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	1. Briefing Book on Civil Defense Policy for NSC Meeting, 12/15/76		
1a. Cover	Cover sheet (1 p.) DECLASSIFIED 12/13/01 <i>dal</i>	ca.12/15/76	A
1b. Index	Table of Contents (1 p.) DECLASSIFIED 12/13/01	ca.12/15/76	A
1c. Talking Points	Talking Points for Secretary of Defense (2 pp.) SANITIZED 12/13/01	ca.12/15/76	A
1d. Talking Points	Talking Paper for the Secretary of Defense and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (3 pp.) SANITIZED 12/13/01	ca.12/15/76	A
1e. Background	Background and Discussion for Talking Paper (2 pp.) DECLASSIFIED 12/13/01	ca.12/15/76	A
1f. Memo	E.C. Aldridge, Jr. to Dr. James P. Wade (5 pp.) SANITIZED 12/13/01	12/13/76	A
1g. Precis	DOD Precis of Response (4 pp.) SANITIZED 12/13/01	ca.12/15/76	A
1h. Report	Report on U.S. Civil Defense Policy (15 pp.) SANITIZED 12/13/01	12/3/76	A
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1j. charts	Briefing Charts (11 pp.) SANITIZED 12/13/01	ca.12/15/76	A

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WHM, 5/3/85

SECDEF



12/15

This is the book
Jim Wade prepared
on Civil Defense, thinking
it would be an agenda
item today. Brent is
trying to defer the discussion.
Talker is good. Staser

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NSC MEETING, 1500
WEDNESDAY, 15 DECEMBER 1976

U.S. CIVIL DEFENSE POLICY - NSSM 244

Copy for: Secretary of Defense

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MR 98-15 #1; OSD ltr 7/31/01

By del NARA, Date 12/11/01

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NSC Meeting

NSSM 244, U.S. Civil Defense Policy

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Tab C (Scan)	Background paper explaining difference in fatality numbers briefed to the President and in NSSM 244 Response
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Talking Points for Secretary of Defense for
NSC Meeting, 15 December 1976, 1500 Hours

SUBJECT: Civil Defense Policy, NSSM 244

Status US Civil Defense

- Current US CD program and funding (\$2.5 million federal dollars) inadequate.
 - Focuses almost exclusively on population protection. Does not include economic/industrial protection programs which are important to assure US recovery.
 - Given one-week warning, adds only a few million survivors to the [REDACTED] who would survive without CD.
 - Requires unrealistic one-year period of warning for surge to increase population survival to [REDACTED] US population.
 - Not until mid 80s will it give US a nationwide city crisis relocation capability.

Strategic Importance

- US capability to protect US population in event of nuclear attack important on moral and political grounds.
 - US places high value on human life
 - Population surviving is significant for post-war recovery
 - US ability or lack of ability to protect US population could affect US willingness or perceived willingness to react to Soviet threats at thresholds between non-use, limited employment of nuclear weapons.
- While Soviet CD as we currently assess it does not degrade US deterrent, Soviet hardening and dispersal programs could pose problems for our strategic objectives and weapons acquisition and employment policies in the future.

Relation CD to NSSM 246

- Enhanced US population protection program, with emphasis on planning for population relocation, is called for by NSSM 246 strategic alternatives S-3 - S-5.

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CD Policy Recommendation

- US should move toward a one-week warning/surge capability to protect about 3/4 of the US population through a mix of in-being fallout shelters and crisis relocation planning.
- One week warning of likelihood of Soviet attack is reasonable for planning purposes.
- Cost is modest; eventually \$215 million federal per year. (FY 78 request is \$107 million; modest increase would be desirable. OMB position is that the CD budget should remain at about the current level -- \$88 million, FY 77 plus inflation--pending a Presidential policy decision on US civil defense.)
- Such a program could not be construed as part of a US attempt to develop a first-strike capability since it would depend on surging capabilities in a crisis and is moderate in cost.

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Talking Paper for the Secretary of Defense and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (NSC Meeting, 15 December 1976)

SUBJECT: NSSM 244, U.S. Civil Defense Policy (C)

PURPOSE OF MEETING

To discuss the major issues relating to U.S. civil defense (CD) policy and provide appropriate background information for a Presidential decision on future U.S. civil defense policy and programs.

ISSUES

For decision:

- U.S. CD policy and programs;
- Relationship between CD preparedness and natural disaster preparedness; including funding arrangements between the Federal government and local and State governments.

For discussion:

- Implications of U.S. and Soviet CD programs for the strategic balance and NSDM 242;
- Federal CD management options.

RECOMMENDED POSITION

- DoD believes that the Response adequately discusses alternative U.S. civil defense policies and programs. We support the study recommendation that U.S. strategic policies be continually assessed as we learn more about Soviet CD. We note that the study presents opposing views of the strategic implications of civil defense, and especially the significance of Soviet civil defense measures for current U.S. strategic objectives. We believe that these views should be considered in the evaluation of options for U.S. strategy in NSSM 246.

- With respect to the future U.S. civil defense policy, DoD believes that the U.S. objective should be to enhance the U.S. post-attack survival and recovery capability. Accordingly, while we believe that the U.S. can and should take steps now to improve U.S. population survival, we also support the Response recommendation for follow-on studies of the additional requirements for enhancing U.S. national recovery.

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
- Current US CD program (\$82.5 million federal dollars) depends on one-year surge to add [redacted] survivors to the [redacted] who, because they are outside the likely areas of nuclear attack, would survive a large-scale attack with no CD. Given only one week of warning to surge CD capabilities, the current program would add only a few million survivors to the [redacted].

- DOD believes that the US should improve its current population protection capability to assure the survival of about 3/4 of the US population. We believe that the civil defense program should focus on a "one-week surge" capability for crisis relocation coupled with a nationwide fallout protection capability. We recommend further work to refine the costs and requirements for these capabilities. In the interim, DOD recommends a modest increase in funding for CD in FY 78 so that the US can progressively develop an effective crisis surge capability. As planning progresses and the requirements for this capability become better understood, full funding to provide a one-week surge capability to protect about 3/4 of the US population (currently estimated at \$215 million) could be warranted. We recommend against programs which depend upon massive blast protection.

- With respect to the relationship between CD preparedness and natural disaster preparedness, DOD believes that Option 3 (managing CD as a predominantly attack-oriented program which permits federal assistance to State and local natural disaster activities which benefit attack preparedness) is the most politically practical approach.

- DOD supports the Response recommendations for further study of Soviet civil defense and comparative US/Soviet recovery capability. Review of federal management arrangements and recodification of Executive orders concerning civil defense and preparedness activities should be accomplished expeditiously.

BACKGROUND/DISCUSSION: See enclosure


Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)


Director, Joint Staff

Coordination: (continued on page 3)

Coordination:

Concurred
Director, Defense, Research and
Engineering

Concurred
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller)

Non-Concurred, see elaborating
Memorandum (attached)
Director, Planning and Evaluation

Concurred
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
(Atomic Energy)

Concurred
Director, Net Assessment

Concurred
Director, Defense Civil Preparedness
Agency

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BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION FOR TALKING PAPER ON NSSM 244

BACKGROUND

- The NSSM 244 Response reviews U.S. civil defense policies and programs, taking into account the current status of the U.S. and Soviet CD programs, their potential impact on the strategic nuclear balance, and their implications for the U.S. nuclear weapons employment policy (NSDM 242). Tab A summarizes the NSSM response.

DISCUSSION

Strategic Implications

- DoD concerned about both capability and purpose of Soviet CD.
- U.S. does not use Soviet fatalities as a measure of our ability to deter attack, but rather depends upon its ability to destroy those political, economic, and selected military targets critical to the enemy's post-attack power and early recovery as a major power.
- DoD believes that while we cannot confidently assess intent, Soviet CD, when viewed in conjunction with Soviet strategic offensive and defensive programs and ABM R&D, suggests Soviet pursuit of a damage limiting or war-winning strategy. In contrast, the Department of State considers the Soviet program a Soviet hedge against nuclear war which will not materially increase Soviet willingness to risk a nuclear exchange nor undermine the deterrent value of U.S. strategic forces.

Civil Defense

- The majority of DoD participants believe that if, after review of the study, the U.S. should adopt as its CD objective a "one-week surge capability", then a modest increase in funding above the currently projected FY 78 budget would be warranted. P&E believes that the \$25 million increase reflected in the currently projected FY 78 budget would be sufficient to begin development of this capability.
- DoD believes the U.S. should upgrade its CD population protection measures as a "hedge" in the event of nuclear attack and in order to enhance U.S. post-attack survival and recovery capability.
- DoD believes that U.S. can improve basic CD capability under any of the alternative strategic policies now under consideration in NSSM 246. All recent work suggests that a program which depends on one-week surge is reasonable. A large-scale CD program emphasizing blast shelters is likely to be economically and politically unacceptable in this country. Furthermore, it could be destabilizing if Soviets believed it was integral to a U.S. shift toward first-strike strategy.

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MR 98-15, #5; OSD et al 7/31/01

By del NARA Date 12/11/01

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Enclosure

- OSD and JCS believe that our current and projected weapons' acquisition and employment policies and programs are adequate for SIOP execution through the mid-1980s. However, significant improvements to and expansion of those parts of the Soviet civil defense program concerned with dispersing and hardening industrial capacity and protecting political and military leadership could require changes in these policies and programs later on.

- U.S. ability (or lack of ability) to protect the US population could be politically significant. The psychological impact of the perceptions of the likelihood of heavy casualties in the U.S., whether or not projections of Soviet losses were similar, could affect U.S. decision-making at thresholds between non-use, limited employment, and full-scale employment of nuclear weapons.

- With the exception of P&E, DOD believes that NSSM 244 underplays the advantage in crisis coercion capability that might accrue to the Soviets from a significant superiority in crisis relocation capability.

- The majority of the DOD participants believe that an asymmetrical advantage in crisis relocation capability could provide the Soviets with an effective crisis coercion capability against the U.S. On the other hand, P&E notes that the NSSM 244 Response states (1) that a significant superiority in crisis relocation capability would not provide the Soviets with an effective crisis coercion capability against the U.S., (2) that U.S. civil defense measures are not appropriate for crisis management, and (3) that evacuation of the Soviet urban population would undoubtedly cause all U.S. strategic forces to be brought to full alert status, thereby mitigating the effectiveness of such Soviet civil defense efforts to limit damage from a U.S. attack. Other OSD offices and the JCS agree that bringing U.S. forces to full alert status could mitigate the effectiveness of the Soviet actions. However, they believe that even in this case, without an effective U.S. crisis relocation capability, U.S. population vulnerability would remain high. It is this unilateral vulnerability which could affect U.S. action or allied support of the U.S. during the crisis. P&E notes that US population vulnerability would still remain high (~60M prompt fatalities) even with full implementation of the recommended CD program.

- Under the current US strategic policy, the U.S. relies on the capability of its strategic offensive forces to deter nuclear attack on the U.S. and to assist in controlling escalation. As a consequence, the U.S. civil defense program is essentially a hedge against the failure of deterrence and escalation. As such, contrary to current declaratory policy, civil defense currently is not a significant factor in the U.S. deterrence posture.

- DOD believes that while strategic offensive forces are the prime determinants of our ability to maintain deterrence, the relative survival and recovery capabilities of the U.S. and USSR can also affect the strategic balance.

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, PLANNING AND EVALUATION

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

13 December 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. JAMES P. WADE, JR.

SUBJECT: U.S. Civil Defense Policy (NSSM-244) (S)

Jim:

I have reviewed the memorandums and "talking points" paper you prepared jointly with the Joint Staff for DepSecDef pertaining to the NSSM-244 study. In general I agree with the memos and paper, but I am concerned about those sections (page 2, last paragraph, memo for DepSecDef; page 2, third paragraph, memo for Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; and page 3, third paragraph, talking points for DepSecDef) that tend to link civil defense with crisis coercion/management.

My concern is twofold. First, the NSSM-244 study (chaired by DoD) concluded that surging civil defense would not be among the effective or approximate means of dealing with a major crisis and should not be considered an appropriate tool for crisis management. Are we now disagreeing with that conclusion? If so, it puts DoD in the awkward position of disagreeing with the NSSM-244 response which we chaired. Second, as written, the paragraphs previously noted are illogical and misleading. If we all agree that surging US strategic forces would mitigate the effectiveness of Soviet crisis relocation of their population, how can we assert that "an asymmetrical advantage in crisis relocation capability could provide the Soviets with an effective crisis coercion capability against the U.S." If what you're really concerned about is that the vulnerability of the U.S. population is high with [redacted] or without [redacted] an effective U.S. crisis relocation capability, why don't you say so and not link civil defense population survival measures with crisis coercion/management.

Furthermore, all of DoD members agree to the program we should pursue. We should not weaken our uniform and rational position while highlighting a secondary consideration in the selection of a Civil Defense. Subject to the deletion of the paragraphs discussed above (and noted), I concur with the memos and talking points and recommend they be sent to DepSecDef.

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MR 98-15, #6; OSD JtV 7131101

By dal NARA Date 12/11/01
Attachment

Pitt
E. C. Aldridge, Jr.

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Civil Defense

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- DoD believes the U.S. should continue its CD population protection measures as a "hedge" in the event of nuclear attack and in order to enhance U.S. post-attack survival and recovery capability.

- DoD believes that U.S. can improve basic CD capability under any of the alternative strategic policies now under consideration in NSSM 246. All recent work suggests that a program which depends on one week surge is reasonable. A large-scale CD program emphasizing blast shelters is likely to be economically and politically unacceptable in this country. Furthermore, it could be destabilizing if Soviets believed it was integral to a U.S. shift toward first-strike strategy.

Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)

Director, Joint Staff

Coordination:

M. L. Harris . 13 DEC 1976

Director, Defense, Research and
Engineering

Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller)

Director, Planning and Evaluation

Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense (Atomic Energy)

Director, Net Assessment

Director, Defense Civil
Preparedness Agency

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Assistant Secretary of Defense
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Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)

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Coordination:

Director, Defense, Research and
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Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)

Director, Joint Staff

Coordination:

Director, Defense, Research and
Engineering

Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller)

Director, Planning and Evaluation

[Signature] 12/13

Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense (Atomic Energy)

Director, Net Assessment

Director, Defense Civil
Preparedness Agency

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Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)

Director, Joint Staff

Coordination:

Director, Defense, Research and
Engineering

Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller)

Director, Planning and Evaluation

Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense (Atomic Energy)

Director, Net Assessment

John E. Davis 12/13/76

Director, Defense Civil
Preparedness Agency

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SECRETDOD PRECIS OF RESPONSE TO NSSM 244, U.S. CIVIL DEFENSEKey Points

- Status of U.S. civil defense:
 - Current program focuses almost entirely on saving population and local/state government leaders; does not include programs for protection of industry or other societal functions necessary for recovery although CD legislation includes property protection.
 - Provides incomplete coverage -- one year surge required to increase population survival from full-scale nuclear attack to [REDACTED] more than would survive without CD).
 - Effective nationwide crisis relocation capability for high risk areas unavailable until mid-1980s.
- Status of Soviet civil defense:
 - Soviet CD program more encompassing. Probable priorities: protection of key leaders in hardened shelter, protection of economic and military facilities and essential workers through dispersal and hardening programs, protection of general population in-place and through evacuation.
 - U.S. uncertain about magnitude and effectiveness of Soviet CD preparedness because of major gaps in intelligence data, but concerned by continuing Soviet CD efforts.
- Strategic Implication of U.S. and Soviet CD:
 - Current U.S. CD policy and program have no direct impact on U.S. strategic weapon acquisition and employment policies; CD complements the latter by helping to enhance U.S. post-attack survival and recovery.
 - Soviet measures to protect the general population do not affect current U.S. strategic weapons objectives or acquisition and employment policies, since the latter require the ability to destroy political, economic and military installations critical to post-war recovery and not population per se.
 - Soviet measures to protect key leaders and economic and military facilities affect current U.S. strategic objectives and weapons acquisition and employment policies.

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MR 98-15, #7; OSD Ltr 7/31/01

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- Currently, Soviet hardening and dispersal programs do not appear to degrade U.S. assured retaliatory capability or require modifications to NSDM 242.
 - Significant improvements to and expansion of the Soviet CD program could require changes in current U.S. nuclear weapons employment and acquisition policies.
 - Relative rate of recovery of U.S. and USSR significant for post-war power. Population surviving is significant, but other resources (e.g., industrial capability) are also required.
 - The presence (or absence) of a population protection capability could affect U.S. decision-makers' willingness or perceived willingness to react to Soviet threats, at thresholds between non-use, limited employment, and full scale employment of nuclear weapons.
- Alternate National Objectives
- Three alternatives for U.S. strategy referred to NSSM 246:
 - Continued reliance on offensive forces and continued downgrading of CD in strategic planning; CD considered essentially a hedge and as not affecting deterrence.
 - Addition to U.S. strategic objectives of requirement for defensive programs for an assured level of U.S. survival; would lead to larger CD program, but no major changes in other defensive programs.
 - Revision of strategy to requirement for both offensive and defensive forces to achieve comparable-to-Soviet recovery capability; would lead to improved counterforce as well as enhanced defensive measures. Latter could go beyond CD.
- Alternate U.S. CD Population Protection Policies
- Two issues were presented for decision:
 - What level of U.S. population survival should U.S. CD seek to assure?
 - Should U.S. CD focus on in-being readiness or assume a period of warning for surging the CD system to full capacity?
- Alternate U.S. CD Programs
- Options developed in terms of numbers of survivors, nature of protection, and cost. Reaction time assumed available varies from minutes (in-place) to years (surge). In-place programs more expensive, have greater visibility and potential international costs, are less dependent on adequate warning and decision-maker reaction for effectiveness than surge.

ILLUSTRATIVE POPULATION PROTECTION PROGRAM OPTIONS

LEVEL OF U.S. POPULATION SURVIVAL OBJECTIVE	OPTION THRUST	BASIS OF PROTECTION	IN-BEING CAPABILITY	ANNUAL FEDERAL COST, IN \$ MILLIONS (BASED ON A TEN-YEAR PERIOD)			
				SURGE PERIOD REQUIRED 1 Week	1 Month	1 Year	
1	1/3	Discontinue most Federal CD programs	Rely on capability of State and local governments	\$10.M	10	10	10
2	1/2	Continue approximate current level of effort as a CD "Insurance Policy"	Mix of in-being fallout shelters and preparation for crisis surging	\$375.M	135	100	75
3a	3/4	Significantly enhance CD capability	Above, plus crisis relocation planning	Not Possible	215	200	175
3b	3/4	↓	Above, plus in-place blast shelters	\$1800 M	435	425	340
3c	3/4+	↓	Above, plus additional in-place blast shelters	\$4500 M	500	485	400

- Alternate CD/Natural Disaster Relationship:

- U.S. has difficulty in achieving CD effectiveness because States and local governments primarily concerned with natural disaster preparedness; participation in CD matching programs linked to natural disaster concerns.

- Resolution of dilemma should be contingent on goals and program selected on federal level. Three options possible:
 - Manage CD as an exclusively attack-oriented program entirely funded by Federal government. This prohibits the provision of technical assistance or use of CD funds for natural disaster preparedness activities and changes current federal/state matching fund arrangements.

 - Manage CD as an exclusively attack-oriented program funded by a mix of 100% Federal funding and matching funds programs. This prohibits use of technical assistance or use of CD funds for natural disaster preparedness activities, but retains current federal/state matching fund arrangements.

 - Manage CD as a predominantly attack-oriented program which permits Federal assistance to State and local natural disaster activities which benefit attack preparedness. This permits limited natural disaster preparedness technical assistance and funding (e.g., selected warning and communications equipment, tests and exercises, planning activities) when closely related to civil defense activities and retains current federal/state matching fund arrangements.

- Alternate Federal Management Arrangements:

- Currently, difficult to pinpoint agency responsibility for emergency preparedness in general and specifically for CD.

- Selection of management option to reduce confusion should be deferred until after CD program selected.

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NSSM 244

REPORT ON
UNITED STATES
CIVIL DEFENSE POLICY

by an

AD HOC INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP

3 December 1976

Classified by ATSD(AE)
Subject to General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Automatically Downgraded at Two-Year
Intervals. Declassified on 12/31/84

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report responds to the NSSM 244 requirement to review US civil defense policy. It describes the current US civil defense program, offers alternative civil defense policies and programs, describes the Soviet civil defense program, and then assesses the potential impact on the strategic nuclear balance of the US and Soviet civil defense programs.

PRINCIPAL ISSUES

The principal issues for decision addressed in the study are:

- What is the most appropriate US civil defense policy and what are the appropriate programs to support this policy?
- What should be the relationship between civil defense preparedness and natural disaster preparedness, including funding arrangements between the Federal Government and State and local governments?

Other major issues analyzed in the study are:

- What is the potential impact on the strategic balance of US and Soviet civil defense programs?
- What are the implications of US and Soviet civil defense programs for the concept of flexible response, as embodied in current US nuclear weapons employment policy (NSDM 242)?
- What should be the management arrangements within the US Government for civil defense programs and development of civil defense policy?

CURRENT U.S. CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM

The Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 states that there shall be "a system of civil defense to protect life and property in the United States against attack". However, the law does not specify the capability or level of readiness of that system.

The current US civil defense (CD) program focuses almost entirely on saving population in the event of nuclear attack. It does not include activities directed to the protection of industry, although authority for such activities is contained within the definition of "civil defense" as set forth in the Federal Civil Defense Act. (Nor does the current program include protection against chemical or biological attack.) The major elements of the current CD program are:

- Survey of fallout shelter spaces in existing buildings (buildings were marked with shelter signs until 1970);
- Plans for stocking of these shelter spaces with food and water (food stocks in current shelter spaces have become unfit for use);

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- Maintenance of a national warning system;
- Development of local plans for use of best-available existing shelter;
- Development of State and local capabilities for conducting emergency operations (based on emergency plans for use of existing forces and resources, e.g., police and fire forces, physicians, hospitals, news media);
- Training and equipping of Radiological Defense Officers and Monitors to detect and analyze postattack radiation hazards; and
- Establishment of Emergency Operating Centers to:
 - Protect key State and local leaders and ensure the continuity of State and local government, and
 - Control civil defense operations.

There is incomplete coverage in virtually all of the above program areas, with consequent impact on program readiness. The program currently relies on crisis actions ("surging") to develop or rebuild capabilities needed to protect the population. For example, if a large-scale attack occurred following an intense crisis of about one week, the current program could only add a few million survivors to the estimated 80 million who, because they would be outside the likely areas of attack, probably would survive a large-scale attack with no civil defense. It is estimated that at least one year of intensive effort (i.e., essentially one year of warning time) would be required for the current program to achieve its full potential of saving about [REDACTED] additional people (about [REDACTED] total survivors).

Efforts at developing the capability to relocate population from high risk areas during a crisis have recently begun; however, at the projected level of effort, nationwide planning is not expected to be completed until the mid-1980s, with an initial, low-confidence capability for crisis evacuation expected by about 1980.

RELATIONSHIP OF CIVIL DEFENSE TO NATIONAL SURVIVAL AND RECOVERY

The protection of population is only one element (albeit an important one) in a balanced program for enhancing national survival and recovery following a nuclear attack. Current US capabilities also include protection and dispersal of key Federal Government leaders (outside the formal CD program) and some State and local leaders. Other elements of a balanced program would include the protection of industry, and the protection of other economic operations that could contribute to postattack rehabilitation and eventual recovery.

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In this context, the protection of industry may be important, but also may be very difficult to achieve. In order to better understand the requirements for and capability to protect industry, further studies are required. These studies should

- Determine various measures and definitions of national recovery;
- Provide a means of determining the effect which various population and industrial capability levels have on national recovery;
- Determine the content and cost of programs to achieve various national recovery goals and the Federal role in encouraging or supporting such programs.

ALTERNATIVE CIVIL DEFENSE POLICIES

Strategic Context. Under the current US strategic policy (as discussed in the Strategic Implications section on page 7), we rely on the capability of our strategic offensive forces to deter nuclear attack on the US and to assist in controlling escalation. As a consequence, the US civil defense program is essentially a hedge against the failure of deterrence and escalation control.

The US could add to its current strategic objectives a requirement for defensive programs to provide an assured-level-of-US-survival. In the current situation, where the US has no ABM and minimal air defenses, the burden for meeting such a requirement would fall almost entirely on US civil defense. Alternatively, the US could change its strategic objectives to require both strategic offensive and defensive programs to provide an assured-level-of-US-survival, or comparable-to-Soviet recovery capability. Then force improvements could include improved counterforce capabilities as well as enhanced defensive measures, one of which could be civil defense. (The NSSM 246 study currently underway addresses these considerations.)

Alternative Policies. US civil defense should focus on what is most meaningful and effective for the United States, rather than reflecting the Soviet civil defense program:

- Major differences in roles and scope between the formal US and Soviet CD programs preclude a meaningful, simple comparison of the relative effort expended in these programs (such as the frequently cited comparison of the roughly \$100 million US CD expenditure and the purported Soviet \$1 billion CD expenditure, on an annual basis).
- The relative US and Soviet fatalities in any single scenario does not adequately reflect the vulnerability of the two populations to a nuclear attack because the number of casualties is scenario and demography dependent. Because of US concern for human life and because surviving population is an important dimension of post war

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recovery capability and national power, the number of US survivors added rather than a comparison with Soviet fatalities is the basis which should be used for measuring the effectiveness of US civil defense.

Viewed as a hedge or insurance policy against the possibility of nuclear war, the basic US civil defense policy issue is the extent to which the US should hedge against such a contingency. In this context, the inherent importance of population survival permits consideration of alternative civil defense policies for population protection, independent of overall US policy regarding national survival and postattack recovery.

The important civil defense policy issues presented for decision relating to the protection of population are:

- Level of Survival: What level of US population survival should US civil defense seek to assure?
- Level of Readiness: Should US civil defense focus on in-being readiness or should it assume that there would be some period of time available (a week, a month, a year) for surging the civil defense system to full capacity?

Level of Survival. With respect to a decision on the level of US population survival, there are three representative approaches which could be taken:

- 1 Accept the level of survival (about one-third the US population, currently about 80 million people) which would result if there were essentially no Federal civil defense program. Under this approach, most of the Federal civil defense program would be discontinued; however, the ability to reconstitute the program, if required, would be maintained.
- 2 Maintain a moderate CD program for the protection of population (and continuity of State and local governments) as an insurance policy which enhances somewhat US population survival in the event of nuclear war. Under this approach, a comprehensive population protection program would be maintained, but the level of effort would only produce a moderate increase in total US survivors (e.g., to a level of about one-half the US population, currently about [REDACTED]). This would result from "in-place" protection of the population in the best available nearby shelter.
- 3 Seek to significantly enhance the overall level of US survivors (e.g., to a level of about three-fourths the US population, currently about [REDACTED]) as part of a major effort to hedge against the failure of deterrence and escalation control. This approach would presumably be part of a significant overall US effort to enhance national survival and postattack recovery.

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Level of Readiness. In parallel with the decision on level of population survival, judgment is also required as to the warning time which will be assumed, since a particular level of population survival might be achieved through either:

- In-being capability, which could provide protection for in-place population given minutes of warning, using facilities and equipment bought in peacetime.
- Surge capability, which could provide crisis relocation, blast sheltering, or a combination of these, given adequate reaction time (a week, a month, a year), using plans made during peacetime. For these to be effective requires a decision early enough in the crisis to initiate CD buildup actions, and sufficient time to carry them out.

The appropriate programs which follow from the policy decisions outlined above are described below.

ALTERNATIVE CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAMS

The study formulated alternative programs to respond to the policy decision with respect to level of population survival and warning time. The alternative programs and their respective costs are summarized in Table One on page 5a. Note that the program costs presented are only the costs to the Federal Government. The additional State and local costs would be in the range of \$50-60 million for each of the options. It should also be noted that the costs and effectiveness associated with those options which seek to significantly enhance the level of US survivors through in-place blast shelter are particularly sensitive to uncertainties in projected Soviet strategic weapon programs and employment policies.

As Table One indicates, for any given level of population survival, programs which provide "in-being" capabilities ready to use with only minutes of warning are much more expensive than those which assume a week, a month, or a year of time in which to "surge" civil defense. On the other hand, the effectiveness of "surge" programs depends critically upon timely initiation of CD buildup actions (and acceptance of the political/economic impacts) and there being sufficient warning time prior to an attack to permit achieving planned capabilities.

The scenarios which were used for sizing the US CD program options were:

- Increased tension with threats (but no actual nuclear attack) in which at least days, to at most several months, of activity and political reaction time would be available for surging preplanned CD measures, followed by a full Soviet nuclear attack.
- Surprise full nuclear attack (i.e., only minutes of tactical warning in which only in-being capability would be effective.)

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ILLUSTRATIVE POPULATION PROTECTION PROGRAM OPTIONS

LEVEL OF U.S. POPULATION SURVIVAL OBJECTIVE	OPTION THRUST	BASIS OF PROTECTION	ANNUAL FEDERAL COST, IN \$ MILLIONS (BASED ON A TEN-YEAR PERIOD)				
			IN-BEING CAPABILITY	SURGE PERIOD REQUIRED			
				1 Week	1 Month	1 Year	
1	1/3	Discontinue most Federal CD programs	Rely on capability of State and local governments	\$ 10.M	10	10	10
2	1/2	Continue approximate current level of effort as a CD "Insurance Policy"	Mix of in-being fallout shelters and preparation for crisis surging	\$375 M	135	100	75
3	3/4	Significantly enhance CD capability	Above, plus crisis relocation planning	Not Possible	215	200	175
3b	3/4	↓	Above, plus in-place blast shelters	\$1800 M	435	425	340
3c	3/4+		Above, plus additional in-place blast shelters	\$4500 M	500	485	400

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The scenario of a limited nuclear attack on the US (e.g., ICBM silos only, urban or military target demonstration, limited attack of selected industries such as petroleum or utilities) also was considered for use in sizing the US CD program elements. Formulating specific program elements tailored to such a limited attack scenario, however, appears to be unnecessary in that:

- Only a relatively modest incremental cost (\$20M annually) would be required, above virtually any program for responding to a major Soviet attack, to enhance warning, evacuation capability and fallout protection in counterforce target areas.
- A program tailored to respond to Soviet limited nuclear options against selected military or industrial targets would have to be comparable in scope to a nationwide program intended to respond to a major Soviet attack. The problem is that the Soviets can choose the location of the attack, and nuclear fallout resulting from such a limited attack would not be confined to the attack area.

The major use of the limited attack scenario would be in establishing priorities for completing CD planning efforts (e.g., crisis relocation planning) and in actually executing our CD measures in time of crisis, rather than in sizing the CD program elements.

SOVIET UNION CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM

A confident estimate of the effectiveness of the Soviet program cannot be made at this time because of major gaps in the intelligence data available. The recent Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on Soviet civil defense upon which this response drew concluded that the Soviet program is more extensive and better developed than it appeared to be when the Intelligence Community last examined Soviet civil defense in 1971. While there were significant shifts in emphasis in the Soviet civil defense program during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the study did not reveal any major changes in direction since about 1971, nor did it suggest a crash program aimed toward any particular target date.

The formal Soviet CD is a broad program with preparations suggesting the following order of priority:

- (1) assuring continuity of government and control by protecting the political and military leadership;
- (2) providing for continuity of important economic operations by hardening facilities, protecting personnel, and other measures; and
- (3) protecting nonessential personnel through sheltering or evacuation.

The Soviet CD program for the protection of population includes the following elements: a national warning system, plans for crisis evacuation of cities, blast and fallout shelters to protect government and military leaders, party cadre and essential workers, and fallout shelters for some unknown

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proportion of the general public. It also includes programs for industrial dispersal and hardening, and other measures more directly related to postattack recovery. While it is known that the Soviets are taking some actions with respect to all of these elements, evidence is currently lacking on the progress they are making in many of their preparations.

In the early 1970s, the Soviets consolidated the management of the entire civil defense program by placing it under military direction, with extensive military staffing. Furthermore, they have increased their efforts to provide hardened command posts for the military and civilian leadership and they have modified to a degree their previous policy of mass evacuation of cities by placing somewhat greater emphasis on constructing hardened shelters within urban areas -- a decision which they have attributed to concern that a nuclear attack could occur with little prior warning. Thus far the hardened shelter program for urban areas is primarily for the protection of personnel judged by the Soviets as essential, rather than for the protection of the general population.

The numbers of underground structures discovered in a partial survey of industrial facilities, and the wide range of locations and industries at which such structures have been found, indicate that preparations for industrial protection are more extensive than previously had been realized. However, the expansion of industries during the past 15 years into areas distant from previously existing urban centers has not significantly reduced the vulnerability of Soviet industry to nuclear attack. Although light industries are somewhat less concentrated, Soviet heavy industries remain for the most part in large urban areas.

The effectiveness of Soviet civil defenses would vary widely, depending on such circumstances as the size of the attack, weather conditions, and (most important) the period of warning prior to attack. Soviet planners would face major uncertainties in predicting the effectiveness of their civil defenses. While there are many gaps in the information available, the US Intelligence Community believes that under optimum conditions, which included a period of warning prior to an unrestrained ~~attack~~ US attack during which evacuation and other prescribed preparations were implemented, Soviet civil defense measures would: (1) assure survival of a large percentage of the leadership necessary to maintain control, (2) reduce prompt casualties among the urban population to a small percentage, and (3) give the Soviets a good chance of being able to distribute at least a subsistence level of supplies to the surviving population, although the economy as a whole probably would experience serious difficulties. Without adequate warning time to implement civil defense measures or in the event the Soviets chose not to implement civil defense measures, the Intelligence Community believes that a lesser number of Soviet leaders would survive and the Soviets would experience catastrophic human casualties and economic breakdown, and have difficulty in distributing subsistence level supplies to survivors.

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF CIVIL DEFENSE

The US View. As indicated in the discussion of US civil defense policy alternatives, under current US strategic policy, the US civil defense program is essentially a hedge against the failure of deterrence and escalation control. As such, contrary to current declaratory policy, civil defense is not a significant factor in the current US deterrence posture.

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On the other hand, Soviet civil defense efforts with respect to the protection of industry and political leadership do impact on the US view of deterrence. On the basis of our present understanding, Soviet CD currently is believed to have little impact on the effectiveness of US retaliatory forces in accomplishing their mission. However, significant improvements to and expansion of the Soviet civil defense program could require changes in current US nuclear weapons employment and acquisition policy (e.g., increased numbers or yields of weapons or changes in targetting in order to maintain US destructive capability).

The purpose and effectiveness of Soviet civil defense efforts should not be addressed in isolation, but looked upon as one of several damage-limiting measures supporting a nuclear strategy which may be quite different from that of the US. On the one hand, the Soviet CD program is consistent with a damage-limiting doctrine. The extensive Soviet air defense efforts, size and extent of their counterforce strategic weapons programs and ABM research and development are also consistent with such a doctrine, and may point with their CD efforts toward a strong interest in a "war-winning" strategy (i.e., the assurance of a viable national society following a nuclear war, and rapid recovery to predominant power status). On the other hand, the Soviets did agree in 1972 to the ABM Treaty, which would appear to be inconsistent with a damage-limiting or war-winning strategy.

In consequence of the above, US policies should be continually assessed as we learn more about the actual Soviet civil defense program.

Recently the public press has focused attention on the possibility of an imbalance in US-Soviet populations during a post-attack recovery period. At present, it is estimated that US casualties would be about 130 million

and Soviet casualties about 80 million as a result of a bolt-out-of-the-blue-all-out exchange. An even greater imbalance would occur as a result of a protracted crisis situation wherein the Soviets were able to implement successfully their plans for evacuating and sheltering their urban population. If the US did not have a similar capability, then for the duration of the evacuation period, Soviet casualties could be limited to a small percent of their urban population whereas US casualties would be greater and the US might be placed at a strategic disadvantage. Upon termination of the city evacuation, however, Soviet vulnerability would go back to the previous level.

It has been suggested that the perception of a population imbalance in the post-attack recovery period might be employed by the Soviets as a lever in dealing with the US. A counter to this point of view is the argument that the Soviets cannot maximize surprise in an attack on the US as well as maximize their civil defense preparations. Evacuation of the Soviet urban population would undoubtedly cause all US strategic forces to be brought to full alert status, if they had not already been placed on full alert status as a result of the growing political crisis which might precede Soviet implementation of evacuation plans. If the US forces were surged for a few days, the number of strategic systems committed to US nuclear war plans would be substantially increased, thereby mitigating the effectiveness of Soviet CD efforts to limit damage from a US attack.

Nevertheless, perceptions of the likelihood of heavy casualties in the US could be politically significant, whether or not projections of Soviet losses were similar. The psychological impact of heavy losses could affect US decision-making at thresholds between non-use, limited employment, and full-scale employment of nuclear weapons. Further, surviving population is an important dimension of postwar recovery capability and national power.

The Soviet View. There remains a question as to how the Soviet leaders assess civil defense, in particular:

- The extent to which their own civil defense program will affect their willingness to attempt to coerce the US in time of crisis or initiate limited or major attacks against the US, particularly if the US has a considerably weaker CD program.
- How they would view various US civil defense programs.

A confident estimate cannot be made as to whether Soviet civil defense measures, together with other elements of Soviet military power, would significantly affect Soviet willingness to attempt to coerce the US in time of crisis or otherwise take greater risks of confrontation.

The Soviets' overall assessment of their present civil defense against an unrestrained US nuclear attack probably is not highly optimistic. Even under the most favorable circumstances, the Soviets probably would have to expect a breakdown of the economy, and under the worst conditions, catastrophic human casualties as well. Nevertheless

despite all the problems and uncertainties the Soviets probably believe that civil defense measures contribute to giving the USSR a chance to survive as a national entity and to be in a better position than the US following a nuclear exchange. They probably would expect their present civil defense to be able to protect some key civilian and military leaders and political and economic cadres, to reduce damage to economic facilities, to reduce casualties among the population, and to support the conduct of military operations.

There are differing interpretations of the purpose of Soviet CD efforts and the relationship of the Soviet CD program to the strategic balance. One view is that the Soviet CD program should be considered as a Soviet hedge against nuclear war and will not materially increase Soviet willingness to risk a nuclear exchange nor undermine the deterrent value of US strategic forces. An opposing view is that the Soviets are engaged in an effort to achieve a war fighting and war survival capability and that their intent is to erode US SIOP capabilities. This opinion holds that the Soviets will increasingly strive to enhance their international position by capitalizing on their war survival capabilities.

Those US CD alternatives which result in either no increase or a moderate increase in US population survival are unlikely to affect Soviet perceptions of the strategic balance. On the other hand, if US population protection is significantly enhanced through construction of blast shelters, US CD could contribute to Soviet perceptions of US development of a posture which could enhance a first-strike capability, although the nature of US strategic offensive programs would continue to dominate Soviet perceptions in this regard.

MANAGEMENT

The study addresses two major issues concerning civil defense management:

- Federal/State and local relationships (including funding), particularly as they pertain to the relationship of civil defense and natural disaster preparedness, and
- Federal organizational/functional arrangements.

Federal/State and Local Relationships. Current law specifies civil defense as a joint responsibility between the Federal Government and the States with their political subdivisions. Major elements of the program, those which essentially have no use for other than attack preparedness, are fully Federally funded. The program management efforts of States and local government and some operational systems development features such as Emergency Operating Centers, local warning systems and limited emergency communications are supported by up to 50% Federal funding.

State and local governments determine the extent and nature of their involvement in civil defense programs. At present, they are primarily interested in natural disaster preparedness activities rather than in civil defense.

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As a consequence, a portion of civil defense resources have in recent years been used to support activities which are more related to natural as opposed to nuclear disaster preparedness. On the one hand, this tends to reduce civil defense effectiveness for any given level of funding. However, it also keeps the State and local governments interested in cooperating with the Federal Government on civil defense matters.

Analysis of the relationship between natural disaster preparedness and attack readiness is hampered by a lack of hard reliable data and a system capable of measuring civil defense output against alternative program inputs and the beneficial tradeoffs between various elements of the two programs. Based upon the best data available, however, the following generalizations can be made: There is a correlation between natural disaster and attack preparedness, to the extent that those States which have attained a higher level of natural disaster preparedness also tend to have attained a higher level of attack readiness. Nevertheless, natural disaster activities contribute to attack preparedness to only a limited extent. The latter requires a significantly more complex and comprehensive response potential than the former. Consequently, the expenditure of civil defense funds for natural disaster activities has limited objective utility for the achievement of attack readiness. Federal/State and local relationships in this environment essentially centers on determining how Federal civil defense resources can be managed to provide a maximum benefit for attack readiness while recognizing the conflicting priorities between the Federal Government on the one hand and State and local governments on the other.

Alternatives are:

1. Manage civil defense as an exclusively attack-oriented program entirely funded by the Federal Government. (Requires change in law.)
 - The principal advantage is that Federal priorities can be assured, both as to the program elements to be developed and the geographical location of their implementation.
 - The principal disadvantage is that it weakens State and local participation and involvement.
2. Manage civil defense as an exclusively attack-oriented program funded by a mix of 100% Federal funding and matching funds programs. (Conforms to current law and reaffirms FY 77 Presidential guidance.)
 - The principal advantage is involvement of States and local governments, while maintaining Federal assurance of funding for certain high priority attack preparedness activities.
 - The principal disadvantages are lack of assurance that the partially supported State and local effort will focus on high priority attack preparedness elements, and that voluntary participation will coincide with national priorities or requirements.

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3. Manage civil defense as a predominantly attack-oriented program which permits Federal assistance to State and local natural disaster activities which benefit attack preparedness. (Relaxes FY 77 Presidential guidance to conform with FY 72-76 practice.)

- The principal advantages are a higher degree of participation and involvement by States and local governments.
- Disadvantages are a relatively lower degree of assurance of State and local focus on high priority attack preparedness elements, and pressures engendered for higher funding levels for elements with high natural disaster application but low attack preparedness value.

Selection from among these options will be highly dependent on the policy and program alternatives which are chosen. A high-cost, in-being civil defense capability tends to favor all Federal financing; while a limited cost, surge program tends to favor mixed Federal/State funding.

Federal Organizational/Functional Arrangements. Civil Defense program responsibilities are currently assigned to seven Federal departments and agencies. In addition, approximately 27 other Federal agencies are responsible for emergency preparedness functions which potentially impact upon the nation's ability to sustain and survive an enemy attack. Despite this interrelationship, these programs are only loosely coordinated within the Federal Government. Furthermore, both DCPA and FDAA provide funds to State and/or local governments which are used for natural disaster preparedness activities.

These organizational/functional arrangements are perceived by some as constituting unnecessary fragmentation of essentially related functions because of:

- The lack of precision in and agreement concerning interpretation of Executive Orders which assign civil defense and other national emergency preparedness programs to various Federal departments and agencies;
- The assignment of policy guidance responsibilities to FPA and operational responsibilities to DCPA and
- Centralized coordination of emergency responsibilities at the State and local level as compared to the essentially decentralized Federal approach.

Management action to improve integration of Federal preparedness programs, or at least clarify existing responsibilities and authorities, would potentially improve administration of civil defense as well as preparedness programs.

Management actions regarding the above have ramifications for programs beyond civil defense (such as industrial mobilization and resource management, continuity of government, post-attack recovery, and disaster relief) which have

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not been examined in detail in this study. Their impact on these areas should be determined before a final decision is made. There is general accord, however, that (as a minimum) there should be a thorough review and recodification of the Executive Orders concerning civil defense and other preparedness activities, to eliminate ambiguities and inconsistencies which exist in current documents.

FURTHER WORK

The ad hoc working group was unable to address some issues in detail, and believes that the following should be initiated:

- A comparative analysis study of the US and Soviet preparedness for survival and postwar recovery, to include the impact of CD on postwar recovery.
- Further analysis of the extent and effectiveness of the Soviet civil defense program, and sufficient support provided for the intelligence community to make Soviet civil defense a priority intelligence target.
- Review of Federal organizational/functional arrangements for the management and coordination of overall national preparedness programs.
- A review and recodification of Executive Orders concerning civil defense and other preparedness activities, to eliminate ambiguities and inconsistencies.

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- The NSSM 244 Response indicates that, in the event of a bolt-out-of-the-blue nuclear attack, the JCS SIOP/RISOP strategic nuclear exchange simulations suggest that U.S. casualties would be about [REDACTED] and Soviet casualties about [REDACTED].
- In the event of a Soviet attack following a 30 day period of tension during which the U.S. and USSR assume a fully generated posture, casualties are estimated at [REDACTED] U.S. and 97 million Soviet citizens. These numbers were briefed to the President.
- Comparison of the 1966 SIOP/RISOP simulation with the 1975 simulation show expected fatalities in the U.S. [REDACTED] since 1966 while expected fatalities in the USSR remain relatively constant. The increase for the U.S. is a product of both the two-fold increase in Soviet megatonnage and the assumption the Soviets use fall-out producing surface bursts extensively. Fatality totals in the USSR have not increased substantially over the years in the simulation because of SIOP adherence to U.S. policy-directed population restraints. However, even without such restraints, increases comparable to those in the U.S. would not be expected due primarily to the demography of the USSR.

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (g)

MR 98-15, #9; OSD-ets 7131101

By dal NARA, Date 12/11/01

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NSSM 244 BRIEFING CHARTS

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MR 98-15, #10; OSD 220 7/31/01

By dlr, NARA, Date 12/11/01

TAB D

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NSSM 244 - U.S. CIVIL DEFENSE POLICY

- o - REVIEW U.S. CIVIL DEFENSE POLICY
- o CONSIDER THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF SOVIET AND U.S. CIVIL DEFENSE ON THE STRATEGIC BALANCE AND NSDM 242
- o PROPOSE ALTERNATIVE U.S. CIVIL DEFENSE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS
- o CONSIDER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIVIL DEFENSE AND NATURAL DISASTER PREPAREDNESS PROGRAMS

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STATUS OF U.S. CIVIL DEFENSE

- 0 POPULATION PROTECTION PROGRAM ONLY
- 0 CURRENT FEDERAL BUDGET \$82.5 MILLION
(\$107 MILLION REQUESTED FOR FY 78)
- 0 DEPENDS ON WARNING TIME/SURGE:
 - 00 [REDACTED] WOULD SURVIVE WITH NO CD
 - 00 GIVEN ONE WEEK WARNING, WOULD ADD ONLY FEW MILLION
SURVIVORS
 - 00 REQUIRES ONE YEAR SURGE TO ADD [REDACTED] SURVIVORS
- 0 NATIONWIDE CRISIS RELOCATION CAPABILITY UNAVAILABLE UNTIL
MID-1980s

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SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE

- O MAJOR GAPS IN U.S. KNOWLEDGE OF SIZE AND EFFECTIVENESS
- O LARGER AND MORE ENCOMPASSING THAN U.S.
- O PROBABLE PRIORITIES:
 - OO PROTECT KEY LEADERS
 - OO PROTECT INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY
 - OO PROTECT GENERAL POPULATION
- O SHOULD BE PRIORITY U.S. INTELLIGENCE TARGET

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STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

0 MILITARY

- 00 SOVIET HARDENING AND DISPERSAL AS CURRENTLY ASSESSED DO NOT DEGRADE U.S. DETERRENT

- 00 SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS TO SOVIET CD IN CONJUNCTION WITH IMPROVEMENTS IN SOVIET COUNTER-MILITARY CAPABILITIES COULD AFFECT U.S. STRATEGIC EMPLOYMENT AND ACQUISITION POLICIES

0 POLITICAL

- 00 CD CAN AFFECT POST-ATTACK RECOVERY

- 00 CD COULD AFFECT U.S. WILLINGNESS OR PERCEIVED WILLINGNESS TO REACT TO SOVIET THREATS

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POST-ATTACK RECOVERY

- o POPULATION PROTECTION ONLY ONE ELEMENT, BUT IMPORTANT
- o U.S. GOAL SHOULD BE BALANCE BETWEEN POPULATION PROTECTION AND ENHANCING NATIONAL ECONOMIC RECOVERY
- o FURTHER STUDY NEEDED ON PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY
- o IN THE INTERIM, US CAN AND SHOULD DETERMINE ITS POPULATION PROTECTION OBJECTIVES

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POPULATION PROTECTION ISSUES

- 0 U.S. POPULATION PROTECTION POLICY CAN BE CONSIDERED INDEPENDENT OF NATIONAL RECOVERY POLICY
- 0 TWO BASIC ISSUES
 - 00 WHAT LEVEL OF POPULATION SURVIVAL SHOULD U.S. CD SEEK TO ASSURE?
 - 00 WHAT AMOUNT OF WARNING TIME SHOULD U.S. ASSUME FOR ACTUATING THE CD SYSTEM?

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ILLUSTRATIVE POPULATION PROTECTION PROGRAM OPTIONS

LEVEL OF U.S. POPULATION SURVIVAL OBJECTIVE	OPTION THRUST	BASIS OF PROTECTION	IN-BEING CAPABILITY	ANNUAL FEDERAL COST, IN \$ MILLIONS (BASED ON TEN-YEAR PERIOD)		
				SURGE PERIOD REQUIRED		
				1 WEEK	1 MONTH	1 YEAR
1/3	DISCONTINUE MOST FEDERAL CD PROGRAMS	RELY ON CAPABILITY OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS	\$ 10.M	10	10	10
1/2	CONTINUE APPROXIMATE CURRENT LEVEL OF EFFORT AS A CD "INSUR- ANCE POLICY"	MIX OF IN-BEING FALLOUT SHELTERS AND PREPARATION FOR CRISIS SURGING	\$375 M	135	100	75
A 3/4	SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCE CAPABILITY	ABOVE, PLUS CRISIS RELOCATION PLANNING	NOT POSSIBLE	215	200	175
B 3/4	↓	ABOVE, PLUS IN-PLACE BLAST SHELTERS	\$1800 M	435	425	340
C 3/4+	↓	ABOVE, PLUS ADDITIONAL IN-PLACE BLAST SHELTERS	\$4500 M	500	485	400

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CURRENT FEDERAL/STATE-LOCAL RELATIONSHIP

- 0 CD LEGALLY A JOINT FEDERAL/STATE-LOCAL RESPONSIBILITY
- 0 STATES AND LOCALITIES DETERMINE EXTENT OF THEIR CD PROGRAMS
- 0 STATES AND LOCALITIES LESS INTERESTED IN CD THAN NATURAL DISASTER PREPAREDNESS
- 0 RECENT TREND HAS BEEN TO USE CD FUNDS TO SUPPORT SOME NATURAL DISASTER ACTIVITIES TO KEEP LOCAL SUPPORT FOR CD

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OPTIONS FOR CD/NATURAL DISASTER RELATIONSHIP

- o CD FEDERAL ATTACK-ORIENTED ONLY PROGRAM (REQUIRES CHANGE IN LAW)
 - oo 100% FEDERALLY FUNDED
 - oo ASSURES ALL FEDERAL PRIORITIES
 - oo WEAKENS STATE-LOCAL PARTICIPATION

- o CD JOINT ATTACK-ORIENTED ONLY PROGRAM
 - oo MIX OF FEDERAL AND STATE-LOCAL FUNDS
 - oo ASSURES SOME STATE-LOCAL PARTICIPATION
 - oo VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION REDUCES ASSURANCE ALL FEDERAL ATTACK PRIORITIES WILL BE MET

- o CD JOINT PROGRAM (CURRENT PRACTICE)
 - oo CD MANAGED AS PREDOMINANTLY, BUT NOT EXCLUSIVELY, ATTACK-ORIENTED PROGRAM
 - oo SOME FEDERAL AID TO RELATED NATURAL DISASTER ACTIVITIES
 - oo ASSURES HIGHEST DEGREE OF STATE-LOCAL PARTICIPATION
 - oo LOWER DEGREE OF ASSURANCE ALL FEDERAL ATTACK PRIORITIES WILL BE MET

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AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY

- o SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE AND COMPARATIVE US-SOVIET POST-WAR RECOVERY CAPABILITY
- o MEASURES TO ENHANCE US ECONOMIC RECOVERY
- o FEDERAL ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS PROGRAMS
- o RECODIFICATION OF PREPAREDNESS EXECUTIVE ORDERS

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