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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 2, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT


FROM: JAMES E. CONNOR

Attached is a set of materials prepared for the transition to your second Administration.

The first paper, entitled "Planning the Transition" identifies items you may wish to consider in order to ensure maximum flexibility in shaping the policies, structure and people of your new Administration. It is basically a paper designed to prevent events from getting out of control during the transition period. A second paper entitled "Presidential Objectives" sketches out a series of objectives around which you might wish to organize your second Administration. The themes of peace, prosperity and trust are identified as the key elements and specific policy and programmatic suggestions are identified under each of these three themes. If you choose to pursue these objectives, some brief organizing principles are identified. The third paper entitled "Modern Mid-term Transitions: The Implications for President Ford" was prepared by the Institute of Politics at the Kennedy School of Government under the direction of Jonathan Moore. That paper examines in some detail mid-term transitions from Eisenhower to Nixon. It concludes that most mid-term transitions have not been successful because the re-elected President lost his chance for shaping events in the direction he wished. The first 11 pages of the study, which summarize previous transitions, may be of interest to you.

*Never submitted to the President -
for obvious reasons!*

R. Cheney 1/20/77



ORIGINAL RETIRED TO
SPECIAL DOCUMENTS FILE

A list of key personnel decisions is attached as the fourth item. It includes about 100 names of individuals in the Cabinet and the White House and Executive Offices. Its format is designed to let you consider whether each individual should be replaced, retained, or appointed to a new position.

Attachments (4)

PLANNING THE TRANSITION

The President is an excellent position to determine the kind of transition he wants between his first and second administration. His choices will directly affect the course of his new administration. But the President's freedom to choose is not absolute. Unless he moves quickly to prevent it, a combination of institutional momentum and human nature will sharply constrain his freedom. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the situation likely to occur immediately after the election and to suggest ways in which the President can protect the freedom to choose his course. Thus this paper essentially concentrates on preventing undesirable things from happening. Subsequent papers will focus on the positive steps which the President wishes to accomplish.

I. BACKGROUND:

In recent years there have been three types of transitions:

- the man elected previously is re-elected (Eisenhower 1956; Nixon 1972)
- the man elected previously as Vice President is elected President for the first time (Truman 1948; Johnson 1964)
- a new President from the Party out of power is elected for the first time (Eisenhower 1952; Kennedy 1960; Nixon 1968).

The most dramatic and far-reaching transitions obviously should take place when Parties change and, in theory at least, the least dramatic should take place when a President is re-elected. The 1972 Nixon transition, however, indicates that even in those circumstances which should most stress continuity, a President can use the transition between his two

administrations to effect far-reaching changes. But Nixon may well have gone too far in crossing up expectations. The shock of the resignation requests and the bitterness and uncertainty felt by those whose resignations had not been accepted may well have contributed to the absence of bureaucratic support for Nixon as Watergate unravelled. A President is therefore to some extent constrained by expectations about the type of transition which " should " occur. These expectations in turn are engendered by the President's prior status as an incumbent or as one elected for the first time in his own right. The most significant aspects of these observations for President Ford is that there is no historical standard against which to measure him. He acceded to the Vice Presidency and the Presidency under unique circumstances. He should therefore be able to establish the standard of continuity or change by which he wishes to be measured. It must be recognized, however, that unless he acts quickly to establish the standard, it will be established for him by others and may act to constrain his freedom of movement. If the President is to maintain his flexibility, steps must be taken both before and immediately after the election to convey his sense of what is appropriate for the transition.

II. CONTINUITY OR CHANGE

A President signals his desire to stress continuity or change by the way he deals with three areas:

- people
- policies
- programs

The most visible and the most easily accomplished of these areas is people. If the President wishes to stress continuity in his second administration, then the surest method is to make only a small number of personnel changes and to spread them over a reasonable period of time (2-3 months). On the other hand, if he wishes to convey a marked sense of change, the number of changes must be increased and the time span must be compressed (2-3 weeks). This memorandum is based on the assumption that the President will wish to stress change during the transition.

III. TIMING

After a very brief post-election respite, the President can expect speculation about his new appointments to start building rapidly. Individuals within the present administration will campaign to advance themselves or at least to hold onto the current positions. It is extremely important that all major decisions on personnel be made before the period of speculation starts. Those who are to be replaced should be identified, notified and their prospective resignations announced no later than November 15th. They should be given a decent interval in which to find employment outside the Federal Government, but in no case should they be permitted to remain beyond the Inauguration. Those in the administration who are to be promoted to significant new positions should also be identified and notified by November 15th. The early date is necessary in

order to enable them to involve themselves in budgetary and policy decisions which will be forthcoming in the Budget and State of the Union Messages.

New appointees, i. e., those who were not previously in the administration should be identified no later than December 15th. They should all be announced by January 15th.

IV. THE SCOPE OF CHANGE

Four distinct personnel categories must be considered in planning for the transition. In order of importance these are:

Category I

-- Senior White House staff - Senior Executive Office staff - Cabinet
(25-30 positions) (TAB A)

Category II

--Second level White House staff - Executive Office Deputies and Associates - Agency heads (35-40 positions) (TAB B)

Category III

--Undersecretaries - Agency deputies - key Assistant Secretaries
(35-40 positions) (TAB C)

Category IV

--Other White House and Executive Office staff - other assistant secretaries and assistant administrators - such regulatory positions as come open.

Work should proceed in identifying and selecting individuals in all four categories simultaneously. The difference between categories is not one of urgency, but rather of sensitivity of position. For that reason separate evaluation and selection teams should be established for the first three categories. A reconstituted Presidential Personnel Office can handle the fourth category.

The teams should be small (4-5 persons); each team should have one relatively senior White House staffer who will devote a great deal of his time during the period from mid-October to mid-November to preparing materials for the team. The existence of the teams should be kept highly confidential.

V. PROCEDURES

Dossiers must be prepared on each of the individuals in the first three categories. The dossier should be the responsibility of the White House staffer assigned to the review team. It would include information on the individual's previous performance in terms of:

- managerial and substantive competence
- policy preferences
- ability to deal with the public and interest groups
- political loyalty
- support during the campaign

Upon completion of the dossiers, the teams should review the record and recommend whether individuals should be:

- retained
- promoted
- released
- found another less sensitive position

As a cautionary note, it should be pointed out that there will be a great temptation to use the fourth rather than the third category. This should be avoided except in the most exceptional circumstances. The individuals in the first three categories are by definition in extremely sensitive positions. They have become accustomed to status, access to power, and the courting of the press. Their behavior in positions which are less important may not be suitable and may result in a great deal of discontent and trouble down the road.

VI. RECONSTITUTING THE PERSONNEL OFFICE

As presently constituted the Personnel Office is not up to the task of reviewing and evaluating the several hundred Presidential appointees in Category IV. In order to do that as well as to carry out its mission of identifying and recruiting individuals from outside the government,

the office must be completely overhauled.

The nature of the change depends on what functions the President wishes the PPO to play during his entire four year term. One approach would be for the PPO to continue its relatively restricted role of identification and recruitment. A second approach would be for the office to maintain an ongoing review and evaluation function of Presidential appointees throughout the four years. This function has not been performed at all during the past two years. Yet it can be argued that it is extremely important that it be carried out during the next four. The reason is that the President will be a constitutional lame duck during the last two years of his administration. His ability to control the bureaucracy will depend almost entirely on his ability to control his political appointees. If these appointees are not aware from the beginning that their performance is being evaluated and that disloyalty, self serving deal cutting, or straight incompetence will not be tolerated, they will not be controllable during the last two years, and may not be controllable during the first two. For that reason, it is strongly recommended that in reconstituting the PPO a review and evaluation function be added to it. Since this function will also be vital during the transition period, a decision will have to be made on whether the PPO will be reconstituted once or twice. In the

latter case an interim step would be to establish a transition task force to take over the PPO. It would be headed and staffed by individuals, most of whom would not expect to stay in their jobs beyond January 15th. After that date a permanent operation incorporating either the recruitment function alone or both recruitment and evaluation could be established. An alternative would be to set up the permanent PPO immediately after the election.

The director and staff would expect to stay in their jobs for an extended period of time and their first task would be to complete the review and evaluation of category four appointees. Should the President decide to pursue the latter alternative, a decision is necessary almost immediately in order to identify the individual who would head the PPO.

VII. POLICY FORMULATION

Although the scope and pace of personnel changes will have a great affect on perceptions of the transition, the President will also shape opinion by the way in which he approaches the process of policy formulation. If he leaves the current mechanisms untouched, he will enhance the belief that not much will change. Conversely, if he moves quickly to restructure the policy process, he will clearly signal that he intends to strike out in his own direction. This is particularly important in this President's situation because his policy mechanisms are an amalgam of bodies he inherited from previous administrations (NSC, OMB, Domestic Council); groups he formally established himself (EPB, ERC); and groups and individuals whose roles have evolved in an ad hoc fashion during the campaign in order to

prevent policy blunders or promote politically useful ideas in a short time frame. This latter approach, however successful it has been recently, will not be suitable as a transition device since it will not convey an externally visible sense of Presidential direction and inclination to set his own mark on the new administration. For this reason it will be necessary to establish a special mechanism to assert control over policy during the period from the election to the inauguration. This mechanism must act as a screen over budgetary policy matters, State of the Union proposals, other departmental policy proposals and policy content of the Inauguration address. It should be particularly sensitive to sorting out the hardy policy perennials which greet any new President, and it should be capable of fashioning a coherent set of proposals which will set the national agenda for the next four years. In order to achieve these goals, the mechanism must have several characteristics. It should be:

- small - in order to meet regularly without excessive schedule juggling.
- extremely high level - in order to assure that it is respected and has access to and the confidence of the President.
- composed of individuals who understand policy from a Presidential perspective and who are not out to enhance institutional goals
- composed of individuals who will be around beyond the transition in significant positions in order to insure continuity beyond January 20th.

Membership in the policy review group cannot be determined until the key personnel decisions in Category I are made. Nevertheless, once those decisions are made, the group should be announced and in place no later

than November 15th.

The existence of a policy review group will forestall some but not all of the institutional maneuvering for advantage after the election. It will not, however, ensure that the formal policy apparatus will be up to the challenges of the next four years. During the transition, the President has an opportunity to improve the policy apparatus while at the same time visibly conveying a sense of change. There are two ways to do this:

-- establish a temporary, bipartisan, highly visible study group to examine the executive policy apparatus and to suggest changes to the President

-- establish an internal lower profile group to do the same thing

Either group would focus on the roles of:

OMB

NSC


Domestic Council

CIEP

EPB

ERC

Generally, those of your advisers who have discussed this issue would prefer the internal study group.



PROGRAM

During the transition a great deal of attention will be focused on events at the higher levels. Political executives will be moving in and out of jobs. While this occurs, the bureaucracy as usual will be moving to solidify its position. Regulations which were held up pending the election will be issued in vast numbers. Slots will be filled at a furious rate. As a result, it is almost certain that unless steps are taken early in the transition, the flexibility of the President and his Cabinet will be sharply reduced. There are two steps, however, which can be taken to prevent the worst excesses. These are:

- name transition officers in each department
- impose a strict hiring freeze on positions above the GS-13 level

In general the transition officer would be the most senior policy official in a department who had been recommended for retention in that department by the personnel review teams. In some cases, this would be the Cabinet Officer himself, and in other cases it might go down as far as a senior Assistant Secretary. The transition officer would review and sign off on:

- all proposed regulations scheduled for issuance during the period from the election to the inauguration
- all managerial, budgetary and organizational decisions
- all promotions above grade GS-15

In addition, he would serve as the main departmental contact with the White House and the Executive Offices.

The freeze on employment is designed obviously to give new policy officials the greatest possible flexibility in organizing and staffing their offices. OMB would be charged with administering the freeze and would make exceptions when necessary.

IX. SYMBOLS

One of the most important functions of the transition is symbolic. It is the effort to heal the divisions caused by the election and to assure the Nation that the President represents all of the people, not just the winning electoral coalition. It is relatively easy to predict at least some of the interests which may feel heavily defeated by the President's success in the elections. Those would be:

Blacks
Labor
The "Cotton" South
Some North Eastern Urban Areas

The President can, without modifying policy or undermining the groups which elected him, make certain kinds of symbolic gestures towards these groups. Such gestures would include: post election visits, meetings, conferences, and some appointments to positions of relatively high visibility, if not major policy significance. This latter step, however, should be handled very carefully since it can produce individuals who in a very short

order become dissatisfied with their lot. It would be wise now to start to identify potential slots and individuals for this symbolic phase. The actual number of appointments or stages is less important than the fact that they are well planned and well executed. In this area a little can go a very long way. All actions in the symbolic area ought to be ready for release almost immediately after the election.

TAB A

Category I

White House:

Buchen
Hartmann
Marsh
Cheney
Baroody
Cannon
Friedersdorf
Scowcroft
Seidman
Nessen

Executive
Office:

Lynn
Greenspan
Bush
Dent
CEQ Chairman
Houser (OTP)
CIEP Executive Director
Steuer (OSTP)

Cabinet:

Kissinger
Simon
Rumsfeld
Levi
Kleppe
Agriculture
Richardson
Usery
Mathews
Hills
Coleman
Scranton

TAB B

Category II

White House:

Jones
Connor
Smith
Carlson
Cavanaugh
Fletcher
Gorog
Hyland
Kendall
Leppert
Schmults
Bennett
Orben
Gergen
Duval
Quern

Agency Heads:

Balzano
Martinez
Seamans
Train
Zarb
Eckerd
Fletcher
Roudebush
Ikle
Keogh
Parker

OMB:

O'Neill
Oaxaca
Ogilvie
McGurk
Kearny
Mitchell

CEA:

MacAvoy
Malkiel

STR:

Yeutter
Walker

CEQ:

Busterud
Willard

OSTP:

Associate Directors

TAB C

Category III

Under Secretaries :	Knebel (Agriculture) Vetter (Commerce) Clements (DOD) Ellsworth (DOD) Lynch (HEW) Rhineland (HUD) Frizzell (Interior) Tyler (Justice) Moskow (Labor) Robinson (State) Rogers (State) U/Secy. Pol. (State) Barnum (Transportation) Dixon (Treasury) Yeo (Treasury) Thomas (Treasury)	Key Assistant Secretaries:	Assistant Secretary Admin. & Mgt. (HEW) Assistant Sec. Comptroller (HEW) Asst. Secy. Fish & Wild Life & Parks (Interior) Asst. Secy. Energy & Minerals (Interior) Solicitor General Asst. Secy. for OSHA (Labor) Dep. U/Secy. Manage- ment (State) Counselor to Dept. (State) Director Policy Planning (State) Dep. U/Secy. (DOT) Asst. Secy. Policy (DOT) Commissioner IRS
Agency Deputies:	Ganley (Action) CSA Deputy Fri (ERDA) Quarles (EPA) Hill (FEA) Chambers (GSA) Low (NASA) Kapp (USIA) Vaughan (VA) Murphy (AID) Lehman (ACDA)		

Presidential Objectives

It is a commonplace that a President cannot do all that he wishes. When he tries, he is likely to end up doing nothing well and quite a few things badly. For this reason, it is necessary for him to choose carefully those areas to which he will devote his time and his prestige. The purpose of this paper is to suggest some areas which the President might wish to choose for the next four years.

BACKGROUND

When President Ford took office August 9, 1974, his freedom of choice was extremely limited. At home he faced the most severe constitutional crisis since the Civil War. Trust in government and the institution of the Presidency had collapsed. The economy was wracked by double-digit inflation and about to pay the price for past excesses by plunging into the sharpest decline since the 1930's. In foreign affairs the issue of Vietnam still dominated the agenda; our alliance structure was weak, our defense posture had been hurt by years of congressional cutbacks and the Middle East appeared ready to explode again. The oil embargo of the previous year had finally raised energy policy to the level of a significant national and international issue.

The change over the past two and a half years has been remarkable. It is not necessary to recount the changes here, but only to indicate that although problems remain, their magnitude is less and the direction of their solutions is now far clearer than it once was.



As a result the President has more flexibility than he has had in the past. Moreover, his election will strengthen his political position, particularly vis-a-vis the Congress. For that reason the time is especially appropriate for him to set forth his goals and objectives for the nation over the next four years.

GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

The basis of the next term must rest on the themes of peace, prosperity and trust on which the President campaigned. Each of the specific goals and objectives can be placed under one of these three categories:

Peace

...Protect and preserve the security of the United States by ensuring an adequate defense capability. This will entail maintaining and perhaps increasing the real level of defense expenditures.

...Enhance U. S. security and the prospects for world peace by strengthening the alliance structure.

...Reduce world tensions by negotiating sound agreements for control of strategic weapons and mutual conventional force reduction.

Prosperity

...Recognize the link between domestic prosperity and world prosperity.

Concentrate efforts on:

- resolving scarce world resource problems, particularly energy and food
- reconstructing a sound international financial apparatus

...Continue to reduce inflation in the United States by restraining

government expenditures

- ...Strengthen individual and national prosperity by enacting tax cuts
- ...Reply on private sector growth to expand the economy. Stimulate such growth when necessary through tax cuts rather than government expenditures.

Trust

- ...Maintain the trust people have in the President by:
 - setting realistic goals and meeting them
 - conveying the President's own personal sense of integrity and morality
 - dealing quickly and effectively with any bit of scandal
 - lessening the burden of government procedures and regulation
 - reducing further the size of the federal government and simplify its structure and operations
 - transferring responsibilities and resources to the levels of government closest to the people
 - appointing superior people to positions of government leadership
 - provide strong federal leadership through legislation example and funding in the attack on crime
 - ensure that government does not intrude on but rather assists the family and voluntary institutions in the society

In addition to these governmental steps, the President should establish as one of his major goals strengthening of the Republican Party in order to restore an effective two party system particularly at the Congressional and State levels.

ORGANIZING TO ACHIEVE GOALS

In order to achieve the goals stated above, the President must have the right kind of people and the right kind of organizational structure. This section of the paper does not propose a specific structure, but rather sets forth the principles that should be followed in developing the structure and finding the people.

People

1. On his election the President will be able to attract the best people in the country to serve the nation. He should not settle for less.

2. Finding and attracting the best people is not an easy task. It will require an intensive effort led by a person of the highest caliber. The President must identify and convince such a person to take on the personal responsibility of recruitment for top positions.

3. The best people are the ones with the most options. The President should quickly identify those in his Administration who are the best and personally ask them to stay.

4. The President, however, should not out of a sense of generosity indicate to those who are not the best that they should stay. For to do so would preclude attracting top caliber people.


Structure

1. The current White House and Executive Office structure was inherited and then modified to meet the needs of the President's first term. It does not appear well equipped to deal with his new objectives.
2. People both in and out of government expect change after a President receives an electoral mandate.
3. The current system is not equipped to deal effectively with the integration of foreign and economic policy.
4. The Domestic Council apparatus essentially concentrates on social programs and is not able to integrate economic policy considerations.
5. The role of the Cabinet has been enhanced, but is still unclear.
6. There is duplication and overlap between the roles of OMB and the Domestic Council.
7. Certain functions which are essential to the President's goals are not now under effective control, e. g. tax policy.

Modern Mid-term Transitions:
The Implications for President Ford

Presidential Transition Study Group
Institute of Politics
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Appendix: Summaries of Major Government
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PRESIDENT FORD'S SECOND TERM: THE LESSONS OF MODERN MID-TERM TRANSITIONS

Since 1945, four incumbent Presidents have been either elected in their own right or reelected: Truman in 1948, Eisenhower in 1956, Johnson in 1964, and Nixon in 1972. If President Ford is victorious on November 2nd, he will be the fifth. While current conditions differ from those in the past (even the recent past of 1972-3), President Ford's planning for the pre-Inaugural period and the start of his second term should take account of lessons which can be drawn from the experience of his predecessors.

If elected, President Ford will have a personal mandate from the nation's voters which he has not had to date. He will not have won in a landslide, and his reelection will be widely viewed as a "come-from-behind" win, a triumph of the underdog. The President will confront a Congress both houses of which are dominated by the opposition party; Ford cannot expect the House to have fewer than 270 Democrats or the Senate to have fewer than 60. The President will see his election as indicating that the people want a smaller Federal presence rather than new Federal spending; his budget and legislative program will doubtless reflect this view. And the Federal government over which the President will preside is a behemoth, which annually spends \$140 billion for income security, \$100 billion for national defense, \$60 billion for grants-in-aid to states and localities and \$40 billion for interest on the national debt. When Johnson began his second term, the entire Federal budget did not exceed \$100 billion.

The initial question is how these conditions compare with those during the four previous modern mid-term transitions. Some relevant aspects are charted below:

	<u>Truman</u>	<u>Eisenhower</u>	<u>Johnson</u>	<u>Nixon</u>
First personal national mandate	<u>Yes</u>	No	<u>Yes</u>	No
Small margin of victory	<u>Yes</u>	No	No	No
Come-from-behind underdog win	<u>Yes</u>	No	No	No
Congress run by opposition party	No	<u>Yes*</u>	No	<u>Yes</u>
Few new programs; reduce Fed presence	No	<u>Yes*</u>	No	<u>Yes</u>
Federal budget, responsibilities much as in 1976	No	No	No	<u>Yes</u>

As the table rather clearly shows, President Ford at the start of his second term will confront a combination of circumstances which make his position unique. His personal political status will parallel Harry Truman's. The political landscape, however, will be reminiscent of that facing Richard Nixon at the beginning of 1973: conservative President vs. liberal Congress in an era of large and growing government.

Thumbnail sketches of the course and consequences of the Eisenhower, Johnson, and Nixon mid-term transitions follow. The aim of this overview is to draw from them lessons of use to President Ford, in hope of thereby maximizing the probability that his second term will proceed largely as he wishes.

*The Congress elected in 1956 was controlled by the Democrats, but was expected (at first) to cooperate with the Administration. Moreover, in the early weeks of the new Administration, Eisenhower's program of Modern Republicanism included new initiatives in such areas as Civil Rights and School Aid.

The history of mid-term transitions since World War II is one of missed opportunities and squandered popular mandates. Without exception, they have been unsuccessful, if we measure success in terms of the Administration that followed; it is unlikely that either Truman, Eisenhower, Johnson, or Nixon would have rated the second half of his tenure as highly as the first half. It remains true, however, that a second term presents a President with his single best chance to "seize the moment", thereby making his mark on the Federal establishment and the nation. In President Ford's case, this will be true for at least three reasons, one applicable to all reelected Presidents and two of special relevance for him.

First, a President in the early days of his second term has the luxury of time to focus energy and attention on his personal interests and priorities. When he first moves into the Oval Office, a President spends his time learning his own job and the jobs of his principal aides; through appointments and program efforts, an Administration must be constructed from scratch. Everything, especially mundane details and routine business, is important and demands attention today (if not sooner). At the start of his second term, the President presumably has a feel both for his own responsibilities and for the people who have governed with him. He can afford to ignore issues and agencies that he believes are in competent hands, and to concentrate on those aspects of the Federal estate that he particularly wants to advance or alter.

Second, Gerald Ford will share with Harry Truman the benefits of being an upset victor. Nothing so changes the image of a political

figure as winning a race he was supposed to lose. President Ford will emerge from reelection with a reservoir of press respect and public good will the likes of which he has not seen since August, 1974, and probably never will see again. Gone will be any picture in the public mind of a President who got his job by accident, perhaps without the skills or acumen to make it on his own. In its place will be a picture of a master politician. The new image may some day come to haunt the President--as it did Harry Truman when, after the Korean War began, the nation decided that it wanted a statesman rather than a politico--but for the moment, the President's election is a crown jewel, and the stature it gives him a crowbar.

Third, election will give President Ford his first personal mandate from the national electorate and thus end his status as a non-elected "caretaker" President. In this, he will follow Truman and Johnson, but the change in Ford's case will have special importance because he alone was not even an elected Vice President. Moreover, Ford's victory will be a narrow one, unlike that of any midterm predecessor except Truman. One of the tasks of his transition period will thus be "mandate widening". By his Inauguration, Gerald Ford should have become President of all the people and not merely the 48-52% of the electorate that supported him on November 2nd. The halo of victory and the American propensity to rally around a winner will help in this process, but not enough to complete it unaided. President Ford will also need a successful post-election campaign to unify the people behind him, but the potential is there for winning substantial public acceptance of his vision of the Federal government.

Lessons of the Past

Beyond personal statements and conduct, Presidents mold the government by their appointments, programs (including budgets) and reorganizations of the executive branch. The diversity of earlier mid-term transition experiences suggests that any conclusion broad enough to accurately describe all of them will be obvious or trivial. But though past Presidents used the tools of their office with varying enthusiasm and effect, a few warnings and recommendations can be confidently made.

First, "if 'twere done 'twere well 'twere done quickly." Harry Truman learned this the hard way. After snatching victory from the jaws of defeat, he took a few aides to Key West for a month of working vacation. It was a gladsome moment, and all reveled in it. But in that month, interest group promisees of the Fair Deal went on their own to the new Congressional leadership (the Democrats had recaptured both Houses in the 1948 elections) and agreed on the priorities of the coming session--when Civil Rights would receive attention, when the repeal of Taft-Hartley would reach the floor, etc. By mid-December, and without the President's participation, the strategy and priorities of the new Congress were set. Truman returned to the Capitol only to find most of his options foreclosed.

The lesson of the story is that whatever chance there is for fundamental reshaping vanishes quickly. The impact of the President's re-election and his ability to use it as a lever peaks very quickly; time spent relaxing immediately after the election is time dangerously spent.

This is particularly true when the President's program will face an uphill battle because Congress is controlled by the opposition. Congressional hostility starts small and grows over time as one pet project after another is vetoed or dashed. It will doubtless be far easier to muster a majority in January than in September. President Ford should take a vacation this winter--but in late December, not early November.

Alone among modern Presidents, Johnson began planning for his second term even before the election; he had task forces at work through 1964, shaping the programs which would be offered as part of the Great Society. Because President Ford favors a more modest role for the Federal government, he can be expected to offer few sweeping, costly new proposals. Like Eisenhower, in 1956, many of his legislative submissions will have been seen before, and it is therefore not important to follow Johnson's example. It is important, however, that President Ford's program (for example, his proposed tax cut) be ready early in 1977 so that it can be sold to Congress while the memory and impact of his victory are still fresh.

The second warning drawn from examination of past mid-term transitions complements the first; in appointments, as in program matters, inaction squanders opportunities. In the euphoria of victory, there is a tendency to be magnanimous and refuse all offers of resignation. Eisenhower in 1956 and Johnson in 1964 both succumbed, deciding to go with the same team in the same slots that brought them victory. In 1976, the President's tendency to follow in their footsteps will be given added impetus by memories of November 8, 1972; on the day after

his magnificent victory, President Nixon called together his Cabinet and senior aides, congratulated and thanked them and then, through H.R. Haldeman, demanded immediate formal resignations from all. The temptation to draw a striking contrast with 1972 will be strong; it should be resisted.

Of modern second term Presidents, only Nixon saw fully the opportunities inherent in the mid-term transition, and the dangers of post-election complacency. His impulse should be respected, despite distaste for the counterproductive means by which he attempted to achieve his goals. It is traditional for senior members of an Administration to resign upon reelection of the President so that he may have a free hand in shaping his second term team. If President Ford says nothing, the resignations will come--one of the ironies of 1972 is that they would have come if President Nixon had said nothing. The tradition of resignation is a powerful tool in the hands of a President. It is part of the "fresh start" of the new term, and a way to signal the direction which the Administration will (and will not) take.

It behooves the President to give real and serious thought to the direction which he wants his Administration to take, and to shape his Cabinet accordingly. In all likelihood, this will require the acceptance of some of the resignations tendered. Even if the President values all of his senior officers (only two of whom, after all, are not his appointees), he may wish to reassign some of them and bring fresh blood into certain departments. The opportunity to match people whose capabilities are known to jobs whose duties are established, and in the process to shape the Cabinet as a body, is denied both new Presidents and interim

Chief Executives finishing the term of others and filling vacancies one by one with the best people available at the moment. Johnson in 1964 and Eisenhower in 1956 missed the chance to build the kind of Cabinet they wanted in light of what they had learned in office without having to fire anyone. President Ford should not waste his chance to do the same simply to avoid looking like his predecessor..

Second term Presidents have looked in different directions when filling vacancies within their Administrations, but all have searched more narrowly than elected Presidents at the start of their first term. Eisenhower tended to choose men who had previously held elective office: ex-Congressmen or Governors. Johnson promoted from within the government, promoting Assistant Secretaries to Under Secretary posts, looking to the career Foreign Service for new Ambassadors, etc. Nixon consciously filled the upper levels of the bureaucracy with White House staff members, protégés of Messrs. Haldeman and Ehrlichman, many of whom began their service as advance men in the 1968 campaign. It is the rare President beginning his second term, however, who has gone outside of the government to fill many high level positions. Of Nixon's appointments at the start of his second term, only three were not either already in the Federal government or about to leave it because of a defeat at the polls: Brinegar, Brennan, and Dent. Johnson's only major early appointment from the private sector was Commerce Secretary Connor (who had played an important role in the 1964 campaign). Because fewer posts are vacant at the start of a second term than when an Administration first takes office, more care can be taken in filling each. It may be worthwhile for President Ford to make a conscious

effort to break with the patterns of the past and mount a scaled-down version of the "talent hunt" of Kennedy in 1960 or Nixon in 1968 to find qualified individuals outside of the government to take some Administration posts.

The third lesson of previous mid-term transitions is that starting the second term off on the right foot demands of the President a coherent set of long range goals and a strategy for putting across his program.

President Eisenhower is the great example of one who frittered away his victory by failing to develop a vision of his Administration and the direction in which it would strive to lead the nation. Initially, he campaigned and won on a platform of "modern Republicanism". Early in 1957, however, he wavered in support of his own budget and programs; the public impression of confusion and uncertainty which this produced contributed to Congress' failure to act on most of his legislative requests. When Eisenhower did at last steady his Administration, abandoning modern Republicanism in favor of a more conservative stance on fiscal and social issues, respect for him in Congress rose and his effectiveness increased.

By contrast, both Johnson and Nixon used their mid-term transitions to develop comprehensive, consistent views of themselves as Presidents and the direction in which the nation ought to be led. Both failed--the one because of Vietnam, the other because of Watergate--but their failures are less relevant here than their efforts to think through what they wanted and the early successes which followed those efforts.

President Nixon's vision is particularly apt in this respect, because his program coincided in many respects with that likely to be advanced

by President Ford. Nixon, for example, implemented his conservative fiscal goals largely by use of the veto power. For a variety of reasons, President Ford will probably follow this precedent, particularly in view of the fact that the new Congress will be marginally more likely to sustain his vetoes than its predecessor, but no more likely to pass moderate appropriations the first time around. At the same time, Nixon's approach to Congressional relations, exemplified in his first stormy 1973 meeting with Congressional leaders, was unnecessarily harsh and interfered with Executive/legislative cooperation in those areas where it would have been to the advantage of both branches. President Ford will have an opportunity at the start of his second term to build a working relationship with a hostile Congress which is better than both Nixon's and his own before the election. Drawing on his electoral triumph and his own intimate knowledge of the Congress and its members, he can achieve a non-inflammatory basis for negotiations and consensus on a range of non-budgetary items. But it will take a great deal of effort...and it will have to be thought through in advance. Johnson's cultivation of freshmen Congressmen and the body as a whole was both successful and well-planned.

Similarly, Nixon's reorganization efforts were implemented with a heavy hand, though many of the proposals made by the Ash Commission have been found meritorious by students of the Executive branch and may appeal to President Ford. At some time between the third and fifth years of their tenure, most modern Presidents have taken an interest in the organization of the Executive Branch, usually as a consequence of mounting frustration with a structure which impedes Executive leadership in the Federal government. President Ford may wish to prepare for

some activity of his own in this area, perhaps by appointing a Commission or prominent individual to study the question and come up with recommendations.

Reorganization is difficult, and its results are not immediately visible. In the long run, however, it promises greater permanent change than other approaches. Moreover, it is an area in which early action commends itself. If there is a time for reorganization in such areas as energy and nuclear policy, the transition is it; after policy debates begin and Congress sees the shape of proposed Administration programs in these areas, it will be much more reluctant to permit organizational change. While the "honeymoon" lasts, before complex legislative proposals and combat, President Ford can attend to organizational matters with less friction than will be possible during the Spring and Summer. Finally, if President Ford can persuade the Congress to renew (and even expand) the President's Reorganization Act authority, organizational change will become one area in which the President has significant independent influence and flexibility. In any case, we have appended a summary of Reorganization studies of the past two decades.

The final lesson of previous mid-term transitions is one of less relevance to President Ford. Presidents in the past have tended to interpret large victories (such as those of 1956, 1964, and 1972) as endorsements of their person and vision in every respect, when in fact such triumphs more usually result from the electorate's negative reaction to the losing candidate. Hubris is endemic to second term Presidents who have won election comfortably. It is invariably fatal to their hopes and dreams.

THE EISENHOWER MID-TERM TRANSITION: 1956-57

Themes

Eisenhower won reelection by a landslide. His personal platform was "Modern Republicanism", under which the Federal government was to take the lead on seeing that economic productivity was distributed so that no one suffered hardship while, at the same time, private enterprise continued. Modern Republicanism was the constructive Republican reaction to the New Deal--progressive programs, but with fiscal responsibility and sound money. It was reflected in the new budget, of which more below.

Eisenhower's was largely a non-transition. As detailed below, there were few major personnel shifts and few great programmatic changes. The President had failed to carry Congress with him, but his own personal popularity and the narrowness of Democratic majorities (49-47 in the Senate) combined to offer the promise of a long "honeymoon" and cordial relations with Congress.

The transition was overshadowed by events abroad--most notably the aftermath of the abortive Hungarian attempt to escape Soviet domination and the Suez crisis, which broke the week before the election and did not end until January.

In short, continuity--business as it had been--was the dominant theme of the Eisenhower transition, in his mind and the mind of others. Ike was the first President to be reelected in the shadow of the 22nd Amendment, limiting a President to two terms. The effects of this were the subject of much comment, but little else.

Appointments

Ike rejected all the pro-forma post-election resignations of his Cabinet and senior staff; changes were expected to come, but slowly. It was speculated that controversial Cabinet members--including Secretary of State Dulles and Agriculture Secretary Benson--would be eased out, but this did not happen. Ultimately, no Cabinet members left during the transition period. In all of 1957, only three were replaced (the Secretaries of Defense and the Treasury, and the Attorney General)--all because they wished to return to private life. During the transition period (from election to Inaugural), the highest level personnel changes were the appointment of a new CEA Chairman, Under Secretary of State, and head of the U.S.I.A. Other nominations were routine, though some of the names now ring a bell: Elliot Richardson, for example, was appointed Assistant Secretary of HEW.

Eisenhower generally showed a preference for officials with a background in elective office. The three additions to his White House staff during the transition, for example, were two ex-Congressmen (Anderson and Richards) and an ex-Senator (George).

Program/Budget

Modern Republicanism was premised on the notion that the Republican party could and should offer social programs of its own. Eisenhower's initial FY1958 budget and program messages reflected this and the foreign affairs crises of late 1956. The proposed budget was \$72 billion, up \$3 billion from the year before. This was expected to generate a small surplus, but included significant increases in military spending and a new program of Federal aid for school construction. In addition

to the school program (outlined in a message to Congress on January 28), Eisenhower's legislative priorities included new policies in the Middle East (called for in a message to Congress on January 5), and revision of immigration laws (tied to admission of Hungarian refugees; message to Congress on January 31). Other priorities included new Civil Rights legislation, higher postal rates, moves towards home rule for D.C., legislation to encourage the development of atomic energy, extension of tax provisions due to expire in April, 1957. Legislative requests ultimately totalled over 200, but most were both minor and old.

It was widely believed at the outset of the Administration that Ike would get most of what he asked for, in the form in which he asked for it. Senate Majority leader Johnson and Speaker Rayburn, both of whom faced dissention from within Democratic ranks, were conciliatory and basically supportive, but would want to put their own earmarks on new legislation.

Eisenhower did not meet with the Congressional leadership until January 1 (a meeting had been planned for mid-December but was put off because the Democratic leadership would not be in Washington; there was reportedly some grumbling about how Eisenhower ran such meetings).

What Happened

Eisenhower's second term did not live up to the bright promise of its beginning. In 1957, Congress passed only 37% of the legislation he requested, a lower proportion than in any year of his first Administration.

While the general explanation for this shortfall is that Eisenhower did not make up his own mind about what he wanted or provide vigorous and consistent leadership, the first manifestations of these findings

came in the post-election transition period. The President took a two-and-a-half week vacation in December, and in January he left Washington for a tour of drought-stricken farm land. A projected mid-December meeting with Congressional leaders was postponed until January 1, and this in the end was the only such meeting before Inauguration. By the time the program messages went to the Hill, Congress and the country knew that the President had no plans for replacing people in the Administration who were outspoken opponents of modern Republicanism. Treasury Secretary Humphrey said that he wanted to return to private life but that Eisenhower wished him to stay through the budget session.

On January 16, Ike sent his new budget to Congress. That very afternoon, the new budget was attacked by Humphrey; the budget included no provision for tax cuts, and Humphrey said that without them, the country "will have a depression that will curl your hair." He found "a lot of places in this budget that can be cut," and urged Congress to do so. On January 23, at his first post-Inaugural press conference, Eisenhower refused to rebuke Humphrey, and even gave him what might be interpreted as lukewarm support. After some uproar and confusion, Eisenhower in April, 1957 proposed \$1.3 billion of cuts in his own budget, then reversed himself the next month.

The image of equivocation and confusion solidified later in 1957 when the President demonstrated lack of knowledge about the contents and future of his own Civil Rights and School Aid bills. When, early in 1958, an Administration staffer defended a bill before a Congressional Committee as essential to "the program of the President", he was greeted by laughter from both sides of the aisle.

By waffling between Modern Republicanism and support of the "Old Guard" of the party, the President dissipated the good will engendered by his reelection and damaged his own reputation as a capable leader, with negative results for his legislative program. Eisenhower began his transition by proposing to seize the initiative and make his own mark on the fabric of the nation's political life, but failed to do so successfully when he lost direction and bearings after January. He ignored appointments and reorganization as tools, and his programmatic efforts were half-hearted and ultimately counterproductive.

Eisenhower Transition Calendar

- Nov 4 - Soviet troops enter Hungary to quash the Hungarian revolt.
- Nov 5 - British and French troops land in Suez.
- Nov 6 - Eisenhower reelected by a landslide, but Democrats retain control of both houses of Congress. Ike attributes his victory to his philosophy of "Modern Republicanism".
- Nov 8 - Eisenhower orders 5000 Hungarian refugees admitted to the U.S.
- Nov 9 - Eisenhower briefs 23 Congressional leaders on the crises in Eastern Europe and the Middle East.
- Nov 14 - Eisenhower holds his first post-election press conference, and first press conference since October 5. He emphasizes getting his program through by persuasion, not desk pounding.
- Nov 26 - Eisenhower flies to August, Georgia for a vacation. He does not return to Washington until December 13.
- Nov 30 - Former Congressman Anderson is named to the White House staff. A new Commissioner of Education (from outside government) and ambassadors to India and Japan (both career diplomats) are named.
- Dec 8 - Christian Herter, former Governor of Massachusetts, named as Under Secretary of State.
- Jan 1 - Eisenhower meets with Congressional leaders and announces legislative priorities for 1957.
- Jan 5 - A special message to Congress asks for authority to use U.S. troops and economic aid to protect free nations in the Middle East.
 - Former Senator George appointed to the White House staff.
- Jan 7 - Former Congressman Richards appointed to the White House staff.
- Jan 16 - FY1958 budget submitted to Congress; spending to be up \$3 billion over the year before.
 - At a press conference, Treasury Secretary Humphrey attacks the new budget and invites Congress to cut it.
- Jan 21 - Eisenhower inaugurated

- Jan 23 - At his first press conference of the new term, Eisenhower refuses to reprimand Humphrey, and gives only lukewarm support to his own budget.
- Jan 28 - Special education message sent to Congress by Eisenhower. It proposes a new program of aid for school construction.
- Jan 30 - Second press conference of the new Administration.
- Jan 31 - Eisenhower message to Congress asks revision of the immigration laws and passage of new refugee legislation.

THE JOHNSON MID-TERM TRANSITION: 1964-65

Themes

The theme of Johnson's transition was the birth of the Great Society. In 1964, Johnson saw himself as the guardian of John Kennedy's program, fulfilling the fallen President's promises. In 1965, his landslide victory allowed him to realize his own dreams and fulfill his own promises by creating and carrying through to passage his own social welfare programs, the grandest since the New Deal.

The emphasis in Johnson's transition was on legislation rather than appointments or organization. The idea was to hit the ground running in January, 1965. This goal was largely achieved.

Appointments

The emphasis on programs precluded major personnel shuffles, and Johnson was not temperamentally suited for firing individuals in any case.* He asked all of Kennedy's Cabinet members to stay on, and most did so through 1964 and even after his own election--only Commerce Secretary Hodges and Treasury Secretary Dillon resigned, both without Presidential encouragement (though Dillon was said to feel uncomfortable with LBJ and vice versa). Even in the White House, personnel changes were minimal. Kennedy men, such as O'Brien, Bundy, White, and Goodwin, became Johnson men. LBJ added some of his own staffers, men like Valenti and Moyers. All in all, the continuity was remarkable.

Johnson's tendency was "to find qualified men already in government service to promote to important vacancies." (New York Times, 12/28/64.)

* Johnson rid himself of unwanted aides by begging them to stay and, when they assented, giving them nothing to do.

Thus, Treasury Under Secretary Fowler replaced Dillon, Nicholas Katzenbach was named Attorney General, John Carver was appointed Under Secretary in the Department of Interior after serving as an Assistant Secretary since 1961, Thomas Mann was named Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs--becoming only the third career diplomat ever to reach the rank of Under Secretary--and most ambassadors were drawn from career ranks. Only Secretary of Commerce Connor was appointed from outside of the government, and he had played a major role in the 1964 campaign.

Program

Johnson was determined to initiate social programs which would rival those of the New Deal. As early as May, 1964, when he first used the term Great Society in a speech at the University of Michigan, Johnson announced the appointment of working groups to examine specific areas. Fourteen "task forces" were ultimately created, on subjects as diverse as agriculture, health, and income maintenance. They submitted reports one week after Johnson's reelection, and a team of White House staffers working under Bill Moyers sifted through their products to prepare a 1200-page book for LBJ's use, consisting of the best and most feasible recommendations. Some were costed out by the Budget Bureau and rejected as too expensive; others were incorporated directly into the State of the Union address of January, 1965 and Johnson's early legislative proposals. The reports focused largely on domestic issues; foreign affairs were clearly to take a back seat to "our cities, our countryside, our classrooms." The one constraint that Johnson placed on his new programs was economic in nature--the FY1966

budget was not to be allowed to exceed \$100 billion. Thanks to some sleight of hand, this promise was kept.

Johnson worked to assure passage of his ambitious programs by cultivating the incoming 89th Congress. His landslide had added almost 40 Democrats to the House, creating the most lopsided majority in some 30 years. As a former legislator, Johnson knew most of the senior members of Congress, and he was quick to attract the loyalty and affection of younger members by inviting them to White House receptions, meetings with Cabinet members, etc.

What Happened

The decision to escalate U.S. involvement in Vietnam was made in January, 1965, not because Johnson wished a wider war but because he wished a quick end to the conflict, one that would permit undivided attention to domestic affairs. Ultimately, the war consumed Johnson's second term and destroyed his Presidency.

In the beginning, however, it was not so. Johnson's pre-election planning and cultivation of Congress paid off handsomely; he won some 90% of the Congressional votes on which he took a position in 1965. Important legislation--Voting Rights, Medicare, School Aid--was passed. Johnson's popularity and image as a leader were strong. In that sense, the Johnson transition of 1964-65 was the most successful of the four discussed herein.

If there was a weakness in the 1964 transition, it was LBJ's failure to restructure his Cabinet in his own image. Left to his own devices, and writing on a blank slate, Johnson could (and probably would) have put together a Cabinet that would have invited him to leave

Vietnam. But he was reluctant to displace the tough-minded advisers that he inherited from Kennedy. The reluctance was born of many things --his insecurity in international affairs, which led him to rely on military and foreign policy "experts" when his native common sense would have served him better; a desire to be magnanimous in the flush of victory; his personal distaste for letting people go; and the awe in which he held JFK's "Harvards". In the end, he paid dearly for this reticence.

Johnson Transition Calendar

- Nov 2 - LBJ elected to the Presidency in his own name for the first time with the largest electoral victory in U.S. history.
- Nov 10 - The White House received the reports of the fourteen task forces which had been set up the previous Spring to suggest programs for the Great Society.
- White House staffer Bill Moyers compiled a 1,200 page report for the President of what he thought were the best and most feasible recommendations of the task forces.
- LBJ used the summary of the task force reports to develop his State of the Union address, his first messages to Congress, and his budget message. The President asked the Bureau of the Budget to "cost out" several of the programs suggested.
- Dec 16 - LBJ held a series of private meetings with Congressional, business, labor, and other national leaders to inform them in advance of his legislative agenda for the upcoming session.
- Dec 20 - Secretary of Commerce Luther Hodges resigns; Johnson names John T. Connor to fill the vacancy. Connor, a New Jersey businessman, was Chairman of "National Independents for Johnson" in the '64 campaign.
- Dec 28 - LBJ announces his intention to name as many as twenty new ambassadors. He also names John A. Carver, an Assistant Secretary in Interior since 1961, Undersecretary of the Dept. of Interior.
- Jan 4 - LBJ makes his State of the Union address to the 89th Congress (address is delivered, for the first time, in the evening so that the American people can listen). In the speech, LBJ outlines his legislative program (the Great Society) and tells Congress that they can expect Presidential messages on the specifics of the program almost immediately.

- Jan 7 - LBJ sends to Congress a special health message calling for a hospital insurance plan under Social Security for persons 65 and older, and for a variety of programs to combat illnesses and diseases in persons of all ages.
- Jan 12 - LBJ sends to Congress a far-ranging education message and a draft bill to carry out his program for aid to elementary and secondary schools.
- Jan 15 - James T. Connor is confirmed by the Senate as Secretary of Commerce.
- Jan 16 - LBJ announces nine Special Assistants to the President: O'Brien, Bundy, Moyers, Reedy, Valenti, Busby, Goodwin, Cater, and White.
- Jan 25 - LBJ sends budget message to Congress. Budget is under \$100 billion as he had promised.
- Feb 7 - Kenneth Belieu was named as Undersecretary of the Navy. Mr. Belieu, a Korean War hero, was Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Installations and Logistics before his promotion.
- Feb 10 - Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Acting Attorney General since Robert Kennedy's resignation in August, 1964, was confirmed by the Senate as Attorney General.
- Feb 13 - Thomas Mann, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs and a Special Assistant to the President, was named Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs.

THE NIXON MID-TERM TRANSITION: 1972-73

Themes

President Nixon viewed his landslide victory as a national mandate to "get government off your back and out of your pocket...There will be no more throwing money at problems." The thrust of his transition was to gain control of a hostile bureaucracy and defeat a hostile Congress by isolating them both from the decision-making process.

Nixon moved almost immediately to act on his mandate. He reshuffled the Executive branch, reorganized the White House to accomplish by decree what Congress had refused to give him by law in the way of reorganization, submitted a tight budget which abolished or cut back on a number of social programs, and generally emphasized twin themes of government belt-tightening and efficiency and a continuation of the New Federalism (shifting responsibility for major problems back to the states and localities) of his first Administration.

Appointments

During the months following his reelection, President Nixon extensively reshuffled his Cabinet. Only five Cabinet members held the positions in February, 1973 that they had held in November, 1972. In Congressional Quarterly's words, "The complexion of the new Cabinet... indicate(s) a shift in emphasis toward managerial skill and responsiveness to the wishes of the White House staff...efficiency, cost cutting ability and unquestioned loyalty...emerge as the hallmark of the new Nixon Cabinet." Three of the new Cabinet members had already been in the Administration (Richardson, Lynn, and Weinberger); three came from

outside (Dent, Brennan, and Brinegar). Nixon's choice of newcomers signalled fairly clearly that he did not intend to shift power from the White House to the departments in his second term.

President Nixon felt that the best way to tame the bureaucracy was by staffing it with his own men. During the transition, large numbers of White House staff members and campaign aides--Carlucci, Malek, Morgan, Krogh, Herringer, Whitaker, Walker, Magruder, Butterfield...--were appointed to Under and Assistant Secretary positions in the departments and agencies. By February, Nixon had either a former member of his staff or a man of proven compatibility at or near the top of every Department but Labor. The moves combined to open better communication channels, and they did make the bureaucracy more responsive to White House wishes. Inevitably, the price was some loss of independence by the departments and agencies. Less inevitably--because it might not have happened with different men and a different President--the price also included some stifling of criticism. The job shifts during the transition, particularly the way in which they were handled, severely damaged morale in the Executive branch, upsetting the normal flow and delaying, for example, the development of a new legislative program.

Program/Budget

The FY1974 budget was described by one aide as "the opening barrage in a campaign to redirect social policy in this country." It abolished or reduced a number of Federal social programs (e.g., the Job Corps, Model Cities). When Congressional appropriations exceeded his targets,

the President vetoed them. When the vetoes were overridden, he impounded funds to prevent expenditures beyond his goals. At the same time, the President moved to end the Wage and Price Controls first imposed in August, 1971; Phase III was announced in January, 1973-- it unexpectedly ended mandatory controls on most goods and services.

President Nixon refused to deliver his State of the Union Address to Congress in person. Instead, it was presented in six written parts; an overview and separate messages dealing with Natural Resources and the Environment, the Economy, Human Resources, Community Development, and Crime and Law Enforcement. The Administration prepared and submitted legislation on a broad array of topics ranging from energy policy to legal services to patent reform.

The dominant theme, however, was not new programs but improved management of the Federal government, to be accomplished through Executive branch reorganization. Congress ignored the President's Reorganization Plan when it was presented in 1971; in 1973, Nixon sought to implement the Plan unilaterally. The Ash Council had recommended that seven Cabinet Departments be compressed into four. The President implemented this recommendation in January, 1973 by promoting Treasury Secretary Schultz to Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs and placing him in charge of the Commerce and Labor Departments as well as his own, and raising three other Cabinet officers to the rank of Counselor to the President: HEW Secretary Weinberger was Counselor for Human Resources, Agriculture Secretary Butz became Counselor for Natural Resources and was to oversee the Department of Interior as well as his own, and HUD Secretary-designate Lynn was made

Counselor for Community Development and given authority over the Department of Transportation as well as HUD. The new structure was reflected in the scope of the written State of the Union messages.

President Nixon chose confrontation over cooperation in his dealings with the 93rd Congress. In reorganization, the budget, Vietnam, and other matters, the President spurned Congressional advice and participation, and sought to circumvent the legislature wherever possible (as in his efforts to reorganize the White House by appointments alone). In response, Congress introduced or enacted a spate of legislation designed to clip the President's wings, such as legislation to prevent impoundments and require Senate confirmation of the Director of OMB. In short, the President never had a post-election honeymoon with Congress; at his first briefing of Congressional leaders, Nixon expressed his willingness to veto appropriations in excess of his budget requests and tag the Congress with a "big spender" label if his wishes were not heeded.

What Happened

Nixon was aware of the tendency of Administrations to grow complacent in the second term. In the first Cabinet meeting on the morning after the election he termed leaving everything as it was "the mistake of the second Eisenhower Administration," and he was determined "to change the historical pattern" and avoid a "coast downhill".

Ultimately, his determination came to nought. It was dwarfed, like everything else, by Watergate. Even before the fall, however, there was some evidence that Nixon's tactics would not work. The "super-Secretaries" and increased reliance on the White House staff

demoralized an already sagging Cabinet and in the long run, probably would have impeded the handling of government business. Congress channeled most of its resentment into the Watergate investigations, but it, too, chafed at the Administration's actions and reacted by turning on the President's legislative program. Nixon's Congressional Quarterly Support rating was about 50% in 1973, the lowest of any President in the rating's 20-year history.

Nixon Transition Calendar

- Nov 8 - Nixon announces plans for reorganization to Cabinet and White House staff and asks for resignations and evaluations (due Dec. 15).
- Nov 27 - Nixon meets with reporters at Camp David expressing a desire "to change not only some of the players but some of the plays." Speaking of Cabinet members he says "rather than running the bureaucracy, the bureaucracy runs him...they become prisoners of the bureaucracy." Announces he has accepted Laird and Romney resignations.
- Nov 28 - First Cabinet announcement: Richardson to Defense, Weinberger to HEW, Ash to OMB.
- Nov 29 - Brennan (President of N.Y. Construction Trades Councils) to Labor.
- Nov 30 - Rogers reappointed to State, but with three new assistants.
- Dec 1 - Schultz reappointed to Treasury and made Chairman of Council of Economic Policy (elevation to White House-level assistant).
- Dec 2 - Finch, H. Dent, Brown, Colson resign. Kissinger, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Timmons, Garment, Klein, Dean reappointed.
- Dec 5 - Lynn to HUD.
- Dec 6 - F. Dent (President of Mayfair Mills) to Commerce, Simon and Morgan (a 1968 advance man and Ehrlichman aide) assigned to Treasury.
- Dec 7 - Brinegar (V.P. of Union Oil) to Transportation.
- Dec 8 - Kleindienst reappointed to Justice, Bork named Solicitor General, and seven Interior resignations accepted.
- Dec 9 - Whitaker (from White House) to Interior, Krogh (from White House) to Transportation.
- Dec 12 - Clements to Defense (over Richardson's objections).
- Dec 14 - Cole (former advance man) named to head Domestic Council and Office of Intergovernmental Relations assigned to Council; six Labor resignations accepted.

- Dec 15 - Scali to U.N.; six HEW resignations, two Transportation resignations accepted.
- Dec 19 - Carlucci (of OMB) to HEW; Butterfield (White House aide) to FAA; Herringer (campaign aide) to Transportation.
- Dec 20 - Ruckelshaus reappointed to EPA, three Commerce resignations and five HUD resignations accepted.
- Dec 21 - Schlesinger to CIA.
- Jan 5 - Supercabinet announced and the beginning of the end for OEO.
- Jan 8 - Administration announced freeze on housing and urban programs pending review; written State of the Union announced.
- Jan 11 - Harvard Professor Dunlop to Cost of Living Council and Phase III begun.
- Jan 23 - Peace agreement reached with Hanoi and Viet Cong.
- Jan 26 - Executive office reorganized: Office of Emergency Preparedness, Office of Science and Technology, Consumer Affairs, National Aeronautic and Space Commission all are abolished or are transferred to one of the agencies. Other White House staffs cut.
- Jan 29 - Budget message-- social programs are drastically cut.
- Jan 31 - First news conference of the new term--questions focus on the Vietnam peace agreement.
- Feb 2 -
- Mar 14 - Nixon's written State of the Union is sent to Congress in six parts, including special messages on national resources and the environment, the economy, human resources, community development, and crime and law enforcement.