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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Memo	D.R. to the President re possible approach to SALT TWO (3 pp.)	Undated	A
2. Memo	Copy of item 1 (3 pp.)	Undated	A
3. Proposal	U.S. proposal on manner for proceeding (3 pp.)	Undated	* C(A)
4. Cable	Secretary Kissinger to General Scowcroft re evening session on SALT (3 pp.)	1/21/76	A
5. Cable	Henry Kissinger to General Scowcroft re NSC meeting (2 pp.)	1/22/76	A
6. Cable	Secretary Rumsfeld to General Scowcroft re Kissinger's meeting with Brezhnev (3 pp.)	1/22/76	A
7. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to the President re report from Secretary Kissinger (3 pp.)	1/22/76	A
8.	<u>Wade to Rumsfeld, 2/11/76</u>		
8a. Memo	James P. Wade to Secretary of Defense (1 p.)	2/11/76	A
8b. Memo	NSC Memo to the President re SALT contingency planning (25 pp.)	2/11/76	A
9.	<u>Rumsfeld to Cheney, 2/12/76</u>		
9a. Memo	Donald Rumsfeld to Dick Cheney re approach to SALT (1 p.)	2/12/76	A
9b. Briefing Paper	"Approach to SALT TWO" (5 pp.)	Undated	A
9c. "	"Alternative SALT Concepts" (7 pp.)	Undated	A
9d. "	U.S. Proposal for manner of proceeding (2 pp.)	Undated	* c(A)
10.	<u>Scowcroft to the President, 2/15/76</u>		
10a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to the President re this evening's meeting with Don and Henry Henry (1 p.)	2/15/76	A

FILE LOCATION
 Cheney Files
 General Subject File
 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks - General Box 11

RESTRICTION CODES
 (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
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WHM, 6/4/85

Declassified 6/29/89 KBH

declassified with portions exempted opened 4/7/99 KSH

opened 7/31/01 KSH

opened 12/17/04

declassified with portions exempted declassified in full 3/2000

Revised 10/17/04

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
10b.	Proposal U.S. proposal on manner for proceeding (2 pp.)	Undated	AC(A)
	<i>↓ declassified 12/13/89 KBH</i>		
10c.	" Copy of item 10b with some annotations (2 pp.)	Undated	XC(A)
10d.	Memo Donald Rumsfeld to Asst. Asst. to the Pres. for National Security Affairs <i>opened 7/31/01 KBH</i>	2/14/76	A
10e.	Proposal U.S. proposal for on manner for proceeding (2 pp.)	Undated	A
10f.	Proposal Clarification of recommended changes to "draft memorandum" (2 pp.) <i>Declassified 6/29/89 KBH</i>	Undated	A
10g.	Memo Brent Scowcroft to the President (4 pp.) <i>Declassified 12/13/89 KBH</i>	2/5/76	A

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WHM, 6/4/85

For President
from D.R

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POSSIBLE APPROACH TOWARD SALT TWO

INTRODUCTION: It is improbable that the interrelated Backfire and intermediate range cruise missile issues can be satisfactorily resolved by summer of this year. The issues dealing with the systems having a direct and primary homeland to homeland role should be susceptible to final agreement within six months. The question is how best to proceed under those circumstances.

SUGGESTED APPROACH: I suggest the following approach: Immediately with respect to the Soviet negotiators and ultimately with the US public.

1: The primary elements of both sides' strategic forces are ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. These systems all have as their primary mission the capability for homeland to homeland nuclear attack.

2. There are potential additional homeland to homeland systems; systems which neither side has up to this time developed or deployed-- such as seabed systems deployed in coastal or internal waters, intercontinental range cruise missiles and space based systems.

3. There are systems of lesser range which can have a bearing both upon theatre nuclear capabilities and under certain circumstances on homeland to homeland capabilities; among such systems are air, sea, and land-based cruise missiles with less than intercontinental range, certain bombers with a range less than that of those bombers originally classified as heavy bombers, mobile medium range ballistic missiles, etc.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.

MR 89-20 #27 OSD Oct 6/29/89
By KBH NARA, Date 6/29/89



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-2-

4. It is now possible mutually to agree on useful limitations on those systems having a direct and primary homeland to homeland strategic role. It is also possible mutually to agree to ban the development or deployment of those potential systems mentioned in paragraph 2 above which if deployed would have a direct homeland to homeland role. It has not proven possible to work out the difficult problem of finding mutually acceptable limitations on those systems having a theatre role or which are affected by defenses against theatre capabilities, but which also have a homeland to homeland capability (ALCMs on heavy and other bombers).

5. We therefore propose agreement now on those central systems where agreement is now possible, and continued negotiations on those gray areas where the interrelationship between theatre and homeland to homeland capabilities make it necessary to take more time to find mutually agreeable and useful solutions.

6. In implementation of this approach we propose conclusion of a SALT TWO agreement which would include agreement on all provisions of the Joint Draft Text other than those referring to Backfire or intermediate range cruise missiles, coupled with an agreement to initiate negotiations this summer on the gray areas not dealt with in such a SALT TWO agreement, with the target date for the completion of these negotiations to be October 1977.

7. In the event the Soviet Union agrees to this approach, it will be important to think through the best approach to our allies in connection

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with the negotiations to begin in mid-1976. It would seem wise to maintain the bilateral US/USSR format but to consider a backstopping committee including representatives of NATO and Japan.

8. A question arises as to whether the term of such a SALT TWO agreement should be shortened to five years as opposed to ten. On balance, it would appear that there is little we would be able or wish to deploy prior to 1986 which we could not deploy under the terms of such an agreement. The longer term would, therefore, seem preferable.

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MR 89-20 #27 OSD Mr. 6/23/89
By KBH NARA, Date 6/29/89

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*II - Kib
III - consult after
from AC*

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FM SECRETARY KISSINGER

TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

HAKTU 4

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: SECRETARY KISSINGER
SUBJECT: EVENING SESSION ON SALT

1. WE BEGAN THE SECOND SESSION WITH BREZHNEV THIS EVENING, AND I PROCEEDED ALONG THE LINES I HAD INDICATED IN MY PREVIOUS REPORT.

2. FIRST, I ASKED SOME MORE QUESTIONS ABOUT BREZHNEV'S ASSURANCE ON THE BACKFIRE RANGE TO DETERMINE WHAT FLIGHT PROFILE THEY HAD USED AND WHAT THEY WOULD ESTIMATE THE RANGE TO BE IN ALL HIGH ALTITUDE MODE AT SUBSONIC SPEED. THIS DREW ONLY A REPEAT BY GENERAL KOZLOV OF THE "OFFICIAL" BREZHNEV GUARANTEE THAT THE AIRCRAFT HAD A "MAXIMUM OPERATIONAL" RADIUS OF 2200-2400 KM.

3. I THEN PROCEEDED TO SUM UP THE POINTS OF AGREEMENT AND DIFFERENCES IN OUR TWO POSITIONS. I NOTED THAT ON ALCMS WE BOTH HAD THE SAME APPROACH: TO COUNT AS MIRVED, AND TO BAN ABOVE 2500 KM, AND BAN ON OTHER AIRCRAFT ABOVE 600 KM. I SAID WE COULD NOT ACCEPT THEIR COUNTING OF THE B-1 AS EQUAL TO 3 MIRVED VEHICLES. THIS BROUGHT A LAME REJOINER FROM GROMYKO THAT THE REASON WAS THAT THE B-1 WAS SUPERSONIC AND COULD REACH THE TARGET EARLIER THAN THE B-52, BUT THIS WAS NOT PRESSED SERIOUSLY.

4. ON SEA BASED CRUISE MISSILES I NOTED WE AGREED ON SUBMARINES BUT NOT ON SURFACE SHIP CRUISE MISSILES BETWEEN 600 KM AND 2500 KM. I THEN SAID THA WE WERE SURPRISED BY THEIR

***** WMSR COMMENT *****

SCOWCROFT, MCFARLANE, SEC FILE

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INTERPRETATION OF THE BAN ON INTERCONTINENTAL LAND BASED CRUISE MISSILES, WHICH LEAD TO A LONG CONFUSED DEBATE. GROMYKO FIRST CLAIMED THAT THEY ASSUMED ALL ALONG THAT ALL LAND BASED CRUISE MISSILES OVER 600 KM WOULD BE BANNED, AND THAT WAS IMPLICIT IN THEIR PROPOSAL. I KNOCKED THIS DOWN, BUT IF WAS FINALLY LEFT THAT THEY WOULD CONSIDER THE QUESTION AGAIN: EITHER TO RETURN TO THE ORIGINAL INTERPRETATION, LEAVING ALL LAND BASED MISSILES UP TO INTERCONTINENTAL RANGE FREE, OR BANNING ONLY THOSE ABOVE 2500 KM.

5. I NOTED THE SIMILARITY IN RANGE BETWEEN THEIR CLAIM OF 2200-2400 KM FOR THE BACKFIRE AND OUR PROPOSAL FOR SLCMS ON SURFACE SHIPS UP TO 2500 KM, AND I AS WELL CONTRASTED OUR WILLINGNESS TO INCLUDE SLCMS AS STRATEGIC WEAPONS IN SALT AND THEIR RESISTANCE ON BACKFIRE. I SUGGESTED A SEPARATE FIVE YEAR AGREEMENT IN WHICH THEY WOULD NOT DEPLOY MORE THAN 275 BACKFIRE IN THE PERIOD UP TO THE END OF 1982, AND WE WOULD NOT DEPLOY MORE THAN 25 SURFACE SHIPS WITH CRUISE MISSILES FOR THE FIVE YEAR PERIOD. I SAID THIS WAS A CONDITIONAL PROPOSAL SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT AS ALL OUTSTANDING ISSUES.

6. IN THIS CONTEXT I PROPOSED THAT WE ALSO REDUCE FROM 2400 TO 2300 BY 1980. THIS LAST POINT CAUSED SOME CONSTERNATION. BREZHNEV SAID THAT HE COULD NOT REVISE VLADIVOSTOK, AND BOTH GROMYKO AND BREZHNEV REPEATED THAT BACKFIRE WAS NOT STRATEGIC. AFTER CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION ON THE SOVIET SIDE BREZHNEV SAID HE DID NOT REJECT OUR IDEAS OUT OF HAND, BUT PROPOSED A RECESS UNTIL 12 NOON TOMORROW, WHICH I ASSUME MEANS HE WILL HOLD A POLITBURO MEETING IN THE MORNING.

7. MY STRATEGY TOMORROW WILL BE TO LISTEN TO WHATEVER THEY PRODUCE. ASSUMING THEY CONTINUE TO REJECT ANY NUMERICAL LIMIT ON BACKFIRE I WILL CONCENTRATE MAINLY ON THE CRUISE MISSILES AND TRY TO DRAW BREZHNEV OUT FURTHER ON ANY ASSURANCES ABOUT BACKFIRE. INCIDENTALLY, DOBRYNIN "GUARANTEED" THAT THE POLITBURO WOULD NEVER AGREE TO COUNT BACKFIRE, BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN SOLD AS A PERIPHERAL ATTACK SYSTEM.

8. UNLESS THERE IS AN UNEXPECTED BREAK IN THE SOVIET POSITION, WHICH IS NOT ENTIRELY RULED OUT, ALL I CAN DO IS NARROW THE DIFFERENCES TO THE POINT THAT THEY CAN BE CONSIDERED AGAIN IN WASHINGTON. BASICALLY, WE MAY LEAVE HERE WITH A REASONABLE CRUISE MISSILES PACKAGE PLUS SOME ASSURANCES ON BACKFIRE'S RANGE AND OTHER INDICATORS. IF SO, WE CAN EVALUATE WHAT SUCH AN OVERALL AGREEMENT WOULD LOOK LIKE IN WASHINGTON.

9. IN THIS LIGHT I REALLY SEE NO REASON TO GO TO A PURE VERSION

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PAGE 02

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OF OPTION III, NOR DO I SEE DEFERRAL AS A REAL OPTION UNLESS
THE SOVIETS GET DESPERATE.
GRNC

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PAGE 03

OF 03


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NSC - State Dept Guidelines

MR 01-102 #51, OSD-EE, 9/23/04

dal NARA Doc 12/17/04

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O 220350Z JAN 76 ZYH ZFF-4/1
FM SECRETARY RUMSFELD HAMBURG GERMANY

TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT-THE WHITE HOUSE FOR THE PRESIDENT

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY HMB 1014

1. BRENT, PLEASE PASS TO KISSINGER AND CLEMENTS IF PRESIDENT FEELS ADVISABLE.
2. RECEIVED SECDEF 212037Z JAN 76, CABLE OF SCOWCROFT'S MEMO TO PRESIDENT WHICH SETS FORTH A PROGRESS REPORT ON SECSTATE'S MEETING WITH BREZHNEV ON 21 JAN 76. GENERAL BROWN AND I HAVE STUDIED THE CABLE AND WE HAVE THESE THOUGHTS.
3. CABLE STATES THAT BREZHNEV ACCEPTED U.S. PROPOSAL TO BAN ALCOM'S WITH RANGE OVER 2500 KM; WE ASSUME THAT MEANS ON HEAVY BOMBERS, IN VIEW OF THE RANGES DISCUSSED IN THE NSC. HOWEVER, BANNING ALL ALCOM ABOVE 2500 KM IS NOT A BIG GIVE FOR THE U.S.
4. BREZHNEV'S STATEMENT THAT THE SOVIET MIRV VERIFICATION CONCESSION IS LINKED ORGANICALLY TO ALL OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS SOUNDS ENTIRELY NEW. IN VP AND NSC MEETINGS WE RECALL SOVIET POSITION HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS A LINK BETWEEN MIRV VERIFICATION AND COUNTING RULES AND THE CRUISE MISSILES.
5. THE SOVIET STATEMENT ON BACKFIRE RADIUS AT 2200 KILOMETER TO 2400 KILOMETER DIFFERS SO SUBSTANTIALLY FROM THE U.S. COMMUNITY ESTIMATE AT ABOUT 2600 NAUTICAL MILES (OR 4160 KILOMETERS) THAT IT APPEARS TO BE A FACTUAL SUBJECT MERITING FURTHER TECHNICAL STUDY AND DISCUSSION.
6. WE RECOMMEND AGAINST MOVING TOWARD AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD COUNT EACH INDIVIDUAL MISSILE ON HEAVY BOMBERS AS BREZHNEV HAS PROPOSED. THAT WOULD BE LIKE COUNTING EVERY BOMB ON B-52'S.
7. COUNTING B-1'S AS THREE MIRVS WHEN B-1 AND B-52 PAYLOADS ARE SO CLOSE, AND WHEN THE U.S. IS PRESSING THE MIRV LIMIT, WOULD BE INADVISABLE. IN ADDITION, IT COULD PROVE TO BE AN UNWISE PRECEDENT.
8. BREZHNEV'S PROPOSAL TO BAN SURFACE SHIP LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES WITH RANGES OVER 600 KM IS NEW, ALTHOUGH SPECIFIC PLANS FOR OVER 600 KM ARE NOT DEVELOPED, WE SUGGEST THE 2500 KM FIGURE WE HAVE DISCUSSED

***** WHSR COMMENT *****

SCOWCROFT, HYLAND, MCFARLANE, RODMAN...NOT SENT TO HAK BY SIT ROOM


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IN THE NSC, TO PROTECT AN ANTI-SHIPING OPTION IN THE NEXT DECADES, IF WE DO MOVE TO A LOWER NUMBER, THE U.S. SHOULD GET SOMETHING FOR IT, IN THAT THIS IS NEW TECHNOLOGY IN WHICH WE ARE WELL AHEAD.

9. BREZHNEV'S CLAIM THAT THE PREVIOUS AGREEMENT TO BAN LANDBASED CRUISE MISSILES OF INTERCONTINENTAL RANGE WAS MEANT TO BAN ALL CRUISE MISSILES AT SHORTER RANGES IS NEW TO US, HIS PROPOSAL TO BAN ALL LAND-BASED CRUISE MISSILES OVER 600 KM WOULD AGAIN LIMIT A NEW TECHNOLOGY IN WHICH THE U.S. HAS A SUBSTANTIAL LEAD. WE RECOMMEND STICKING TO 2500 KILOMETER RANGE.

10. ON THE POINT IN PARAGRAPH 8, YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT DURING THE NPG MEETING HERE IN HAMBURG, EUROPEANS, LED BY FRG MOD LEBER, EXPRESSED CONCERN ON THIS SUBJECT, THEY SEE THE CRUISE MISSILE AS A COUNTER TO IRBM AND MRBM THREATS IN NATO EUROPE, AND URGE U.S. TO PROTECT THE CRUISE MISSILE AT RANGES NECESSARY FOR THE EUROPEAN THEATER, WHICH IS ESTIMATED TO BE 2500 KM.

11. AS TO THE IDEA OF PUSUING THE APPROACH OF PUTTING BACKFIRE AND SURFACE SHIP CRUISE MISSILES IN A SEPARATE CATEGORY FOR A FIVE-YEAR PERIOD (1977 TO 1982), IT IS NOT CLEAR FROM THE CABLE WHAT SURFACE SHIP CRUISE MISSILE RANGE HE IS CONSIDERING. WE RECOMMEND THE 2500 KM FIGURE DISCUSSED IN PARAGRAPH EIGHT ABOVE.

12. THE IDEA OF LINKING BACKFIRE AND SURFACE SLCM IS APPROPRIATE BUT, OF COURSE, ACCEPTABILITY DEPENDS ON THE SPECIFIC NUMBERS AND WHAT ELSE IS IN THE PACKAGE.

13. SECSTATE INDICATED HE IS THINKING OF STARTING AT 250 BACKFIRES, THE SLIPPERY SLOPE PROBLEM WE HAVE DISCUSSED SUGGESTS THAT THE OUTSIDE LIMIT WOULD BE 300 BACKFIRES AT THE 2400 TOTAL OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES, OR 400 BACKFIRES AT THE 2300 REDUCED LIMIT.

14. SECSTATE INDICATED INTENTION TO OUTLINE A LIMIT OF ABOUT 24 SHIPS WITH 10-15 LAUNCHERS EACH. PRESENT PRELIMINARY NAVY PROGRAM SUGGESTS ACCEPTABLE LIMIT OF 50 SHIPS WITH 10 LAUNCHERS EACH, RANGE REQUIREMENTS FOR SURFACE SHIPS ARE DISCUSSED IN PARAGRAPH ELEVEN ABOVE, AND FOR LANDBASED CRUISE MISSILES IN PARAGRAPHS NINE AND TEN.

15. IN VIEW OF FACTUAL DIFFERENCES OUTSTANDING REGARDING BACKFIRE CAPABILITIES, THE NEW ELEMENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN RAISED IN MOSCOW, AND THE FACT THAT TIME IS NOT PRESSING ON THE U.S. SIDE, OUR FEELING IS THAT SECSTATE COULD POLITELY SAY THAT HE WISHES TO DISCUSS THESE NEW IDEAS PERSONALLY WITH THE PRESIDENT AND COME HOME, WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT HE WOULD GET BACK TO THE SOVIETS IN THE WEEKS AHEAD, THE NEXT BEST APPROACH WOULD BE TO PURSUE OPTION ONE MODIFIED. I ALSO SUGGEST THAT, IF HE IS TO RETURN HOM AS SUGGESTED, WE ALL EXERCISE GREAT CARE IN ANG BACKGROUNDING OF THE PRESS. THE NEWS SHOULD BE THE FACT THAT

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PAGE 02

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YOU--THE PRESIDENT--TAKE THESE MATTERS SERIOUSLY AND THAT YOU ARE
PROCEEDING IN A MEASURE, CAREFUL MANNER, AS YOU ARE, AND, THAT
DISCUSSION WILL CONTINUE IN AN ORDERLY WAY, WARM REGARDS,
SSO NOTE: DIVER IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT,
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PAGE 03 OF 03 TOR:022/07:16Z DTG:220350Z JAN 76





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FM HENRY A, KISSINGER

TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

HAKTO 5

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
REF: TOHAK 20

HAVE JUST NOW READ YOUR REPORT ON THE NSC MEETING. THERE ARE SEVERAL POINTS I WANT TO EMPHASIZE STRONGLY TO THE PRESIDENT. FIRST, WE HAVE HAD TWO VERIFICATION PANELS AND FOUR NSC MEETINGS AT WHICH AGREED OPTIONS WERE DEVELOPED.

SECOND, THE PRESIDENT APPROVED, AT DOD URGING, OPTION 4 WHICH INCLUDES A BAN ON SUBMARINE LAUNCHED SLCMS BEYOND 600 KMS AND THIS WAS SUBMITTED TO THE SOVIETS IN WRITING. THUS, WE CANNOT SIMPLY REPUDIATE IT.

THIRD, THE PRESIDENT APPROVED AS A FALLBACK OPTION 3 INCLUDING THE NUMBERS FOR A BACKFIRE/SURFACE SHIP TRADE OFF. I SUBMITTED A MODIFIED OPTION 3 WHICH IS MUCH MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE US. WE CANNOT BLITHELY SWEEP AWAY THESE NUMBERS AFTER DISCUSSING THEM WITH THE SOVIETS. THE JCS FIRST COMPLAINED THE SLCM NUMBERS WERE TOO LOW, THAT THEY MIGHT WANT HUNDREDS OF SURFACE SLCM PLATFORMS. NOW THEY SAY THE NUMBERS ARE TOO HIGH, THEY'LL HAVE ONLY EIGHT. THE WHOLE CONCEPT OF THE GREY AREA IS BEING CHALLENGED AFTER BEING PROPOSED BY RUMSFELD AND APPROVED AT THE NSC MEETINGS.

FOURTH, IT MAKES NO SENSE AT ALL TO KEEP ASKING FOR NEW PAPERS FROM THE JCS. THE ONLY RESULT WILL BE PILING UP A RECORD THAT WILL BE USED AGAINST US LATER. FINALLY, AS I REPORTED IN MY LAST MESSAGE, I INTEND TO LISTEN TO BREZHNEV'S PRESENTATION THIS MORNING AND TO CONCENTRATE ON CRUISE MISSILES.

I STRONGLY REQUEST THAT THE PRESIDENT RECONVENE THE NSC AND LAY DOWN THE LAW. HE SHOULD RECOUNT THE RECORD OF THE PAST TWO MONTHS, THE FACT THAT UNANIMOUS AGREEMENT WAS

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

SCOWCROFT, HYLAND, MCFARLANE, RODMAN, SECFLA, SDO

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines
By KOH, NARA, Date 6/3/01



REACHED ON OPTION 4, THAT HE PERSONALLY APPROVED OPTION 3, THAT WHAT I HAVE OFFERED IS BETTER, THAT I WAS AUTHORIZED TO DEAL WITH SLCMS AND BACKFIRE AS A GREY AREA, AND THAT NOW THE WHOLE CONCEPT IS BEING UNDONE BY IRRESPONSIBLE AND TOTALLY NEW IDEAS. YOU SHOULD INFORM THE PRESIDENT THAT UNDER THESE CONDITIONS I WILL NOT REACH ANY AGREEMENT HERE AND WILL SIMPLY BRING ALL OF THE ISSUES BACK TO WASHINGTON, NO MATTER WHAT THE SOVIET REPLY, I HAVE BEEN DRIVEN TO A DEFERRAL OPTION WHICH IS LESS FAVORABLE TO US THAN WHAT WE HAVE TABLED AND WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN REJECTED.

PLEASE MAKE SURE THE PRESIDENT KNOWS MY THINKING INCLUDING THIS MESSAGE.
GRNC

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PAGE 02

OF 02

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February 12, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: DICK CHENEY

FROM: DONALD H. RUMSFELD *D.*

1. Attached is a copy of my views on a fleshed out Option III ("Deferral") which I have sent separately to Brent.
 2. Also attached is the reference paper we discussed. The last two pages of it were in the President's brief for the NSC meeting on SALT on 2/11/76.
 - It was never worked in the SALT interagency "working group."
 - It was apparently written by an NSC staff man the night of 2/11/76.
 - The Boards displayed in the NSC meeting were apparently taken from the paper.
 - The handwritten notes, additions and deletions reflect the OSD representatives views as they would have appeared on the Boards if he had seen the paper.
 - It should be clear from this that when NSC members were discussing the various options they could only have been talking in broad principles and could well have had different details in mind, since the details had not been fully sorted out.
 - Finally, when you compare the level of detail on Option III in the President's briefing paper against the level of detail in the paper I have prepared today on Option III (which is attached), it is clear how confusion can arise.
- P.S. Also attached is the packet.

DECLASSIFIED • E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.0
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (c)
NSC - State Dept. Guidelines
MR 01-102, #52, OSD Ltr. 3/23/04
By dal NARA Date 12/17/04

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~NO FORN DISSEM~~



February 12 1976

APPROACH TO SALT TWO

INTRODUCTION: It seems likely that the interrelated Backfire and intermediate range cruise missile issues may not be satisfactorily resolved in the period immediately ahead. However, the issues dealing with systems having a direct and primary homeland-to-homeland role should be capable of being resolved in a formal agreement in a shorter period of time. Following is a suggested approach under these circumstances.

CONCEPTUAL APPROACH: to be put forward soon to the Soviet Union:

1. The primary elements of U.S. and Soviet strategic forces are ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. These systems all have as their primary mission the capability for homeland-to-homeland nuclear attack.
2. There are additional potential homeland-to-homeland nuclear systems; systems which neither side has up to this time developed or deployed -- such as seabed systems deployed in coastal or internal waters, and space based systems.
3. There are systems of somewhat lesser range which can have a bearing both upon theatre nuclear capabilities and, under certain circumstances, on homeland-to-homeland capabilities; among such systems are air, sea, and land-based cruise missiles with less than intercontinental range, certain bombers with a range somewhat less than that of those bombers now classified as heavy bombers, mobile intermediate range ballistic missiles, and the like.



~~TOP SECRET~~

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
4. It would seem to be possible now, and desirable, to mutually agree on equitable limitations on those systems having a direct and primary homeland-to-homeland strategic role. Further, it would seem possible to agree to ban the development or deployment of those potential systems mentioned in paragraph 2, which, if deployed, would have a direct homeland-to-homeland role. It has not yet proven possible to work out the admittedly difficult and complex problems of finding mutually acceptable limitations on those "grey area" systems having a theatre role or which are affected by defenses against theatre capabilities, but which also have some homeland-to-homeland capability (e.g., ALCMs on other bombers).

5. Therefore, consideration should be given to an agreement now on those central systems where agreement is now possible, and because of the complexities involved, continuing negotiations on those "grey area" systems where the interrelationship between theatre and homeland-to-homeland capabilities makes it necessary to take more time to find mutually agreeable and useful solutions.

6. In implementation of this approach, conclusion of a SALT TWO treaty, in the period immediately ahead, could include:

(a) agreement on all provisions of the Joint Draft Text other than those referring to Backfire or intermediate range cruise missiles,

(b) coupled with an agreement to initiate negotiations this summer (one month following successful negotiation of the SALT TWO Treaty) on the "grey areas" not dealt with in such a SALT



TWO Treaty, without prejudice as to how they would be dealt with,

(c) with the target date for the completion of negotiations on "grey area" systems, to be October, 1977, and


(d) a fixed completion date of 1 January 1979 should also be considered.

7. In the event the Soviet Union agrees to a SALT TWO treaty under this approach, it will be necessary to think through the best method to consult our allies during any negotiations on "grey area" systems, to begin in mid-1976. It would seem essential to maintain the bilateral US/USSR format but to consider a backstopping committee including representatives of NATO and Japan, or at the minimum, a more intensive consultation mechanism.

8. A question arises as to whether the term of such a SALT TWO agreement should be shortened to five years as opposed to ten. On balance, assuming agreement as described, it would appear that there is little the U.S. would be able or wish to deploy prior to 1986 which could not be deployed under the terms of such an agreement. The longer term would, therefore, seem preferable, but the term should be left open until the specifics of the agreement are known.

"OPTION III ELABORATED": In the event that this approach is selected, the U.S. proposal to the Soviets should consolidate the areas of agreement in a SALT TWO Treaty and defer the Backfire and cruise missile "grey area" issues for an agreed interim period, during which negotiations on these issues would continue.

1. Illustratively, the SALT TWO Treaty would include:




-- Codification of the Vladivostok understanding, and subsequently agreed issues including:

- 2400 aggregate limit, which includes ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers;
- 1320 MIRV aggregate limit;
- definitions of, for example, ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs;
- mobile ICBMs counted in aggregate;
- US MIRV verification provisions.

NOTE: If heavy bombers, with long-range ALCMs were to be considered as MIRV platforms in the 1320 limit, the verification procedures for heavy bombers with ALCMs should not take the approach that "once tested with ALCM, all launchers/platforms would be counted as MIRVed." Otherwise, for example, the first ALCM platform deployed could "pollute" the entire B-52 bomber force.

- heavy missile definition which includes a throw-weight criteria;
- upper throw-weight limit on heavy missiles;
- no development, test, or deployment of fixed ballistic or cruise missile launchers on ocean floor, seabed or internal waters;
- no development, test or deployment of earth orbital nuclear weapon systems;
- each Party undertakes not to take actions which could lead to the provisions of this Agreement being circumvented;
- reductions below 2400 should be sought in the SALT TWO Treaty or soon thereafter;
- Cruise missile limits along the following lines:
 - ban on testing, or deployment of ALCMs with ranges greater



HALK
no deployment
of SSICM or land-based
above 6000 km.
no testing above
2,500 km
til '81

than 2500 Kms on heavy bombers;

-- count deployment of intercontinental cruise missiles (ICCMs)

(i.e., range greater than 5500 Km) whether land-, sea- or air-launched;

-- Cruise missile definition will include term "nuclear-armed."

2. Elements deferred for subsequent negotiations: Agreed understandings, apart from the Treaty, to specify that:

-- The Soviets agree not to upgrade Backfire or provide tanker support, arctic basing, arming with long-range ASMs, or acceleration of the agreed current deployment rate of two per month or a total of (insert [redacted] estimate) Backfires by October, 19~~80~~⁸¹.

-- The US agrees not to accelerate deployment of its long-range cruise missiles currently in development, i.e., no deployment prior to October, 19~~80~~⁸¹.

-- Negotiations on "grey area" systems would commence in mid-1976, or one month following completion of the details of the SALT TWO Treaty. Target date for completions of the negotiation on "grey area" systems would be October, 1977.

-- Both sides agree not to test cruise missiles, i.e., sea-based, air-based, land-based, with ranges above 2500 km during the interim period, ~~ending October, 1977.~~

-- Other "grey area" or "intermediate-range" nuclear systems could be considered, as appropriate, in the interim negotiations. However, issues to be addressed in the interim "grey area" negotiation will only include those systems which fit the concept of a "grey area," namely those systems having a theatre nuclear role but also having, under certain circumstances, homeland-to-homeland capabilities.



ALTERNATIVE SALT CONCEPTS

The following are alternative approaches that the US might adopt as the basis for a reply to the most recent Soviet proposal:

- I. Seek numerical limits on Backfire.
- II. Exclude Backfire from strict SALT limitations.
- III. ^{Codify Vladivostok and Continue Negotiations} ~~Defer a permanent solution on~~ Backfire and cruise missiles, ^{"gray area"} systems, _{the}

Each of these concepts is described in more detail below along with illustrative approaches for implementing each concept.

I. Numerical Limits on Backfire

The basic idea underlying this option is to impose numerical limitations on Backfire. Two illustrative approaches are:

A. Include Backfire in the aggregate and limit long-range cruise missiles as in the initial US position put forth in Moscow (i. e., Modified Option IV). Under this approach, for example:

-- All Backfire deployed after October 1977 (or beyond a level of 100) would be counted in the aggregate of 2400.

-- In return, heavy bombers and surface ship platforms equipped with 600-2500 km cruise missiles would be counted under the 2400 and 1320 ceilings and SLCMs above 600 km banned on submarines.

-- In addition, land-based cruise missiles with range above 2500 km would be banned and ALCMs above 600 km would be banned on aircraft other than heavy bombers.

-- *Cruise missiles would be defined as nuclear-armed.*

B. Include Backfire in separate limit outside the aggregate with comparable limits on sea-based cruise missiles, treating both as hybrid systems. Under this approach, for example:

~~* At some point, a decision will have to be made for all cruise missile limitations as to whether: (1) all cruise missiles, (2) all "armed" cruise missiles, or (3) only "nuclear-armed" cruise missiles are covered. This paper assumes that nuclear-armed cruise missiles will be controlled in the emerging SALT agreement without prejudice to conventional-armed issues or unarmed (i. e., RPV) issues. In general, for those limitations at relatively long ranges, e. g., 2500 km, the limitation might apply to all armed cruise missiles, since the impact on tactical applications would be less significant; at lower ranges, the limits might be applied only to "nuclear-armed" missiles to avoid impact on tactical applications.~~



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NSC - Dir. Dept. Audiences
MR 01-102, 252; OSD 111, 3/23/04
dal NARA Date 12/17/04

-- Backfire would be counted in a separate limit of ~~0.6~~

250.

-- A balancing limitation on 600-2500 km sea-based cruise missile platforms (with freedom to mix between platforms) at the same level would be applied.

-- *Cruise missiles would be defined as nuclear-armed.*

-- If the Soviets choose to deploy Backfire, they could not deploy sea-based cruise missiles over 600 km.

-- Parallel assurances would be applied against strategic use of hybrid systems including specific constraints, such as a 2500 km limit on cruise missile range and prohibition on Backfire upgrading.

-- The aggregate ^{would} ~~could~~ be reduced, ~~for example,~~ to 2150 by 1980, so that the total numbers of central systems (2150) plus the number of hybrid systems (250) would not exceed 2400.

II. Exclude Backfire from Strict SALT Limitations

Under this concept, there would be no ^{agreed} numerical limitations on Backfire. An illustrative approach is:

Obtain MLBM reductions in exchange for excluding Backfire from numerical limitations while maintaining the cruise missile limits proposed in Moscow. Under this approach, for example:

-- *The aggregate would be reduced to 2150 by 1980.*

-- We would accept Soviet assurances against Backfire upgrading and seek additional collateral constraints.


In return,


-- *The Soviets would freeze the deployment of SS-18s (currently numbering about 80) and dismantle ^{by 1980} a significant portion (e.g., all ~~200-200~~ of their older heavy missiles (SS-9s) in a ^{reduction} to 2150.*

-- *In ^{addition} return,* heavy bombers and surface ship platforms equipped with 600-2500 km cruise missiles would be counted under the 2400 and 1320 ceilings and SLCMs above 600 km banned on submarines.

-- *In ²⁵⁰⁰ addition,* land-based cruise missiles with range above 2500 km would be banned and ALCMs above 600 km would be banned on aircraft other than heavy bombers.

-- *Cruise missiles would be defined as nuclear-armed;*





Codify Vladivostok and Continue Negotiations

III. ~~Defer a Permanent Solution on Backfire and Cruise Missiles~~ "Gray Area" Systems

The basic idea under this concept would be to defer Backfire and some cruise missile limits either indefinitely or for an agreed interim period while codifying in a SALT TWO agreement those limits agreed at Vladivostok and subsequently (including "once a MIRV, always a MIRV"). An illustrative approach of deferral for an interim period is:

for an agreed interim period limitations on ~~SLCMs and land-based cruise missiles~~ on those systems which fall within gray areas. Under this approach, for example, area systems could be considered in these negotiations. As appropriate at a later time other "gray area" systems could be considered in these negotiations.

-- The interim period ^{would} be, for example, through the end of 1979 or 1980, one to two years. It would start one month following completion of the SALT TWO agreement, i.e. mid 1976, with a fixed target completion date of October 1977. The sides would agree that reductions to 2150 by 1980 would be an objective of the interim period negotiations.

-- During the interim period, negotiations would take place on Backfire and SLCM and land-based cruise missile limits. A framework for consultation with our allies could be considered to provide for allied "monitoring" of the interim negotiations. During the interim period, the Soviets would provide assurances against Backfire upgrading, ^{arctic basing,} tanker support, ^{arming with long-range ASMs and} acceleration of an agreed current deployment rate, etc.

-- During the interim period, the sides would agree not to test SLCMs and land-based cruise missiles beyond 2500 km.

-- The US would agree not to ^{deployment of long-range cruise missiles} accelerate its ^{current} development programs which do not include deploying SLCM and land-based cruise missiles above 600 km during this period, i.e. no deployment during the interim period.

-- In the SALT TWO agreement that would be concluded now:
o Count or ban land-, sea- and air-launched intercontinental range (5500 km) cruise missiles.
o Heavy bombers with 600-2500 km ALCMs would be counted in the 1320 MIRV limit (or constrained by a separate sublimit) and 600-2500 km ALCMs would be banned on other aircraft.
o Ban ALCMs of range greater than 2500 km from heavy bombers.

o Cruise missiles would be defined as nuclear-armed. The US and Soviet package proposals as put forward during Secretary Kissinger's recent trip to Moscow are shown in the table on the next page.

o Seek reductions in 2400 aggregate to go into effect as soon as possible.

US

ICMs on Heavy Bombers

Ban above 2500 km;
Count H. B. w/ALCMs
in 1320

ALCMs on Aircraft Other than Heavy Bombers

Ban above 600 km

SLCMs on Submarines

Ban above 600 km

SLCMs on Surface Ships

Ban above 2500 km;
(1)* Count platforms in 1320
(2)* Limit of 25 platforms in 5-year agreement

Land-Launched Cruise Missiles

Ban above 2500 km

Backfire

(1) Count in 2400 aggregate after October 1977
(2) Limit of 275 in 5-year agreement

Aggregate

(1) 2400
(2) 2300 by October 1980 with 5-year agreement

* (1) Designates the US position at the start of the Moscow discussions;
* (2) designates the US position at the conclusion of the discussions.

Soviet

Ban above 2500 km;
Count H. B. w/ALCMs
in 1320; B-1 counts as three

Ban above 600 km


Ban above 600 km

Ban above 600 km

Ban above 600 km

Assurances on maximum operational radius and intercontinental capability

2300 or lower if cruise missile limits are accepted



ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTS

J

Numerical Limits on Backfire

A

include Backfire in the aggregate.
(Old Option IV)

• Backfire counted in the aggregate of 2400 after October 1977 (or beyond a level of 100).

• Heavy bombers and surface ship platforms with 600-2500 km cruise missiles counted under the 2400 and 1320 ceilings.

• Ban submarine-launched cruise missiles above 600 km.

• Ban land-based cruise missiles above 2500 km.

• Ban ALCMs above 600 km on aircraft other than heavy bombers.

• Cruise missiles defined as nuclear-armed.

B

Include Backfire in separate limit outside the aggregate with comparable limits on sea-based cruise missiles.


• Count Backfire in a separate limit of, ~~e.g.~~ 250.

• Apply a balancing limitation at the same level on sea-based cruise missile platforms.

• Parallel assurances against strategic use of hybrid systems including specific constraints such as a 2500 km limit on cruise missile range and prohibition on Backfire upgrading.

• Reduce aggregate, ~~e.g.~~ to 2150 by 1980, so aggregate plus separate limit total 2400.

• Cruise missiles defined as nuclear-armed.



ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTS (Continued)

II

Exclude Backfire from Strict SALT Limitation

Obtain heavy missile reductions in exchange for excluding Backfire from numerical limitations.

- Assurances against Backfire upgrading plus additional collateral constraints.
- Soviets freeze SS-18 deployment and dismantle ^{by 1980} a significant portion (100-200) of their SS-9s.
- Reduce aggregate to 2150 by 1980.
- Heavy bombers and surface ship platforms with 600-2500 km cruise missiles counted under the 400 and 1320 ceilings.
- Ban submarine-launched cruise missiles above 600 km.
- Ban land-based cruise missiles above 2500 km.
- Ban ALCMs above 600 km on aircraft other than heavy bombers.
- Cruise missiles defined as nuclear-armed.


Codify Vladivostok and Continue Negotiations

III

Defer a Permanent Solution on the Backfire and Cruise Missiles "Gray Area" Systems

Defer Backfire and some cruise missile limits for an agreed interim period.

- Interim period ^{would} ~~could~~ be, e.g., through the end of 1979 or 1980, from mid 1976 to October 1977.
- Interim period negotiations on Backfire, ~~SLCMs~~, and ~~land-based~~ cruise missiles.
- Interim period assurances against Backfire upgrading, ^{Arctic basing, tanker support, longer-range ASMs, and} acceleration of an agreed current deployment rate, etc.
- Interim period restraint on testing of ~~SLCMs~~ and ~~land-based~~ cruise missiles beyond, e.g., 2500 km, and on development, ~~possibly including~~ ^{possibly including} not deploying ~~ment of~~ long-range ~~SLCMs~~ and ~~land-based~~ cruise missiles, above 600 km.
- ~~Agree on reductions to 2150 by 1980 as objective.~~
- In the SALT TWO agreement:
 - Count or ban land-, sea- and air-launched ICBMs.
 - ~~Count heavy bombers with 600-2500 km ALCMs in the 1320-MIRV limit (or constrain by a separate sublimit) and ban 600-2500 km ALCMs on other aircraft.~~
 - Ban ALCMs above 2500 km from heavy bombers.
 - Cruise missiles defined as nuclear-armed.
 - Seek reductions.



ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTS (Continued)

II

Exclude Backfire from Strict SALT
Limitation

Obtain heavy missile reductions in exchange for excluding Backfire from numerical limitations.

- Assurances against Backfire upgrading plus additional collateral constraints.
- Soviets freeze SS-18 deployment and dismantle a significant portion (100-200) of their SS-9s.
- Reduce aggregate to 2150 by 1980.
- Heavy bombers and surface ship platforms with 600-2500 km cruise missiles counted under the 2400 and 1320 ceilings.
- Ban submarine-launched cruise missiles above 600 km.
- Ban land-based cruise missiles above 2500 km.
- Ban ALCMs above 600 km on aircraft other than heavy bombers.

III

Defer a Permanent Solution on
Backfire and Cruise Missiles

Defer Backfire and some cruise missile limits for an agreed interim period.

- Interim period could be, e.g., through the end of 1979 or 1980.
- Interim period negotiations on Backfire, SLCMs, and land-based cruise missiles.
- Interim period assurances against Backfire upgrading, tanker support, acceleration of an agreed current deployment rate, etc.
- Interim period restraint on testing of SLCMs and land-based cruise missiles beyond, e.g., 2500 km, and on development, possibly including not deploying SLCMs and land-based cruise missiles above 600 km.
- Agree on reductions to 2150 by 1980 as objective.
- In the SALT TWO agreement:

Count heavy bombers with 600-2500 km ALCMs in the 1320 MIRV limit (or constrain by a separate sublimit) and ban 600-2500 km ALCMs on other aircraft.



The United States proposes that the two sides proceed in the following manner:

1. The US and USSR would complete the agreement reached at Vladivostok, including all provisions which have been agreed upon since that meeting.

2. In particular, the new agreement would include provisions (a) to ban cruise missiles with a range over 600 km from all aircraft except those heavy bombers that are counted in the ceiling of 2400; (b) to ban development, testing and production of an air-launched cruise missile with a range greater than 2500 km; and (c) to consider each heavy bomber equipped with a cruise missile with a range between 600 and 2500 km as equivalent to a MIRVed missile and therefore counted against the ceiling of 1320 MIRVed vehicles.

3. On this basis agreement would be reached on the provisions for verification of deployment of MIRVed missiles.

4. For the period beginning with the signature of this new agreement through October 1980, the US and USSR would reach an understanding through an exchange of assurances or in a mutually acceptable document, on the following restraints: (a) for the interim period no sea-based or land-based cruise missiles would be tested to a range greater than 2500 km; (b) no sea-based or land-based cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 km would be operationally deployed on surface ships, on submarines,

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NSC - State Dept. Guidelines

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By dal NARA Date 12/17/04



or on land; (c) developmental programs for such missiles would not be otherwise constrained; (d) the Soviet side would provide assurances that the rate of production of the Soviet Backfire bomber would not be accelerated during this period and that its operational capabilities would not be improved; (e) both sides would agree that their common objective would be to reach a mutually acceptable solution to the problems of sea- and land-based cruise missiles and the Backfire bomber; (f) both sides would also agree that their common objective would be to reduce strategic armaments from the 2400 ceiling agreed at Vladivostok to a level of 2150 by 1980; (g) separate negotiations to achieve these objectives would begin no later than early 1977 with the aim of reaching a solution as soon as possible; these negotiations would not replace the commitment to the negotiations for a further comprehensive agreement, as currently reflected in the draft treaty being negotiated in Geneva.



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

SECRET/SENSITIVE

January 22, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

Secretary Kissinger asked me to provide you with the following report of his latest meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev.

1. Have concluded four-hour evening session which yielded important progress, specifically Soviet concession on throw weight and a willingness to consider reductions even beyond 2300. Moreover, we have narrowed differences on SLCMs and obtained concrete assurances on Backfire performance. It is clear that significant agreement is within our grasp, but decision will have to be made by you after my return.
2. Following are the details of the session. Brezhnev began by picking up the previous discussion with Gromyko on the definition of a heavy missile and the interpretation of the increase in silo dimensions by no more than 10-15 percent. He accepted my proposal of September that they would agree to define a heavy missile as any ICBM having a launching weight and throw weight greater than the largest light missile existing on either side at the time the agreement goes into effect. This means of course the SS-19 now becomes the threshold. In return, we agreed to their interpretation that the original silo could be increased by no more than 32 percent of its volume. This has no meaning as long as the throw weight definition has been agreed. So that represented a significant concession we have been insisting on for years in both SALT negotiations.
3. Then Brezhnev turned to a point-by-point discussion of the five-year interim agreement. First, he noted that we now agreed on banning ALCMs on any aircraft other than heavy bombers, banning any ALCM over 2500 KM, and banning cruise missiles over 600 KM on submarines. I confirmed this description of the status of the discussions. Brezhnev then went into the counting of B-1 as three MIRVed vehicles and B-52 as only one. I had said at the second meeting that we would agree to limit the number of ALCMs on the B-1 to no more than the number of any individual B-52.

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6

MR 99-20, # 6, State letter 9/15/99

By Lt NARA, Date 3/21/2000

(Of course, both aircraft are designed to carry 20.) Brezhnev argued against this but I feel this was mostly bargaining material. He then turned to the five-year interim agreement and rejected it both on grounds that it included Backfire and that they still wanted a ban on SLCMs over 600 KM on surface ships. He repeated their proposal that all land-based cruise missiles over 600 KM should be banned.

4. At this point he went over his assurances on the Backfire performance, and emphasized that he would make the limit of performance at 2200 KM a matter of record that would be binding for the duration of the agreement, if we would agree that this issue was completely settled and would not be raised in subsequent talks. He also agreed that there would be no upgrading of Backfire and that he would discuss specific criteria.

5. Then he made a new proposal, namely that they would agree to reduction to 2300 and "even larger" if we accepted their proposal on land-based and sea-based cruise missiles, that is to ban them over 600 KM.

6. He would not be drawn out further on the scale of reductions but certainly 2200 is possible in light of his statements. I probed to see whether they might come back to the counting of sea-based SLCMs as MIRV and this probably is not a firm position. I asked some questions about the criteria on Backfire performance, but it was clear that we will have to give them the specifics if we want to go in this direction.

7. I consider that we have now achieved significant concessions on the issues we have pressed: First, the MIRV counting rules can be confirmed in return for the ALCM counting as MIRV; second, we have set a limit on throw weight; third, we have the opportunity to dictate a set of limitations on Backfire performance; fourth, we have a chance at a significant reduction in Soviet forces, that would constitute almost 20 percent of their present force, and we can probably work out a cruise missile solution that counts land-based intercontinental cruise missiles and counts SLCMs on surface ships as MIRV. I could probably have wrapped up the agreement under normal conditions. In light of the discussions in Washington that Brent has reported I could not go further than to say this was a constructive initiative on Brezhnev's part, but that I would have to report it and we would reply within two or three weeks. Given the massive confusions reflected in the NSC meeting, I had no choice but to let the opportunity to exploit this breakthrough go by.

8. I raised Angola very privately with Brezhnev and warned him we would not be passive in the face of the Cuban expeditionary force. I then said it for the record in the large meeting, and Gromyko and I will meet on it tomorrow morning.

9. I believe that what has been achieved here in two days offers us the chance for an agreement that is clearly in our interest. I intend to brief the press that progress has been made, and that some issues have been settled while the differences on others have been narrowed.

10. Finally, it is imperative that everyone now be quiet until we can return and review where we stand.

SECRET

ATTACHMENT

CLARIFICATION OF RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO "DRAFT MEMORANDUM"

PARAGRAPH 1

It is important to include in the memo a generalized description of the concept of approach to the "interim agreement" negotiations. Although not necessary to specifically define the approach, some characterization is needed. Further, "initial" draft implies that where agreement was reached on provisions discussed at higher levels, such provisions will be incorporated in the new treaty. This overlooks the "package approach" of previous US positions.

PARAGRAPH 2

(1) Ban on "cruise missiles on other aircraft" should not be put in the treaty, but in the interim agreement. Until definitions of a "cruise missile" and a cruise missile "range" is achieved, the provision should be placed in the interim agreement package. How to adequately verify the "shorter" range threshold for cruise missiles is a major issue yet to be resolved.

(2) It is a mistake to denote the heavy bomber platform equivalent to a MIRVed missile. This will cause difficulties in separating out a missile verification counting rule from the ALCM heavy bomber platform MIRV counting rule.

(3) As verification range thresholds for cruise missile are very difficult and not tested to date, a review after a fixed period of time should be sought.

PARAGRAPH 4

(1) The interim agreement target completion date should be set as early as possible. The "gray area" concept calls for an approach wherein the issues are faced head-on, early enough before program deployments will be at a level when controls are meaningless. The concept calls for balanced and verifiable elements of mutual restraint, with a negotiating period short enough so that the sides are willing to exercise meaningful restraint while the issue is being negotiated.

Next the completion date of the interim agreement should not be set at a time which would lag the date when major procurement funding is requested. Otherwise, the procurement funds could be delayed by the Congress to coincide or slightly follow the interim agreement completion date.

In the case of SLCM, its initial deployment is scheduled for January 1980. Procurement request is January 1978. For the SLCM programs, the preferred date for completion of the interim agreement negotiations would be January 1978. January 1979 could result in a slippage of one year. However, Congress could authorize procurement with a hold on release of funds until January 1979.

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MR 89-70 #38 OSD Mr. 6/23/89

By KBH NARA, Date 6/29/89

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-2-

Such an approach could result in only a three month delay in the initial deployment date. Interim agreement completion dates of 1980, and beyond, would be unacceptable, in that leverage in the negotiations through the SLCM program would be lost - not to mention the planned defense needs for the program.

The mobile, intermediate range missile, SS-X-20, has a estimated range of 4600 kms. The SS-X-20 is a MIRVed missile with three RVs. Off-loading one RV could increase its operational range capability over the ICBM range threshold of 5500 km. As such, this system, with an initial projected deployment of 1250 missiles (on 300 launchers), is an important "gray area" system having early impact on the SALT THREE negotiations. The interim agreement completion date on cruise missiles and Backfire should be targeted at the earliest feasible date, to provide the framework for addressing other important issues, like the SS-X-20.

(2) Assurances on cruise missiles should be structured to be symmetrical with Backfire. In addition, development/deployment rates should be specified and agreed upon.

(3) Backfire assurances should be worded to leave neutral the issue as to its current intercontinental capability. Draft implies the bomber currently does not have an intercontinental capability.

PARAGRAPH 4 (e)

Reductions would preferably be sought in the SALT TWO and follow on negotiations -- not in the "gray area" interim agreement negotiations. It is not necessary to specify the 2150 figure. This was tied by the Soviets to the US accepting the Soviet position banning cruise missiles above 600 kms on sea-based and land-based systems.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

February 15, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *(D)*

Attached are memoranda which may be useful to you in connection with this evening's meeting with Don and Henry.

As a result of the NSC meeting and subsequent meeting in your office, I prepared a draft note to be passed to the Soviets, embodying Option III (Tab A). I passed a copy of the note to Henry and to Don.

The State comments are at Tab B. They are basically editorial in nature and the bulk of them have been incorporated.

Don's response is at Tab C. It raises a number of issues, some of which are substantive and basic to the character of Option III. A discussion of those major issues is at Tab D. A spread sheet, containing a new draft of a note to the Soviets, with the substantive Defense changes in brackets, is at Tab E.

For your reference, the chart of the main elements of Option III as shown at the NSC meeting is at Tab F.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.

MR 89-17, #33 NSC Ltr. 10/27/89

By KBH NARA, Date 12/7/89

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.

MR 89-17, #34 MSC LH. 10/27/89

By KBH, NARA, Date 12/7/89

The United States proposes that the two sides proceed in the following manner:

1. The US and USSR agree to complete, and sign as soon as possible, a treaty incorporating: the agreement reached at Vladivostok, the other provisions which have been agreed upon in high level discussions since that meeting, and those provisions which are under discussion in Geneva.
2. In addition, the treaty would include provisions (a) to ban testing or deployment of cruise missiles with a range over 600 km from all aircraft except those heavy bombers that are counted in the ceiling of 2400; (b) to ban development, testing or production of any air-launched cruise missile with a range greater than 2500 km; and (c) to consider each heavy bomber equipped with a cruise missile with a range over 600 and up to 2500 km as equivalent to a MIRVed missile and therefore to be counted against the ceiling of 1320 MIRVed vehicles.
3. On this basis the treaty would also include an agreement on the provisions for the verification of the deployment of MIRVed missiles, along the lines tentatively agreed in high level discussions and, as well, agreement on the distinction between heavy and non-heavy ICBM's.
4. The US and USSR would also conclude an interim agreement for the period beginning with the signature of the new treaty through

October 1980, to include the following constraints: (a) during the interim period no sea-based or land-based cruise missiles would be tested to a range greater than 2500 km; (b) during this period no sea-based or land-based cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 km would be operationally deployed on surface ships, on submarines, or on land; (c) the Soviet side would provide assurances that during this period the rate of production of the Soviet Backfire would not be accelerated beyond the current rate, that the operational capabilities would not be improved, and, through other assurances to be agreed, that the Backfire will not be deployed or operated in an intercontinental mode; (d) both sides would agree that their common objective would be to reach a mutually acceptable solution to the problems of sea- and land-based cruise missiles and the Backfire bomber as soon as possible. Negotiations to this end could begin immediately following the signing of the treaty based on Vladivostok; (e) as part of this interim agreement both sides would also agree that their common intention is to reduce strategic armaments from the 2400 ceiling agreed at Vladivostok to a level of 2150 by 1980; (f) negotiations on the resolution of the issues covered by the interim agreement would not replace the commitment, as currently reflected in the draft treaty being negotiated in Geneva, to conduct further negotiations beginning in 1977 for a comprehensive agreement.

with JANUARY 1989
change

The United States proposes that the two sides proceed in the following manner:

1. The US and USSR agree to complete, and sign as soon as possible, a treaty incorporating: the agreement reached at Vladivostok, the other provisions which have been agreed upon in high level discussions since that meeting, and those provisions which are ^{(already settled) or still} under discussion in Geneva.

2. In addition, the treaty would include provisions (a) to ban testing or deployment of cruise missiles with a range over 600 km from all aircraft except those heavy bombers that are counted in the ceiling of 2400; (b) to ban development, testing or production of any air-launched cruise missile with a range greater than 2500 km; and (c) to consider each heavy bomber equipped with a cruise missile with a range over 600 and up to 2500 km as equivalent to a MIRVed missile and therefore to be counted against the ceiling of 1320 MIRVed vehicles.

3. On this basis the treaty would also include an agreement on the provisions for the verification of the deployment of MIRVed missiles, along the lines tentatively agreed in high level discussions and, as well, agreement on the distinction between heavy and non-heavy ICBM's ^(and the definition of a heavy missile.)

4. The US and USSR would also conclude an interim agreement for the period beginning with the signature of the new treaty through

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.

MR 89-22, #35 NSC Ltr. 10/27/89

By KAH NARA, Date 12/7/89

October 1980, to include the following ^{mutual} constraints: (a) during the interim period no sea-based or land-based cruise missiles would be tested to a range greater than 2500 km; (b) during this period no sea-based or land-based cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 km would be operationally deployed on surface ships, on submarines, or on land; (c) the Soviet side would provide assurances that during this period the

rate of production of the Soviet Backfire would not be accelerated beyond

the current rate, that the ^{aircraft} operational capabilities would not be improved,

in a way that would enhance its intercontinental capabilities and, through other assurances to be agreed, that the Backfire will not

be deployed or operated in an intercontinental mode; (d) both sides would

agree that their common objective would be to reach a mutually acceptable

^{definitive} solution to the problems of sea- and land-based cruise missiles and the

Backfire bomber as soon as possible. Negotiations to this end could

begin immediately following the signing of the treaty based on Vladivostok;

(e) as part of this interim agreement both sides would also agree that

their common intention is to reduce strategic armaments from the 2400

ceiling agreed at Vladivostok to a level of 2150 by 1980; (f) negotiations

on the resolution of the issues covered by the interim agreement would

not replace the commitment, as currently reflected in the draft treaty

being negotiated in Geneva, to conduct further negotiations beginning in

1977 for a comprehensive agreement.

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10d

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

14 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

FROM: Donald H. Rumsfeld



Attached are our line-in line-out revisions to the draft you sent today.

The changes reflect the points made more fully in my memo of 12 February 1976, the meeting with the President on 13 February 1976, and the information I have subsequently gathered at his request concerning the SLCM IOC.

Also attached is a memo elaborating on the reasons why these revisions are necessary.

Attachments

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

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~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE

February 15, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT: Outstanding SALT Issues

We have the following issues still to be resolved before completing a reply to the Soviets on SALT, based on the concept of completing Vladivostok and concluding an interim agreement covering Backfire and cruise missiles:

- (1) the duration of an interim agreement: ending in October 1977, or October 1980;
- (2) the composition of the interim agreement: to include only cruise missiles and Backfire or other "grey area" systems as well;
- (3) how to handle cruise missiles on aircraft other than heavy bombers: to ban their deployment through the Vladivostok agreement, or keep as an unresolved issue;
- (4) whether to specify "nuclear-armed" cruise missiles or to keep the definitional problem open;
- (5) how to tie in possible reductions: as a goal of the successful conclusion of the interim agreement, or as a goal of SALT III, or both:

* * *

I. The Duration of the Interim Agreement:

The rationale of the interim agreement was to permit Vladivostok to be completed by setting aside those elements where agreement is not yet possible; but to set them aside in such a way that the Soviets would have an incentive to agree. The incentive would be (a) to accept the counting

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.

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MR 89-17, #39 NSC 1st. 10/27/89

By KBH, NARA, Date 12/1/89

of ALCM on heavy bombers as MIRVs in the Vladivostok agreement through 1985, and (b) to constrain both Backfire and U. S. cruise missiles during the interim period, so that a definitive solution is not automatically precluded. To achieve this, the original idea was to establish a duration for at least 1979-80, as discussed in the NSC, so that the Soviets would see some actual restraint on deployment compared to a potential Initial Operational capability of early 1980 for SLCM; it was on this basis that we could proposed a constraint on Backfire rates of production or deployment at current levels. Thus both sides would proceed with their current programs, but without acceleration.

An alternative idea is to proposed an interim agreement, without specifying its termination date at this time, but advancing a "target date" for completion by October 1977; to propose that we not accelerate our developmental programs, which would in fact mean not to deploy before early 1980, but not to make this a precise commitment; to propose that Backfire production and deployment be limited to current and agreed rates; and in any case, not specify a termination date that would go beyond our major procurement requirements, i. e. the January 1979 budget presentations.

This alternative concept raises certain problems: (1) would we implement the Vladivostok agreement in October 1977, if the interim agreement negotiations had collapsed? (2) what incentive is there for the Soviets in accepting a target date, that in fact, applies no limits whatsoever on U. S. deployment; (3) we would face a situation in which Backfire might still be constrained and Soviet cruise missiles would run free, but the U. S. would make few if any deployments between October 1977 and early 1980s.

On the other hand, a later date beyond late 1980, has the disadvantage that our deployment programs are frozen, while Backfire is being deployed, even though at a constrained rate; our failure to deploy as currently planned risks Congressional refusal to appropriate the funds for actual procurement. In addition, we have the basic, underlying issue of the impact of our proposal on the Soviet leaders; proposing an early expiration of October 1977, could be interpreted as not sufficiently serious to warrant considering the basic concept. In this regard, it is not much different from the pure deferral, as suggested in early conversations and rejected by the Soviets. If it is rejected, we may have exhausted our fallbacks.

II. The Composition of the Interim Agreement:

The choice is between confining the Interim Agreement to the unresolved cruise missile issues and Backfire, or leaving an opening to bring in other

Soviet systems, such as that intermediate range ballistic missile (SS-X-20), which could be upgraded to an ICBM;

- the argument for an expanded definition of grey areas is that it establishes the principle for the future, when other weapons systems may be created that do not clearly fall into SALT, but are not covered in any other arms control negotiation;
- the argument against is (a) it transforms SALT into a negotiation that ultimately will include all FBS; (b) it impinges on the interests of our Allies, since the Soviets will not only raise FBS, but also nuclear systems of the British and French, if we raise weapons targetted only against Europe or Asia.

III. How to handle cruise missiles on aircraft other than heavy bombers:

The proposition put to the Soviets, and tentatively agreed by them was (a) cruise missiles over 600 km in range would not be deployed on aircraft other than heavy bombers; (b) no air launched cruise missile would be developed, tested or produced with a range greater than 2,500 km, i. e. they would be banned altogether; and (c) heavy bombers equipped with cruise missiles between 600 km and 2,500 km would be counted as a MIRVed vehicle.

The choice is to consolidate this entire agreement in Vladivostok, or to agree only on counting ALCMs on heavy bombers as MIRVed -- in the latter case, we would (a) permit "development" but not testing of an air launched cruise missile with a range greater than 2,500 km; (b) permit testing on aircraft other than heavy bombers of air launched cruise missiles (c) leave open deployment on other aircraft.

There is a basic problem with this latter position: if "development" is permitted of an air-launched cruise missile beyond 2,500 km in range and testing up to that range is permitted on all aircraft it makes the restrictions on ALCMs on heavy bombers counting as MIRV essentially meaningless, because the U. S. and the USSR would be free, as would the Soviets to deploy an air launched cruise missile of any range on any other aircraft if the interim agreement collapses.

IV. Whether to specify nuclear-armed cruise missiles?

By specifying at this point the definitional problem, we alert the Soviets to the implication of "nuclear-armed; they would then conclude that

conventionally-armed cruise missiles would not be covered by the Vladivostok treaty, and thus would be permitted at any range, on any platform.

- The argument for doing so, is that the definition is crucial to all limitations; if we are not to deploy conventionally armed cruise missiles, we may not be prepared to accept any given limitation on range or platforms;
- The argument for leaving the definitional problem aside, for now, is that it introduces a new element, at the very point we are trying to persuade the Soviets to accept a concept for proceeding; second it is not critical under the interim agreement, since no distinction would be applied in the interim period except for a limit on testing beyond agreed ranges (2, 500 km).

V. How to tie in a commitment for reductions:

The basic problem is that the Soviets have linked a willingness to reduce even beyond 2, 300 to a solution of the cruise missile problem. We are in the process of making a counterproposal that does not solve the cruise missiles problem; but since reductions are clearly in our net interest can we persuade the Soviets to make a more definitive commitment to reductions

- If we put the commitment to reductions in the Vladivostok treaty, the Soviets will probably only agree to the generalized commitment of "possible reductions" -- which is already agreed in Geneva;
- On the other hand, we might persuade them to state a common intention to reduce to say 2, 150, if it is linked to a successful conclusion of the Backfire and cruise missile issues. In other words, we are turning the Soviet position around: we will reduce as they propose when the interim agreement issues are resolved.

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except # 1, # 2, # 10f

and # 7, 10a, 10b, 10c, 10g.

and # 5 and 10d

and # 6 and 9a-9d