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1. Remarks	Remarks by Don Rumsfeld for restricted session of 12/10/75 Defense Planning Committee Ministerial Meeting (7 pp.)	12/10/75	A WHM 8/7/00
2. Background	"FV1977 Navy Shipbuilding Issue" (7 pp. - note 2 copies of page 4 are included for a total of 8 pp. closed)	3/30/76	A

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WHM
5/21/85

- THE AIR COMBAT FIGHTER -

THE LARGEST AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT OF THE NEXT 20 YEARS -

WORTH 28 BILLION DOLLARS (U.S. AIR FORCE, NAVY, FOREIGN SALES)

Tip O'Neil

WHY SHOULD THE F-17 AIRCRAFT BE CHOSEN ?

1. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WILL SPEND LESS for the F-17.

This aircraft features two low cost engines, and, because it has two engines, less aircraft will be lost due to accidents, resulting in \$820 million savings. A Navy version can be developed using more common parts including the same engines, saving over \$2 billion. The foreign sales will be much greater, because the F-17 is a twin-engine airplane, so this will lower the price of the U.S. Government buy. Lastly, the Northrop/GE team has a proven track record of meeting their cost commitments. Northrop is the lowest cost producer of fighter aircraft in the United States. Neither GE or Northrop has a record of cost overruns. General Dynamics/United Aircraft are the TFX team. All of the General Dynamics aircraft programs for over twenty years (TFX, B-58, F-102/F-106, B-36) have had huge overruns, been below performance, and late.

Despite the fact that the F-17 aircraft will cost less to procure, it has flown very successfully, and it will meet or exceed the USAF and NATO requirements.

2. The F-17 will result in much LARGER POSITIVE GOLD FLOW to the U.S.

There are at least four countries who will buy only a twin-engine fighter -- Germany, Iran, Taiwan, and Canada. This means at least 1000 more aircraft sales or 25% of the total overseas market, ..over \$5 billion extra gold flow. The Northrop/GE team has been successful in selling military aircraft to 22 countries; they are known and respected all over the world.

3. The F-17 will SAVE MORE LIVES.

Assuming only 1000 aircraft in the U.S. for 15 years of peacetime flying, twin-engine safety will result in saving 87 pilots and 216 aircraft.

4. The F-17 will CREATE MORE JOBS WHERE THEY ARE NEEDED THE MOST.

The F-17 will create about 4000 direct aerospace jobs in Massachusetts for 10-15 years. 12000 direct aerospace jobs would be created in California. Massachusetts has the highest unemployment rate in the Continental U.S., even higher than Michigan. California (Northrop) and Massachusetts (General Electric), which would benefit the most from the F-17, both have over 7% unemployment. Texas (General Dynamics) and Connecticut (United Aircraft) average 5% unemployment. Fort Worth (General Dynamics) has less than 3% unemployment.



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
SIGNIFICANT INSTALLATIONS AND ACTIVITY
REALIGNMENTS

ACTIVITY	ACTION	PERSONNEL IMPACT		ANNUAL SAVINGS	
		Mil	Civ		
ARIZONA	Disestablish				
NRF DOUGLAS	" "			4,100	
NRF FLAGSTAFF	" "			1,200	
		0	0	5,300	Totals
ARKANSAS					
NRF HOT SPRINGS	" "			16,400	
NRF PINE BLUFF	" "			1,900	
		0	0	18,300	Totals
CALIFORNIA					
NRF CHICO	" "			3,700	
NRF EUREKA	" "			2,200	
NRF REDDING	" "			3,400	
NRF SAN LUIS OBISPO	" "			1,300	
NPPS OFFICE, LONG BEACH	Study possible disestablishment	0	-29		
NELC/NUSC SAN DIEGO	Study possible consolidation	0	-370		
NPPS OFFICE, VALLEJO	Study possible disestablishment	0	-41		
NARF ALAMEDA	CIV REDUCTION		-80		FY76
NARF NORTH ISLAND	" "		-92		FY76
NAS NORTH ISLAND	" "		-75		FY76
MSCPAC OAKLAND	" "		-209		FY76
		0	-896	10,600	Totals
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA					
NRL, WASHINGTON DC	" "		-65 (FY-76)		
			-23 (FY-77)		
		0	-88		Totals
FLORIDA					
NAS KEY WEST	Study possible reduction to NAF status or transfer of host responsibility to other service	-2589	-638		
NAS WHITING FIELD	Study feasibility of consolidating undergraduate helicopter pilot training with Army's at Ft. RUCKER, AL	-635	-14		



UNDERWATER SOUND REFERENCE CENTER, ORLANDO.	Study possible reduction to NAF status or transfer of host responsibility to other service	0	-95	
TRAINING SQUADRONS ONE and FIVE, NAS SAUFLEY FIELD, PENSACOLA	Disestablish, relocate residual Personnel to NAS WHITING FIELD Milton FL	-284	-22	
NAS SAUFLEY FIELD	Study dis- establishment and redesignation as a Navy Auxiliary Field	-333	-131	
NARF JACKSONVILLE	CIV REDUCTION	0	-71	
NARF PENSACOLA	" "	0	-163	
		-3895	-1134	
HAWAII				Totals
NRF HILO	Disestablish			6,400
				6,400 Totals
ILLINOIS				
NRF GALESBURG	" "			2,100
				2,100 Totals
INDIANA				
NWSC CRANE	Civ Reduction	0	-445	
		0	-445	Totals
KANSAS				
NRF ARKANSAS CITY	Disestablish			2,500
NRF MANHATTAN	" "			1,600
NRF PARSON	" "			3,400
NRF EMPORIA	" "			1,300
				8,800 Totals
KENTUCKY				
NRF PADUCAH	" "			2,400
				2,400 Totals
MARYLAND				
NRF HAGERSTOWN	" "			2,600
				2,600 Totals
MONTANA				
NRF HELENA	" "			5,000
NRF MISSOULA	" "			5,600
				10,600 Totals



NEW HAMPSHIRE					
NPPS BRANCH OFFICE, PORTSMOUTH	Study possible disestablishment	0	-26		
NEW JERSEY		0	-26		Totals
NAVILCO, BAYONNE	Relocate to ASO, Complex, Philadelphia, PA	-7	-370		
NAS LAKEHURST					
	Study possible termination of air operations and consolidation of residual personnel with Catapult Test Facility.	0	-59		
NEW MEXICO		-7	-429		Totals
NRF CARLSBAD	Disestablish		-1	12,900	
NRF SANTA FE	" "			12,900	
NEW YORK		0	-1	<u>25,800</u>	Totals
NRF DUNKIRK	" "			9,400	
NRF NORTH HORSELL	" "			7,000	
NRF OGDENSBURG	" "			9,900	
NRCENTER OSWEGO	" "			11,700	
NRCENTER SCOTIA	" "			9,100	
NRCENTER YOUNGSTOWN	" "			9,300	
NAVRESO, BROOKLYN		-18	-734		
	Study possible relocation to Great Lakes, Il	0			
NPPS OFFICE, BROOKLYN		-18	-776	<u>56,400</u>	Totals
	Study possible disestablishment	0	-42		
NORTH CAROLINA					
NRF WASHINGTON	Disestablish			3,000	
NARF CHERRY POINT		0	-49		
	Civ Reduction	0	-49	<u>3,000</u>	Totals
OHIO					
NRF CHILLICOTHE	Disestablishment			600	
NRF ZANESVILLE	" "			1,300	
OREGON				<u>1,900</u>	Totals
NRF COOS BAY	" "			7,200	
NRF KLAMATH FALLS	" "			2,200	
				<u>9,400</u>	Totals



PENNSYLVANIA					
NAVAL HOSPITAL	Study possible	-590	-248		
PHILADELPHIA	closure or reduction				
	to a 100-bed Hospital				
NRF CURWENSVILLE		Disestablish		3,800	
			-590 -248	<u>3,800</u>	Totals
SOUTH CAROLINA					
NRF ANDERSON	" "			1,700	
NRF FLORENCE	" "			11,700	
NRF GEORGETOWN	" "			4,900	
NRF GREENWOOD	" "			-0-	
				<u>18,300</u>	Totals
TENNESSEE					
NAS MEMPHIS	Study re-	-580	-100		
	location of				
	Naval/Marine Air				
	Reserves units to				
	Richards-Gebaur AFB				
		-580	-100		Totals
TEXAS					
NAS CORPUS CHRISTI	Study the (a)	-1549	-877		
	disestablishment				
	of the NAS and its				
	redesignation as an				
	NAF by relocation				
	of the Chief of Naval				
	Air Training to				
	Pensacola, FL and the				
	five Training Squadrons				
	to a site to be				
	determined. (b) reduce				
	operations to caretaker				
	status, eliminating all				
	flight operations except				
	some Army and Coast Guard				
	helo flights. (c) transfer				
	reduced base support to				
	Army.				
NRF PARIS		Disestablish		1,500	
NRF SHERMAN	" "			<u>2,400</u>	
				3,900	Totals
UTAH					
NRF PROVO	" "		-1549 -877		
				<u>3,500</u>	Totals
				3,500	Totals



VIRGINIA

NPSS OFFICE,
PORTSMOUTH

Study possible 0 -51
disestablishment

NARF NORFOLK

Civ Reduction -49

0 -100

Totals

WASHINGTON

HRF CLARKSTON

Disestablish

4,600

NRF OLYMPIA

" "

3,800

NRF PORT ANGELES

" "

2,200

NRF YAKIMA

" "

4,100

14,700

Totals

WEST VIRGINIA

NRF FAIRMONT

Disestablish

700

700

Totals

WISCONSIN

NRF EAU CLAIRE

Disestablish

1,500

1,500

Totals

TOTALS

NAVAL RESERVE
REDUCTIONS IN FORCE
UNDER STUDY

1 Civ Reduction 210,000 Savings
1,321 Civilians
3,847 Civilians; 6,595 Military

OVERSEAS ACTIVITIES

GUAM

SHIP REPAIR FACILITY

Study possible -7 -330
disestablishment

or reduction

Alternatives:

(a) Close completely

(b) Reduce to caretaker
status

(c) Maintaining Repair
function at a reduced
level

-7 -330

Totals

PUERTO RICO

NAVAL STATION,

Study possible -29 -366
disestablishment.

An alternative will
consider the transfer
of host responsibilities
to the Coast Guard

-29 -366

Totals



GRAND TOTALS:

NAVAL RESERVE	1 Civ Reduction	210,000 Savings
REDUCTIONS IN FORCE	1,321 Civilian	
UNDERSTUDY	4,543 Civilian	
	6,621 Military	



I. ACTIVITY REALIGNMENTS

<u>STATE/ACTIVITY</u>	<u>ACTION</u>	<u>PERSONNEL IMPACT</u>	
		<u>MIL</u>	<u>CIV</u>
<u>CALIFORNIA/</u>			
NPPS OFFICE, LONG BEACH	Study possible disestablishment	0	-29
NELC/NUSC SAN DIEGO	Study possible consolidation	0	-370
NPPS OFFICE, VALLEJO	Study possible disestablishment	0	-41
Total		0	-440
<u>FLORIDA/</u>			
NAS KEY WEST	Study possible reduction to NAF status or transfer of host responsibility to other service	-2589	-638
UNDERWATER SOUND REFERENCE CENTER, ORLANDO	Study possible disestablishment and transfer of functions to other R&D activities	0	-95
TRAINING SQUADRONS ONE and FIVE, NAS SAUFLEY FIELD, PENSACOLA	Disestablish, relocate residual personnel to NAS WHITING FIELD Milton, FL	-284	-22
NAS SAUFLEY FIELD	Study disestablishment and redesignation as a Navy Auxiliary Field	-333	-131
NAS WHITING FIELD	Study feasibility of consolidating undergraduate heli- copter pilot training with Army's at Ft. Rucker, AL	-635	-14
Total		-3841	-900
<u>NEW HAMPSHIRE/</u>			
NPPS BRANCH OFFICE, PORTSMOUTH	Study possible disestablishment	0	-26
Total		0	-26



NEW JERSEY/

NAVILCO, BAYONNE	Relocate to ASO, Complex, Philadelphia, PA	-7	-370
NAS LAKEHURST	Study possible termination of air operations and consolidation of residual personnel with Catapult Test Facility.	0	-59
Total		-7	-429

NEW YORK/

NAVRESO, BROOKLYN	Study possible relocation to Great Lakes, IL	-18	-734
NPPS OFFICE, BROOKLYN	Study possible disestablishment	0	-42
Total		-18	-776

PENNSYLVANIA/

NAVAL HOSPITAL, PHILADELPHIA	Study possible closure or reduction to a 100-bed Hospital	-590	-248
Total		-590	-248

TENNESSEE/

NAS MEMPHIS	Study relocation of Naval/Marine Air Reserve units to Richards-Gebaur AFB	-580	-100
Total		-580	-100

TEXAS/

NAS CORPUS CHRISTI	Study the (a) disestablishment of the NAS and its redeignation as an NAF by relocation of the Chief of Naval Air Training to Pensacola, FL and the five Training Squadrons to a site to be determined. (b) reduce operations to caretaker status, eliminating all flight operations except	-1549	-877
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some Army and Coast Guard
helo flights. (c) transfer
reduced base support to
Army.

Total		-1549	-877
<u>VIRGINIA/</u>			
NPPS OFFICE, PORTSMOUTH	Study possible disestablishment	0	-51
Total		0	-51
	GRAND TOTAL	-6585	-3847



II. NAVAL RESERVE CENTERS/FACILITIES:

<u>STATE</u>	<u>ACTION</u>	<u>PERSONNEL IMPACT</u>	<u>ANNUAL SAVINGS</u>	
ARIZONA				
NRF DOUGLAS	Disestablishment		4,100	
NRF FLAGSTAFF	" "		1,200	
			<u>5,300</u>	Total
ARKANSAS				
NRF HOT SPRINGS	" "		16,400	
NRF PINE BLUFF	" "		1,900	
			<u>18,300</u>	Total
CALIFORNIA				
NRF CHICO	" "		3,700	
NRF EUREKA	" "		2,200	
NRF REDDING	" "		3,400	
NRF SAN LUIS OBISPO	" "		1,300	
			<u>10,600</u>	Total
HAWAII				
NRF HILO	" "		6,400	
			<u>6,400</u>	Total
ILLINOIS				
NRF GALESBURG	" "		2,100	
			<u>2,100</u>	Total
KANSAS				
NRF ARKANSAS CITY	" "		2,500	
NRF MANHATTAN	" "		1,600	
NRF PARSON	" "		3,400	
NRF EMPORIA	" "		1,300	
			<u>8,800</u>	Total
KENTUCKY				
NRF PADUCAH	" "		2,400	
			<u>2,400</u>	Total
MARYLAND				
NRF HAGERSTOWN	" "		2,600	
			<u>2,600</u>	Total
MONTANA				
NRF HELENA	" "		5,000	
NRF MISSOULA	" "		5,600	
			<u>10,600</u>	Total
NEW MEXICO				
NRF CARLSBAD	" "	1 CIV	12,900	
NRF SANTA FE	" "		12,900	
		<u>1 CIV</u>	<u>25,800</u>	Total



NEW YORK					
	NRF DUNKIRK	"	"	9,400	
	NRF NORTH HORNELL	"	"	7,000	
	NRF OGDENSBURG	"	"	9,900	
	NRCENTER OSWEGO	"	"	11,700	
	NRCENTER SCOTIA	"	"	9,100	
	NRCENTER YOUNGSTOWN	"	"	9,300	
				<u>56,400</u>	Total
NORTH CAROLINA					
	NRF WASHINGTON	"	"	3,000	
				<u>3,000</u>	Total
OHIO					
	NRF CHILLICOTHE	"	"	600	
	NRF ZANESVILLE	"	"	1,300	
				<u>1,900</u>	Total
OREGON					
	NRF COOS BAY	"	"	7,200	
	NRF KLAMATH FALLS	"	"	2,200	
				<u>9,400</u>	Total
PENNSYLVANIA					
	NRF CURWENSVILLE	"	"	3,800	
				<u>3,800</u>	Total
SOUTH CAROLINA					
	NRF ANDERSON	"	"	1,700	
	NRF FLORENCE	"	"	11,700	
	NRF GEORGETOWN	"	"	4,900	
	NRF GREENWOOD	"	"	-0-	
				<u>18,300</u>	Total
TEXAS					
	NRF PARIS	"	"	1,500	
	NRF SHERMAN	"	"	2,400	
				<u>3,900</u>	Total
UTAH					
	NRF PROVO	"	"	3,500	
				<u>3,500</u>	Total
WASHINGTON					
	NRF CLARKSTON	"	"	4,600	
	NRF OLYMPIA	"	"	3,800	
	NRF PORT ANGELES	"	"	2,200	
	NRF YAKIMA	"	"	4,100	
				<u>14,700</u>	Total
WEST VIRGINIA					
	NRF FAIRMONT	"	"	700	
				<u>700</u>	Total
WISCONSIN					
	NRF EAU CLAIRE	"	"	1,500	
				<u>1,500</u>	Total
	GRAND TOTAL		1 CIV	<u>\$210,000</u>	



III. REDUCTION IN FORCE

STATE/ACTIVITY

CIVPERS
IMPACT (FY-76)

CALIFORNIA/

NARF ALAMEDA	-80
NARF NORTH ISLAND	-92
NAS NORTH ISLAND	-75
MSCPAC OAKLAND	-209
Total	-456

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA/

NRL, WASHINGTON DC	-65 (FY-76)
	-23 (FY-77)
Total	-88

FLORIDA/

NARF JACKSONVILLE	-71
NARF PENSACOLA	-163
Total	-234

INDIANA/

NWSC CRANE	-445
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NORTH CAROLINA/

NARF CHERRY POINT	-49
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VIRGINIA/

NARF NORFOLK	-49
	<hr/>
	-1321



IV. (If Necessary) OVERSEAS ACTIVITY REALIGNMENT

<u>COUNTRY/ACTIVITY</u>	<u>ACTION</u>	<u>PERSONNEL IMPACT</u>	
		<u>Mil</u>	<u>Civ</u>
<u>GUAM/</u>			
SHIP REPAIR FACILITY	Study for possible Disestablishment or reduction. Alternatives: (a) Close completely (b) Reduce to caretaker status (c) Maintaining Repair function at a reduced level	-7	-330
<u>PUERTO RICO/</u>			
NAVAL STATION, ROOSEVELT ROADS (WEST ANNEX)	Study for possible Disestablishment. An alternative will consider the transfer of most responsibilities to the Coast Guard.	-29	-36
Grand Total		-36	-366



V. DEFENSE AGENCY REALIGNMENT ACTIONS

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>ACTION</u>	<u>PERSONNEL IMPACT</u>	
		<u>Mil</u>	<u>Civ</u>
DEFENSE SUPPLY AGENCY (DSA) Philadelphia, PA	Study feasibility of closing or significantly reducing the operations of the Defense Clothing Factory		1,600
DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY (DMA) Kansas City, MO, Louisville, KY, Providence, RI, San Antonio, TX	Study feasibility of closing one or more of its Topographic Center Field Offices.		200
Army Military Ocean Terminal, Bayonne, NJ	Reduction in Force Cargo handling		157



NAVY ANNOUNCES PLANS FOR
INSTALLATION REALIGNMENT, REDUCTION AND CLOSURE STUDIES

Secretary of the Navy J. William Middendorf II today announced proposed management actions designed to improve overall fleet readiness through reductions in overhead and support costs.

In announcing plans to initiate formal study of 73 base realignment, reduction and closure actions, Secretary Middendorf said, "The proposed actions, if finally approved and implemented, would result in annual savings to the Navy of approximately 41 million ^{(in addition to releasing,} ~~and release~~ to active combat units some 2100 military personnel now serving in support assignments." Illustrating the potential effects of these candidate actions on overall fleet capabilities, Secretary Middendorf said, "The potential 41 million annual savings alone would provide sufficient funds ^{both} to man and operate 8 destroyers as well as providing fuel for 15 additional destroyers annually."

Today's announcement is the first step in a detailed study process to analyze the effects of potential closure and realignment actions. The procedures for this study entail a detailed evaluation of the possible environmental impact of candidate actions and of those alternatives that may be developed. The Navy will prepare draft environmental impact statements for those major actions which could significantly affect the quality of the human environment. This will include consideration of such environmental factors as pollution, population and traffic



conditions, and the socio-economic impact of such realignments on employment, housing, public schools, recreational activities, etc. These statements will be filed with Council on Environmental Quality and disseminated to all interested agencies, activities, and parties for comment. Notice of the availability of these draft EIS will also be published in the Federal Register. It is anticipated that this study process will require a period of 4 to 9 months to accomplish.

Four Naval Air Stations -- NAS Saufley Field, Fla.; NAS Key West, Fla.; NAS Memphis, Tenn.; and NAS Corpus Christi, Texas will be examined to determine the impact of closure or reduced activity. Fort-five Naval Reserve Centers and Facilities will be disestablished by June 30, 1976 in line with Congressional guidance, and the Naval Hospital at Philadelphia will be examined with a view toward reduction in capacity or possible closure.

Several smaller Navy activities are being studied for possible disestablishment, consolidation or relocation. The Naval Electronics Laboratory Center and the Naval Undersea Center, both located in San Diego, are being studied for possible consolidation. Navy Publications and Printing Service Offices and Branch Offices will be analyzed for possible realignment, and several alternatives are being considered for the relocation of the Navy Resale Systems Office in Brooklyn, N.Y.

In each of the foregoing candidate actions, an environmental impact assessment (EIA) will be undertaken as a part of the study.



The manner in which they are being announced reflects the full integration of the provisions of NEPA into the DOD decision-making process. As a result, announcements of candidate installation actions are being made early in the decision process, and much of the definitive information available in previous closure or reduction announcements is not yet available.

The Navy has completed the necessary EIA step for two additional activity realignments. These assessments concluded that the actions did not constitute major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. Nevertheless, a 30-day waiting period will be observed on these actions to allow for public comment prior to their implementation. The two actions being handled in this manner involve disestablishment of Training Squadrons ONE and FIVE at NAS Saufley Field Fla. and relocation of the Navy International Logistics Control Office from Bayonne, N.J. to the Navy's Aviation Supply Office Complex in Philadelphia.

In addition to the activity realignment studies which are being undertaken, 1322 civilian personnel positions will be eliminated at eleven naval activities during Fiscal Years 1976 and 77. Included are 445 positions at the Naval Weapons Support Center at Crane, Ind.; 88 positions at the Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, D.C.; 209 civil service seamen of The Military Sealift Command at Honolulu, Haw.; Long Beach, Calif.; Seattle, Wash.; and Anchorage, Alaska; and 75 workers at Naval Air Station, North Island, Calif. Position reductions at a



Calif. --80; NARF North Island, Calif. --92; NARF Jacksonville, Fla. -- 71; NARF Pensacola, Fla. -- 163; NARF Cherry Point, N.C. -- 49; and NARF Norfolk, Va. --49.

Under the Department of Defense program for stability of civilian employment, every effort will be made to assist displaced employees in obtaining other acceptable employment.

Defense Agency Realignment Actions

In addition to the Navy realignment studies, two Defense Agencies are reviewing realignment actions in accordance with the NEPA process.

The Defense Supply Agency, in an effort to improve operations while accommodating Fiscal Year 1977 civilian end strength reductions, will study the feasibility of closing or significantly reducing the operations of the Defense Clothing Factory which is collocated with the Defense Personnel Support Center, Philadelphia. The Defense Clothing Factory, which employs approximately 1600 civilian workers, has a principal mission of producing short runs of military clothing items. With clothing items of the type produced available from commercial sources, it is considered appropriate to study the impacts of fuller reliance on the commercial clothing industry.

The Defense Mapping Agency, in a move to improve operations and production, will study the feasibility of closing one or

more of its Topographic Center Field Offices which are located in Kansas City, Mo., Louisville, Ky., Providence, R.I., and San Antonio, Texas. A preliminary review indicates that the closure of one of these field offices during Fiscal Year 1977 could result in manpower savings of up to two hundred authorizations.

Also independently affecting the Bayonne, N.J. area is an Army reduction in force of 157 personnel by 30 June 1976. As a result of this action, cargo handling will be accomplished by contracting out.

A state by state breakdown of the U. S. Navy installations involved in today's announcement is attached.

END



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



Dick Cheney



DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Authority DOD Directive 5200.30

By W H M NLF Date 8/7/00

REMARKS FOR RESTRICTED SESSION OF THE
DEFENSE PLANNING COMMITTEE MINISTERIAL MEETING
DECEMBER 10, 1975
BRUSSELS, BELGIUM

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for your "Summary Appraisal," Mr. Chairman. I'm impressed how succinctly you stated the problem.

As a new Secretary of Defense, it is clear to me that I am not in a position to cast much light on the details of the problems you have been wrestling with this past year or two, so my remarks will be somewhat personal.

When I left Brussels some 14 months ago, my support for the Alliance was strong, as you, Mr. Secretary General, and the members of the Permanent Council know. It is, if possible, even stronger today. My belief in the need for an effective collective defense was firm in 1974; it is even firmer today.

There are reasons why this is so. One, paradoxically, is the policy of detente -- something we have all thought a great deal about. Detente, of course, means, literally, relaxation of tensions. But what some outside of our ranks seem to forget is that no one seeks to relax tensions that do not exist. The fact of our world in 1975 is that there are real tensions and they pose dangers for us all.

I believe that detente should be seen for what it is. And in trying to define it in the remarks I made at my swearing in ceremony at the Pentagon, I described it as "the word for the approach we use in relations with nations who are not our friends, who do not share our principles, whom we are not sure we can trust; and who have great military power and have shown an inclination to use it to the detriment

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of freedom." That is -- very simply -- what it is to me. In a world where real tensions exist -- and they do, our efforts to reduce some of that tension safely and effectively can succeed only if our efforts are rooted in a strong defense and deterrents. Indeed, a strong defense and deterrents are the foundation of any hope for success along this path. President Ford, as you know, knows this well with some 22 years of involvement as a member of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee of the House.

We seek to reduce confrontations, to lessen dangers, to put relations on a somewhat less precarious footing, to see if there might not be some interests that we share. But where East and West are concerned, we must not forget that in many of the most basic matters, including the fact that we cherish freedom, we are fundamentally opposed. Detente begins with an awareness of basic political differences, dangers, and tension. As has been suggested here in the DPC, it must include an awareness of the need for enough military strength to lend weight to our political and ideological principles, as well as to deter adventure or outright aggression. It is clear to me that it has been our defense capabilities and their deterrent effect that have made possible such improvements in relations with the Soviet Union as we have seen in recent years. It is off of this base, which must remain firm, that Foreign Ministers negotiate.

If we are to make real, as opposed to illusory, progress in the reduction of tension, we must continue to ensure that the use by the Soviets of their military weight in pursuing political gains, or ideological acceptance, or even crisis advantage, remains foreclosed.

The United States Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, who has been so successful in this effort, knows this well.

For example, while the negotiations for Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions are taking place, it would, as we have all agreed, be exceedingly unwise for any of us to take unilateral steps to reduce our capabilities in NATO. It is natural that we should seek to achieve a stable military situation in Europe at lower levels of force, but at what point we might successfully stabilize the balance or to what extent it can be stabilized by negotiation, remains to be seen. In the meantime, we should do nothing to undermine the prospects of these discussions -- which reductions in strength would surely do.

Of even more fundamental importance, collective defense remains essential because of the grave questions raised by the steady growth of Soviet military power in recent years, during this process of detente: continued improvements in Soviet strategic nuclear forces, increases in Soviet troops deployed in Central Europe and along the Sino-Soviet border, and expansion of Soviet naval operations across the world's oceans. We now estimate that the Soviets have a military establishment of about 4.4 million men, and we are quite confident that in recent years they have added at least 100,000 men to their forces facing Western Europe. In spite of the numerical advantage in tanks that the Soviets already had in Central Europe, they are adding still more to both tank divisions and motorized rifle divisions. They have increased their artillery by about one-third in the past five years; they have deployed a new array of surface-to-air guns and missiles; and they have introduced new high performance

combat aircraft. With that growth in weaponry at Soviet disposal, our nations, individually and collectively, would not be prudent if we failed to look to our own military posture.

All of us, I recognize, have other worthy uses for our resources. All of us must wrestle with constraints on defense budgets. I am doing so now. But despite any limitations, there is a great deal we can and should do to maintain defense, deterrence, and detente. We must maintain and improve our strategic, theater nuclear, and conventional forces as the essential combination for credible deterrence. It is essential that we have the ability to meet any level of attack. To do that, we must be able to conduct military operations at the lowest level of force and damage consistent with achievement of our objectives. And we must be seen by the Soviets and by our own people to be able to do precisely that.

There is a tendency in some quarters, I realize, to equate provocation with belligerence and strength. But history suggests that one can also provoke by being weak. Evident weakness on our part -- and particularly conventional weakness in an era of nuclear equivalency -- just as surely as belligerence, could provoke rivals into adventures that they might otherwise avoid. Despite the continued Soviet buildup, an adequate conventional balance is within our reach, as my predecessor has emphasized, and we must make certain that, while we guard our nuclear power, the non-nuclear balance does not shift away from us.

In the light of these circumstances, I have observations on several areas of particular interest to me.

First, considering the pressures on our resources, we must be confident that our own military programs and plans are keyed to deterring and dealing with the real threat. Programs that are geared to the past or are marginal to that purpose should be ended, and the resources being used for them moved into the vital programs for today and the period ahead. Our able, and I believe, very effective SACEUR, has suggested this, as has the Military Committee.

Second, we need to restore political and military cohesion to the Southern flank. No one nation in the Southern region can defend itself alone; each requires the Alliance, and we must be frank to the nations of the Southern region in acknowledging that the Alliance, and each nation in the Alliance, needs each of them. We must make sure that our allies on the Southern flank work together again and are capable of receiving the reinforcements which other NATO members plan to provide as necessary.

On a delicate subject, I will speak delicately, however uncharacteristic of me this will prove to be. As we consider the Southern flank, we should note the changes in Spain. I submit that the situation may now be evolving, so that we can -- together -- explore ways of developing closer cooperation with Spain in the defense of Europe and the Mediterranean area. I will say no more.

Third, sometimes in life we have a chance to ride a wave rather than swim against it, to push toward an important goal. I believe the Alliance may well have such an opportunity now, in the area of

standardization, rationalization and interoperability. With pressures on defense budgets, a growing intolerance of waste, and a lack of standardization and rationalization is waste -- let there be no doubt -- and recognition of the growth in Soviet capabilities, we have both the incentive, but, more important, the opportunity, to achieve real progress toward standardization.

As Defense Ministers, we must look ahead systematically, as Georg Leber suggested yesterday, to determine our common needs for modern weapons and to develop a basis for sharing in the development and production of new weapons. This does not mean cartelization which would result in higher costs and less effective weapons. It does mean selection of the most cost effective weapons and shared production within the Alliance. We should not let that wave go by and pass us, with respect to this oldest and most disturbing problem. This is the time to reach out -- not back.

On SALT, which I anticipate Secretary Kissinger will cover later this week, there are, of course, two contentious issues facing us at this time -- the BACKFIRE and Cruise Missile issues. You are well aware of the views on each. I shall merely state my belief that, however the matter is to be handled, we have to take into account first the fact that BACKFIRE exists and affects Soviet capabilities; and, second, that cruise missiles of various types constitute potentially important weapons systems. The task before us is to find a mutually acceptable arrangement for resolving these issues.

Beyond these two issues, there are other unresolved problems such as MIRV verification, definition of what constitutes a heavy missile, land-and-air mobile ICBMs, and the task of finding ways to limit Soviet throw-weight. The status of these issues has not changed significantly from those which Ambassador Johnson outlined to the NAC on September 12. There have been discussions, but we do not yet have a clear idea of how far the Soviets are prepared to go.

Finally, and very personally I cannot fail to say the obvious -- particularly as my country approaches its bicentennial celebration -- that our peoples - plural - are the embodiment of political liberty and decency in the world. We have a solemn obligation to ourselves, our citizens and, in fact, to all mankind to make every necessary sacrifice to preserve freedom. There must be no doubt among us, or in the world at large that the continuity of our policy can be relied upon by friend and foe alike. In the case of my own country, our strength continues to be dedicated to the preservation of the United States and the Alliance. The two, in my view, are not separable.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for permitting me to make these somewhat personal remarks.

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Excerpts of Remarks
Donald Rumsfeld
Atlanta, Georgia
Armed Forces Week
May 12, 1976

One of the architects of U.S. postwar foreign policy, Dean Acheson, was fond of quoting King Alfonso X of Spain to the effect that, had he been present at the creation, he would have given "some useful hints for the better ordering of the universe." In that neither Secretary Acheson or King Alfonso was "present at the creation," we are left with the world as it is, with its imperfections. Still, both in their lifetimes offered their own hints, through word and action, for "the better ordering of the universe."

As others who were not present at the opening ceremony, I too have some hints. And, like all of us really, I have to take the world as I find it, rather than how I might have wished it, had I been there. Together my hints could be described as a look at our circumstances, at what exists in the world today.

I would add my conviction, optimistic as it is, that through sensible efforts we can together, maybe not make a perfect world, but certainly improve the world of tomorrow. If we're honest about where we are, realistic about the impossibility of instantaneously changing everything for the better, we can be confident that over a period of time there are few difficulties that cannot be substantially improved. And that, after all, is what government of the people is all about.

If I were to offer any hints -- they might better be described as observations -- one would be that our economic, political and social systems are unique. Together they comprise a rare treasure to be cherished. All one needs to do is to look at this city with its rich past, obvious vitality today, and even brighter future, to know that freedom is the proper "ordering." You prove it every day.

Second would be that the idea that we cannot continue to believe, as we did before World War II, that the two oceans bordering our country can successfully insulate America so that we can go about our business here without regard for the rest of the world. Technology has moved too fast. The nations of the world are too interdependent, and increasingly so. What happens elsewhere in the world is too important to our economic well-being and our security. We can no longer think that we can ignore the world or even that we can stay aloof until forced, as the attack on Pearl Harbor forced us, to become involved. It's not for our generation to live in such a world.

A third observation would be the truth that while the kinds of problems we face don't lend themselves to instantaneous solutions, there are few problems that we can't help solve over a period of time if we get about of it. True, while the United States is not, as in years immediately after World War II, the only power in the world from a political, military or economic standpoint, we do remain the single greatest influence.

Finally, I would make the observation that free systems are not having an easy time in our world today. It suggests that their success is not automatic. As has been said more eloquently, vigilance is indeed the price of liberty. This is why it's so appropriate for all of us to be here, to reflect on the contribution of the men and women of our Armed Forces, their dedication and their determination.

I became Secretary of Defense some six months ago. I had been involved previously in national security questions, though not with the kind of concentration and focus that is demanded in this post. After six months there are some things I can say about where we are and about our future.

First, the United States has today -- and there should be no doubt about it -- the military capabilities to do the job from a defense standpoint. We can fulfill our assigned missions. The men and women of our Armed Forces are clearly the best trained, the best educated, the finest soldiers and sailors in the world. I do not make that statement about our capabilities today lightly. It's a complicated subject. It requires a great deal of thought and analysis. It's a statement that is supported by all of those who are in positions of responsibility dealing with this subject.

Let me give you an example of how complicated that area really is. One man turns to me and he says, "You know, the Soviet Union has more amphibious ships than we do." Conclusion: the Soviet Union is the most powerful. A second man comes up and says, "Did you know that those amphibious ships that the Soviet Union has are small and that the ones we have are large with considerably greater displacement tonnage, and far more capable than those of the Soviet Union?" Conclusion: the Soviet Union is inferior to the United States. Then a third man comes up and he says, "Well, what would you and the Soviets use those ships for?" You think to yourself; The United States is bounded by two oceans. We're a nation that has always needed freedom of the seas. Our allies, some 41 -- are across the ocean. They're not contiguous to the United States. Our allies, as well as ourselves, are industrial nations heavily dependent on the economic lifelines across the sea. The Soviet Union is a landpower; its allies are contiguous. One looks and sees that they might use their amphibious ships for landings in relatively nearby objectives areas... Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Germany, or down through the Black Sea into the Mediterranean. One comes to the conclusion that the United States needs to have considerably more capable amphibious ships because of the more

demanding tasks they face. Our geographical location requires deployment across an ocean to get into action, in most cases, and our amphibious concepts are built around landing against intense opposition. By the same token, the Soviet Union's amphibious ships suit their needs just fine, which is to say that their ships are, in fact, designed to deal with the kinds of purposes the Soviet Union conceivably would want to use them for.

Trying to reduce all of the complexities in national security planning would require a similar discussion of almost every capability. Trying to boil that down to a single phrase, or a word, is kind of like trying to describe a rainbow and being allowed only to use the words black or white. It's not useful.

A second fact that I would mention is, simply, that the Soviet Union does exist...it's there, and the Soviets have been attentive to their military capabilities. They have been engaged in a steady growth and improvement in terms of their level of effort; in terms of their military capabilities quantitatively; in terms of their military capabilities qualitatively; and in terms of their institutional capability to produce additional military weapons. They have, in fact, with great steadiness of purpose, moved technologically from what was almost an oxcart society in the post World War II period to a position of considerable military power today.

A third point I would make is that the Soviets do not believe in what we believe in. Let there be no doubt about it. This business of suggesting that some countries have socialism, some countries have democracy, some countries have communism...and that there's not really very much difference between them...is nonsense. They do not think in terms of the God-given rights of man, in terms of individual freedom, or in terms of self-determination and liberty.

Another point I would make is related. It is a fact of history, for those who wish to see it, that free people, during times of peace or relative peace, during times of stability -- even though that stability may be imperfect -- have tended to relax; to look inward, to be less absorbed with potential dangers and more absorbed with their immediate problems. History further suggests that the nations that have relaxed, have done so at their peril. The concern that President Ford has, and I have, is that the decisions we make today will determine our capabilities in the decades to come. It is correct that we have the capabilities today to carry out our national security missions. It is equally true that steady growth on the part of the Soviet Union, and the tendency on the part of the United States during the past decade and a half to cut Defense Budgets, have set in motion a set of adverse trends. If those trends are permitted to continue, we would be injecting an instability into the world situation that would affect the world and indeed create a world unlike that we've known during our lifetime.

Over the past ten years the Congress of the United States has cut some \$48 billion from three Presidents' defense budgets, some \$38 billion in the last six years alone, and seven billion only seven months ago for the FY 1976. Because of these cuts, the trends in military capabilities have been adverse. The President made the judgment that we could not wait another year to arrest those adverse trends. That is why he sent to the Congress last January a substantial defense budget. It was a judgment, a correct judgment, that reasonable people are driven to by the facts of our world.

I'm not saying the Soviet Union is ten feet tall. I'm saying they used to be 5'3", they're now about 5'10" and you're not going to like them when they're 6'5".

People say to me, "How does it happen that those trends have been so adverse?" The answer is that we are a free country, and we're free to even make some errors.

You've heard friends, and you've even heard some Congressmen and Senators go around saying, "I'm for a strong national defense ... but," and then right after the word "but" you hear a lot of things. Sometimes you hear, "We've got all the weapons we need." Or sometimes you hear, "I'm for a strong national defense, but I don't want to get involved in an arms race." Or, "I'm for a strong national defense, but the Pentagon can get more efficient." Or, "I'm for a strong national defense, but we can't afford it." Let me talk to you a little bit about the "but we can't afford it."

Today, the Defense Establishment is taking a smaller percentage of the gross national product; a smaller percentage of the federal budget; a smaller percentage of net public spending; and a smaller percentage of the labor force than at any time since before the Korean War or before Pearl Harbor, depending on which statistics you use.

Let me tell you something else about the "but we can't afford it." Just before the Korean War, there was a debate in the country whether we ought to have a \$13 billion defense budget or a \$16 billion defense budget. After a lot of anguish it was decided that the country really couldn't afford a \$16 billion defense budget, that such a large budget would be harmful to the economy. Then the Korean War broke out. Six months later, after deciding we couldn't afford a \$16 billion budget, we had a \$48 billion defense budget. One year later, we had a \$60 billion defense budget. And, we could afford it just fine.

What does this mean? It means that the test for free people today is not whether they react to crises or even manage crises brilliantly. Rather it is to have the wisdom, and the judgment,

the foresight, and the steadiness of purpose to see that we contribute to stability in the world, and contribute to peace in the world. Indeed, to the extent you have to use your weapons, one can accurately conclude that you had inadequate capability in the first place.

Personally, I am a little tired of having people say to me, "I'm for a strong national defense ... but where can we cut the budget?" I think the issue before the American people is not whether the budget can be cut, but whether the budget is sufficient to do the job, whether we are approaching our responsibilities in a sensible, thoughtful, steady, determined way, a way that reflects the value we place on our freedoms, on our liberty and on the contribution we can make in this world.

You simply cannot take \$7 billion out of the budget last year; \$38 billion the last six years; and \$50 billion the last ten years and not have it affect your capability. It reminds me of that wonderful statement by H. L. Menken, "For every problem there's a solution that's simple, neat and wrong."

My view is that the American people don't make mistakes on big issues for very long. We wouldn't be celebrating our 200th year were that the case. I don't believe we will make a mistake on something as important as the strategic nuclear balance. You know, as those cuts were imposed in past years, we didn't understand the importance of deterrence.

Where were the budget cuts made? Where did the trimming take place? Well, it took place in steaming hours for ships, flight hours for airplanes, exercises for the general purpose forces, spare parts, stocks, maintenance, overhaul, all the things that contribute to a healthy national defense -- all the things that in the eyes of others affect their judgment as to the strength of our deterrent below the strategic nuclear level.

We have a strategic nuclear balance -- that is to say, we have the capability that could survive an attack, and the Soviets know we do, and inflict sufficient damage so that they are dissuaded or deterred from embarking on such an attack. While we maintain that balance, it is particularly important -- because of our goal of keeping the nuclear threshold high -- to see that our conventional capabilities, our general purpose forces, are strong, are ready and seen as being ready.

Freedom is a very precious thing, but it should be purposeful. Freedom without purpose, freedom for all to pull in different directions, doesn't achieve the great things that this country has been able to achieve. This nation needs, obviously, a single national

economic policy. You don't need 435, one for each Member of the House of Representatives. We need one. We need one foreign policy for the nation, not 100, one for each Senator. We need one defense policy for the nation. What that means is that individuals can debate, yes, discuss, yes, consider, weigh, but at some point they must decide. That means that individuals have to say, "I have this view, but I'm willing to work within a broader view to achieve something really important."

Armed Forces Week causes us all to reflect about the past. The Bicentennial encourages each of us to think about the future, our hopes for the future, and our conviction that we really do have a great opportunity to contribute to making a better future for ourselves, our families, our neighbors, our country and, indeed, for the world.

It has been said that ours has been a "truly magnificent gamble," that we have placed all of our hopes, all of our trust in the people, in the theory that, given sufficient information, they will make right judgments and that they should help guide and direct the course of our nation. The power of the American system, the genius of it, is virtually beyond measurement. What that means is that the decisions we make; the uses to which we put our immense resources, will affect the future of the modern world. Each of us, as a participant in guiding and directing our country, has, at the same time, a tremendous responsibility and a wonderful opportunity.

I think we have some guiding and directing to do. The men and women of the Armed Forces are doing their jobs and I salute them. For the rest of us, it is for us to see that they have the tools to do that job.

Thank you.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dick Cheney

What is going on?



ORIGINAL RETIRED TO
SPECIAL DOCUMENTS FILE

Thursday, Oct. 21, 1976

Pentagon Aides in Film Saying Soviets Lead U.S. in Weapons

By George C. Wilson

By a Washington Post Staff Writer

The Secretary of the Navy, two Air Force generals and an admiral warn against the Soviet military threat in a privately financed film that the American Security Council said yesterday will be offered to television stations across the United States in the coming weeks.

The film could prove politically embarrassing to President Ford because it portrays the United States as being far behind the Soviet Union in weaponry. The privately financed American Security Council said its educational arm produced the \$60,000 film "to reach as many Americans as possible with the facts concerning the growing military imbalance."

Navy Secretary J. William Middendorf says in the film that Soviet author Alexander Solzhenitsyn, whom Democratic presidential nominee Jimmy Carter has charged Ford with snubbing, "is right when he says we must reassert our will to protect our freedoms.

"In a few precious moments of freedom that we may have left, let's not be found wanting," Middendorf continues in the film, entitled "The Price of Peace and Freedom."

Air Force Gen. Daniel James Jr., commander of the North American Air Defense Command, says in another part of the film that the anti-ballistic-missile defense that Congress canceled "was the best one that had ever been developed in the history of mankind."

He says that Congress, "in its wisdom, decided that it was too expensive to maintain for the small amount of sky that it protected, and they voted it out."

James also says that "The Russians have developed their anti-ballistic missiles around their center of government, and they haven't cut it back at all. In fact, I think they are continuing to try to refine it to the point where it can be as good as ours was."

The July 3, 1974, agreement signed in Moscow between the United States and Soviet Union allowed each nation to build one anti-ballistic-missile complex. The United States decided to scrap its ABM defense of the Air Force Minuteman field at Grand Forks, N.D., while the Soviet Union limited its ABM deployment to Moscow.

Air Force Gen. Russell E. Dougherty, commander of the Strategic Air Command, and Adm. Isaac C. Kidd Jr., commander of Atlantic forces, also appear in the American Security Council film to warn against the growing Soviet military might.

"What used to be an Atlantic lake in the minds of the alliance and the United States is now, indeed, an Atlantic moat filled with predatory steel sharks, if you will, conceived and con-

structed in the Soviet Union," Kidd says in the film.

The American Security Council showed its film to reporters and others at a luncheon yesterday. John M. Fisher, president of the council, which claims 200,000 dues-paying members, said the Defense Department cooperated in the making of the film but did not contribute money to it. The AFL-CIO also cooperated in the production, he said, but did not help pay for the film.

The council said it intends to buy time on the three television networks soon to show the half-hour film, and hopes also to get it shown on 1,000 affiliated and independent television stations. The film shown yesterday is a follow-up to an earlier one, "Only the Strong," produced by the defense-minded council.

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REVIEW & OUTLOOK

Defense and the Electorate

President Ford's defense-budget victories in the Senate and House Budget Committees are a further sign of a basic change in public mood on defense and foreign policy. They show what can be done, even with the present Congress, if the President is willing to seize leadership.

President Ford's threat to veto any defense spending bill he considered inadequate was surely instrumental in the decision of the committees to give their approval to nearly his full funding requests. The President proposed \$101.1 billion in defense outlays for fiscal 1977; the Senate committee approved all but \$200 million of this, and the House committee cut only \$500 million from the President's figure. In budget authority for future spending, the Senate group cut \$300 million and the House \$1.3 billion from the President's proposal of \$113.3 billion. In recent weeks, some congressional liberals talked in terms of cutting \$7 billion; and since their strength is greatest in the budget committees, final congressional action may come even closer to the President's totals.

The meaning of the President's veto threat was that for the first time in years the President was willing to make an issue of the defense budget. Typically the Secretary of Defense has been sent out single-handed to defend the request, without strong support from the President or the rest of the national security apparatus. The mood in the Executive Branch was lukewarm. The mood in Congress was anti-defense. The mood among the public was buffeted by Vietnam and lulled by detente.

The result has been a steadily shrinking defense effort. The budget showed increases year after year, but these were too small even to keep pace with inflation. In constant dollars, defense fell repeatedly. Naturally, the result has been a steady erosion of American military power. Meanwhile, the Soviets have been celebrating detente with one of the most immense arms buildups the world has ever seen.

The results are traced in the following table, prepared by the Library of Congress at the request of Senator John Culver, formerly one of the Pentagon's most outspoken critics:

Item	Military Trends		
		1965	1975
Army	U.S.	939,950	789,100
	U.S.S.R.	1,800,000	2,500,000
Tanks	U.S.	10,200	10,100
	U.S.S.R.	30,500	40,000
Surface Combat Ships	U.S.	320	182
	U.S.S.R.	275	226
Attack Submarines	U.S.	169	73
	U.S.S.R.	336	253
Tactical Aircraft	U.S.	5,800	5,000
	U.S.S.R.	3,250	3,350
ICBMs	U.S.	854	1,054
	U.S.S.R.	224	1,403
Strategic Missile Submarines	U.S.	31	41
	U.S.S.R.	40	73
Bombers	U.S.	935	529
	U.S.S.R.	1,420	635

Source: United States-Soviet Military Balance. The Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service. Jan. 1976.

Even the President's budget requests are only the smallest start toward reversing this trend. Even if he receives the full request, constant-dollar spending on defense will increase by only about 2%, with budget authority going up a bit over 5%. As a percentage of GNP, the defense budget will continue to decline, to 5.4%, compared with 5.7% in fiscal 1976, 6.0% in fiscal 1975, 8.3% in fiscal 1964, and somewhere between 15% and 20% in the Soviet Union.

There are of course those who continue to argue that American defense spending is too high. But the trends are so clear they are now reduced to arguing that military power does not matter. Yet we are seeing, as for example Soviet and Cuban adventurism in Angola, that it matters very much indeed. Seeing their growing might, and judging the American will by the lack of response, the Soviets are increasingly willing to make trouble all over the world. Watching the same trends, the U.S. allies grow increasingly unreliable.

It seems that this became evident to the American people before it became evident to either the administration or Congress. It was the response of the people—to Solzhenitsyn, to Angola, to the firing of James Schlesinger, to Daniel Patrick Moynihan, to Ronald Reagan—that has now forced President Ford to reach for the reins, and forced Congress to respond.

It is unfortunate for the President that he failed to take the initiative, and can now be pictured as merely responding to political pressure. But that is what the political process is for. The President has made the turn and is headed in the right direction, and he is still the man in the best position to seek and carry out the electorate's mandate for stronger defense and foreign policies.

Wall Street Journal 4/1/76