the press.
 5. By comparison with the Congress, the Administration looks better than in the absolute. Congress has shown itself to be leaderless and negative. The debacle in Vietnam has also put egg on Congressional faces. Congressional inability to enact an energy program is increasingly evident, as is Congressional inability to control spending.
- G. The foregoing analysis indicates a difficult road ahead for a Ford election. The polls confirm the difficulty. However, there is no outstanding Democratic candidate yet to emerge:



1. Senator Kennedy, no matter what happens, carries the spectre of Chappaquiddick. ("Do you want a President who leaves the scene of a fatal accident?")
2. Senator Jackson is facing increasing difficulty because of the "Jackson Amendment" fiasco and other actions.
3. Governor Wallace will be at his best a major "spoiler" for others.
4. The Muskies, Humphries, etc. cut no major swathe.

So far as the Republican nomination is concerned, barring any catastrophe, Ford has the nomination if he wants it and really goes after it. Ronald Reagan really cannot fight an incumbent President, if the President uses the power and influence available to him for renomination.

At this reading it is possible for the President to be elected. The country has not reached the point where it is anti-Ford nor in a mood to reject his Administration as a failure nor to vent its frustration out of the Vietnam collapse, inflation and the recession on the Ford Administration. It could, however, develop into this unless a positive program is undertaken to prevent it. Should this happen, not only would election be impossible, nomination could be.

The President has the where-with-all to influence these potentialities in a major way. It will take concerted planned and coordinated effort. Nomination and election can be achieved by positive effort -- always with the caveat that further disastrous economic decline or foreign calamity could negate them.

II. Basic Program for Action

There are three principal areas for immediate and continuous action:

1. Convincing the public the President will seek election.



2. The establishment of policies and programs and determination which will establish the President as a leader.
3. Development of a campaign organization and strategy.

These points interrelate but they merit individual consideration.

A. Convincing the public Ford will be the candidate.

There is still a widespread view that Ford will not seek the office but that he is acting as a possible candidate only to keep what power he has. Any declaration of non-candidacy would make him the lamest of lame ducks. The very fact that this week it was necessary for the President to restate his interest in candidacy emphasizes this point. Influential people are yet to be convinced.

Among the steps that must be taken to solidify opinion on Ford's commitment to candidacy should be:

1. Avoidance of any Hamlet-like remarks or postures on his candidacy. He must say "I have every intention of becoming the Republican nominee, and will announce my actual candidacy at the appropriate time" or something to this effect.
2. Dispell the notion that Mrs. Ford's physical condition is a factor in any decision -- that the decision is made and Mrs. Ford is for it no matter what. An affirmative statement from Mrs. Ford would be essential.
3. Ford's personal involvement with the Republican Party in a more meaningful way and with the Republican National Committee specifically. Ford should meet with Republican Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, Republican Governors, Mayors, and other leaders on Republican strategy -- Republican Party matters. This could and should be done before any declaration of his own candidacy. This should be progressed in a planned approach and not "shot from the hip."



4. An early declaration of candidacy.
5. Neutralizing the Reagan threat.

B. The Ford Image


The President is considered a "decent human being"; an honest, straightforward person; a well-meaning, well-intentioned man who wants to do the right thing. But the public view of the Ford Administration is not yet one of positive strength. The image has too much of a defensive aspect and does not reflect the President's own deep concerns and purposes. This stereotype must be dissipated and a true Ford leadership image established.

Events are going to produce a whole series of new Ford initiatives through which the President's own personal strength, courage, candor, and common sense intelligence can be made to come through. The following steps are indicated:

1. The President must continue to demonstrate that he is developing the policies and making the decisions in both the foreign and the domestic areas. In this way, he will restore public confidence in the ability of government to deal effectively with the problems confronting our nation at home and abroad.

The time is ripe for it, if not overripe politically. Congressional actions of the last six months have undermined the Administration's foreign policy and thereby contributed to the collapse of Vietnam and Cambodia, the failure of the mediation effort between Israel and Egypt, the Greco-Turk imbroglio, and the likelihood of Portugal's going Communist. All of these events present an opportunity for a new Ford Administration foreign policy. To date, performance leaves Ford no credit for any past achievements (they were all under Nixon), but only present and future responsibilities.

There is a need not just for a reappraisal of policy toward Israel-Arab relations but for a clear reaffirmation of the U.S. determination to preserve its role as a stabilizing factor in world affairs, under the strong leadership of President Ford. The American people do not want other nations to feel that they are withdrawing from the world or abandoning their friends. It is time for new initiatives toward peace and for U.S. security. It is time that policies are known as Ford policies, not Nixon policies.



2. In the domestic field the President must also be the leader and the Administration must speak with a single voice on major policy. It does no good to have Secretary Simon take one position, Greenspan another, Zarb still another, etc. The President should not look like an umpire among his advisors, the policies should be his: Umpires are not leaders.

Publicly advertised meetings on the slopes of Aspen or the cabins of Camp David to arrive at a policy are not conducive to the public believing in Presidential continuous involvement and leadership assertion. The President must convey a continuum of concern and total involvement and not a periodic manifestation thereof.

3. The President must become more partisan in the best sense of the word. He should stress his leadership of the Republican Party and take on "the Democratic Congress" for its failings.
4. The President must identify more with the people and their problems. His own middle class background, his coming from the State of Michigan where unemployment from the auto industry is so substantial, his own modest income and property give him a base from which to communicate that he has not made of adequate use.
5. The President needs to inspire confidence -- show that he knows what the problems are, that he can mobilize to meet them and has the hard driving commitment and capacity to see that they are tackled. The Ford Administration has been more talk oriented in the public mind than action oriented, more attuned toward the legislator than toward the decider, the executive. Ford needs to establish himself by overt actions as The Executive. He should use his executive powers in decisive ways.
6. The President should speak for the vast majority of Americans, articulate American values and aspirations. He should be the spokesman for our



free enterprise system, our free labor movement, our voluntary society, our concern for the individual, our spiritual heritage as a nation. But such talk must be put in the context of the dangers, difficulties and vicissitudes that confront us.

His speeches should be developed out of an agreed upon concept of his image, his strategy, and his programs. They should be shorter, punchier in their thrusts and more meaty in their content. They should go tandem with executive action so far as possible and not be mere talks or admonitions. His speeches have not been thematic. They are (like the recent Yale Law School one on crime) isolated from other speeches and remote from any executive action.

7. The President must use the power and influence at his disposal to discredit his opposition, to out-flank potential rivals for his job and strengthen his own position. He can and should use patronage more effectively. He should arrange a means by which critics can be answered (not necessarily by himself) and the folly or danger of opposing programs can be highlighted.

When the occasion indicates he should "get rough" and keep in mind Leo Durocher's phrase "Nice guys finish last". The people admire a fighter -- that is why Truman was elected over a "sure-shot" Tom Dewey.

C. Substantive Issues and Strategy

1. The 1976 Campaign must combine: (1) the Presidential image; (2) the issues to be presented in 1975 and 1976 to the Congress and the people; and (3) the campaign issues themselves. It is not possible to separate the President's performance in office from his efforts as a potential and actual candidate. Accordingly, there must be a unified, singular effort to establish the appropriate image and performance of the President now and through November, 1976 and project his likely performance from 1977 through 1980.



2. There needs, accordingly, to be delineated now the issues and a straightforward, understandable statement of them. The facts are that the public does not know what Ford stands for. The Administration's energy program is a melange; the budget issues are unclear; the economic policy is confused; and foreign policy is in disarray.

The President needs to establish a simple statement of objectives and how to achieve them. A preliminary suggested approach is as follows:

- a. The Theme for the Administration and for the Campaign of 1976 could be:

"Rediscover America"

This means return to fundamentals, the well-spring of the Spirit of America. It means build for the future on our basic fundamental precepts -- free men agreeing upon a mutual course of practical action. It means building a society of free, self-reliant citizenry who can achieve material well-being and spiritual and individual political freedom -- a society for individual opportunity based upon basic personal and family security.

- b. An immediate thrust should be:
an all out effort which combats the recession and unemployment by launching a comprehensive energy production and conservation program to make the U.S. virtually self sufficient in energy by 1985-1990.

This several fold effort should embrace:

- (1) financing and constructing fossil fuel and nuclear power plants;
- (2) financing and developing mines, pipelines, railroad reconstruction, fabricating pipe, generators, rail equipment and the like;
- (3) conversion of plants from automotive or other uses not in demand to energy production or to energy conservation and environmental safeguarding efforts consistent with increased energy.



- (4) expediting continental shelf, off-shore exploration and development of oil resources; opening U.S. oil preserves to exploitation; freeing the way to controlled strip-mining of coal; expediting power plant, transmission line and transportation facilities approvals and construction;
- (5) training and channeling manpower into these areas;
- (6) eliminating procedural delays by self-seeking local groups and environmentalist non-growth advocates, including elimination of court restraints by non-interested parties and reconstruction of judicial review in the national interest;
- (7) establishing a Federal Energy Resource and Development Corporation, FERD, to help finance the whole program through attracting private monies with governmental sponsorship and back-up;
- (8) freeing up oil, gas and electric sources from overweening bureaucratic controls so as to encourage investment and development.

Note: To accomplish this effort the President must tell it like it is. The people must be told the facts -- unvarnished -- about: the energy situation and future costs of energy; the impossible condition of depending on foreign sources of energy that confront the U.S.A.; the critical outlook for jobs and employment unless we tackle the energy problem now and all-out. It is a case of the five "E's"

Energy
Economy
Employment
Ecology
Efficiency

It must be made clear we cannot solve any one of the five "E's" without taking on all of them.



To survive in this world we need:

- More energy for production and to maintain employment and to provide better living for all our people
 - More strength in our economy for jobs and income. Control of inflation means more capital investment in productive facilities
 - More employment to combat the recession. The private sector of the economy can best provide productive employment at respectable wages. The increase in "public jobs" is nothing but a "dole" and must, at best, be a stop-gap
 - To improve our environment, our ecology, takes energy (not the reverse) to eliminate dangerous pollutions and enhance living. Energy production is not only compatible with environmental safeguards, it is essential
 - Efficiency means we must be more productive. Wages should not be a "dole" but should pay for productive effort. Labor productivity, capital productivity, managerial productivity and governmental productivity are all absolutely essential for natural growth and, indeed, survival as a viable democratic society.
- c. For a strong America we need a strong people physically, spiritually and with an esprit de corps as a nation. Fundamental is to remove the fear of disease and the consequences of ill health. This means a program of National Health Insurance and adequate manpower and other resources for medical care.



The President should consider this, like energy, as an overriding must -- a program that must be progressed even if other social programs must be cut back. A healthy people is a self-reliant people and one able to cope with problems. This means more medical personnel (i.e. women M.D.'s, paramedics, etc.) and standards for basic health protection for the middle class American and not just the senior citizen, the reliefers and the rich.

- d. A law-abiding and a safe America where person and property is secure. This means a revision of law, of enforcement activities, of courts and prosecutors, and of procedures designed to protect individuals and properties against crime and to deal expeditiously with criminal offenders. Unsafe cities, insecure suburbs and exposed rural areas do not represent a sound base for a productive society of free individuals.
- e. A vital America is one that can move, whose people and whose goods can move expeditiously. All our transport is in serious trouble:
 - (1) the private automobile and the industry that fabricates it;
 - (2) the railroads are bankrupt or on their way to it;
 - (3) the airlines are in serious financial difficulties;
 - (4) the merchant marine is in dire straits;
 - (5) urban and metropolitan transit is in serious difficulties as is public transit in rural areas.
- f. A comprehensive transportation policy is long overdue. It must be formulated and progressed.

The welfare system is a drain on the Treasury and for too many, a disincentive to productive living. A new policy (perhaps negative income tax - incomes policy or an "everybody does something for his money" system) is required.




- g. A strong America is a solvent America -- a nation that meets its expenditures with income -- that keeps inflation in bounds -- that doesn't rob the pensioner and the senior citizen of his earned purchasing power by inflation, the cruelest of taxes.

This means, again, telling it like it is. "You don't get something for nothing". Continued, unbridled spending is the road to erosion of pension and social security benefits, the evaporation of savings. Measures to keep down the cost of living cannot be negative, they must involve improved productivity and increased supply of goods and services.

- h. A strong America at home is a strong America abroad. Our foreign policy cannot be separated from our domestic policies and our domestic situation. America has been a "beacon light" to people everywhere, not because of any foreign policy but because of its domestic accomplishments and its willingness to share them.
- i. Foreign policy should be built upon American enlightened self-interest and not trying to make the world over into an American image.

American foreign policy should seek to secure U.S. access to oil supplies and essential raw materials during the time the energy program within the nation is in its crucial stage of development. This means that any solution of the Middle East problem must recognize U.S. needs for petroleum imports, that Latin American policy recognize the need for petroleum from Venezuela and bauxite from Jamaica. It means using our food surplus, our technical, scientific and managerial know-how in return for oil, bauxite, and other scarce raw materials.

Detente should be developed for mutual economic advantage with clearly evident American economic benefit: - raw materials, technological information, income and employment. It appears too much a Soviet Union advantage at this point. The U.S. must recognize and understand the benefits of detente to the U.S.




- j. A realistic program for rebuilding U.S. military strength should be undertaken. The Soviet strength must be publicly faced and acknowledged and the American people made aware of the perils American defense inferiority can mean to individual Americans. The idea that Defense spending is wasteful or that Defense expenditures are "at the expense of" social programs must be directly challenged and dissipated.

D. Organization for the campaign

Organization for the 1976 campaign should start now. This involves moving forward simultaneously in several areas:

1. Organization for campaign strategy and strategic execution thereof - A Strategy Group
 - a. A substantive program of issues built around a basic theme ("Rediscover America") should be developed now. The President should vigorously expose these now while the Congress is in session and right through 1975 and 1976. He should take the issues to the people now and in the 1976 campaign.
 - b. For this purpose a small group of five or so persons should be designed with one of their number given the executive responsibility for carry out and follow-up. This top level group would be outside the White House, but report to and be available to the President and the campaign chairman. This should be a "brain trust" and not have a formal or official place in the Republican campaign structure as such. This group would be expected to devise strategy, advise on its implementation and monitor it.
 - c. This strategy group should have access to and be able to authorize opinion polling and take other soundings on the issues and strategy. They should be concerned both with the positive program of the President and with the analysis and attached strategies for the opposition. It is crucial that this group be small, top level and directly related to the President and the Campaign Chairman.



2. Strengthening the Republican Party for the Campaign

- a. The President, the Vice-President and key Cabinet officials must help the party beginning now to organize and raise funds. This means appearance at State Republican functions if the party is going to be viable in 1976.

Ronald Reagan's strength today is his willingness to travel the hustings for party fund raising efforts.

- b. A campaign Chairman for Ford should be lined up as soon as possible. Someone like Rogers Morton would be an excellent choice -- experienced, knowledgeable, respected by most of the party, and devoted to the President.
- c. A Republican Party campaign group, separate and apart from the Republican National Committee, should be organized as soon as practicable -- using the resources of the Committee so far as practicable to avoid cost and duplication in areas such as research, primary requirements, etc.
- d. Republican Senate and House leadership and members, Republican Governors and other key Republican State and local leaders should be enlisted for active roles on behalf of the President.
- e. Immediate attention should be given to:
 - (1) The State Primaries
 - (a) A selection should be made of which state primaries to enter, if there is an option;
 - (b) Financing -- contributors under the new law should be lined up and potential delegates contracted and committed, state by state.
 - (c) Intelligence on the States where primaries are to be held should be gathered, analyzed and molded into the primary campaign efforts.



- (d) Getting out a vote and establishing a large vote for Ford is important in the primaries.
3. Organizing a "People for Ford" citizen group, outside of the Republican Party itself, should start as soon as possible.

- (a) Such a group could possibly command some labor support, particularly if the Democrats moved toward the liberal left.
- (b) There are so few Republicans (18%) in the electorate that a broad gauge effort to elect Independents and Democrats is essential.
- (c) Leadership for such a group is crucial. It should be selected with care and in its top councils there should be represented:

Business and Industry
Labor
Women
Blacks
Hispanics and other minorities
Democrats for Ford
Professional groups
Ethnic groups

4. Coordination of Campaign efforts

- (a) The whole effort-strategy, Republican Party and People for Ford should be coordinated under the campaign chairman. He should have available to him and to the President-Candidate the Strategy Group of five who must be relied upon to advise, monitor and advance the campaign strategy.
- (b) The Campaign direction and coordination should be outside the White House for sound organizational reasons and in the light of the "Watergate" and "CREEP" history. However, it must be recognized that the President's efforts as President on the substantive issues facing the nation are the most important aspect of the campaign and his performance as President will be the principal determination of his image. Accordingly, the campaign chairman and the strategy group must have access and influence with the President as President and not merely in his role as candidate.

